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B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 5 Administrative Law 2015 Dec Question Paper with Solutions - KSLU

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Administrative Law

Previous Year Question Paper with Solution

B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) · Sem 5

2015 Dec Examination

munotes.in

Mumbai

First published on munotes.in on 21 October 2026.

Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.

Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.

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The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by Karnataka State Law University at the 2015 Dec examination.

The Paper as Set

The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2015 Dec examination, reproduced as Karnataka State Law University set them, in the order it set them. Long reading passages are shortened to their first and last lines and our summary; the original paper prints them in full. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.

Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 13 questions answered

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Read the original question paper

Q1Explain the doctrine of "Separation of Powers" in India, with appropriate cases.[16]

Answer

For full marks, cover: what the doctrine demands in its strict form, and why no constitution follows it strictly; the Indian constitutional design (separate vesting of powers; Articles 50, 121, 122, 235); the deliberate overlaps (ordinances and delegated legislation; tribunals: Bharat Bank; legislative and judicial functions shared); the leading cases, arranged by what each teaches: Delhi Laws Act (the legislature cannot abdicate), Ram Jawaya Kapur (no rigid separation, but differentiated functions), Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (judicial power cannot be taken by the amending body), Asif Hameed (each organ in its sphere; judicial restraint), L. Chandra Kumar (writ jurisdiction as basic structure), Madras Bar Association (tribunal independence and the branches' "discourse"); what the doctrine forbids in India; an assessment; a conclusion.

The doctrine in its strict form

In its strict form the separation of powers makes three demands. The legislative, executive and judicial functions should be performed by different bodies. The same persons should not sit in more than one of them. And no organ should control or interfere with another in its proper work. The aim is liberty: if power is divided, no single person or body can become a tyrant.

No working constitution meets all three demands. Modern government needs the executive to make detailed rules, the legislature to supervise the executive, and the courts to review both. The real question in any country is how far the doctrine is followed, and where its core lies.

The Indian design

The Constitution does not state the doctrine in words. But its structure gives each organ a distinct base.

Separate vesting. The executive power of the Union is vested in the President (Article 53). Legislative power belongs to Parliament and the State legislatures. Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the subordinate courts.

Insulating the judiciary from the executive. Article 50 directs the State to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services. Article 235 vests control over district and subordinate courts, including postings and promotions, in the High Court.
Mutual restraint between legislature and courts. Under Article 121, Parliament may not discuss the conduct of a judge in the discharge of his duties, except on a motion for his removal. Under Article 122, courts may not question proceedings in Parliament on the ground of an irregularity of procedure.

The deliberate overlaps

The same Constitution mixes functions on purpose.

The executive legislates. The President and Governors may promulgate ordinances when the legislature is not in session. Statutes routinely delegate rule-making to the Government.

The executive adjudicates. Tribunals set up by the executive decide disputes that would otherwise go to courts. The Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., AIR 1950 SC 188, held that an industrial tribunal's functions were "very much like those of a body discharging judicial functions although it is not a Court". So an appeal lay to the Supreme Court under Article 136.
The legislature exercises quasi-judicial functions. Each House punishes breaches of its privileges, and Parliament decides on the removal of judges.
The courts make rules and administer. The High Courts manage the subordinate judiciary (Article 235) and the courts frame their own rules of procedure.

So India has a functional, not a watertight, separation.

The cases, and what each teaches

1. The legislature cannot abdicate. In re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912, AIR 1951 SC 332, upheld a power to extend existing laws to Delhi with modifications. It struck down a power to repeal or amend laws in force there. The legislature may delegate details. It must itself settle the policy, which is the essence of legislation.

2. No rigid separation, but differentiated functions. Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1955 SC 549, concerned the Punjab Government's take-over of the publication of school textbooks without a statute. Mukherjea CJ said the Constitution has not recognised the doctrine "in its absolute rigidity". But the functions of the branches "have been sufficiently differentiated", so that one organ cannot assume functions that essentially belong to another. The executive could act in a field open to legislation, though it could never act against the Constitution or any law.

3. Judicial power cannot be taken over, even by amendment. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. A constitutional amendment declared the Prime Minister's election valid and withdrew the dispute from every court. The Supreme Court struck down that clause. The amending power is constituent power, and deciding a particular dispute is judicial power. Using the one to do the other destroyed the basic structure.

4. Each organ in its sphere; the courts must restrain themselves. Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1989 SC 1899. The High Court had directed the State to entrust medical college selections to an independent statutory body. It then quashed selections for not following those directions. The Supreme Court held that the High Court had gone beyond its role. Each organ must function within the sphere the Constitution marks out for it. The only check on the courts' own power is their self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint.

5. Judicial review is beyond the reach of the other organs. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125, held that the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227, and of the Supreme Court under Article 32, is part of the "inviolable basic structure". Tribunals may supplement the courts but cannot replace them.

6. Tribunal independence and inter-branch dialogue. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, decided 14 July 2021, struck down provisions of an ordinance fixing a minimum age of fifty and a four-year term for tribunal members. The Court said that such interdiction "does not amount to conflict with parliamentary or executive wisdom" but adds to the discourse between the three branches. Parliament re-enacted similar provisions, and the Court struck those down again in November 2025. The episode shows the doctrine as a continuing negotiation over the independence of bodies that exercise judicial power.

What the doctrine forbids in India

Drawing these together, Indian law forbids:

Abdication of essential legislative policy to the executive (Delhi Laws Act).
Usurpation by one organ of a function essentially belonging to another, such as the legislature deciding a particular case (Indira Nehru Gandhi).
Exclusion of judicial review over legislative and executive action (L. Chandra Kumar).
Executive domination of bodies that exercise judicial power (Madras Bar Association).
Judicial overreach into policy making, which the courts themselves disclaim (Asif Hameed).

An assessment

The Indian approach takes the practical part of the doctrine and leaves the rigid part. It accepts that modern government needs mixed functions. What it protects is the core: an independent judiciary able to check the other two organs, and a legislature that keeps its essential role. The criticism is that the courts sometimes give themselves the widest role of all. They read their own independence broadly while asking the other organs to accept checks. Asif Hameed's insistence on judicial restraint is the necessary answer to that criticism.

For administrative law the doctrine has a practical meaning. The administration may make rules, decide disputes and exercise wide discretion, because modern government needs it. But each of those powers is held subject to a check by another organ. Rules are laid before the legislature and tested in court for vires. Adjudication is open to appeal and judicial review. Discretion is reviewed for arbitrariness. Separation of powers in India is thus less a wall between the organs than a system of mutual accountability.

Conclusion. India follows the separation of powers in a functional, not a rigid, form (Ram Jawaya Kapur). The Constitution vests each power separately and insulates the judiciary (Articles 50, 121, 122, 235). Yet it deliberately lets the executive legislate and adjudicate within limits (Delhi Laws Act, Bharat Bank). The core is protected as basic structure. No organ may take over another's essential function (Indira Nehru Gandhi), and judicial review cannot be excluded (L. Chandra Kumar). Bodies exercising judicial power must stay independent (Madras Bar Association). The courts themselves must stay within their sphere (Asif Hameed).

B.A. LL.B. (Five Years) Sem 5 Administrative Law 2015 Dec Question Paper with Solutions

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