LLB 3 years Sem 1 Torts April 2024 - Law Of Torts 60/40 Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines a "consumer" as any person who:

1. buys any goods for a consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, and includes any user of such goods other than the buyer, when such use is made with the approval of the buyer; or
2. hires or avails of any service for such a consideration, and includes any beneficiary of such service other than the person who hires it, when the service is availed of with the approval of that person;

but does not include a person who obtains goods for resale or goods or services for any commercial purpose.

Explanation (a) provides that "commercial purpose" does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him exclusively for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment. Explanation (b) provides that buying and availing include offline and online transactions through electronic means, teleshopping, direct selling and multi-level marketing.

Malfeasance is the doing of an act which is wrongful and unlawful in itself, an act which the defendant had no right to do at all, such as a trespass or an assault.

Misfeasance is the improper or negligent performance of an act which is in itself lawful, such as a contractor entitled to dig up a road who leaves the trench unlit and unguarded.

The third term completing the set is non-feasance, the omission to perform an act which the defendant was under a duty to perform.

Qui facit per alium facit per se means "he who acts through another acts himself". It is one of the two maxims on which vicarious liability rests, the other being respondeat superior, let the superior answer.

Its effect is that where a person authorises or employs another to do an act, the act is treated in law as his own, and he is answerable for it. It is the basis of the liability of a master for the torts of his servant committed in the course of employment, and of a principal for the acts of his agent within the scope of his authority.

Ubi jus ibi remedium means "where there is a right, there is a remedy", commonly rendered as there is no wrong without a remedy. Jus means the legal right to be protected and remedium the right of action by which it is enforced. Wherever the law confers a right, it also confers the means of vindicating it, for a right without a remedy would be no right at all.

Ashby v White (1703) is the leading case: a returning officer wrongfully refused the plaintiff's vote; the candidate he supported was elected anyway, so he lost nothing; Holt CJ held the action lay, because want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal.

Volenti non fit injuria means to a willing person no injury is done. It is a general defence: where the plaintiff has freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk, agreed to run that risk, he cannot afterwards sue for the harm it causes.

Two elements must both be proved: knowledge of the risk and consent to bear it. Knowledge alone will not do, which is why scienti non fit injuria is not the law.

• Public nuisance: an act or omission causing common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to people in general dwelling in the vicinity. It is an offence under Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code, punishable under Section 290, and a Magistrate may order its removal summarily under Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A private individual may sue in tort only on proof of special damage, that is damage over and above that suffered by the public generally, which must be direct and substantial. Under Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 a suit may be brought by the Advocate General or by two or more persons with the leave of the court, without proof of special damage.
• Private nuisance: interference with the use or enjoyment of the land of a particular occupier, actionable at his suit.

Essentials of private nuisance: (i) an unreasonable interference; (ii) with the use or enjoyment of land or a right over it; (iii) damage, either physical injury to property or substantial discomfort to the occupier.

Factors deciding reasonableness.

Defences which do not work: that others do the same; that the activity is for the public benefit; that the plaintiff came to the nuisance; that reasonable care was taken; and that the place was convenient.

Remedies. Damages; injunction, which is what a plaintiff usually wants; and abatement, the self-help remedy, exercisable on notice, without unnecessary damage, and choosing the less mischievous of two methods.

• The Fatal Accidents Act, 1855: gives the wife, husband, parent and child of a person killed by a wrongful act a new and independent cause of action for their own loss of dependency.
• The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides its own machinery for death in a motor accident.

2. Waiver. Where the plaintiff has alternative remedies he must elect, and by electing one he abandons the other. Where the tort has brought a gain to the wrongdoer, he may waive the tort and sue in quasi-contract for money had and received, which is worth doing where the defendant's gain exceeds the plaintiff's loss.

3. Accord and satisfaction. Accord is the agreement to accept some consideration in place of the right of action; satisfaction is the actual payment or performance of it. Accord without satisfaction discharges nothing, and the accord must be free from fraud, coercion and undue influence.

4. Release. The giving up of the right of action by the injured party's own act. Under English law a release required a deed; in India Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 allows a promisee to dispense with or remit performance wholly or in part, so a release without consideration is effective.

The Consumer Protection Councils are the advisory bodies established under the Act at three levels, to promote and protect the rights of consumers.

1. The Central Consumer Protection Council, Sections 3 to 4 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.

Section 3 requires the Central Government to establish the Central Council by notification. Section 3(2) provides that it shall consist of the Minister in charge of the Department of Consumer Affairs in the Central Government as Chairperson, and such number of other official or non-official members representing such interests as may be prescribed.

Section 4 provides that the Council shall meet as and when necessary, but at least one meeting shall be held every year.

Section 5 states its object: to render advice on promotion and protection of the consumers' rights under the Act.

2. The State Consumer Protection Councils, Sections 6 to 7.

The six rights (Section 6 of the 1986 Act, now Section 2(9) of the 2019 Act), which the Councils exist to promote:

1. the right to safety, against goods and services hazardous to life and property;
2. the right to be informed of the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price, so as to protect against unfair trade practices;
3. the right to choose, that is access to a variety of goods and services at competitive prices;
4. the right to be heard, and to have consumer interests considered at appropriate forums;
5. the right to seek redressal against unfair or restrictive trade practices and unscrupulous exploitation; and
6. the right to consumer education, called consumer awareness in the 2019 Act.

They are drawn from the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, adopted in 1985, which themselves build on the four rights stated by President Kennedy to the United States Congress in 1962.

Trespass ab initio is a doctrine by which a person who enters land under an authority given by law, and who then abuses that authority, is treated as a trespasser from the very beginning, that is his original entry, lawful when made, becomes retrospectively unlawful.

The leading case: The Six Carpenters' Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 146a.

Facts. Six carpenters entered an inn at Cripplegate, a house open to the public, which they were therefore entitled to enter by authority of law. They ordered bread and wine and paid for them. They then ordered more wine and refused to pay for it. The innkeeper sued them in trespass, arguing that by refusing to pay they had abused their authority and become trespassers from the beginning.

Held. The carpenters were not liable as trespassers ab initio, and the court laid down two rules:

1. Where an entry, authority or licence is given by the law and the person abuses it, he becomes a trespasser ab initio. Where the authority or licence is given by the party himself, an abuse does not make him a trespasser ab initio; the party's remedy is an action for the particular wrong done.

Illustrations. A police officer entering under a warrant who then ransacks the house; a customs officer entering to inspect who steals goods; a distrainor entering to distrain who works or uses the goods; a guest at a common inn who commits a positive wrong there.

The modern limit: Elias v Pasmore (1934) 2 KB 164. Police entered lawfully to arrest a man and seized documents, some lawfully and some unlawfully; they were trespassers only as to the unlawful seizure, and not ab initio in respect of the entry. The doctrine is now applied narrowly.

Distinguish revocation of a licence. Trespass ab initio is retrospective: the original entry becomes wrongful. Revocation is prospective: a person whose licence is withdrawn becomes a trespasser only if he remains after a reasonable time to leave. And trespass by remaining is one of the three forms of trespass to land, the others being entry and dispossession.

a. What is the liability of Ramesh?

Ramesh is liable, both under the scienter rule and in negligence.

1. Under the scienter rule. A dog is an animal mansuetae naturae, that is of a harmless domestic species. For such an animal the keeper is liable only if the plaintiff proves that he knew of the vicious propensity of that particular animal.

Here that knowledge is admitted on the face of the problem: the dog "has a tendency to bite". Once scienter is established, liability is strict: it is no defence that Ramesh took care, that the dog had never bitten this child before, or that he did not expect it to bite on this occasion. The keeper of an animal known to be vicious keeps it at his peril.

4. Defences, and why they fail. The recognised defences to the scienter action are the plaintiff's own default including provocation, act of God, act of a stranger and volenti non fit injuria.

• Provocation would be a complete answer if the child had teased or hurt the dog, but nothing in the problem suggests it, and a very young child is in any event judged by the standard of a child of that age, Yachuk v Oliver Blais Co (1949).
• Volenti cannot be raised against a small child, who is incapable of the free and informed consent the defence requires.
• Contributory negligence by a child is judged by the standard of a child of that age, and children of tender years are treated as incapable of contributory negligence altogether.

Ramesh must therefore compensate for the child's medical expenses, pain and suffering, any scarring or disfigurement, and the parents' expenses, the suit being brought by the child through his next friend under Order 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. The keeper changes, and with it the framework. A zoo is not a private keeper. It is a statutorily recognised institution under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972: Section 38H requires recognition by the Central Zoo Authority, and the Recognition of Zoo Rules, 2009 prescribe standards for enclosures, barriers, moats and visitor safety. Keeping the animal is therefore lawful and authorised, which removes the element that makes a private keeper's position so weak.

The claim then rests on negligence and on occupier's liability. A zoo owes its visitors, who are invitees paying for entry, a high duty of care, and it is liable if the enclosure, barrier or supervision was inadequate, or if it knew of the particular animal's aggression and did nothing. If the barriers complied with the prescribed standards and were properly maintained, the zoo discharges its duty.

3. The visitor's own conduct is likely to be decisive. In a zoo the animal is enclosed and the public is warned. If the visitor crossed a barrier, put his hand into an enclosure or teased or fed the animal contrary to displayed notices, three defences open up at once:

• plaintiff's own default, which is a defence to the scienter action;

a. Identify the case and the principle involved.

The case is Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, and the principle is the manufacturer's duty of care to the ultimate consumer, resting on Lord Atkin's neighbour principle.

Facts of the case. On 26 August 1928 Mrs May Donoghue went to the Wellmeadow Cafe in Paisley with a friend, who bought her a bottle of ginger beer. The bottle was of dark opaque glass and was sealed, so its contents could not be seen or examined. She drank part of it, and when the remainder was poured out the decomposed remains of a snail floated out. She suffered shock and severe gastro-enteritis and sued the manufacturer, with whom she had no contract at all, her friend having bought the bottle.

b. Explain the principle involved.

The principle has three limbs, and each is satisfied here.

1. The duty arises in tort, independently of contract. Before 1932 it was thought that a manufacturer owed duties only to the person he contracted with, so the ultimate consumer, whose contract was with the retailer, had no claim against the only person who could have prevented the harm. Donoghue separated the duty in tort, owed to persons generally, from the duty in contract, owed only to the other party. The boy therefore has a claim against the manufacturer although he bought from the hotel.

2. The product must reach the consumer in the form in which it left the manufacturer, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination. This is why the sealed opaque bottle was decisive. Had the container been transparent, or had the hotel been expected to open and inspect it, the chain would have been broken and the manufacturer might have escaped.

3. The consumer must suffer injury to person or property caused by the want of care.

One point specific to these facts. The problem says a young boy was served beer in a hotel. In Maharashtra the sale of liquor to a person below the prescribed age is prohibited under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 and the rules made under it, and serving him is an offence by the hotel. That does not defeat his claim against the manufacturer. The defence of ex turpi causa non oritur actio requires the illegality to be connected with the harm, and here the harm was caused by the decomposed snail, not by the boy's age; the manufacturer's duty to bottle its product cleanly is owed to every consumer of it.

2. A infringed that right. As returning officer he was under a duty to receive and register the vote of a qualified elector, and he wrongfully refused to do so.
3. The absence of loss is irrelevant. B suffered nothing: the candidate he wished to support was elected in any event. But where a legal right is violated the law presumes damage, and the plaintiff need prove none. This is the class of torts described as actionable per se, alongside trespass, libel and false imprisonment.

Holt CJ stated the principle in words worth reproducing: if the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise of it; and want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal. He added that it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy. The maxim is ubi jus ibi remedium.

Malice is not the ground of liability, and this should be stated plainly, because candidates often think it is. The action lies because a right was infringed, whether the refusal was malicious or merely wrong. Malice matters only to the quantum, since it will support aggravated and possibly exemplary damages.

But nominal does not mean trivial where the violation is grave. Where the right infringed is of constitutional importance and the officer acted maliciously, the court may award aggravated or exemplary damages, and in India it has. In Bhim Singh v State of Jammu and Kashmir (1985) 4 SCC 677 an MLA was wrongfully arrested and detained so as to prevent his attending the Assembly; although he had been released by the time of the decision, the Supreme Court awarded Rs. 50,000 as exemplary compensation, saying the Court would not be doing its duty if it merely declared the violation and passed on.

1. A declaration that the refusal was unlawful.
2. In India, additional and more practical remedies:

• a writ petition under Article 226 against the returning officer for breach of a public duty, or a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of that duty, though it would be infructuous once the poll is over;

a. What wrong Air-Fly Airways committed?

The airline committed a deficiency in service, and possibly an unfair trade practice.

1. Deficiency in service. Section 2(11) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 defines deficiency as any fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force, or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service, and includes any act of negligence or omission or commission which causes loss or injury to the consumer, and deliberate withholding of relevant information from the consumer.

4. Unfair trade practice, under Section 2(47), if the airline advertised or sold a schedule it knew it would not keep, which would be a false representation about the nature and standard of the service.

Rockey is a consumer under Section 2(7), having hired a service for consideration, and transport is expressly within "service" in Section 2(42).

b. What remedies are available to Rockey? Explain.

1. A complaint before the District Commission.

• Where: under Section 34(2) he may file where the opposite party carries on business or has a branch office, where the cause of action arose, or where he himself resides or personally works for gain. He would file in Mumbai.
• Pecuniary jurisdiction: Section 34(1), where the value of the consideration does not exceed Rs. 50 lakh. An air ticket is well within it.
• Limitation: Section 69, within two years of the cause of action, extendable for sufficient cause with reasons recorded.
• Procedure: complaint in writing under Section 35, no lawyer necessary, nominal fee, decision ordinarily within three months under Section 38(7).

5. The regulatory route, that is a complaint to the DGCA under the Civil Aviation Requirements and through the AirSewa grievance portal, which is quick and costs nothing, though it produces a direction rather than compensation.

6. The ordinary civil remedies, which Section 100 preserves, the Act being in addition to and not in derogation of any other law: a suit for breach of contract on the contract of carriage.

Note on international carriage. This is a domestic sector, Mumbai to Goa, so the Consumer Protection Act applies without qualification. Had the journey been international, the Carriage by Air Act, 1972, giving effect to the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions, would have applied its own regime for delay, with monetary limits and a twenty-one day notice requirement, and that difference is worth one sentence in any answer on airline liability.

A. Why the legislation was needed.

Before 1986 the consumer's remedy existed only on paper. A suit under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 or in tort meant court fees, lawyers, the full rigour of the Code of Civil Procedure and years of delay, for a claim often worth a few hundred rupees. Caveat emptor, let the buyer beware, placed the risk on the party least able to investigate. Privity of contract barred the ultimate consumer from suing the manufacturer. And the seller's standard form contract, drafted by him and signed by a consumer with no bargaining power, disposed of most disputes before they began.

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was passed to give the consumer a forum he could actually reach and remedies that would actually help him. It was replaced by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 because the market had changed: e-commerce, misleading advertising and celebrity endorsement, the absence of any product liability regime, and congestion in the very machinery created to be fast.

B. The Preamble.

• the right to seek redressal against unfair or restrictive trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation; and
• the right to consumer awareness.

These derive from the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection, 1985, which themselves build on the four rights stated by President Kennedy to the United States Congress in 1962. Under the 1986 Act they appeared in Section 6 as the objects of the Central Council; under the 2019 Act they are a defined term which the Central Consumer Protection Authority is charged with enforcing for consumers as a class, which is a change of legal quality.

2. To establish a regulator. Sections 10 to 27 create the Central Consumer Protection Authority, to regulate matters relating to violation of consumer rights, unfair trade practices and false or misleading advertisements. It may inquire on its own motion; it has an Investigation Wing under a Director General with powers of search and seizure; it may order recall of unsafe goods and reimbursement of the price; and it may impose penalties for misleading advertisements of up to Rs. 10 lakh on a manufacturer or endorser, rising to Rs. 50 lakh for repeat contraventions, and prohibit an endorser for one year, extending to three.

5. To create product liability. Chapter VI (Sections 82 to 87) is entirely new. A product liability action may be brought against a product manufacturer, product service provider or product seller for harm caused by a defective product. Under Section 84 the manufacturer is liable for a manufacturing defect, a design defect, deviation from manufacturing specifications, non-conformity with an express warranty, or inadequate instructions or warnings; and Section 84(2) makes him liable on an express warranty even if he proves he was not negligent or fraudulent.

6. To regulate e-commerce and direct selling. Section 2(7) Explanation (b) brings online transactions, teleshopping, direct selling and multi-level marketing within the definition of consumer; Section 2(17) defines the electronic service provider; and Section 94 empowers the Central Government to make rules, under which the Consumer Protection (E-Commerce) Rules, 2020 were made.

7. To strike at unfair contract terms. Section 2(46) defines an unfair contract as one causing significant change in the rights of the consumer, including excessive security deposits, disproportionate penalties, unilateral termination without cause and unreasonable charges; and Sections 49(2) and 59(2) empower the State and National Commissions to declare such a term null and void.

A. Definition.

Defamation is the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or which tends to make them shun or avoid him, or which exposes him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, without lawful justification. The interest protected is reputation, that is what others think of the plaintiff, and not his own feelings, so a statement which merely insults him privately is not defamation.

B. Kinds.

Libel is defamation in a permanent form addressed to the eye: writing, print, a picture, a caricature, a photograph, a statue, an effigy, a film or a broadcast.

Slander is defamation in a transient form addressed to the ear: the spoken word or a gesture.

The words may be defamatory on their face or by innuendo, that is by a secondary meaning conveyed to persons who know extrinsic facts. Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers (1929): a photograph of a man with a woman described as his fiancée defamed his actual wife, because those who knew her inferred that she was not married to him.

2. The statement must refer to the plaintiff. It is enough that reasonable people would understand it to refer to him; the defendant's intention is irrelevant. Hulton v Jones (1910): a humorous article about a fictional "Artemus Jones" defamed a real barrister of that name, although the writer had never heard of him. A statement about a class is not actionable unless the class is so small, or the words so pointed, that they can be taken to refer to the plaintiff individually.

3. The statement must be published, that is communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Dictating a defamatory letter to a typist is publication; sending it in a sealed envelope to the plaintiff is not. Every repetition is a fresh publication, and the repeater is liable as well as the originator.

D. The defences.

• Qualified privilege protects a statement made where the maker has a legal, moral or social duty to make it and the recipient a corresponding interest in receiving it, or where both share a common interest, and fair and accurate reports of parliamentary and judicial proceedings. It is defeated by proof of malice, meaning an improper motive, and that is the entire difference between the two kinds.

1. Apology, under the Libel Acts, a defence to an action against a newspaper where the libel was inserted without actual malice and without gross negligence, and in India principally a matter of mitigation of damages.
2. Consent of the plaintiff, express or implied.
3. Innocent dissemination, protecting a merely mechanical distributor such as a newsagent or a library who did not know and had no reason to suspect that the publication contained a libel.

E. Remedies. Damages, which may be nominal where the injury is slight, compensatory, aggravated where the manner of publication or the defendant's later conduct injured the plaintiff's feelings, or exemplary in an appropriate case; an injunction, though courts are slow to restrain publication in advance; and an apology or retraction.

F. The Indian constitutional dimension.

The remedies for a tort are of two kinds: judicial remedies, obtained by an action in a court of law, and extra-judicial remedies, which the injured party may take by his own act without approaching a court, also called remedies by self-help.

A. Judicial remedies.

1. Damages.

The principal remedy. In tort damages are unliquidated, assessed by the court on the principle of restitutio in integrum: the plaintiff is to be placed, so far as money can, in the position he would have occupied had the tort not been committed.

Kinds:

• Nominal damages: a small sum where a legal right is infringed but no loss suffered, awarded to vindicate the right. Ashby v White (1703).
• Contemptuous damages: the smallest coin in the realm, where the plaintiff has a technical right but the court disapproves of his suing; he is usually refused his costs as well.

Controls: causation by the but for rule; remoteness, by reasonable foreseeability since The Wagon Mound (1961); the eggshell skull rule, Smith v Leech Brain and Co (1962); and mitigation.

2. Injunction.

An order of a court directing a person to do or, more usually, to refrain from doing an act. It is equitable and discretionary, granted where damages would be an inadequate remedy, and it is the remedy that matters in nuisance, trespass and the protection of easements, because the plaintiff wants the interference stopped.

Kinds: temporary or interim, granted during the pendency of a suit under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and perpetual, granted by the decree under Sections 37 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; and prohibitory, restraining a wrongful act, and mandatory, compelling the defendant to undo what he has done.

1. Self-defence. Reasonable force may be used to defend one's own person or that of another, and one's property. The force must be proportionate and used for defence, not retaliation.
2. Expulsion of a trespasser. An occupier may remove a trespasser using reasonable force, but only after a request to leave and a reasonable opportunity to comply, unless the entry was forcible.
3. Re-entry on land. A person wrongfully dispossessed may re-enter peaceably, but may not use force amounting to a breach of the peace; if he cannot enter peaceably his remedy is Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
4. Recaption of goods. The owner of goods wrongfully taken may retake them from the wrongdoer, peaceably and without unnecessary force. He may enter the wrongdoer's land to do so, but the land of an innocent third party only on request and refusal.

Both torts protect the individual against misuse of the machinery of the law, but they attack it at different points and their ingredients are almost opposite.

A. Malicious prosecution.

Definition. Malicious prosecution is the institution of unsuccessful criminal proceedings, maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, against the plaintiff, which results in damage to him.

The five essentials, all of which the plaintiff must prove:

1. That the defendant prosecuted him, that is set the criminal law in motion against him. Merely giving information to the police, on which they act, is generally not prosecuting; the defendant must have been the person who actively instigated the proceedings.
2. That the prosecution terminated in the plaintiff's favour, by acquittal, discharge, withdrawal or quashing. Until it does, no cause of action arises, because to allow a suit while the prosecution is pending would be to try the same issue twice.

Distinguish abuse of process, where legal process valid in itself is used for a collateral and improper purpose. It does not require the proceedings to have ended in the plaintiff's favour, nor the absence of reasonable and probable cause; the wrong is the improper use made of the process.

B. False imprisonment.

Definition. False imprisonment is the total restraint of a person's liberty, for however short a time, without lawful justification. It is a form of trespass to the person and is actionable per se.

Essentials:

1. Total restraint. The confinement must be complete, with no reasonable means of escape. A partial obstruction is not enough: Bird v Jones (1845), where part of a public bridge was fenced off and the plaintiff could have gone another way; Coleridge J observed that a prison may have its boundary large or small, but a boundary it must have.
2. Absence of lawful justification. Restraint under a valid arrest, an order of a court or a statutory power exercised within its terms is lawful.
3. The period is immaterial. A few minutes suffices; duration goes only to the quantum.

Indian constitutional cases. Bhim Singh v State of Jammu and Kashmir (1985) 4 SCC 677: Rs. 50,000 awarded to an MLA wrongfully arrested to prevent his attending the Assembly. Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746: sovereign immunity is no defence to a claim for compensation for violation of Article 21. D K Basu v State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416 laid down the requirements to be followed in every arrest and detention.

C. The distinctions.