BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 CRPC 2022-23 - ATKT Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(x) defines a warrant case as a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years.

Section 2(w) defines a summons case as a case relating to an offence not being a warrant case.

The dividing line is therefore two years, and the classification is of the case, not of the process issued in it.

Section 2(13) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines a "child in conflict with law" as a child who is alleged or found to have committed an offence and who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date of commission of the offence.

Section 2(u) of the Code defines a Public Prosecutor as any person appointed under section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor.

Section 24 requires the Central or State Government to appoint a Public Prosecutor for every High Court, and for each district from a panel prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Sessions Judge, the person being an advocate of not less than seven years' practice.

A non-compoundable offence is one which cannot be settled between the parties at all. Section 320(9) provides that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section, so any offence which does not appear in the table to section 320(1) or the table to section 320(2) is non-compoundable, and no composition of it is permissible even with the court's consent.

Examples are murder under section 302, rape under section 376, and dacoity under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code.

A proclamation is the public notice a court issues requiring an absconding person to appear. Section 82(1) provides that where a court has reason to believe, whether after taking evidence or not, that any person against whom a warrant has been issued has absconded or is concealing himself so that the warrant cannot be executed, it may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and time not less than thirty days from the date of publishing it.

An accomplice is a guilty associate or partner in the crime, a person who has himself participated in the offence charged and who is then produced as a witness for the prosecution against those who took part with him.

The Code does not define him. His position comes from the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and from two provisions that must be read together.

Section 133 of the Evidence Act provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Illustration (b) to section 114 of the same Act provides that the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars.

How an accomplice becomes a prosecution witness. Under sections 306 and 307 of the Code, a Chief Judicial Magistrate, a Metropolitan Magistrate, or a Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, may tender a pardon to a person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence, on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge. Once pardoned he is called an approver, and section 306(4) requires him to be examined as a witness both in the court of the Magistrate and in the subsequent trial. Section 308 provides for his trial if he fails to comply with the condition.

Conclusion. An accomplice is competent but suspect, and the whole of the law about him is an attempt to hold those two things together: his evidence is admissible because he is often the only person who can describe the crime from inside, and it is distrusted because he has an obvious motive to shift the blame and to buy his own freedom. That is why a court will convict on it only where independent evidence connects the accused with the crime.

The application, section 265B. The accused files an application in the court in which the offence is pending, containing a brief description of the case and an affidavit stating that he has voluntarily preferred the application after understanding the nature and extent of the punishment provided by law, and that he has not previously been convicted by a court in a case in which he had been charged with the same offence. The court issues notice to the Public Prosecutor or complainant and to the accused, and examines the accused in camera in the absence of the other party, to satisfy itself that the application has been filed voluntarily. If it is not satisfied, or if the accused has been previously convicted of the same offence, the court proceeds from the stage the application was filed, in accordance with the Code.

The disposition, sections 265C and 265D. The court issues notice to the Public Prosecutor, the investigating officer, the victim and the accused, to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition, which may include compensation to the victim and other expenses. The court's role is to see that the process is voluntary; it may not participate in the working out. If a satisfactory disposition is worked out, the court prepares a report signed by the presiding officer and all the participants; if not, it records an observation to that effect and proceeds with the case from the stage the application was filed.

The judgment, sections 265F to 265K. The court delivers the judgment in open court, signed by the presiding officer. Section 265G: the judgment is final, and no appeal shall lie except a special leave petition under Article 136 or a writ under Articles 226 and 227. Section 265H gives the court the powers it has under the Code in respect of bail, trial and other matters. Section 265I applies section 428, set off of the period of detention already undergone. Section 265K provides that the statements or facts stated by the accused in the application shall not be used for any other purpose except for the purposes of the Chapter. Section 265L excludes juveniles or children as defined by the Juvenile Justice Act.

Conclusion. Plea bargaining was introduced to relieve a system in which undertrials often spend longer awaiting trial than the sentence they would receive, and its design reflects that origin: the accused gains a sentence of one fourth, or half of any minimum, and the victim gains compensation and an end. Its safeguards, an affidavit of voluntariness, an in camera examination, the exclusion of offences over seven years and of offences against women and young children, and the rule in section 265K that nothing said in the application may be used elsewhere, exist because a procedure that trades a plea for a sentence is only safe if the plea is genuinely free.

Section 253, conviction on plea of guilty in absence of accused in petty cases. Where a summons has been issued under section 206 and the accused desires to plead guilty without appearing, he shall transmit to the Magistrate, by post or by messenger, a letter containing his plea and the fine specified in the summons, and the Magistrate may in his discretion convict him and sentence him to the fine.

Section 254, procedure when the accused is not convicted. If the Magistrate does not convict the accused under section 252 or 253, he shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution, and also to hear the accused and take all such evidence as he produces in his defence. The Magistrate may, on the application of either party, issue a summons to any witness to attend or to produce a document, and may require the reasonable expenses of the witness to be deposited.

Section 257, withdrawal of complaint. If a complainant, at any time before a final order is passed, satisfies the Magistrate that there are sufficient grounds for permitting him to withdraw his complaint against the accused, or if there are more than one accused, against all or any of them, the Magistrate may permit the withdrawal, and shall thereupon acquit the accused against whom the complaint is withdrawn.

Section 258, power to stop proceedings in certain cases. In any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, a Magistrate of the first class, or with the previous sanction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate any other Judicial Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded, stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgment, and where such stoppage is made after the evidence of the principal witnesses has been recorded, pronounce a judgment of acquittal, and in any other case release the accused, and such release shall have the effect of a discharge.

Section 41 of the Code, as substituted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 with effect from 1 November 2010, sets out when a police officer may arrest without a warrant and without an order of a Magistrate.

Section 41(1)(a): any person who commits a cognizable offence in the presence of a police officer.

Section 41(1)(b): against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years, with or without fine, provided the officer has reason to believe on the basis of that complaint, information or suspicion that the person has committed the offence, and he is satisfied that the arrest is necessary:

1. to prevent the person from committing any further offence;
2. for proper investigation of the offence;
3. to prevent him from causing the evidence to disappear or tampering with it;

Section 41(1)(c) to (i): a proclaimed offender; a person in possession of anything reasonably suspected to be stolen property and reasonably suspected of having committed an offence with reference to it; a person who obstructs a police officer in the execution of his duty or who has escaped or attempts to escape from lawful custody; a person reasonably suspected of being a deserter from the Armed Forces; a person concerned in an act committed outside India which would be an offence in India and for which he is liable to be apprehended or detained; a released convict committing a breach of a rule under section 356(5); and a person for whose arrest a requisition has been received from another police officer.

Section 41(2): in a non-cognizable offence, no person shall be arrested except under a warrant or order of a Magistrate.

Section 41A, notice of appearance. Where the arrest of a person is not required under section 41(1), the police officer shall issue a notice directing him to appear before the officer at the place specified. The person is bound to comply, and where he complies and continues to comply, he shall not be arrested unless the officer, for reasons to be recorded, is of opinion that he ought to be arrested. Where he fails to comply, the officer may arrest him, subject to any order of a competent court.

A. The sentencing power.

Section 28(2) of the Code provides that a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but any sentence of death passed by such a Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.

Section 28(3): an Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of death, or of imprisonment for life, or of imprisonment for a term exceeding ten years.

Section 28(1): a High Court may pass any sentence authorised by law.

Section 367, power to direct further inquiry or to take additional evidence. If the High Court thinks that a further inquiry should be made into, or additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make such inquiry or take such evidence itself, or direct it to be made or taken by the Court of Session. Unless the High Court otherwise directs, the presence of the convicted person may be dispensed with, and the result of the inquiry or evidence shall be certified to the High Court.

Section 368, power of the High Court to confirm the sentence or annul the conviction. In any case submitted under section 366, the High Court may confirm the sentence, or pass any other sentence warranted by law; or may annul the conviction and convict the accused of any offence of which the Court of Session might have convicted him, or order a new trial on the same or an amended charge; or may acquit the accused. The proviso is important: no order of confirmation shall be made until the period allowed for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is presented within that period, until the appeal is disposed of.

Conclusion. A Sessions Judge may pass any sentence known to law, including death, but a death sentence is the one sentence he cannot make effective by himself: the reference under section 366 is mandatory and automatic, it operates whether or not the convict appeals, and until the High Court confirms it the sentence has no force. The High Court on a reference is not exercising appellate jurisdiction but is required to consider the whole case afresh, on the evidence, and may acquit, alter the conviction, order a retrial or substitute another sentence. That double check is the Code's response to the irreversibility of the punishment.

Functions and responsibilities, section 8(3). The Board must ensure the informed participation of the child and his parent or guardian at every step; ensure the child's rights are protected throughout the process of apprehending, inquiry, aftercare and rehabilitation; ensure the availability of legal aid; provide an interpreter or translator where necessary; direct the Probation Officer, Child Welfare Officer or social worker to conduct a social investigation and report within fifteen days; adjudicate and dispose of cases in accordance with the process in section 14; transfer to the Child Welfare Committee matters concerning a child in conflict with law who is found to be a child in need of care and protection; pass a final order including an individual care plan; conduct an inquiry for declaring a fit facility; inspect residential facilities monthly; order the police to register an FIR for offences committed against a child in conflict with law under Chapter IX; and conduct a regular inspection of adult jails to check whether any child is lodged there and take immediate measures for transfer.

Power to dispose of the case, sections 17 and 18. Where the Board finds the child has not committed the offence, it passes an order to that effect under section 17. Where it is satisfied on inquiry that the child has committed the offence, section 18(1) allows it to: allow the child to go home after advice or admonition; direct group counselling; order community service; order the child or his parents to pay a fine; release him on probation of good conduct under the care of a parent, guardian or fit person on a bond, for up to three years; release him on probation under the care of a fit facility for up to three years; or send him to a special home for up to three years for reformative services. Section 18(2) allows additional orders to attend school, a vocational training centre, a therapeutic centre or a de-addiction programme.

Cite Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787. A heinous offence under section 2(33) is one for which the minimum punishment under the Penal Code or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. An offence whose maximum is seven years or more but which prescribes no minimum is therefore not heinous, and the Supreme Court held that such an offence falls to be dealt with as a serious offence under section 2(54). The distinction decides the case, because only a heinous offence opens the section 15 preliminary assessment and with it the possibility of a trial as an adult.

Conclusion. The Board's powers are those of a Magistrate exercised under a wholly different set of instructions. It alone may deal with a child in conflict with law, it must grant bail unless one of three narrow grounds is made out, it must investigate the child's circumstances before it disposes of the case, and the seven orders open to it under section 18 contain no punishment in the ordinary sense, the heaviest being three years in a special home. Its single power to send a child into the adult system, section 18(3), is confined to a child above sixteen accused of a heinous offence, is exercisable only after the section 15 assessment, and is subject to the Children's Court deciding the question again under section 19.

(i) To the High Court, under section 374(2).

Section 374(2) of the Code provides that any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge, or on a trial held by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed, may appeal to the High Court.

Ram was convicted by the Court of Session of murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, an offence triable exclusively by that court, so his appeal lies to the High Court.

Two further points complete the answer.

Section 28(2) provides that a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but any sentence of death passed by such a Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.

Section 28(3) withholds the power from an Assistant Sessions Judge, who may pass any sentence except death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term exceeding ten years.

Section 366(2) requires the court passing the sentence to commit the convicted person to jail custody under a warrant.

Conclusion. Ram's appeal lies to the High Court under section 374(2), and the same High Court will in any event have the whole record before it on the mandatory reference under section 366, where it may under section 368 confirm, pass any other sentence warranted by law, annul the conviction, order a retrial or acquit. A Sessions Judge undoubtedly has the power to sentence to death under section 28(2), but the sentence is inoperative until confirmed, and the confirmation must be signed by at least two judges of the High Court under section 369.

A "thing" includes a mobile phone. The place of the search, if one becomes necessary, is a "place" within section 2(p), which includes a house, building, tent, vehicle and vessel.

But the order cannot be directed at the accused. In State of Gujarat v. Shyamlal Mohanlal Choksi, AIR 1965 SC 1251, decided 14 December 1964, the Supreme Court held that section 94 of the Code of 1898, the predecessor of section 91, does not apply to an accused person. The Court read the section in the light of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which provides that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, and held that the scheme of the Code contains no provision authorising a summons to an accused to produce a document after the proceedings have begun. The ratio applies unchanged to section 91 of the 1973 Code.

The court's power under section 91 is available "for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code", so it may be exercised during the trial. In addition, section 311 empowers the court at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding to summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance though not summoned, or recall and re-examine any person already examined, and it shall do so if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case.

The same constitutional limit applies: the court cannot summon B, the accused, to produce the phone, on Shyamlal Mohanlal. It may summon X, who received the messages, or the service provider, or any third party in possession.

Kaushik has not completed eighteen years on the date of the offence, so under section 2(13) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 he is a child in conflict with law. He goes before the Juvenile Justice Board, not before an ordinary criminal court.

(i) Yes, but under the Juvenile Justice Act and not under the Probation of Offenders Act.

The Probation of Offenders Act route is closed. Section 3 of that Act permits release after due admonition only where the person is found guilty of an offence punishable under sections 379, 380, 381, 404 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code, or of any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both. An offence punishable with death satisfies neither limb, so section 3 has no application. Section 4 is equally closed, since it excludes an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

So the answer turns on Kaushik's exact age and on what the Board decides at the preliminary assessment. An offence punishable with death is a heinous offence under section 2(33), which means an offence for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. Kaushik is seventeen, so he has completed sixteen. The Board must therefore first conduct the section 15 preliminary assessment. If it decides to dispose of the matter itself, the whole of section 18(1) becomes available and admonition under clause (a) is one of the orders it may pass, though for an offence of this gravity the Board would in practice look to the heavier orders, probation under clauses (e) and (f) or a special home for up to three years under clause (g).

Cite Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787. A heinous offence under section 2(33) is one for which the minimum punishment under the Penal Code or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. An offence whose maximum is seven years or more but which prescribes no minimum is therefore not heinous, and the Supreme Court held that such an offence falls to be dealt with as a serious offence under section 2(54). The distinction matters, because only a heinous offence opens the section 15 preliminary assessment and with it the possibility of a trial as an adult.

If the Board is satisfied that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, it follows the procedure for a summons case, and that order is appealable under section 101(2).

If the Board finds a need for the child to be tried as an adult, section 18(3) empowers it to order the transfer of the trial to the Children's Court having jurisdiction. Section 19 then requires the Children's Court to decide the question again for itself: it must satisfy itself whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Code and pass appropriate orders after considering the special needs of the child, the tenets of a fair trial and a child friendly atmosphere; or it may decide that there is no need for trial as an adult and conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass orders under section 18. Even where it tries him as an adult, section 19(3) requires it to ensure that the child is sent to a place of safety till he attains the age of twenty-one, and section 19(4) requires a follow up by the probation officer or district child protection unit and an evaluation before he is transferred to a jail.

The sections that give the right are: section 373, orders requiring security for keeping the peace; section 374, appeals from convictions, to the Supreme Court from a High Court's extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction, to the High Court from a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge or where a sentence of more than seven years has been passed, and to the Court of Session from a Metropolitan Magistrate, Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first or second class; section 377, appeal by the State against the inadequacy of a sentence; section 378, appeal against an acquittal, by the District Magistrate to the Court of Session or by the State Government to the High Court with leave under section 378(3), or by a complainant with special leave under section 378(4); section 379, appeal to the Supreme Court where the High Court has reversed an acquittal and sentenced to death, life or ten years or more; and the proviso to section 372, the victim's right of appeal against an acquittal, a conviction for a lesser offence or inadequate compensation, held in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, decided 12 October 2018, to require no leave.

Sections 375 and 376 bar appeals where the accused pleaded guilty, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence, and in petty cases.

Section 398 empowers the court to order an inquiry into a complaint dismissed under section 203 or into the case of an accused discharged. Section 399 confers on the Sessions Judge the powers of the High Court under section 401. Section 401 sets out the High Court's powers of revision, which are the powers of an appellate court under sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 and those of a Court of Session under section 307. Two limits are crucial: section 401(2), no order to the prejudice of the accused shall be made without his having had an opportunity of being heard; and section 401(3), the High Court shall not convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. Section 401(4) provides that where an appeal lies and no appeal has been brought, no proceeding by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed.

C. Review.

The Code of Criminal Procedure contains no general power of review. Section 362 is the governing provision and it is a prohibition: save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.

The exceptions are narrow and must be named:

Right or discretion. An appeal is a right. Revision is entirely discretionary; there is no right to have a revision entertained.

Scope. An appeal is a rehearing on fact and law. Revision examines the correctness, legality, propriety and regularity and does not ordinarily re-appreciate the evidence. Review, where it exists, corrects the court's own record.

Forum. Appeals go to the Court of Session, the High Court or the Supreme Court according to the trial court. Revision lies to the High Court or the Sessions Judge. Review is by the same court.

Bars. No appeal lies on a plea of guilty, section 375, or in petty cases, section 376. No revision lies against an interlocutory order, section 397(2), or at the instance of a person who could have appealed, section 401(4). No review lies at all after the judgment is signed, section 362.

Power to enhance or convert. An appellate court cannot enhance a sentence in the accused's own appeal, section 386(b)(iii) proviso; it may do so only in an appeal under section 377 and after hearing the accused. A revisional court cannot convert an acquittal into a conviction, section 401(3), and may at most order a retrial.

Chapter II of the Code, sections 6 to 25A, constitutes the criminal courts and offices. Section 6 is the foundation: besides the High Courts and the courts constituted under any law other than this Code, there shall be, in every State, the following classes of Criminal Courts:

1. Courts of Session;
2. Judicial Magistrates of the first class and, in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrates;
3. Judicial Magistrates of the second class; and
4. Executive Magistrates.

A. Sessions divisions and districts.

Section 7: every State shall be a sessions division or shall consist of sessions divisions, and every sessions division shall for the purposes of the Code be a district or consist of districts. The State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, alter the limits or the number of divisions and districts, and may divide any district into sub-divisions. Every metropolitan area shall be a separate sessions division and district.

C. Magistrates.

Section 11, courts of Judicial Magistrates: in every district, not being a metropolitan area, there shall be established as many courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first class and of the second class as the State Government may, after consultation with the High Court, by notification specify. The presiding officers are appointed by the High Court.

Section 12, Chief Judicial Magistrate and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate: in every district, not being a metropolitan area, the High Court shall appoint a Judicial Magistrate of the first class to be the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and may appoint Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates. The High Court may designate any Judicial Magistrate of the first class in a sub-division as the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate.

Section 13, Special Judicial Magistrates: the High Court may, if requested by the Central or State Government, confer on any person who holds or has held any post under the Government all or any of the powers conferred by the Code on a Judicial Magistrate of the first or second class, for a term not exceeding one year at a time.

Section 21, Special Executive Magistrates, appointed for particular areas or for the performance of particular functions. Section 22, local jurisdiction. Section 23, subordination to the District Magistrate.

F. The prosecuting agency, sections 24 to 25A.

Section 24, Public Prosecutors, appointed by the Central or State Government for every High Court, and for every district from a panel prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Sessions Judge, from advocates of not less than seven years' practice. Section 25, Assistant Public Prosecutors, for conducting prosecutions in the courts of Magistrates. Section 25A, Directorate of Prosecution, inserted in 2005.

G. The sentencing powers, sections 28 to 32.

Section 28: a High Court may pass any sentence authorised by law; a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but a sentence of death is subject to confirmation by the High Court; an Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentence except death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding ten years.

On section 31, O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501, holds that the court has a discretion to direct sentences imposed at one trial to run concurrently or consecutively, that the normal rule where the offences arise out of a single transaction is concurrent running, and that a court departing from it should say why.

Conclusion. The Code builds a pyramid whose levels are defined by two things at once, the court that appoints and the sentence it may pass. The judiciary appoints the judicial officers, the High Court appointing Sessions Judges and every class of Judicial and Metropolitan Magistrate, while the State Government appoints Executive Magistrates and the prosecutors, which is the Code's way of keeping the trial function separate from the executive one after the separation of the judiciary effected by the 1973 Code. Read sections 6 to 23 with sections 28 to 31 together and the whole structure is visible in outline: a Court of Session for every division, first and second class Magistrates in every district, Metropolitan Magistrates where the population exceeds one million, Executive Magistrates for the preventive functions in Chapters VIII, X and XI, and a ceiling on each of them expressed in years.

2. theft under sections 379, 380 or 381 of the Indian Penal Code, where the value of the property stolen does not exceed two thousand rupees;
3. receiving or retaining stolen property under section 411, where the value does not exceed two thousand rupees;
4. assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property under section 414, where the value does not exceed two thousand rupees;
5. offences under sections 454 and 456 of the Penal Code, lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment, and house-trespass after preparation for hurt;
6. insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace under section 504, and criminal intimidation punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or both, under section 506;
7. abetment of any of the foregoing offences;
8. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, where such attempt is an offence;
9. any offence constituted by an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871.

In every case tried summarily, the Magistrate shall enter, in such form as the State Government may direct, the following particulars:

1. the serial number of the case;
2. the date of the commission of the offence;
3. the date of the report or complaint;
4. the name of the complainant, if any;
5. the name, parentage and residence of the accused;
6. the offence complained of and the offence, if any, proved, and in cases of theft or receiving stolen property, the value of the property;
7. the plea of the accused and his examination, if any;
8. the finding;
9. the sentence or other final order;
10. the date on which the proceedings terminated.

F. Judgment: section 264.

In every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding.

G. Language: section 265.

J.V. Baharuni v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 10 SCC 494, is the case to cite. The Supreme Court held that Magistrates trying cases summarily must actually follow the summary procedure rather than a hybrid of their own, and that a successor Magistrate must not mechanically order a de novo trial under section 326(3), particularly in a cheque dishonour case tried summarily under section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Conclusion. The Chapter buys speed with two currencies: the record, because only the substance of the evidence is written down, and the sentence, because whatever the offence carries, a summary trial can end in no more than three months' imprisonment. Everything else in the Chapter is a guard against that bargain going too far. Section 260(1) confines the power to senior Magistrates and to a closed list of offences; section 260(2) obliges the Magistrate to abandon the summary course and re-hear the case the moment it looks unsuitable; and section 264 restores the ordinary discipline of a reasoned judgment as soon as the accused pleads not guilty. Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is the one modern statute that has taken the machinery and raised its ceiling, to one year, because cheque cases are numerous and simple.

The 2013 provisos: where the information relates to an offence under sections 326A, 326B, 354, 354A to 354D, 376, 376A to 376E or 509 of the Indian Penal Code, it shall be recorded by a woman police officer; and where the person against whom such an offence is alleged is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, the information shall be recorded at her residence or a place of her choice in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, and shall be videographed, and her statement shall be recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under section 164(5A).

Section 154(2): a copy of the information as recorded shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.

Section 154(3): where the officer in charge refuses to record the information, the aggrieved person may send its substance in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police, who shall, if satisfied that it discloses a cognizable offence, either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation by a subordinate.

Section 156(1): any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area would have power to inquire into or try. Section 156(2): no proceeding of a police officer shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which he was not empowered to investigate. Section 156(3): any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation.

D. The steps of the investigation.

Section 157, procedure for investigation. If from the information or otherwise the officer in charge has reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, he shall forthwith send a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance on a police report, and shall proceed in person or depute a subordinate to proceed to the spot, to investigate the facts and circumstances and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Proviso (a) allows him not to proceed in person where the information is given against a person by name and the case is not of a serious nature; proviso (b) allows him not to investigate at all where it appears there is no sufficient ground, in which case he must state his reasons in his report and notify the informant.

Section 162, statements not to be signed. No statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation shall be signed, and no such statement shall be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial, except to contradict the maker under section 145 of the Evidence Act, with re-examination permitted. Sub-section (2) preserves section 32(1) statements, dying declarations, and statements admissible under section 27.

Section 163, no inducement. No inducement, threat or promise as mentioned in section 24 of the Evidence Act shall be offered.

Section 164, recording of confessions and statements by a Magistrate, with the mandatory warning, the satisfaction of voluntariness, the signature and the memorandum, and sub-section (5A) for the victims of sexual offences. Section 164A, medical examination of the victim of rape within twenty-four hours with her consent.

Section 169, release of the accused when the evidence is deficient, on a bond to appear before the Magistrate. Section 170, cases to be sent to the Magistrate when the evidence is sufficient. Section 172, the case diary, which the court may use to aid an inquiry or trial but not as evidence.

E. The report on completion: section 173.

Section 173(1): every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay. Section 173(1A), inserted in 2018: the investigation in relation to an offence under sections 376, 376A to 376E of the Penal Code shall be completed within two months from the date on which the information was recorded.

Section 173(2): as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a report in the prescribed form stating the names of the parties, the nature of the information, the names of the persons acquainted with the circumstances, whether an offence appears to have been committed and by whom, whether the accused has been arrested, whether he has been released on bond, and whether he has been forwarded in custody; and in a case under sections 376 and related provisions, whether a medical examination report is attached. The officer shall also communicate the action taken to the informant.

Conclusion. The Chapter gives the police a wide and largely unsupervised power to investigate, and then takes back at the trial almost everything they collect. Section 156(1) lets them investigate a cognizable case without asking anyone, section 165 lets them search on their own recorded grounds, and section 161 makes every witness bound to answer them. But section 162 makes the statements they record inadmissible except to contradict, section 25 of the Evidence Act makes a confession to them worthless, and section 172 keeps the case diary out of evidence. The controls are placed where they matter: at the beginning, by Lalita Kumari's rule that an FIR must be registered, and at the end, by section 167's twenty-four hours and ninety days and by section 173's report, which is what the Magistrate acts on and the accused receives.

2. Sixteen guiding principles: section 3. Every authority under the Act is bound by them, and the most examinable are the principle of presumption of innocence for a child up to eighteen, the principle of best interest, the principle of family responsibility, the principle of non-stigmatising semantics, the principle of institutionalisation as a measure of last resort, the principle of fresh start, and the principle of diversion.

3. The Juvenile Justice Board: sections 4 to 9. Constituted in every district; a Metropolitan or Judicial Magistrate of the first class as Principal Magistrate and two social workers of whom at least one is a woman; exclusive jurisdiction over children in conflict with law under section 8(1); functions listed in section 8(3), including a social investigation report within fifteen days and monthly inspection of residential facilities.

4. The Child Welfare Committee: sections 27 to 30. Constituted in every district for children in need of care and protection; a Chairperson and four members of whom at least one shall be a woman and another an expert on matters concerning children; the powers of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class; functions in section 30, including declaring a child legally free for adoption under section 38.

8. Preliminary assessment and trial as an adult: sections 15, 18(3) and 19. For a heinous offence by a child who has completed sixteen years, the Board conducts a preliminary assessment of his mental and physical capacity, his ability to understand the consequences, and the circumstances, with the assistance of psychologists; the Explanation says it is not a trial; and the Board may transfer the trial to the Children's Court, which must decide the question again under section 19. This is the 2015 Act's most significant departure from the 2000 Act and was Parliament's response to the 2012 Delhi gang rape.

9. Dispositions instead of punishment: section 18. Advice or admonition; group counselling; community service; fine; release on probation of good conduct with a parent, guardian, fit person or fit facility for up to three years; or a special home for up to three years. Section 18(2) adds directions to attend school, a vocational or therapeutic centre, or a de-addiction programme.

10. Absolute limits: sections 21 and 22. No child shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without the possibility of release. No proceeding under Chapter VIII of the Code, security for keeping the peace, shall be instituted against a child.

14. Adoption: sections 56 to 73. A secular law of adoption open to persons of any religion, standing beside the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 57 eligibility, including that a single male shall not be eligible to adopt a girl child; section 58 in-country adoption; section 59 inter-country adoption; section 68 the Central Adoption Resource Authority. Since the Amendment Act of 2021, in force 1 September 2022, the adoption order under section 61 is issued by the District Magistrate, with an appeal to the Divisional Commissioner.

15. Offences against children: Chapter IX, sections 74 to 89. Cruelty to a child, section 75, punishable with imprisonment up to three years, and up to ten years where it causes physical or mental disability; employing a child for begging, section 76; giving a child an intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug, section 77; using a child for vending or peddling narcotics, section 78; exploitation of a child employee, section 79; giving a child in adoption in contravention of the Act, section 80; sale and procurement of children, section 81; corporal punishment, section 82; use of children by militant or adult groups, section 83; kidnapping and abduction, section 84; offences against disabled children, section 85.

Conclusion. The Act's design can be stated in one sentence: a child who offends is to be dealt with by a specialised authority applying dispositions aimed at reform, kept out of prison, kept out of the newspapers, and left at the end with no record and no disqualification. Its 2015 innovation, section 15, is the one qualification to that design, and even it is hedged, applying only to a child above sixteen accused of a heinous offence, requiring an expert assessment that is expressly not a trial, requiring the Children's Court to decide the question again, and leaving section 21's bar on death and irredeemable life sentences untouched. The second and larger half of the Act, the machinery for a child in need of care and protection and the secular law of adoption, has nothing to do with offending at all.

2. To individualise the sentence. The court is directed to look at the circumstances of the case, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, and, through the probation officer's report, at his home surroundings as well. The question becomes not how much punishment but what this offender needs.

3. To reform through supervision rather than confinement. Sections 4(3), 13 and 14 provide for supervision by a probation officer who inquires, supervises, helps the offender find employment and assists him in paying compensation.

4. To leave the offender fit to resume his life. Section 12 removes the disqualification attaching to a conviction, without which the offender would keep his liberty but lose his employment and his standing.

In Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, the Supreme Court described the Act as a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology and held that its benefit may be claimed for the first time in appeal or revision.

B. The grounds on which probation is given.

1. Release after admonition, section 3. The conditions are cumulative:

3. the court is satisfied that the offender or his surety has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the bond period, which is the proviso to section 4(1); and
4. the court has taken into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer, section 4(2).

The order is that the offender be released on entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during a period not exceeding three years, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Section 4(3) allows a supervision order for not less than one year, with the conditions in section 4(4) explained to the offender and a supervision order in the form of section 4(5).

Section 11, an order under the Act may be made by any court competent to try and sentence the offender and by the High Court or any other court in appeal or revision; and section 11(3) allows an appellate court, on its own motion or on the application of the convicted person or the probation officer, to call for the record where a court has declined to deal with an offender under twenty-one under section 3 or section 4.

Section 13, who a probation officer is; section 14, his duties; section 15, probation officers are public servants.

Section 19, section 562 of the old Code, which corresponds to section 360 of the 1973 Code, ceases to apply in the areas where the Act is in force. Read with section 361 of the Code, which obliges a court that could have proceeded under section 360 or under this Act and did not to record its special reasons, the effect is that a court must apply its mind to probation in every eligible case.