BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 CRPC 2022-23 Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(u) of the Code defines a Public Prosecutor as any person appointed under section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor.

Under section 24, the Central or State Government appoints a Public Prosecutor for every High Court, and for each district appoints from a panel prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Sessions Judge; the person must have been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years.

Section 93(1) of the Code allows a court to issue a search warrant in three cases: where the court has reason to believe that a person summoned under section 91 to produce a document or thing will not produce it; where the document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person; or where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding will be served by a general search or inspection.

Section 13(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 provides that a probation officer shall be a person appointed to be a probation officer by the State Government or recognised as such by the State Government, or a person provided for the purpose by a society recognised in that behalf by the State Government, or in any exceptional case any other person who, in the opinion of the court, is fit to act as a probation officer in the special circumstances of the case.

The Code provides for four types of trial: the trial before a Court of Session, Chapter XVIII, sections 225 to 237; the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates, Chapter XIX, sections 238 to 250, itself divided into cases instituted on a police report and cases instituted otherwise; the trial of summons cases by Magistrates, Chapter XX, sections 251 to 259; and the summary trial, Chapter XXI, sections 260 to 265.

Inquiry is defined by section 2(g) as every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under the Code by a Magistrate or Court. Trial is not defined by the Code; judicially it is the proceeding that begins after the charge is framed, or in a summons case after the particulars are stated, and ends in conviction or acquittal.

The distinguishing test is the outcome: an inquiry never ends in conviction or acquittal, a trial always does.

A confession is an admission by an accused person of the offence charged, or of all the facts constituting it. Section 164 of the Code governs its recording by a Magistrate, and the section exists because a confession made to a police officer is worthless: section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes a confession to a police officer inadmissible, and section 26 makes a confession in police custody inadmissible unless made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate.

Who may record it, section 164(1). Any Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate, whether or not he has jurisdiction in the case, may record a confession or statement made in the course of an investigation or at any time afterwards before the commencement of the inquiry or trial. The proviso is absolute: no confession shall be recorded by a police officer on whom any power of a Magistrate has been conferred.

The mandatory warning, section 164(2). The Magistrate shall, before recording the confession, explain to the person that he is not bound to make it and that if he does, it may be used as evidence against him; and the Magistrate shall not record it unless, upon questioning, he has reason to believe it is being made voluntarily.

Statements other than confessions, section 164(5), and section 164(5A). Any statement other than a confession may be recorded in such manner as the Magistrate thinks fit, and he may administer an oath. Sub-section (5A), inserted in 2013, requires the Magistrate to record the statement of a victim of an offence under sections 354, 376 and related provisions as soon as the offence is brought to the notice of the police, and where the victim is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, to record it with the aid of an interpreter or special educator and to have it videographed; such a statement is treated as the examination-in-chief under section 137 of the Evidence Act.

Conclusion. Section 164 is a set of safeguards, not a procedure for obtaining confessions: the warning, the satisfaction of voluntariness, the refusal to return the maker to police custody, the signature and the certifying memorandum together exist so that a confession which reaches the court can be believed. A confession recorded in breach of them may be excluded altogether, and even a properly recorded one is a weak species of evidence which the courts look to corroborate before convicting on it alone.

Section 395(2), the discretionary reference. A Court of Session or a Metropolitan Magistrate may, and any other court may not, refer for the decision of the High Court any question of law arising in the hearing of a case.

Section 395(3). Any court making a reference may either commit the accused to jail or release him on bail to appear when called upon.

Section 396, disposal. When a question has been referred, the High Court shall pass such order as it thinks fit, and shall forward a copy to the court by which the reference was made, which shall dispose of the case conformably to the order. The High Court may direct by whom the costs of the reference shall be paid.

Conclusion. Reference differs from every other supervisory device in the Code in that it moves upward on the initiative of the lower court itself, before it decides, and its object is narrow: no subordinate court may declare a statute invalid, so where its own view is that a provision it must apply is bad, the Code requires it to stop and ask. The High Court's answer then binds it, and section 396 makes the disposal of the case conform to that answer.

Bail in a non-bailable offence is a discretion, section 437. A court other than the High Court or Court of Session may release the accused, but shall not do so if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or where he has certain previous convictions. The provisos allow release even then if the accused is under sixteen years of age, is a woman, or is sick or infirm, and the third proviso where it is just and proper for any other special reason. Section 437(3) allows conditions where the offence carries seven years or more, and section 437(6) requires release where a Magistrate's trial is not concluded within sixty days.

Section 439 gives the High Court and Court of Session a wider power to grant bail in any case and to impose conditions, and section 439(2) the power to cancel bail and commit the person to custody.

Conclusion. The practical difference is not the seriousness of the offence but who decides and on what footing: in a bailable offence release is automatic on the accused being prepared to give bail, and in a non-bailable offence it is a judicial discretion exercised on the material, with a statutory prohibition where the offence carries death or life imprisonment and reasonable grounds appear. The First Schedule, and not the punishment alone, is where the classification must be checked.

The 2013 provisos. Where the information relates to an offence under sections 326A, 326B, 354, 354A to 354D, 376, 376A to 376E or 509 of the Indian Penal Code, it shall be recorded by a woman police officer or any woman officer. Where the person against whom such an offence is alleged is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, the information shall be recorded at her residence or a place of her choice, in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, and the recording shall be videographed; and the police officer shall get her statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under section 164(5A) as soon as possible.

Section 154(2). A copy of the information as recorded shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.

Section 154(3). Where the officer in charge refuses to record the information, the aggrieved person may send its substance in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police, who, if satisfied that it discloses a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation.

Section 156(3) provides a further remedy: a Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order an investigation.

Section 2(14) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines a "child in need of care and protection". The definition is a list, and the marks are in reproducing enough of it. It means a child:

1. who is found without any home or settled place of abode and without any ostensible means of subsistence;
2. who is found working in contravention of labour laws or is found begging, or living on the street;
3. who resides with a person, whether a guardian or not, and that person has injured, exploited, abused or neglected the child, or has violated any other law protecting children, or there is reasonable likelihood of his doing so;
4. who is mentally ill or mentally or physically challenged or suffering from a terminal or incurable disease, having no one to support or look after him, or having parents or guardians unfit or incapacitated to care for him;
5. who has a parent or guardian unfit or incapacitated, as determined by the Committee or the Board;

The authority. Such a child is produced before the Child Welfare Committee, constituted under section 27, and not before the Juvenile Justice Board. Section 31 allows any police officer, public servant, Childline, social worker, public spirited citizen, the child himself or a nurse or doctor to produce him. Section 30 lists the Committee's functions and section 37 the orders it may pass: restoration to the parent or guardian, placement in a children's home or fit facility, foster care, sponsorship, or declaration that the child is legally free for adoption under section 38.

Conclusion. The category exists to give the Act its second and larger stream. A child in conflict with law has done something; a child in need of care and protection has had something done to him, or has no one at all, and the Act's response is the Committee, the children's home and ultimately adoption rather than the Board and the special home. The 2015 Act widened the list to cover child marriage, trafficking, drug abuse and armed conflict, which the 2000 Act did not name.

Procedure, section 407(2) to (7). The High Court may act on the report of the lower court, on the application of an interested party or on its own initiative, but no application by a party lies to the High Court to transfer a case from one criminal court to another in the same sessions division unless an application has first been made to and rejected by the Sessions Judge. Every application shall be by motion supported by affidavit or affirmation, except where the applicant is the Advocate-General. The accused applicant may be required to execute a bond for costs, and where an application is dismissed the High Court may order the applicant to pay compensation not exceeding one thousand rupees to the person who opposed it if it considers the application frivolous or vexatious.

Section 407(8): where the High Court orders a transfer, it shall give written reasons.

Where several offences may be tried together, section 468(3) measures the period by reference to the offence carrying the most severe punishment.

(ii) From the date of the offence, or from the two later dates in section 469.

Section 469(1) provides that the period commences:

1. on the date of the offence; or
2. where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved or to any police officer, on the first day on which it comes to the knowledge of such person or of any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
3. where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, on the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the police officer making the investigation, whichever is earlier.

Section 469(2) excludes the day from which the period is to be computed.

Conclusion. Cognizance of a two-year offence must be taken within three years, computed from the date of the offence, or from the day the offence or the offender first came to the knowledge of the aggrieved person or a police officer, and measured to the date the complaint was filed on the authority of Sarah Mathew. Even where the three years have run, section 473 leaves the court a discretion to condone a properly explained delay, so the bar in section 468 is not necessarily the end of the prosecution.

Two variants must be distinguished. Under section 378(1)(a), an acquittal by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence is appealed by the District Magistrate directing the Public Prosecutor to appeal to the Court of Session. And under section 378(4), where the case was instituted upon a complaint, the complainant may appeal to the High Court only if the High Court grants special leave, applied for within sixty days, or six months where the complainant is a public servant, under section 378(5).

(ii) Yes. Rajesh, as the victim, has an independent right of appeal under the proviso to section 372, and he does not need leave.

The proviso to section 372, inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 with effect from 31 December 2009, provides that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, or imposing inadequate compensation, and that such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court. Since an appeal against a conviction by the Court of Session lies to the High Court under section 374(2), Rajesh's appeal lies to the High Court.

Conclusion. An appeal against Ramesh's acquittal lies to the High Court, and there are two independent routes to it: the State through the Public Prosecutor under section 378(1)(b) with leave under section 378(3), and Rajesh himself as the victim under the proviso to section 372, without leave, on the authority of Mallikarjun Kodagali. The victim's route is the stronger of the two on these facts, because it does not depend on the State choosing to appeal and it carries no leave requirement to be argued first.

Under section 376(1), as it stands after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment not less than ten years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine.

(i) Yes, but not from every court, and not at every stage.

Bail is a discretion, not a right. Section 436 does not apply. The application is governed by section 437(1), under which a court other than the High Court or Court of Session may release the accused, but shall not do so if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 376(1) is punishable with imprisonment for life, so where the material discloses reasonable grounds, the Magistrate is barred and the application must go to the Court of Session or the High Court under section 439(1).

The statutory conditions and bars. Section 439(1) proviso requires notice to the Public Prosecutor before the High Court or Court of Session grants bail in an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session. Section 439(1A), inserted in 2018, requires the presence of the informant or a person authorised by him at the hearing of a bail application in respect of offences under sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB. Section 438(4), also of 2018, excludes anticipatory bail altogether for those four offences.

Conclusion. X may be released on bail, but the discretion belongs in practice to the Court of Session or the High Court under section 439, because section 437(1) bars the Magistrate wherever reasonable grounds appear that he is guilty of an offence punishable with life imprisonment. His clearest entitlement arises on the ninety-first day if no chargesheet has been filed, under the proviso to section 167(2), and that right is his whatever the gravity of the accusation. The offence itself is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and exclusively triable by the Court of Session, and any bail that is granted must carry conditions that comply with Aparna Bhat.

A. What an appeal is.

An appeal is the judicial examination by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court, at the instance of a party aggrieved by it. The Code does not define it. The governing principle is in section 372: no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force. There is therefore no inherent right of appeal; it is a creature of statute, and a candidate must find the section that gives it.

Chapter XXIX, sections 372 to 394, contains the law.

B. Appeals that lie.

Section 373, appeal from an order requiring security for keeping the peace or good behaviour under section 117, or refusing to accept or rejecting a surety under section 121, to the Court of Session.

Section 374, appeals from convictions. This is the principal section.

Section 376, no appeal in petty cases: where a High Court passes a sentence of imprisonment not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding one thousand rupees; a Court of Session or Metropolitan Magistrate, imprisonment not exceeding three months or fine not exceeding two hundred rupees; a Magistrate of the first class, a fine not exceeding one hundred rupees; or in a summary trial by an empowered Magistrate, a fine not exceeding two hundred rupees. The proviso allows an appeal if any other punishment is combined with it.

Section 377, appeal by the State against the inadequacy of a sentence, to the Court of Session where the sentence was passed by a Magistrate, and to the High Court in any other case; and where the investigation was by a central agency, by the Central Government. Section 377(3) requires the High Court to give the accused a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, and he may plead for his acquittal or for a reduction.

Section 380, special right of appeal in certain cases: where more persons than one are convicted in one trial and an appealable judgment has been passed in respect of any of them, all may appeal.

C. The procedure.

Section 382: every appeal shall be made in the form of a petition in writing, presented by the appellant or his pleader, accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order appealed against.

Section 383: where the appellant is in jail, he may present his petition and the copies to the officer in charge of the jail, who shall forward them to the proper appellate court.

Section 384: summary dismissal. The appellate court may dismiss the appeal if it considers there is no sufficient ground for interfering, but the proviso forbids dismissal without giving the appellant or his pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard, except where the appeal is against a sentence of fine only, or where it is presented under section 383 and the court considers it frivolous.

Section 393, finality: judgments and orders passed by an appellate court are final, except as provided in sections 377, 378, 384(4) and Chapter XXX. Section 394, abatement: an appeal under section 377 or section 378 abates on the death of the accused; every other appeal abates on the death of the appellant, except an appeal from a sentence of fine, with a proviso allowing a near relative to apply within thirty days for leave to continue an appeal against a conviction and sentence of death or imprisonment.

Conclusion. The Code's answer to "when can an appeal be filed" is that it can be filed only where a section says so, and the section is chosen by three facts: who is appealing, the accused, the State, the complainant or the victim; what is appealed against, a conviction, an acquittal, a sentence or a security order; and which court decided it, since the forum ascends from the Court of Session to the High Court to the Supreme Court with the seniority of the trial court. Section 372 is the rule and every other section in the Chapter is an exception to it, which is why an appeal that cannot be located in one of them is not an appeal at all but an application in revision.

1. Section 3, release after admonition. Where a person is found guilty of an offence punishable under sections 379, 380, 381, 404 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code, or of any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years or with fine or both, and no previous conviction is proved, the court may, having regard to the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, release him after due admonition instead of sentencing him. The reformative element is that the criminal law's response is a reprimand and nothing more.

2. Section 4, release on probation of good conduct. Where the offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the court may, instead of sentencing at once, direct release on a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon within a period not exceeding three years, and meanwhile to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. Section 4(2) obliges the court to consider the probation officer's report; section 4(3) allows a supervision order for not less than one year; and section 4(4) requires the court to explain the terms and conditions to the offender.

6. Section 12, removal of disqualification. A person dealt with under section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer the disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction under any other law. Without this section the whole scheme would fail, because an offender who kept his liberty but lost his employment or his eligibility would have gained nothing.

7. Section 9, breach. The reformative approach is conditional, not indulgent. On a failure to observe the conditions of the bond, the court may issue a warrant or summons, and on being satisfied may sentence him for the original offence, or on a first failure impose a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees.

8. Section 11, appellate and revisional courts. An order under the Act may be made by any court competent to try and sentence the offender and by the High Court or any other court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision, so the benefit is not lost by the trial court's failure to consider it. Section 11(3) allows an appellate court, on its own motion or on an application by the convicted person or the probation officer, to call for the record where a court has declined to deal with an offender under twenty-one under section 3 or section 4.

C. How the Act displaces the Code.

Conclusion. The Act's reformative character is not a matter of tone but of structure. It gives the court a statutory alternative to sentencing (sections 3 and 4), makes the alternative compulsory to consider for the young (section 6) and for everyone (section 361 of the Code), attaches to it an officer whose duty is to help rather than to punish (section 14), compensates the victim without imprisoning the offender (section 5), and then removes the lasting civil consequence of the conviction (section 12), while keeping the original sentence in reserve for the offender who does not keep his bond (section 9). What it does not do is excuse the offence: the finding of guilt stands, and it is the sentence alone that the Act redirects.

Section 4(2): the Board shall consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, not being a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate, called the Principal Magistrate, and two social workers selected in the prescribed manner, of whom at least one shall be a woman. The Board forms a Bench and has the powers conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure on a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class.

Section 4(3): no social worker shall be appointed unless he has been actively involved in health, education or welfare activities pertaining to children for at least seven years, or is a practising professional with a degree in child psychology, psychiatry, sociology or law.

Section 4(4): no person shall be eligible for selection as a member of the Board if he has any past record of violation of human rights or child rights, has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, has been removed or dismissed from government service, or has ever indulged in child abuse, employment of child labour or immoral acts.

Section 4(5): the Magistrate on the Board shall be given special training and orientation.

Section 8(3) lists the functions and responsibilities, and this is where the marks lie:

1. ensuring the informed participation of the child and the parent or guardian in every step of the process;
2. ensuring the child's rights are protected throughout the process of apprehending, inquiry, aftercare and rehabilitation;
3. ensuring the availability of legal aid through the legal services institutions;
4. providing a qualified interpreter or translator wherever necessary;
5. directing the Probation Officer or Child Welfare Officer or social worker to undertake a social investigation and submit a report within fifteen days from the first date of hearing;
6. adjudicating and disposing of cases of children in conflict with law in accordance with the process of inquiry specified in section 14;
7. transferring to the Committee matters concerning a child alleged to be in conflict with law who is found to be a child in need of care and protection;
8. disposing of the matter and passing a final order including an individual care plan for the child's rehabilitation;

Section 18(1), where the Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child of any age has committed a petty or a serious offence, or a child below sixteen has committed a heinous offence, or a child above sixteen has committed a heinous offence and the Board has after the preliminary assessment under section 15 disposed of the matter, allows it to:

1. allow the child to go home after advice or admonition with counselling of the child and his parents or guardian;
2. direct group counselling;
3. order community service;
4. order the child, or the parents or guardian, to pay a fine;
5. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct in the care of a parent, guardian or fit person on a bond, for up to three years;
6. direct release on probation under the care and supervision of a fit facility, for up to three years;
7. direct the child to be sent to a special home for up to three years for reformative services.

Section 14 fixes the time: the inquiry shall be completed within four months, extendable by a further two months with reasons recorded, and for a petty offence the proceedings terminate if not concluded within six months.

Cite Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787. A heinous offence under section 2(33) is one for which the minimum punishment under the Penal Code or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. An offence whose maximum is seven years or more but which prescribes no minimum is therefore not heinous, and the Supreme Court held that such an offence falls to be dealt with as a serious offence under section 2(54). The distinction decides the case, because only a heinous offence opens the section 15 preliminary assessment and with it the possibility of a trial as an adult.

A. What a warrant case is.

Section 2(x) of the Code defines a warrant case as a case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term exceeding two years. The trial of warrant cases by Magistrates is governed by Chapter XIX, sections 238 to 250, and the Chapter is in two parts, because the procedure differs according to how the case was instituted:

1. Part A, sections 238 to 243, cases instituted on a police report;
2. Part B, sections 244 to 247, cases instituted otherwise than on a police report, that is on a complaint;
3. Part C, sections 248 to 250, the conclusion of the trial, common to both.

B. Cases instituted on a police report.

Section 241, conviction on a plea of guilty. If the accused pleads guilty, the Magistrate shall record the plea and may in his discretion convict him on it.

Section 242, evidence for the prosecution. If the accused refuses to plead, does not plead, claims to be tried, or is not convicted on his plea, the Magistrate shall fix a date for the examination of witnesses. On the application of the prosecution he may issue summons to any witness to attend or produce a document. He shall then take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution, and may permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness has been examined, or recall a witness for further cross-examination.

Section 243, evidence for the defence. The accused shall then be called upon to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence, and if he puts in a written statement, the Magistrate shall file it with the record. If the accused applies for process to compel the attendance of a witness or the production of a document, the Magistrate shall issue it unless he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that the application is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice.

C. Cases instituted otherwise than on a police report.

Section 246, procedure where the accused is not discharged. If, when the evidence referred to in section 244 has been taken, or at any previous stage, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter which he is competent to try and could adequately punish, he shall frame a charge in writing. The charge is read and explained; if the accused pleads guilty the Magistrate may convict him. If he claims to be tried, he shall be asked at the beginning of the next hearing, or immediately if the Magistrate so thinks fit, whether he wishes to cross-examine any of the witnesses whose evidence has already been taken; and those he names shall be recalled and, after cross-examination and re-examination, discharged. The evidence of any remaining witnesses for the prosecution shall then be taken.

Section 247, evidence for the defence: the accused shall be called upon to enter on his defence, and section 243 applies.

D. The two crucial differences between the two procedures.

Section 248, acquittal or conviction. If the Magistrate finds the accused not guilty, he shall record an order of acquittal. If he finds him guilty, then, subject to section 325, he shall, after hearing the accused on the question of sentence under section 248(2), pass sentence according to law. Section 248(3) allows the Magistrate, where he has convicted on a previous conviction charged under section 211(7) and the accused does not admit it, to take evidence on it.

Section 249, absence of the complainant. Where the proceedings were instituted upon complaint, and on any day fixed for hearing the complainant is absent, and the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence, the Magistrate may, in his discretion and at any time before the charge is framed, discharge the accused.

Section 250, compensation for accusation without reasonable cause. Where a person is accused before a Magistrate of an offence triable by him, and the Magistrate acquits or discharges the accused and is of opinion that there was no reasonable ground for making the accusation, he may call upon the informant or complainant to show cause and may order him to pay compensation not exceeding the amount of fine the Magistrate is empowered to impose. Sub-section (3) requires reasons to be recorded, and sub-section (8) preserves the right to a civil or criminal remedy notwithstanding the payment.

The rights of an arrested person come from Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution, from Chapter V of the Code, and from the directions of the Supreme Court in Joginder Kumar, D. K. Basu and Arnesh Kumar, most of which were enacted into the Code by the amendments of 2005 and 2008.

1. The right that the arrest itself be necessary. Section 41, as substituted in 2009, requires a police officer arresting without warrant in a case punishable with imprisonment up to seven years to be satisfied, on reasons recorded in writing, that the arrest is necessary on one of the stated grounds: to prevent a further offence, for proper investigation, to prevent the disappearance of evidence, to prevent inducement or threats to a witness, or to secure his presence in court. Section 41A requires the officer instead to issue a notice of appearance, and a person who complies with it shall not be arrested unless the officer records reasons. Section 60A provides that no arrest shall be made except in accordance with the provisions of this Code or of any other law providing for arrest.

4. The right to have a relative or friend informed. Section 50A, inserted in 2005: the officer shall forthwith give information about the arrest and the place of detention to any friend, relative or other person nominated by the arrested person; shall inform him of that right as soon as he is brought to the police station; shall make an entry in a book kept in the station; and the Magistrate before whom the person is produced shall satisfy himself that this has been complied with.

5. The right to be produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours. Article 22(2) and sections 56 and 57: a person arrested without warrant shall not be detained for more than twenty-four hours, exclusive of the time necessary for the journey, without a special order of a Magistrate under section 167. This is an absolute constitutional guarantee, and detention beyond it without a Magistrate's order is illegal.

8. The right against unnecessary restraint and against handcuffing. Section 49: the person arrested shall not be subjected to more restraint than is necessary to prevent his escape. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526, the Supreme Court held handcuffing to be prima facie inhuman, permissible only on recorded grounds of a clear and present danger of escape, and required the escorting authority to justify it before the Magistrate.

9. The right to a medical examination. Section 54, as substituted in 2009: an arrested person shall be examined by a medical officer soon after the arrest, and where the arrested person is a female, by or under the supervision of a female medical officer; the report shall record any injuries and the approximate time of their infliction, and a copy shall be furnished to the arrested person or his nominee. Section 55A places a duty on the person having custody of the accused to take reasonable care of his health and safety. Section 53 and section 53A govern examination at the request of the police, including the DNA profile of a person accused of rape.

12. The D. K. Basu safeguards. In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, the Supreme Court laid down eleven requirements for every arrest and detention, since largely enacted as sections 41B, 41C, 41D, 50A and 54: accurate, visible and clear identification and name tags; a memo of arrest with the time and date, attested by at least one witness who is a family member or a respectable person of the locality and countersigned by the arrestee; the right to have one friend or relative informed; an entry in the diary at the place of detention naming the friend informed and the officers in custody; a medical examination every 48 hours during custody by a doctor on a panel; copies of all documents to the Magistrate; permission to meet his lawyer during interrogation; and a police control room where the arrest is notified and displayed.

13. The right to a speedy and fair trial, and to compensation. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, held a speedy trial to be implicit in Article 21. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141, awarded compensation under Article 32 for illegal detention. Section 358 allows a Magistrate to award compensation to a person groundlessly arrested, and section 41(2) read with section 57 ensures the arrest is judicially reviewed within a day.

The Code deals with property in Chapter XXXIV, sections 451 to 459, headed "Disposal of property", and with search and seizure in sections 102 and 165.

A. Seizure: section 102.

Section 102(1): any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. Section 102(2) requires a subordinate officer to report the seizure to his superior. Section 102(3) requires the officer to report the seizure forthwith to the Magistrate having jurisdiction, and, where the property cannot conveniently be transported to the court or where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation, or where its continued retention is unnecessary, to give custody to any person on his executing a bond to produce the property when required.

B. Pending trial: sections 451 and 452 read together with 457.

Section 458: where no claimant appears within six months and the person in whose possession the property was found cannot show that he acquired it legally, the Magistrate may order the property to be at the disposal of the State Government and to be sold. Section 458(2) gives an appeal against such an order to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from convictions by that Magistrate.

C. At the conclusion of the trial: section 452.

Section 452(1): when an inquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is concluded, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced before it or in its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commission of any offence.

Section 452(2): an order may be made for the delivery of property to any person claiming to be entitled to possession, without any condition, or on condition that he executes a bond, with or without sureties, to restore it to the court if the order is modified or set aside on appeal or revision.

Section 456, power to restore possession of immovable property. Where a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears that by that force or show of force or intimidation any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the court may, if it thinks fit, order that possession be restored to that person. The order must be made within one month from the date of conviction, or where an appeal is presented, within one month of its disposal. Sub-section (4) preserves the right of any person to a civil suit to establish title.

E. Other provisions.

Section 454, appeal against an order under section 452 or 453, to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie. Section 455, destruction of libellous and other matter. Section 459, power to sell property subject to speedy and natural decay, and the disposal of the proceeds.

F. The principle the courts apply.

Conclusion. The Code's scheme for property runs on a single principle: the court's custody is a means of preserving evidence, not an end, and property is to be held only for as long as the trial actually requires. Section 451 governs the interim, allowing custody, and sale where the property will decay; section 452 governs the end, allowing destruction, confiscation or delivery, subject to the two-month stay in section 452(4) so that an appeal is not defeated; sections 453 and 456 restore the innocent purchaser and the dispossessed occupant; and Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai supplies the working direction that seized property should be photographed, inventoried and released on a bond rather than left to rot in a police compound. The BNSS has enacted that direction: section 497(2) to (5) requires a statement of seized property to be prepared and photographs and videography taken within fourteen days.