BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 CRPC 2021-22 Question Paper with Solutions

The answer is B, examination of blood, blood stains, sputum and sweat.

The reference is to Explanation (a) to section 53 of the Code, as substituted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005, which provides that "examination" shall include the examination of blood, blood stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings by the use of modern and scientific techniques including DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case.

Why the others are wrong. A written examination is not what the word means in the Code. Admonition is a release under section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. A search is governed by sections 93 to 100 and 165 and is a wholly different power.

Why the others are wrong. Punishment, imprisonment and solitary confinement are consequences of a conviction under the substantive law and are dealt with by sections 53 to 75 of the Indian Penal Code. Chapter VIII operates before any offence is committed.

The answer is A, a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.

Section 125(1) provides that upon proof of neglect or refusal, a Magistrate of the first class may order a person having sufficient means to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife, children or parents.

Section 126(1) fixes the place. Proceedings under section 125 may be taken against any person in any district:

1. where he is; or
2. where he or his wife resides; or
3. where he last resided with his wife, or as the case may be with the mother of the illegitimate child.

The second clause is what makes the remedy usable by a deserted wife: she may file where she herself resides.

A murder committed by a thug is expressly in that list, so both the court at Kurla and the court at Thane have jurisdiction.

Why the others are wrong. A gives only the ordinary section 177 rule and ignores section 181(1). B gives only half of section 181(1). D is not a basis of criminal jurisdiction anywhere in the Code.

The answer is A, voluntarily causing grievous hurt.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt is punishable under section 325 of the Indian Penal Code, and section 325 appears in the table to section 320(2) of the Code, so it may be compounded with the permission of the court before which the prosecution is pending, by the person to whom the hurt is caused.

Why the others are wrong, section by section.

B, voluntarily causing grievous hurt by a dangerous weapon or means, is section 326 of the Penal Code, and section 326 appears in neither table. It is non-compoundable.

C, doing an act which endangers the life or personal safety of others, is section 336, and it too appears in neither table. The distractor is finely drawn, because sections 337 and 338, causing hurt or grievous hurt by such an act, are in the section 320(2) table; only the bare act of endangering is not.

The answer is C, the High Court Rule.

Section 283 of the Code, headed "Record in High Court", provides that every High Court may, by general rule, prescribe the manner in which the evidence of witnesses and the examination of the accused shall be taken down in cases coming before it, and such evidence and examination shall be taken down in accordance with such rule.

The answer is C, tried.

Section 300(1) of the Code provides that a person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of that offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 221(1), or for which he might have been convicted under section 221(2).

The constitutional guarantee is Article 20(2): no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. The Latin names are autrefois convict and autrefois acquit.

The answer is A, on the date of the offence.

Section 469(1) of the Code provides that the period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence:

1. on the date of the offence; or
2. where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved or to any police officer, on the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier; or
3. where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, on the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the police officer making the investigation, whichever is earlier.

Section 469(2) provides that in computing the period, the day from which such period is to be computed shall be excluded.

The answer is C, a public servant.

Section 15 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, headed "Probation officers to be public servants", provides that probation officers appointed under this Act shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.

The answer is D, a surrendered child.

Section 2(60) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines "surrendered child" as a child, who is relinquished by the parent or guardian to the Committee, on account of physical, emotional and social factors beyond their control, and declared as such by the Committee.

Why the others are wrong. An orphan, section 2(42), is a child without biological or adoptive parents or legal guardian, or whose legal guardian is not willing or capable of taking care of him. A child in conflict with law, section 2(13), is one alleged or found to have committed an offence, which has nothing to do with relinquishment. A juvenile, section 2(35), is simply a child below eighteen.

The answer is C, admonition.

Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 empowers the court to release an offender after due admonition. Where a person is found guilty of an offence punishable under sections 379, 380, 381, 404 or 420 of the Indian Penal Code, or of any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, and no previous conviction is proved against him, and the court is of opinion, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, that it is expedient to do so, the court may, instead of sentencing him or releasing him on probation under section 4, release him after due admonition.

An admonition is a judicial reprimand, and the matter then ends: there is no bond, no supervision and no continuing liability to be sentenced.

The answer is A, the Criminal Procedure Code.

Section 2(a) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 provides that in the Act, unless the context otherwise requires, "Code" means the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

The Act was passed in 1958, when the Code of 1898 was in force. That Code was repealed and replaced by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and by section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 a reference in any enactment to a repealed enactment is to be construed as a reference to the re-enacted provision. So "Code" in the Probation of Offenders Act is now read as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The definition is in the Indian Penal Code, and the remedy is in the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 defines it: a person is guilty of a public nuisance who does any act or is guilty of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right.

The section adds the rule that decides most disputes: a common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage.

Section 290 of the Penal Code punishes a public nuisance not otherwise punishable with a fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, and section 291 punishes the continuance of a nuisance after an injunction to discontinue.

Section 133(2): no order duly made by a Magistrate under the section shall be called in question in any civil court.

The procedure, sections 134 to 143. Section 134, service of the order; section 135, the person is to obey or show cause; section 136, failure to do either makes the order absolute and he is liable under section 188 of the Penal Code; section 137, where the existence of a public right is denied, the Magistrate shall inquire, and if there is reliable evidence in support of the denial, he shall stay the proceedings until the matter is decided by a competent court; section 138, procedure where he appears to show cause; section 139, local investigation and expert evidence; section 141, the order made absolute, with a power to have the act done and recover the cost; section 142, injunction pending inquiry; and section 143, an order prohibiting the repetition or continuance of a public nuisance.

The question asks for three, so three are given in full and the rest in outline.

Point one. What it is and how it is recorded: section 154(1).

The expression "first information report" does not appear in the Code. It is the name given in practice to the information recorded under section 154, the first information in point of time of the commission of a cognizable offence, given to the officer in charge of a police station. Section 154(1) requires that such information, if given orally, be reduced to writing by or under the officer's direction, be read over to the informant, and be signed by the person giving it, and that its substance be entered in a book kept in the prescribed form. The 2013 provisos require the information to be recorded by a woman police officer where it relates to the sexual offences listed, and to be recorded at the residence of a disabled complainant, in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, and videographed.

Point two. Registration is mandatory, and there are remedies if it is refused.

It cannot be used to prove the facts it states. Its uses are three. It may corroborate its maker under section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It may contradict him under section 145 of that Act. And if the informant afterwards dies, it may become admissible as a dying declaration under section 32(1).

Conclusion. The three points hold together: the FIR is the document that starts the investigation, its registration is a duty and not a discretion wherever a cognizable offence is disclosed, and its value at the trial lies not in what it proves but in what it fixes, the earliest version of the prosecution case, against which every later improvement can be tested. That is also why delay in lodging it must be explained, though delay is not by itself fatal, particularly in sexual offences where the courts have recognised the social reasons for it.

But section 219 permits a joint trial. Section 219(1): when a person is accused of more offences than one of the same kind committed within the space of twelve months from the first to the last of such offences, whether in respect of the same person or not, he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, any number of them not exceeding three. Section 219(2): offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Penal Code or of any special or local law.

Two dacoities under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code are offences of the same kind committed within twelve months, and they are two, not more than three. So two separate charges may be framed and tried at one trial, which is not the same thing as one charge embracing both.

Section 220 does not apply on these facts. Section 220(1) allows a person accused of more offences than one committed in the course of the same transaction to be charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence. Two dacoities at two different houses are not in the course of the same transaction, though the answer should say that if the facts showed a single continuous raiding expedition the position might differ.

Section 211 of the Code, headed "Contents of charge", governs, and it has seven sub-sections.

Section 211(1): every charge under the Code shall state the offence with which the accused is charged.

Section 211(2): if the law which creates the offence gives it any specific name, the offence may be described in the charge by that name only. It is enough to say "murder" or "theft".

Section 211(3): if the law which creates the offence does not give it any specific name, so much of the definition of the offence must be stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged.

Section 211(4): the law and section of the law against which the offence is said to have been committed shall be mentioned in the charge.

Section 211(5): the fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case.

Section 211(6): the charge shall be written in the language of the Court.

Section 213: when the nature of the case is such that the particulars in sections 211 and 212 do not give the accused sufficient notice, the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose.

The illustrations to section 211 show how it works. A charge of murder is equivalent to a statement that the act fell within sections 299 and 300 of the Penal Code, that it did not fall within any of the general exceptions, and that it did not fall within the five exceptions to section 300. A charge under section 326 is equivalent to a statement that the case was not provided for by section 335 and that the general exceptions did not apply.

Conclusion. The contents of a charge are dictated by its purpose, which is notice. Section 211(1) to (4) tell the accused what offence and under what law; section 212 tells him when, where, against whom and about what; section 213 tells him how, where the rest is not enough; and section 211(7) tells him if his past is going to be used against him at the sentencing stage. Section 211(5) is the labour-saving provision that makes it unnecessary to plead every ingredient, because the charge is deemed to assert them all. And section 464 confirms that all of this is a means and not an end: a defect vitiates nothing unless a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned.

5. offences under sections 454 and 456 of the Penal Code, lurking house-trespass or house-breaking in order to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment, and house-trespass after preparation for hurt, assault or wrongful restraint;
6. insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace under section 504, and criminal intimidation punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine or both, under section 506;
7. abetment of any of the foregoing offences;
8. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences, when such attempt is an offence;
9. any offence constituted by an act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871.

Section 260(2): when in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that it is undesirable to try it summarily, he shall recall any witnesses who may have been examined and proceed to re-hear the case in the manner provided by the Code.

Section 264: in every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding.

Section 265: the record and the judgment shall be in the language of the court, and the High Court may authorise them to be prepared by an officer, to be signed by the Magistrate.

J.V. Baharuni v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 10 SCC 494, is the case to cite. The Supreme Court held that Magistrates trying cases summarily must actually follow the summary procedure rather than a hybrid of their own, and that a successor Magistrate must not mechanically order a de novo trial under section 326(3), particularly in a cheque dishonour case tried summarily under section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Three persons may appeal against an order of acquittal, and the section differs for each.

1. The State Government, and in certain cases the District Magistrate: section 378(1).

Section 378(1)(a): the District Magistrate may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence.

Section 378(1)(b): the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court, not being an order under clause (a), or an order of acquittal passed by the Court of Session in revision.

Section 378(3): no appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.

2. The Central Government, where a central agency investigated: section 378(2).

Inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 with effect from 31 December 2009: the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.

"Victim" is defined by section 2(wa) as a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused has been charged, and includes his or her guardian or legal heir.

In Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, decided 12 October 2018, the Supreme Court held that the victim's right under the proviso is unfettered and absolute, that the victim need not apply for leave under section 378(3) or section 378(4), and that the right is available where the order of acquittal was passed after 31 December 2009 even though the offence was committed before that date.

Anticipatory bail is a direction that a person shall be released on bail in the event of his arrest. It is granted before the arrest, on an apprehension of it, and it is contained in section 438 of the Code, which was inserted on the recommendation of the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India, 1969, because the previous Code had no such provision and influential persons were implicating rivals in false cases in order to have them detained.

Section 438(1): where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail.

The section as amended requires the court, when granting or refusing, to take into consideration:

1. the nature and gravity of the accusation;
2. the antecedents of the applicant, including whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction for a cognizable offence;

Section 438(4), inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018: nothing in this section shall apply to any case involving the arrest of any person on accusation of having committed an offence under sub-section (3) of section 376 or section 376AB or section 376DA or section 376DB of the Indian Penal Code. Anticipatory bail is therefore excluded altogether in those cases.

The two Constitution Bench decisions that govern section 438. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, the Supreme Court held that section 438 is a beneficent provision protecting the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21; that the limitations of section 437 are not to be read into it; that the applicant need not show that the accusation is false or that his case is exceptional; and that the court ought not ordinarily to limit the duration of the order. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, a five judge Bench settled the question Sibbia had left open and held that anticipatory bail, once granted, need not be limited to a fixed period and ordinarily continues till the end of the trial, unless the peculiar features of the case require a limit to be set.

A. Constitution: section 4.

The State Government shall constitute for every district one or more Juvenile Justice Boards for exercising the powers and discharging the functions relating to children in conflict with law. A Board shall consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, not being a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate, called the Principal Magistrate, and two social workers selected in the prescribed manner, of whom at least one shall be a woman. It forms a Bench and has the powers conferred by the Code on a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class.

Section 8(2): the powers conferred on the Board may also be exercised by the High Court and the Children's Court when the proceedings come before them under section 19 or in appeal, revision or otherwise.

C. Functions and responsibilities: section 8(3).

The Board must:

1. ensure the informed participation of the child and the parent or guardian in every step of the process;
2. ensure that the child's rights are protected throughout the process of apprehending, inquiry, aftercare and rehabilitation;
3. ensure the availability of legal aid through the legal services institutions;
4. provide a qualified interpreter or translator wherever necessary;
5. direct the Probation Officer, or in his absence the Child Welfare Officer or a social worker, to undertake a social investigation into the case and submit a report within fifteen days from the first date of hearing;
6. adjudicate and dispose of cases in accordance with the process of inquiry specified in section 14;

Bail, section 12. A child alleged to be in conflict with law shall, whether the offence is bailable or not, be released on bail with or without surety, or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or a fit person, unless there appear reasonable grounds for believing that release is likely to bring him into association with a known criminal, expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger, or defeat the ends of justice. If bail is refused, he goes to an observation home, and never to a police lockup or jail, section 10.

Inquiry, section 14. To be completed within four months, extendable by two with reasons; a petty offence terminates if not concluded in six months.

Preliminary assessment, section 15. For a heinous offence by a child who has completed sixteen years, the Board assesses his mental and physical capacity to commit the offence, his ability to understand the consequences, and the circumstances, with the assistance of psychologists; the Explanation states that this is not a trial.

Cite Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787. A heinous offence under section 2(33) is one for which the minimum punishment under the Penal Code or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. An offence whose maximum is seven years or more but which prescribes no minimum is therefore not heinous, and the Supreme Court held that such an offence falls to be dealt with as a serious offence under section 2(54). The distinction decides the case, because only a heinous offence opens the section 15 preliminary assessment and with it the possibility of a trial as an adult.

A. Who he is: section 13 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.

A probation officer under the Act shall be a person appointed to be a probation officer by the State Government or recognised as such by it; or a person provided for this purpose by a society recognised in that behalf by the State Government; or, in any exceptional case, any other person who, in the opinion of the court, is fit to act as a probation officer in the special circumstances of the case.

Section 13(2): the court which passes an order under section 4, or the district magistrate of the district in which the offender for the time being resides, may at any time appoint another probation officer in the place of the person named in the supervision order. Section 13(3): he is, in the exercise of his duties under the Act, subject to the control of the district magistrate of that district.

B. His duties: section 14.

A probation officer shall, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed:

Section 6(2): for the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal with an offender under twenty-one years of age under section 3 or section 4, the court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider it, together with any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender. Here the report is mandatory.

Section 9(1): the court may act on the report of a probation officer in forming the belief that the offender has failed to observe the conditions of his bond, and may thereupon issue a warrant or a summons.

Section 11(3): an appellate court may call for the record of a case on an application made by the probation officer, where the trial court has declined to deal with an offender under twenty-one under section 3 or section 4.

Section 8(1): the conditions of a bond may be varied on the application of a probation officer.

D. His status and protection.

Section 7: the report referred to in section 4(2) or section 6(2) shall be treated as confidential, with a proviso allowing the court to communicate its substance to the offender and to give him an opportunity of producing evidence relevant to it.

The three cases to cite. Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, calls the Act a milestone in the modern liberal trend of reform in penology and holds that its benefit may be claimed for the first time in appeal or revision. Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 633, states the object as preventing the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals through their association in prison with hardened criminals of mature age. Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088, fixes the date on which the offender's age is reckoned for section 6: it is the date on which the trial court has to pass sentence on him, not the date of the offence.

Chapter XXIA of the Code, sections 265A to 265L, inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 on the recommendation of the 154th Report of the Law Commission and the Malimath Committee, and brought into force on 5 July 2006, governs plea bargaining.

A. The cases in which an application may be filed: section 265A(1).

The Chapter applies in respect of an accused against whom:

1. the report has been forwarded by the officer in charge of the police station under section 173 alleging therein that an offence appears to have been committed by him, other than an offence for which the punishment of death, or of imprisonment for life, or of imprisonment for a term exceeding seven years has been provided under the law for the time being in force; or
2. a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence on complaint, other than an offence for which such punishment has been provided, and, after examining the complainant and the witnesses under section 200, has issued the process under section 204.

Section 265B: the accused files an application in the court in which the offence is pending, containing a brief description of the case and an affidavit stating that he has voluntarily preferred the application after understanding the nature and extent of the punishment provided by law, and that he has not previously been convicted of the same offence. The court issues notice to the Public Prosecutor or the complainant and to the accused, and examines the accused in camera, in the absence of the other party, to satisfy itself that the application has been filed voluntarily.

Section 265C: where the court is satisfied, it issues notice to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition, in which the Public Prosecutor, the investigating officer, the victim and the accused participate, and the court's role is to see that the process is voluntary, not to take part in it.

Section 265D: where a satisfactory disposition is worked out, the court prepares a report signed by the presiding officer and by all the participants; where none is worked out, it records an observation to that effect and proceeds with the case from the stage the application was filed.

Conclusion. The answer to the question as asked is therefore this: an application may be filed in any case that has reached the court on a police report under section 173 or on a complaint on which process has issued under section 204, where the offence carries not more than seven years, is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, does not affect the socio-economic condition of the country, and has not been committed against a woman or a child below fourteen; and it may not be filed by a person previously convicted of the same offence, or by a child. Every one of those limits exists for the same reason: a procedure that trades a plea for a lighter sentence is only safe where the offence is not grave, the victim is not vulnerable, and the plea is genuinely free.