Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
CRPC
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
BLS LLB 5 Years · Sem 9
2018-19 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
CRPC
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
BLS LLB 5 Years · Sem 9
2018-19 Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 11 August 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2018-19 examination.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was repealed by the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on 1 July 2024, and every paper in this folder was set on the Code. Each answer is therefore written on the Code the question names, with the Sanhita section that now carries the same rule given alongside it, so that a reader can use these pages for either. Two further things are corrected silently throughout. The printed header names the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, which was repealed on 15 January 2016; the answers are on the Act of 2015 as amended in 2021. And the header names the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, whose own Section 2(a) still defines the Code as that of 1898, read today as the Code of 1973.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2018-19 examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2018-19 examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 3 hours · Total marks 100 · 25 questions answered
Instructions printed on the paper
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Answer the following in one or two sentences 20 Marks
Answer
Section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 defines "inquiry" as every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.
It is a definition by exclusion: whatever a Magistrate or court does under the Code which is not itself a trial is an inquiry.
Answer
Section 2(n) of the Code defines "offence" as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, and includes any act in respect of which a complaint may be made under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871.
Answer
Section 2(u) of the Code defines a Public Prosecutor as any person appointed under section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor.
Section 24 requires the Central or State Government to appoint a Public Prosecutor for every High Court, and for each district from a panel prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Sessions Judge, the person being an advocate in practice for not less than seven years.
Answer
Section 2(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines adoption as the process through which the adopted child is permanently separated from his biological parents and becomes the lawful child of his adoptive parents with all the rights, privileges and responsibilities that are attached to a biological child.
Answer
Section 2(20) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines "Children's Court" as a court established under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, or a Special Court under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, wherever existing, and where such courts have not been designated, the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction to try offences under the Act.
Answer
Two may be given, and the two with the clearest statutory and constitutional footing are these.
The right to be informed of the grounds of arrest. Article 22(1) of the Constitution and section 50(1) of the Code: every person arrested without warrant shall be forthwith communicated full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or the grounds of arrest; and under section 50(2), where the offence is bailable, he shall be informed that he is entitled to be released on bail and may arrange for sureties.
The right to be produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours. Article 22(2) and sections 56 and 57: a person arrested without warrant shall not be detained for more than twenty-four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey, without a special order of a Magistrate under section 167.
Answer
Plea bargaining is the procedure under Chapter XXIA, sections 265A to 265L, of the Code, inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 and in force from 5 July 2006, by which an accused applies for a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case, and, on the court satisfying itself that the application is voluntary, the case is disposed of on a substantially reduced sentence.
Answer
Section 46(1) of the Code provides that in making an arrest the police officer or other person making it shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there is a submission to the custody by word or action.
Section 46(2): if the person forcibly resists the endeavour to arrest him, or attempts to evade the arrest, the officer or other person may use all means necessary to effect the arrest.
Answer
Section 93(1) of the Code allows a court to issue a search warrant in three cases: where the court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons under section 91 has been or might be issued will not produce the document or thing; where the document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person; or where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding will be served by a general search or inspection.
Answer
Compounding is the settlement of a criminal case between the aggrieved person and the accused in the cases the Code permits, and by section 320(8) the composition of an offence shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom it has been compounded.
Section 320(1) lists the offences compoundable without the permission of the court, and section 320(2) those compoundable only with the permission of the court before which the prosecution is pending. Section 320(9) makes the lists exhaustive: no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.
Answer the following
any four · 20 Marks
Answer
Section 6 of the Code provides that, besides the High Courts and the courts constituted under any law other than the Code, there shall be in every State the following classes of Criminal Courts:
The territorial units. Section 7: every State is a sessions division or consists of sessions divisions, and every sessions division is a district or consists of districts, which the State Government may alter after consultation with the High Court, and may divide into sub-divisions. Section 8: an area comprising a city or town whose population exceeds one million may be declared a metropolitan area, which is then a separate sessions division and district.
Constitution of each.
Court of Session, section 9: established by the State Government for every sessions division, presided over by a Judge appointed by the High Court, which may also appoint Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges.
Judicial Magistrates, sections 11 and 12: courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first and second class in every district, established by the State Government after consultation with the High Court, the presiding officers appointed by the High Court; the High Court appoints a first class Magistrate as Chief Judicial Magistrate and may appoint Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates and a Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate.
Metropolitan Magistrates, sections 16 and 17: established in every metropolitan area, appointed by the High Court, with a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate; their jurisdiction extends throughout the metropolitan area.
Executive Magistrates, section 20: appointed by the State Government in every district and metropolitan area, one of whom is the District Magistrate, with Additional District Magistrates and Sub-divisional Magistrates, and Special Executive Magistrates under section 21.
Sentencing powers. Section 28: a High Court, any sentence authorised by law; a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, any sentence authorised by law, a death sentence being subject to confirmation by the High Court; an Assistant Sessions Judge, any sentence except death, life or imprisonment exceeding ten years. Section 29: a Chief Judicial Magistrate, any sentence except death, life or imprisonment exceeding seven years; a Magistrate of the first class, imprisonment up to three years or fine up to ten thousand rupees or both; a Magistrate of the second class, imprisonment up to one year or fine up to five thousand rupees or both; a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has a Chief Judicial Magistrate's powers and a Metropolitan Magistrate those of a first class Magistrate.
Conclusion. The classification in section 6 is not merely a list of names: it is the map of the whole Code, because the class of court decides who may try an offence under section 26 and the First Schedule, how much it may inflict under sections 28 and 29, and where an appeal from it lies under section 374. The one division that is not about seniority is the last: Executive Magistrates try nothing at all and exist for the preventive work in Chapters VIII, X and XI, which is how the 1973 Code gave effect to the separation of the judiciary from the executive required by Article 50.
Answer
The Child Welfare Committee is the authority constituted under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 to deal with a child in need of care and protection, as defined by section 2(14). It is the counterpart of the Juvenile Justice Board, which deals with a child in conflict with law.
Constitution, section 27. The State Government shall by notification constitute for every district one or more Child Welfare Committees. Section 27(2): the Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and four other members, of whom at least one shall be a woman and another an expert on matters concerning children. Section 27(4): no person shall be appointed unless he has been actively involved in health, education or welfare activities pertaining to children for at least seven years, or is a practising professional with a degree in child psychology, psychiatry, law or social work. Section 27(5) disqualifies a person with a record of violation of human or child rights, a conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, removal or dismissal from government service, or involvement in child abuse, child labour or immoral acts. Section 27(9): the Committee shall function as a Bench and shall have the powers conferred by the Code on a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class.
Section 28: the Committee shall meet at least twenty days in a month, and a visit to an existing child care institution by the Committee shall be counted as a sitting.
Production of a child, section 31. Any police officer or Special Juvenile Police Unit or Child Welfare Police Officer, any public servant, Childline services or any registered voluntary or non-governmental organisation, any social worker or public spirited citizen, the child himself, or any nurse, doctor or manager of a nursing home, may produce a child in need of care and protection before the Committee within twenty-four hours excluding the time of the journey.
Functions, section 30. Taking cognizance of and receiving children produced before it; conducting inquiry on all issues relating to and affecting the safety and well-being of the child; directing the Child Welfare Officers or probation officers or social workers to conduct a social investigation and submit a report; conducting inquiry for declaring fit persons for the care of children; directing placement of a child in foster care; ensuring care, protection, appropriate rehabilitation or restoration, including passing necessary directions to parents or guardians or fit persons; selecting a registered institution for placement; conducting at least two inspection visits per month of residential facilities; certifying the execution of a surrender deed; declaring a child legally free for adoption; taking action for the restoration of abandoned or lost children to their families; and coordinating with the police, labour department and other agencies involved in the care and protection of children.
The inquiry and the orders, sections 36 and 37. Section 36 requires the inquiry to be completed within four months of the child's production, extendable by two months for reasons recorded. Section 37 sets out the orders: restoration to the parent, guardian or fit person; placement in a children's home or fit facility; foster care; sponsorship; declaring the child legally free for adoption under section 38; or a direction for aftercare under section 46.
Conclusion. The Committee is the Act's second authority and its larger one in practice, because far more children are in need of care and protection than in conflict with law. Its powers are those of a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, but the question before it is not whether anything has been done but what this child needs, which is why its inquiry is a social one and its orders run from restoration to the family, through foster care and sponsorship, to a declaration that the child is legally free for adoption. Section 3(v), the principle of family responsibility, and section 3(xii), institutionalisation as a measure of last resort, explain why section 37 puts restoration first and a children's home well down the list.
Answer
Section 18(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 sets out the orders. Where the Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child irrespective of age has committed a petty or a serious offence, or a child below sixteen has committed a heinous offence, or a child above sixteen has committed a heinous offence and the Board has, after the preliminary assessment under section 15, disposed of the matter itself, then, based on the nature of the offence, the specific need for supervision or intervention, the circumstances brought out in the social investigation report and the past conduct of the child, the Board may:
Section 18(2): in addition to an order under clauses (a) to (g), the Board may order the child to attend school, to attend a vocational training centre, to attend a therapeutic centre, to be prohibited from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a specified place, or to undergo a de-addiction programme.
Section 18(3): where the Board, after the preliminary assessment under section 15, passes an order that there is a need for trial of the child as an adult, it may order the transfer of the trial to the Children's Court.
Section 17: where the Board is satisfied on inquiry that the child has not committed the offence, it shall pass an order to that effect and release the child if he is in an observation home.
Cite Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787. A heinous offence under section 2(33) is one for which the minimum punishment under the Penal Code or any other law is imprisonment for seven years or more. An offence whose maximum is seven years or more but which prescribes no minimum is therefore not heinous, and the Supreme Court held that such an offence falls to be dealt with as a serious offence under section 2(54). The distinction matters, because only a heinous offence opens the section 15 preliminary assessment and with it the possibility of a trial as an adult.
Conclusion. Not one of the seven orders is a punishment in the ordinary sense: the lightest is an admonition and the heaviest is three years in a special home whose statutory purpose is education, counselling and psychiatric support. The Board's discretion is structured rather than free, because section 18(1) directs it to the nature of the offence, the need for supervision, the social investigation report and the child's past conduct. And two provisions stand over every order: section 21, which forbids a sentence of death or of life imprisonment without the possibility of release absolutely, and section 24, which leaves the child with no disqualification and, in most cases, with the record destroyed.
Answer
Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is headed "Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct", and it is the provision the question names.
Section 4(1): when any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and the court by which he is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.
The proviso: the court shall not direct such release unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction, or in which the offender is likely to live during the period of the bond.
Section 4(2): before making an order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.
Section 4(3): the court may, if it thinks fit, pass a supervision order directing that the offender remain under the supervision of a probation officer for a period not less than one year, and may impose such conditions as it thinks necessary for the due supervision.
Section 4(4): the court making a supervision order shall require the offender to enter into a bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions.
Section 4(5): the court shall explain the terms and conditions to the offender and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order to each of the offender, the sureties and the probation officer.
The related powers. Section 3 allows release after due admonition where the offence is under sections 379, 380, 381, 404 or 420 of the Penal Code, or is punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years or with fine or both, and no previous conviction is proved. Section 6 provides that a person under twenty-one shall not be sentenced to imprisonment unless the court is satisfied that it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and requires it to record its reasons and to call for a probation officer's report. Section 5 allows an order for compensation and costs. Section 8 allows the conditions of a bond to be varied and its duration extended or diminished within the three-year limit. Section 9 governs the consequences of a breach, on which the court may sentence the offender for the original offence. Section 11 allows the order to be made by any court competent to try and sentence the offender, and by the High Court or any other court in appeal or revision. Section 12 provides that a person dealt with under section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer the disqualification attaching to a conviction.
Conclusion. Section 4 gives the court a power to convict without sentencing, and its four conditions are the answer to any question on it: the offence must not be punishable with death or imprisonment for life; the circumstances, the nature of the offence and the character of the offender must make release expedient; the offender or his surety must have a fixed place of abode or regular occupation; and the probation officer's report must have been considered. What the court gives up is immediate punishment; what it keeps is the power under section 9 to sentence him for the original offence at any time within the bond period if he breaks its conditions.
Answer
A summary trial is one in which the ordinary procedure is abridged and only the substance of the evidence is recorded, so that petty cases are disposed of quickly. Chapter XXI, sections 260 to 265, contains the law.
Who may try summarily, section 260(1). A Chief Judicial Magistrate, a Metropolitan Magistrate, and any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the High Court may, if he thinks fit, try summarily.
Which offences, section 260(1). Offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment exceeding two years; theft under sections 379, 380 or 381 of the Penal Code where the value of the property does not exceed two thousand rupees; receiving or retaining stolen property under section 411 and assisting in its concealment or disposal under section 414, within the same limit; offences under sections 454 and 456; insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace under section 504 and criminal intimidation punishable with up to two years or fine under section 506; abetment and attempt of any of these; and an offence under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871.
Section 260(2): where in the course of a summary trial it appears to the Magistrate that the case is of a character which makes it undesirable to try it summarily, he shall recall any witnesses already examined and re-hear the case in the ordinary way.
Section 261: a Magistrate of the second class specially empowered by the High Court may try summarily an offence punishable only with fine, or with imprisonment not exceeding six months with or without fine.
Procedure and the limit, section 262. The procedure of a summons case is followed, and no sentence of imprisonment exceeding three months shall be passed on a conviction under the Chapter.
Record, section 263. The Magistrate enters in the prescribed register the serial number, the date of the offence, the date of the report or complaint, the name of the complainant, the name, parentage and residence of the accused, the offence complained of and the offence proved with the value of the property in theft cases, the plea and examination, the finding, the sentence, and the date on which the proceedings terminated.
Judgment, section 264. In every case tried summarily in which the accused does not plead guilty, the Magistrate shall record the substance of the evidence and a judgment containing a brief statement of the reasons for the finding.
Section 265: the record and the judgment shall be in the language of the court, and the High Court may authorise the record or judgment to be prepared by an officer, to be signed by the Magistrate.
Conclusion. The Chapter buys speed with two currencies, the record and the sentence: only the substance of the evidence is written, and whatever the offence carries, the trial can end in no more than three months. The guards against that bargain going too far are equally clear: the power is confined to senior Magistrates and to a closed list of offences, section 260(2) obliges the Magistrate to abandon the summary course the moment the case looks unsuitable, and section 264 restores a reasoned judgment as soon as the accused pleads not guilty.
Answer
Who he is, section 13 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. A probation officer under the Act shall be:
Section 13(2): the court which passes an order under section 4, or the district magistrate of the district in which the offender for the time being resides, may at any time appoint another probation officer in the place of the person named in the supervision order. Section 13(3): in the exercise of his duties under the Act he is subject to the control of the district magistrate of that district.
His duties, section 14. A probation officer shall, subject to such conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed:
His status, section 15. Probation officers appointed under the Act shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 16 protects action taken in good faith: no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the State Government or against a probation officer or other person in respect of anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act.
Where his report is required. Section 4(2): the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, before releasing an offender on probation. Section 6(2): where the offender is under twenty-one, the court shall call for a report and consider it, together with any other information relating to the offender's character and physical and mental condition. Section 9(1): the court may act on his report in forming the belief that the offender has broken the conditions of his bond. Section 11(3): he may apply to the appellate court to call for the record where the trial court has declined to deal with an offender under twenty-one under section 3 or section 4.
The three cases to cite. Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, calls the Act a milestone in the modern liberal trend of reform in penology and holds that its benefit may be claimed for the first time in appeal or revision. Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 633, states the object as preventing the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals through their association in prison with hardened criminals of mature age. Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088, fixes the date on which the offender's age is reckoned for section 6: it is the date on which the trial court has to pass sentence on him, not the date of the offence.
Conclusion. The probation officer is what turns the Act from a sentencing discount into a system. Section 14 gives him three distinct roles: the court's investigator before the order, reporting on the offender's home surroundings and character; the offender's supervisor after it, including the practical work of finding him employment; and the victim's collector in between, assisting with the payment of compensation. Section 15 makes him a public servant and section 13(3) subjects him to the district magistrate; and in the one case where the stakes are highest, an offender under twenty-one, section 6(2) makes his report compulsory rather than optional.
Answer the following giving cogent reasons
any two · 12 Marks
Answer
(i) Yes. His appeal lies to the High Court under section 374(2).
Murder under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, so Bhagat has been convicted by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge.
Section 374(2) provides that any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge, or on a trial held by any other court in which a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed, may appeal to the High Court.
The appeal is presented by a petition in writing with a copy of the judgment under section 382, and if Bhagat is in jail he may present it to the officer in charge of the jail under section 383, who must forward it. Under section 384 the High Court may dismiss the appeal summarily but not without giving him or his pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Under section 386 it may reverse the finding and acquit him, order a retrial, alter the finding while maintaining the sentence, or alter the nature or extent of the sentence, but not so as to enhance it on his own appeal.
Beyond the High Court, Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution gives an appeal to the Supreme Court as of right where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an order of acquittal and sentenced the accused to death; otherwise he may seek special leave under Article 136.
(ii) The law relating to confirmation: Chapter XXVIII, sections 366 to 371.
The reference is automatic and the sentence is inoperative until confirmed. Section 366(1): when the Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. Section 366(2): the court passing the sentence shall commit the convicted person to jail custody under a warrant.
Section 28(2) is the source of the rule: a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but any sentence of death passed by him shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.
Section 367, further inquiry and additional evidence. If the High Court thinks that a further inquiry should be made into, or additional evidence taken upon, any point bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, it may make the inquiry or take the evidence itself, or direct the Court of Session to do so. Unless the High Court otherwise directs, the presence of the convicted person may be dispensed with.
Section 368, the High Court's powers. In any case submitted under section 366, the High Court:
The proviso: no order of confirmation shall be made until the period allowed for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is presented within that period, until the appeal is disposed of.
Section 369, two judges. In every case so submitted, the confirmation of the sentence, or any new sentence or order passed by the High Court, shall, when the court consists of two or more judges, be made, passed and signed by at least two of them.
Section 370, difference of opinion. Where the Bench is equally divided, the case is decided in the manner provided by section 392, that is by being laid before another judge of the court, whose opinion prevails.
Section 371: the proper officer of the High Court shall without delay send a copy of the order to the Court of Session. Section 413: on receiving it, the Court of Session shall cause the sentence to be carried into effect by issuing a warrant. Section 415 allows postponement of execution where an appeal to the Supreme Court is preferred or leave is applied for.
Conclusion. Bhagat may appeal to the High Court, but he does not have to: the same High Court will have his whole case before it in any event on the mandatory reference under section 366, and until it confirms, the sentence has no force at all. On the reference the High Court is not sitting as an ordinary appellate court reviewing another court's conclusions; it must satisfy itself of his guilt or innocence on the evidence, and it may confirm, substitute another sentence, alter the conviction, order a retrial or acquit. If an appeal is filed as well, the two are heard together, and the proviso to section 368 forbids confirmation before the appeal is disposed of.
Answer
A note on the premise. A chargesheet is filed before a Magistrate, not in the Sessions Court. Dacoity under section 395 of the Indian Penal Code is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, so the Magistrate takes cognizance under section 190(1)(b) and commits the case to the Court of Session under section 209. The answers below assume the case has reached the Court of Session on such a committal, which is the only way it can be there.
(i) Yes, but only before the charge is framed, and on a narrow test.
Section 227 is the provision: if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.
Four things follow and each is worth a mark.
The material is fixed. The judge considers the record of the case and the documents submitted with it, that is the police report and the material forwarded under section 173(5). He does not consider defence evidence at this stage.
Both sides are heard. Section 227 requires the submissions of the accused and the prosecution.
Reasons must be recorded, which makes the order reviewable.
The stage is before the charge. Once a charge is framed under section 228, the remedy is no longer discharge but acquittal at the end of the trial, or the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 482.
The test. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of framing charge the judge is not a mere post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution; he must sift and weigh the material to find whether a prima facie case is made out; but he must not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons or weigh the probability of a conviction. Where the material discloses grave suspicion, the charge is framed; where it discloses mere suspicion, the accused is discharged. State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39, is to the same effect.
Applied to Dev, the question is simply whether the material forwarded with the police report discloses grave suspicion that he took part in the dacoity. Dacoity under section 391 of the Penal Code requires five or more persons conjointly committing or attempting to commit robbery; the paper says there were five in all, so if Dev is discharged the remaining four cannot be convicted of dacoity, though they may be convicted of robbery under section 392 with the aid of section 222 of the Code, which permits conviction of a minor offence included in the offence charged.
(ii) Yes. Raju may be tendered a pardon under section 306, at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial before the judgment is passed, and under section 307 by the Court of Session after commitment.
Section 306(1): with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence, a Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and a Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to that person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor.
Section 306(2) confines it to three classes of offence: an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by a Special Judge under any other law; an offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence. Dacoity, punishable with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to ten years and triable exclusively by the Court of Session, is squarely within it.
Section 306(3): every Magistrate who tenders a pardon shall record his reasons, whether or not the tender is accepted, and, on the accused's application, furnish him a copy of the record free of cost.
Section 306(4): every person accepting a tender of pardon shall be examined as a witness in the court of the Magistrate taking cognizance and in the subsequent trial, if any; and unless he is already on bail, he shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.
Section 307: at any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed, the court to which the commitment is made, that is the Court of Session, may with a view to obtaining the evidence of such a person tender a pardon on the same condition. This is the section that answers the question on these facts, because the case is already before the Court of Session.
Section 308: where a person who has accepted a tender of pardon has, in the opinion of the Public Prosecutor, either by wilfully concealing anything essential or by giving false evidence, not complied with the condition, he may be tried for the offence in respect of which the pardon was tendered, or for any other offence of which he appears to have been guilty in the same transaction, and also for the offence of giving false evidence; but he shall not be tried jointly with any of the other accused, and the prosecution for giving false evidence requires the sanction of the High Court.
Conclusion. Dev may apply for a discharge, but only before the charge is framed and only if the material forwarded with the police report falls short of grave suspicion against him; the judge must hear both sides and record his reasons under section 227. Raju cannot demand a pardon, because the tender is made by the court and not applied for as of right; but he may offer to make a full and true disclosure, and since the case has been committed, the Court of Session may tender him a pardon under section 307 at any time before judgment. If he takes it he becomes an approver, must be examined as a witness at every stage under section 306(4), and forfeits the pardon under section 308 if he conceals anything essential.
Answer
(i) The nature of the offence.
Under the First Schedule to the Code, rape under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code is:
The punishment under section 376(1), as it stands after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, is rigorous imprisonment for a term not less than ten years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine.
(ii) Bail: yes, but not from every court and not at every stage.
Section 436 has no application, because the offence is non-bailable.
Section 437(1) governs an application to a Magistrate, and it contains a prohibition: a court other than the High Court or Court of Session may release the accused, but shall not do so if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 376(1) is punishable with imprisonment for life, so where the material discloses reasonable grounds, the Magistrate cannot grant bail.
The first and second provisos allow release even within the bar where the accused is under sixteen years of age, is a woman, or is sick or infirm; and the third proviso where the court is satisfied that it is just and proper for any other special reason. Under section 437(2), if at any stage it appears that there are not reasonable grounds for believing him guilty but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry, he shall be released on bail.
Section 439(1) is the real forum: the High Court or the Court of Session may direct that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and section 439 contains no prohibition corresponding to section 437(1). The first proviso requires notice to the Public Prosecutor before bail is granted in an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session, and section 439(1A) requires the presence of the informant at the hearing where the offence is under sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA or 376DB.
When bail becomes his as of right. Under the proviso to section 167(2)(a)(i), if the investigation is not completed and the chargesheet is not filed within ninety days, the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. Ninety days applies because the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, which is one of the three limbs of section 167(2)(a)(i). Take care with the other limb. Section 376(1) has carried a minimum of ten years only since the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018; before that the minimum was seven years, so on a pre-2018 fact pattern the ten year limb does not apply and it is the life imprisonment limb that gives the ninety days. This is default bail, and it is an indefeasible right flowing from Article 21: Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616. Note also section 173(1A), which requires the investigation in a rape case to be completed within two months.
Anticipatory bail under section 438 is available from the High Court or Court of Session for section 376(1), but section 438(4) excludes it altogether for sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB.
Conditions. Any bail granted must comply with Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided 18 March 2021, in which the Supreme Court held that bail conditions must be confined to those in section 437(3) and must not mandate or permit any contact between the accused and the victim, and set aside a condition requiring the accused to have a rakhi tied by the survivor.
(iii) No, he cannot compound the offence.
Section 320(9) provides that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. Rape under section 376 appears in neither the table to section 320(1) nor the table to section 320(2), so it is non-compoundable, and no composition of it is permissible even with the court's consent.
The reason is that rape is treated not as a private wrong against the woman but as a crime against society, so the victim has no power to release the accused on its behalf. In Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, (2014) 13 SCC 318, the Supreme Court held that a compromise between the accused and the victim has no place in a rape case and cannot be a ground for reducing the sentence below the statutory minimum. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, (2015) 7 SCC 681, the Court held that any suggestion of compromise or marriage between the accused and the victim in such a case is unacceptable.
Compounding must also be distinguished from quashing. Under section 482 the High Court may quash proceedings in a non-compoundable offence where the parties have settled, but Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, holds that this power is not to be exercised in heinous and serious offences such as rape and murder, however genuine the settlement.
Conclusion. Rana's offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and exclusively triable by the Court of Session. He may be released on bail, but the discretion in practice belongs to the Court of Session or the High Court under section 439, because section 437(1) shuts out the Magistrate wherever reasonable grounds appear that he is guilty of an offence punishable with life imprisonment; and his clearest entitlement arises on the ninety-first day if no chargesheet has been filed. He cannot compound the offence at all, and no settlement with the prosecutrix will help him, either as a composition under section 320 or as a ground for a lesser sentence.
Answer the questions
any four · 48 Marks
Answer
A. What bail is.
The Code does not define bail. It is judicially understood as the release of a person from the custody of the law upon an undertaking, secured by a bond with or without sureties, that he will appear and answer the charge when required. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has since defined it for the first time in Indian law, in section 2(1)(b), as the release of a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence on the execution by such person of a bond or bail bond.
The principle behind it, restated in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, is that "the basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail", because a person is presumed innocent until convicted and the object of custody before trial is only to secure his presence.
B. Bail in a bailable offence: a matter of right, section 436.
Section 2(a) defines a bailable offence as one shown as bailable in the First Schedule or made bailable by any other law.
Section 436(1): when a person accused of a bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant, or appears or is brought before a court, and is prepared to give bail, he shall be released on bail. Neither the officer in charge of the police station nor the court has a discretion. The proviso allows release on a personal bond without sureties where the person is indigent, and the Explanation deems a person indigent if he is unable to give bail within a week of his detention.
Section 436(2): a person who, having been released on bail in the same case, fails to comply with the conditions of the bond as regards time and place of attendance may be refused bail when he appears on a subsequent occasion.
Section 436A, inserted in 2005: where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial, been detained for a period extending up to one half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for the offence, he shall be released on his personal bond with or without sureties. It does not apply to an offence punishable with death. The proviso allows the court, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons recorded in writing, to continue the detention beyond half; but in no case shall a person be detained beyond the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the offence.
C. Bail in a non-bailable offence: a discretion, section 437.
Section 437(1): a person accused of a non-bailable offence may be released on bail by a court other than the High Court or Court of Session, but shall not be so released:
The provisos permit release notwithstanding those bars where the accused is under sixteen years of age, is a woman, or is sick or infirm; where the court is satisfied that it is just and proper for any other special reason; and the fourth proviso permits release where the accused's presence has been secured and he undertakes to comply.
Section 437(2): where at any stage it appears there are not reasonable grounds for believing the accused has committed a non-bailable offence but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry, he shall be released on bail or, at the discretion of the officer or court, on a bond.
Section 437(3): when a person is released under sub-section (1) in a case involving an offence punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, or an offence under Chapter VI, XVI or XVII of the Penal Code, or an abetment, conspiracy or attempt, the court shall impose the condition that he attend in accordance with the bond, that he shall not commit a similar offence, and that he shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts, and may impose other conditions in the interests of justice.
Section 437(5): any court which has released a person on bail under sub-section (1) or (2) may, if it considers it necessary, direct that he be arrested and commit him to custody.
Section 437(6): in a case triable by a Magistrate, if the trial is not concluded within sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence, and the accused has been in custody for the whole of that period, he shall be released on bail unless the Magistrate, for reasons recorded, otherwise directs.
Section 437(7): if, after the conclusion of the trial and before judgment, the court is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty, it shall release him on bond pending the judgment.
D. The special powers, section 439.
The High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and may impose any condition it considers necessary; it may set aside or modify a condition imposed by a Magistrate; and under section 439(2) it may direct that a person released on bail be arrested and committed to custody. The first proviso requires notice to the Public Prosecutor where the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or is punishable with imprisonment for life. Section 439(1A) requires the informant's presence in the sexual offence cases listed.
E. Anticipatory bail, section 438.
Where a person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction that in the event of arrest he shall be released on bail. The court considers the nature and gravity of the accusation, the antecedents of the applicant, the possibility of his fleeing from justice, and whether the accusation appears to have been made with the object of injuring or humiliating him. Section 438(2) allows conditions, including that he make himself available for interrogation, that he not induce any person acquainted with the facts to dissuade them from disclosing it, and that he not leave India without permission. Section 438(4) excludes anticipatory bail for offences under sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB.
The two Constitution Bench decisions to cite are Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, which held that section 438 protects the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21, that the limitations of section 437 are not to be read into it, and that the applicant need not show that the accusation is false or his case exceptional; and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, in which a five judge Bench held that anticipatory bail once granted need not be limited to a fixed period and ordinarily continues till the end of the trial.
F. Default bail, the proviso to section 167(2).
The Magistrate may authorise detention pending investigation for no more than ninety days where the offence is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, and sixty days for any other offence; on the expiry of that period the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and shall be deemed to be released under Chapter XXXIII.
G. General provisions, sections 440 to 450.
Section 440: the amount of every bond shall be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case and shall not be excessive. Section 441: bond of the accused and sureties, and their declaration. Section 441A: a surety shall declare the number of persons for whom he has stood surety. Section 445: deposit instead of recognizance, except in the case of a bond for good behaviour. Section 446: procedure when a bond is forfeited. Section 446A: cancellation of bond and bail bond where a bond is forfeited, and the person shall not be released on his own bond in that case unless the court is satisfied he had no sufficient cause. Section 449: appeal from an order under section 446. Section 450: power to direct levy of the amount due on a bond.
Conclusion. The whole of the law turns on one classification, bailable or not, and one distinction, right or discretion. In a bailable offence release is automatic on the accused being ready to give bail; in a non-bailable offence it is a judicial discretion exercised on the material and on recorded reasons, closed to the Magistrate where the offence carries death or life imprisonment and reasonable grounds appear, but open to the Court of Session and the High Court under section 439 in every case. Around that core the Code has built four protections against the discretion becoming detention: section 436A for the undertrial who has served half his maximum, section 437(6) for the Magistrate's trial that has not begun in sixty days, the proviso to section 167(2) for the investigation that has not finished in sixty or ninety days, and section 438 for the man who has not yet been arrested at all. The governing statement remains that of Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51: bail is the rule and jail the exception, and an accused not arrested during the investigation should ordinarily not be taken into custody when he appears after the chargesheet.
Answer
A. What a complaint is.
Section 2(d) of the Code defines "complaint" as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.
The Explanation provides that a report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer making it the complainant.
Three features of the definition are examinable. It may be made orally or in writing. It must be made to a Magistrate, so an allegation to the police is not a complaint. And it excludes a police report, which is defined separately in section 2(r) as the report forwarded under section 173(2).
B. Taking cognizance: section 190.
Section 190(1): any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered, may take cognizance of any offence:
Taking cognizance is not a formal act. It means the application of the judicial mind to the allegations for the purpose of proceeding, and it is complete when the Magistrate applies his mind under Chapter XV: R. R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 207.
C. The procedure on a complaint: Chapter XV, sections 200 to 203.
Section 200, examination of the complainant. A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and signed by the complainant and the witnesses and by the Magistrate.
The proviso dispenses with that examination in two cases: where the complaint is made in writing by a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties, or by a court; and where the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192, in which case the second Magistrate need not re-examine them.
Section 201, procedure by a Magistrate not competent to take cognizance. If the complaint is made to a Magistrate who is not competent to take cognizance, he shall, if the complaint is in writing, return it for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement to that effect, and if it is not in writing, direct the complainant to the proper court.
Section 202, postponement of issue of process. A Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction, postpone the issue of process and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
The words "and shall" were inserted in 2005 and are mandatory: where the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's jurisdiction, the inquiry or investigation under section 202 is compulsory before process issues. The purpose, as the Supreme Court explained in Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mamtaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638, is to protect a person living far away from being summoned on a false complaint.
Two provisos limit the section: no such direction for investigation shall be made where it appears the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, or where the complaint has not been made by a court unless the complainant and the witnesses present have been examined on oath under section 200. Section 202(2) allows the Magistrate, where the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.
Section 203, dismissal of complaint. If, after considering the statements on oath of the complainant and of the witnesses and the result of the inquiry or investigation under section 202, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall dismiss the complaint, and in every such case he shall briefly record his reasons.
D. Commencement of proceedings: Chapter XVI, sections 204 to 210.
Section 204, issue of process. If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall issue:
Section 204(2): no summons or warrant shall be issued until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. Section 204(3): where the proceeding is instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint. Section 204(4): if the process fee or other fees payable is not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint.
Section 205, magistrate may dispense with personal attendance of the accused, permitting him to appear by his pleader, with a power to direct his personal attendance at any stage.
Section 206, special summons in cases of petty offences, allowing the accused to plead guilty by post and remit the fine.
Section 207, supply of copies to the accused in a police report case: the police report, the FIR, the statements under section 161 of the persons the prosecution proposes to examine, any confession or statement under section 164, and any other document forwarded with the police report, all free of cost. Section 208 is the equivalent in a case instituted otherwise than on a police report where the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session.
Section 209, commitment to the Court of Session. When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise the accused appears and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall commit the case to that court after complying with sections 207 or 208, remand the accused to custody until the commitment has been made and thereafter during and until the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions of bail, send the record and the documents to the Court of Session, and notify the Public Prosecutor.
Section 210, procedure where there is a complaint case and a police investigation in respect of the same offence. The Magistrate shall stay the proceedings on the complaint and call for a report from the police officer; and if a report is made under section 173 and cognizance is taken on it, he shall inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if both were instituted on a police report.
Conclusion. A private complaint travels through three judicial filters before the accused is ever summoned, and that is the point of the chapters. The Magistrate must examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath under section 200; he may, and where the accused lives outside his jurisdiction must, inquire or direct an investigation under section 202; and he must be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding before issuing process under section 204, dismissing the complaint with recorded reasons under section 203 if he is not. Only then does the case commence in the ordinary sense, with a summons or a warrant, a list of witnesses, a copy of the complaint, and, if the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, a commitment under section 209.
Answer
A. What an FIR is.
The expression "first information report" does not appear in the Code. It is the name given in practice to the information recorded under section 154: the first information in point of time of the commission of a cognizable offence, given to the officer in charge of a police station and recorded by him in the prescribed form.
Section 154(1): every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally, shall be reduced to writing by or under the direction of the officer in charge, be read over to the informant, and be signed by the person giving it; and its substance shall be entered in a book kept by the officer in the form prescribed by the State Government.
The 2013 provisos: where the information relates to an offence under sections 326A, 326B, 354, 354A to 354D, 376, 376A to 376E or 509 of the Penal Code, it shall be recorded by a woman police officer; and where the person against whom such an offence is alleged is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, the information shall be recorded at her residence or a place of her choice in the presence of an interpreter or special educator, and shall be videographed, and the officer shall get her statement recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under section 164(5A) as soon as possible.
Section 154(2): a copy of the information as recorded shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant.
Section 154(3): where the officer in charge refuses to record the information, the aggrieved person may send its substance in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police, who shall, if satisfied that it discloses a cognizable offence, either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation by a subordinate.
Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench, holds that registration of an FIR is mandatory under section 154 if the information discloses a cognizable offence, and that no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation; a preliminary inquiry may be made only to ascertain whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, not to verify the veracity of the information, and should be completed within a fixed period. It may be appropriate in matrimonial and family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence, corruption cases and cases of abnormal delay.
Evidentiary value. An FIR is not substantive evidence. It may be used to corroborate its maker under section 157 of the Evidence Act, or to contradict him under section 145; and if the informant dies, it may be admissible as a dying declaration under section 32(1).
B. The procedure of investigation, step by step.
Step 1, the power. Section 156(1): an officer in charge of a police station may investigate any cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate. Section 156(2): no proceeding shall be questioned on the ground that the case was one which he was not empowered to investigate. Section 156(3): a Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order an investigation. For a non-cognizable offence, section 155(2) forbids investigation without a Magistrate's order.
Step 2, report to the Magistrate and proceeding to the spot: section 157. On reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, the officer shall forthwith send a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance on a police report, and shall proceed in person, or depute a subordinate, to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances and, if necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Proviso (a) allows him not to go in person where the information is against a person by name and the case is not serious; proviso (b) allows him not to investigate at all if it appears there is no sufficient ground, but he must then record his reasons and notify the informant.
Step 3, examination of witnesses: sections 160 to 163. Section 160, written order requiring attendance, with the proviso that no man under fifteen or above sixty-five, no woman and no mentally or physically disabled person shall be required to attend anywhere other than where he or she resides. Section 161, oral examination; the person is bound to answer truly except where the answer would expose him to a criminal charge; the officer may reduce the statement to writing, separately for each person, and a woman victim's statement in the listed offences is to be recorded by a woman police officer. Section 162, statements not to be signed and not usable for any purpose except to contradict under section 145 of the Evidence Act, saving statements under section 32(1) and section 27. Section 163, no inducement, threat or promise.
Step 4, confessions and statements before a Magistrate: sections 164 and 164A. A Metropolitan or Judicial Magistrate may record a confession or statement, after warning the maker that he is not bound to make it and that it may be used against him, and only on being satisfied that it is voluntary, with the confession signed and a memorandum appended. Section 164(5A) requires a Magistrate to record the statement of a victim of the listed sexual offences. Section 164A provides for the medical examination of the victim of rape within twenty-four hours with her consent.
Step 5, search and seizure: sections 165, 100 and 102. Section 165, search by a police officer on recorded grounds of belief that a thing necessary for the investigation may be found within his station limits and cannot otherwise be obtained without undue delay, with copies of the record sent forthwith to the nearest Magistrate; section 100, the search to be witnessed by two or more independent and respectable inhabitants who sign the list of things seized; section 102, seizure of property suspected to be stolen or found in circumstances creating suspicion of an offence, with a report to the Magistrate.
Step 6, arrest and custody: sections 41, 41A, 57 and 167. Arrest without warrant under section 41, only on recorded satisfaction of necessity where the offence carries up to seven years, with a notice of appearance under section 41A instead; production before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours under section 57; and remand under section 167, with detention pending investigation capped at ninety days where the offence is punishable with death, life or not less than ten years, and sixty days otherwise, whereupon the accused shall be released on default bail.
Step 7, release or forwarding: sections 169 and 170. Section 169: if there is not sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion, the officer shall release the accused on a bond to appear before the Magistrate. Section 170: if there is sufficient evidence, he shall forward the accused to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance, and take security for the appearance of the complainant and witnesses.
Step 8, the record: section 172. The officer shall enter his proceedings day by day in a diary, with the times at which the information reached him and at which he began and closed the investigation, the places visited, and a statement of the circumstances ascertained. A criminal court may send for the diaries and use them to aid it, but not as evidence, and the accused is not entitled to call for them except as section 172(3) allows.
Step 9, the final report: section 173. Every investigation shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and, by section 173(1A), within two months in the sexual offence cases listed. On completion the officer forwards to the Magistrate a report in the prescribed form, section 173(2), stating the names of the parties, the nature of the information, the names of the persons acquainted with the circumstances, whether an offence appears to have been committed and by whom, whether the accused has been arrested, whether he has been released on bond, and whether he has been forwarded in custody; and he shall communicate the action taken to the informant. Sections 173(5) and (6) require the statements and documents relied on to be forwarded, with a request where appropriate that a part be excluded from the copies given to the accused. Section 173(8) preserves the power of further investigation after the report.
Conclusion. The chain runs from the information to the report, and the Code puts the two ends under judicial control while leaving the middle to the police. Registration under section 154 is mandatory on Lalita Kumari; the investigation itself proceeds on the officer's own satisfaction under sections 156, 157, 161 and 165 with no leave required; and it ends at section 173(2) with a report on which the Magistrate, not the police, decides whether there will be a trial. In between, the two provisions that matter most to the accused are section 162, which makes what the police record almost worthless as substantive evidence, and section 167, which makes custody without a completed investigation impossible beyond sixty or ninety days.
Answer
A. How a case reaches the Court of Session.
A Court of Session cannot take cognizance of an offence as a court of original jurisdiction. Section 193 says so expressly, save as otherwise provided by the Code or any other law, and section 199(2) is one such exception, for defamation of the President, Vice President, a Governor or a Minister.
The case therefore comes by commitment. Section 209: when in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise the accused appears before a Magistrate and it appears that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the Magistrate shall, after complying with sections 207 or 208, commit the case to the Court of Session, remand the accused to custody subject to bail, send the record and documents, and notify the Public Prosecutor.
The trial is governed by Chapter XVIII, sections 225 to 237.
B. The trial, step by step.
Section 225, trial to be conducted by a Public Prosecutor. In every trial before a Court of Session, the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.
Section 226, opening the case for the prosecution. When the accused appears or is brought before the court in pursuance of the commitment, the prosecutor shall open his case by describing the charge brought against the accused and stating by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused.
Section 227, discharge. If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted with it, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons.
Section 228, framing of charge. If, after such consideration and hearing, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which:
Section 228(2): where the Judge frames a charge, it shall be read and explained to the accused, and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or claims to be tried.
Section 229, conviction on plea of guilty. If the accused pleads guilty, the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict him.
Section 230, date for prosecution evidence. If the accused refuses to plead, does not plead, claims to be tried, or is not convicted on his plea, the Judge shall fix a date for the examination of witnesses and may, on the application of the prosecution, issue process for compelling attendance of any witness or the production of any document.
Section 231, evidence for the prosecution. On the date so fixed, the Judge shall proceed to take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution; and he may in his discretion permit the cross-examination of any witness to be deferred until any other witness has been examined, or recall any witness for further cross-examination.
Section 232, acquittal. If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, he shall record an order of acquittal. This is the stage of "no case to answer".
Section 233, entering upon defence. Where the accused is not acquitted under section 232, he shall be called upon to enter on his defence and adduce any evidence he may have. If he puts in a written statement, the Judge shall file it with the record. If he applies for the issue of process for compelling the attendance of a witness or the production of a document, the Judge shall issue it unless he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that the application is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice.
Section 234, arguments. When the examination of the witnesses for the defence is complete, the prosecutor shall sum up his case and the accused or his pleader shall be entitled to reply; provided that where any point of law is raised by the accused, the prosecution may, with the permission of the Judge, make his submissions with regard to that point of law.
Section 235, judgment of acquittal or conviction. After hearing arguments and points of law, the Judge shall give a judgment in the case. Section 235(2): if the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him according to law.
Section 236, previous conviction. In a case where a previous conviction is charged under section 211(7) and the accused does not admit it, the Judge may, after convicting him under section 229 or section 235, take evidence in respect of the alleged previous conviction and record a finding thereon; but he shall not read out the charge of previous conviction nor ask the accused to plead to it, nor refer to it in the earlier part of the trial.
Section 237, procedure in cases instituted under section 199(2), the special procedure for defamation of high public functionaries, tried by the Court of Session without commitment, and in camera if the court so directs, with a power to award compensation up to one thousand rupees to the accused if the court discharges or acquits him and finds that the accusation was made without reasonable cause.
C. The safeguards that run through the trial.
Section 235(2), the hearing on sentence. In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190, the Supreme Court held that this is a substantial right and not a formality, and that a failure to comply vitiates the sentence, though not the conviction.
Section 313, examination of the accused. The court shall, after the prosecution witnesses have been examined and before the accused is called on for his defence, question him generally on the case, so that he may personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; no oath is administered and he is not liable to punishment for a refusal or a false answer.
Section 366, the mandatory reference to the High Court where the court passes a sentence of death, and section 354(3), the requirement of special reasons for such a sentence.
Conclusion. A sessions trial is the Code's most complete procedure, and its shape is governed by the seriousness of what is at stake. It cannot begin at all without a commitment under section 209; it is conducted by a Public Prosecutor and by no one else; it passes through a judicial filter at section 227 before the accused is put on trial, and a second one at section 232 before he is put to his defence; the accused is heard separately on sentence under section 235(2); and if a death sentence is passed, it has no force until the High Court confirms it under section 366. Every one of those features exists because the offences tried here are those the First Schedule marks as exclusively triable by the Court of Session.
Answer
A. What an appeal is.
An appeal is the judicial examination by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court, at the instance of a party aggrieved by it. The Code does not define it, and the governing rule is negative. Section 372: no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force.
There is therefore no inherent right of appeal. It is a creature of statute, and the first task in any problem is to find the section that gives it. Chapter XXIX, sections 372 to 394, contains the law.
B. When an appeal can be filed: the sections that give the right.
Section 373: appeal against an order under section 117 requiring security for keeping the peace or good behaviour, or refusing to accept or rejecting a surety under section 121, to the Court of Session.
Section 374, appeals from convictions, the principal section:
The proviso to section 372, appeal by the victim. Inserted with effect from 31 December 2009: the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the court acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of that court. In Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, decided 12 October 2018, the Supreme Court held that this right is unfettered and absolute and requires no leave.
Section 377, appeal by the State against the inadequacy of a sentence, to the Court of Session where the sentence was passed by a Magistrate and to the High Court in any other case; and by the Central Government where the investigation was by a central agency. Section 377(3) requires the court to give the accused a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, and he may plead for his acquittal or for the reduction of the sentence.
Section 378, appeal in case of acquittal: the District Magistrate may direct the Public Prosecutor to appeal to the Court of Session from a Magistrate's order of acquittal in a cognizable and non-bailable offence; the State Government may direct an appeal to the High Court in any other case, with the leave of the High Court under section 378(3); and in a case instituted upon complaint, the complainant may appeal to the High Court only with special leave under section 378(4), applied for within sixty days, or six months where the complainant is a public servant.
Section 379, appeal against conviction by a High Court in certain cases: where the High Court has, on appeal, reversed an order of acquittal and sentenced the accused to death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for ten years or more, he may appeal to the Supreme Court.
Section 380, special right of appeal: where more persons than one are convicted in one trial and an appealable judgment has been passed in respect of any of them, all of them may appeal.
C. When an appeal cannot be filed.
Section 375, no appeal on a plea of guilty, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence.
Section 376, no appeal in petty cases: a High Court sentence of imprisonment not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding one thousand rupees; a Court of Session or Metropolitan Magistrate sentence of imprisonment not exceeding three months or fine not exceeding two hundred rupees; a first class Magistrate's fine not exceeding one hundred rupees; or a fine not exceeding two hundred rupees in a summary trial. The proviso allows an appeal if any other punishment is combined with such a sentence.
D. The procedure.
Section 382: the appeal shall be by a petition in writing presented by the appellant or his pleader, accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order.
Section 383: an appellant in jail may present his petition and copies to the officer in charge of the jail, who shall forward them to the proper appellate court.
Section 384, summary dismissal: the appellate court may dismiss the appeal if it considers there is no sufficient ground for interfering, but the proviso forbids dismissal without giving the appellant or his pleader a reasonable opportunity of being heard, except where the appeal is against a sentence of fine only, or is presented under section 383 and the court considers it frivolous.
Section 385: procedure for hearing an appeal not dismissed summarily, with notice and the calling for of the record.
Section 386, powers of the appellate court. In an appeal from an order of acquittal, it may reverse the order and direct further inquiry or a retrial, or find the accused guilty and pass sentence. In an appeal from a conviction, it may reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order a retrial; alter the finding, maintaining the sentence; or with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent of the sentence, but not so as to enhance it. In an appeal for enhancement of sentence, it may enhance, but not without giving the accused an opportunity of showing cause, and the sentence shall not exceed what the trial court might have inflicted.
Section 389: suspension of sentence and release of the appellant on bail pending appeal, with reasons in writing and notice to the Public Prosecutor where the conviction is for death, life or ten years or more. Section 391: power of the appellate court to take further evidence or direct it to be taken.
Section 393, finality: judgments and orders of an appellate court are final, except as provided in sections 377, 378, 384(4) and Chapter XXX. Section 394, abatement: an appeal under section 377 or 378 abates on the death of the accused; every other appeal, except from a sentence of fine, abates on the death of the appellant, with a proviso allowing a near relative to apply within thirty days for leave to continue an appeal against a conviction and sentence of death or imprisonment.
Conclusion. The Code's answer to "when can an appeal be filed" is that it can be filed only where a section says so, and which section applies is decided by three facts: who is appealing, the accused, the State, the complainant or the victim; what is appealed against, a conviction, an acquittal, a sentence or a security order; and which court decided it, since the forum ascends with the seniority of the trial court. Section 372 states the rule and every other section in the Chapter is an exception to it, which is why an appeal that cannot be found in one of them is not an appeal at all, and the only remedies left are revision under sections 397 to 401 or the High Court's inherent power under section 482.
Answer
Chapter XXV of the Code, sections 328 to 339, is headed "Provisions as to accused persons of unsound mind". It answers a problem that is procedural and not substantive: section 84 of the Indian Penal Code decides whether a person was of unsound mind at the time of the offence and is therefore not guilty; Chapter XXV decides what happens when he is of unsound mind at the time of the inquiry or trial and cannot defend himself.
The case to cite is Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, which draws the line this Chapter depends on. The Supreme Court held that what section 84 of the Penal Code requires is legal insanity and not medical insanity; that the burden of establishing it lies on the accused and is discharged on a preponderance of probabilities under section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act; that the crucial time is the moment of the act; and that even where the accused fails to discharge that burden, evidence of his mental condition may still raise a reasonable doubt about the mens rea the prosecution has to prove. Chapter XXV asks a wholly different question, about his capacity now, at the inquiry or trial.
A. Unsoundness during the inquiry: section 328.
When a Magistrate holding an inquiry has reason to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate shall inquire into the fact of such unsoundness, and shall cause him to be examined by the civil surgeon of the district or such other medical officer as the State Government directs, and thereupon shall examine the surgeon or officer as a witness and reduce the examination to writing.
Section 328(1A), substituted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 with effect from 31 December 2009: the civil surgeon who finds the accused of unsound mind shall refer him to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist for care, treatment and prognosis, and that psychiatrist or psychologist shall inform the Magistrate whether the accused is suffering from unsoundness of mind or mental retardation. An accused aggrieved by that information may appeal to a Medical Board consisting of the head of the psychiatry unit in the nearest government hospital and a faculty member in psychiatry in the nearest medical college.
Section 328(2): pending that examination and inquiry, the Magistrate may deal with the accused in accordance with section 330.
Section 328(3), where the accused is of unsound mind: the Magistrate shall further determine whether it renders him incapable of entering defence; if it does, he shall record a finding, examine the record of the evidence produced by the prosecution and hear the accused's advocate but without questioning the accused; and if he finds that no prima facie case is made out, he shall, instead of postponing the inquiry, discharge the accused and deal with him under section 330. The proviso: where a prima facie case is made out, he shall postpone the proceeding for such period as, in the opinion of the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, is required for treatment, and deal with the accused under section 330.
Section 328(4), where the accused is a person with mental retardation: on determining that it renders him incapable of entering defence, the Magistrate shall order closure of the inquiry and deal with him under section 330. The contrast is deliberate. Unsoundness of mind is postponed, because it may lift and the trial can then revive; mental retardation is closed, because it will not.
B. Unsoundness during the trial: section 329.
If at the trial before a Magistrate or a Court of Session it appears to the Magistrate or Court that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court shall, in the first instance, try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity, and if satisfied of it, shall record a finding and postpone further proceedings. Section 329(1A) provides the same reference to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the same appeal to the Medical Board. Section 329(2) repeats the discharge rule of section 328(3) in the same words for a trial, and section 329(3) repeats the mental retardation rule, closing the trial.
C. Release or custody pending the finding: section 330.
Section 330(1), as substituted in 2009: whenever a person is found under section 328 or section 329 to be incapable of entering defence by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental retardation, the Magistrate or Court shall, whether the case is one in which bail may be taken or not, order his release on bail. The proviso attaches two conditions: that the condition does not mandate in-patient treatment, and that a friend or relative undertakes to obtain regular out-patient psychiatric treatment from the nearest medical facility and to prevent him from doing injury to himself or to any other person.
Section 330(2): if in the opinion of the Magistrate or Court bail cannot be granted, or if an appropriate undertaking is not given, the accused shall be ordered to be kept in such a place where regular psychiatric treatment can be provided, and the action reported to the State Government; but no order for detention in a lunatic asylum shall be made otherwise than in accordance with such rules as the State Government may have made under the Mental Health Act, 1987.
Section 330(3): the Magistrate or Court shall, keeping in view the nature of the act committed and the extent of the unsoundness of mind or mental retardation, further determine whether the accused can be released. Under proviso (a), where on medical or specialist opinion it decides to discharge him under section 328 or section 329, release may be ordered on sufficient security that he will be prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person. Under proviso (b), where discharge cannot be ordered, it may direct his transfer to a residential facility for persons of unsound mind or mental retardation, where he is to be given care and appropriate education and training.
D. Resumption: sections 331 and 332.
Section 331: whenever an inquiry or trial is postponed under section 328 or section 329, the Magistrate or Court may at any time resume it and require the accused to appear or be brought before it, when it shall proceed further. If the accused has been released under section 330 and his sureties fail to produce him, the court shall issue process for his appearance.
Section 332(1): if, when the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate or Court, he considers him capable of making his defence, the inquiry or trial shall proceed. Section 332(2): if he considers the accused still incapable, he shall act under section 328 or section 329 as the case may be, and if the accused is found to be of unsound mind and incapable of making his defence, shall deal with him under section 330.
E. When the accused appears to have been of unsound mind at the time of the act: sections 334 and 335.
Section 334, judgment of acquittal on the ground of unsoundness of mind. Whenever any person is acquitted upon the ground that, at the time at which he is alleged to have committed an offence, he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not.
Section 335, person acquitted on such ground to be detained in safe custody. Whenever the finding states that the accused did commit the act alleged, the Magistrate or Court shall, if the act would but for the incapacity have constituted an offence, order the person to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as the Court thinks fit, or deliver him to any relative or friend of such person. No such order for delivery shall be made except on the application of a relative or friend who gives security that the person delivered shall be properly taken care of and prevented from doing injury to himself or to any other person, and shall be produced for the inspection of such officer as the State Government directs.
F. Release: sections 337 to 339.
Section 337: where a person is confined under section 330 or section 335, and the Inspector General of Prisons, or the visitors of the asylum, or any two of them, certify that in their judgment he may be released without danger of his doing injury to himself or to any other person, the State Government may order him to be released or detained, or transferred to a public lunatic asylum.
Section 338: where such a person is detained in an asylum and the medical officer certifies that in his judgment the person may be discharged to the care of a relative or friend, the State Government may, on the application of that relative or friend and on his giving security, order the delivery.
Section 339: where any relative or friend to whom a person is delivered under section 335 or section 338 desires that he be again received into custody, or where the security is not observed, the person may be retaken and confined.
Conclusion. Chapter XXV rests on a single principle: a person who cannot understand the proceedings cannot be tried, because a trial he cannot follow is not a trial at all but a formality conducted over him. So the court must first try the fact of incapacity, on medical evidence routed since 2009 through a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist with an appeal to a Medical Board; it must then postpone the proceedings rather than continue them; and it may resume the trial the moment he becomes capable.
Three provisions of the 2009 amendment complete it, and they carry the marks. Sections 328(3) and 329(2) require a discharge rather than an indefinite postponement where no prima facie case is made out. Sections 328(4) and 329(3) treat mental retardation as a different thing from unsoundness of mind and close the proceeding instead of postponing it. And section 330 now begins at bail on an undertaking of out-patient psychiatric treatment, reaching a place of treatment only where bail is impossible. Sections 334 and 335 deal with the different question of a person who was insane at the time of the act, requiring the finding to state whether he committed the act and providing for his detention in safe custody rather than his simple release.
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This volume prints the 2018-19 CRPC paper set by the University of Mumbai for BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9, with a model answer to each of its 25 questions.
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11 August 2026.
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