BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 CRPC 2017-18 Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(d) of the Code defines "complaint" as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.

The Explanation provides that a report made by a police officer in a case which discloses, after investigation, the commission of a non-cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer making it the complainant.

Inquiry, section 2(g), means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.

Investigation, section 2(h), includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf.

The distinction is in who conducts it and for what: an inquiry is judicial, conducted by a Magistrate or court to ascertain whether there is ground to proceed; an investigation is executive, conducted by the police to collect evidence.

Under section 47 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, an observation home is a home established or maintained in every district or group of districts by a State Government, either by itself or through a voluntary or non-governmental organisation, and registered under section 41, for the temporary reception, care and rehabilitation of any child alleged to be in conflict with law, during the pendency of any inquiry under the Act.

Section 2(r) of the Code defines "police report" as a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of section 173.

Section 173(2) requires the officer in charge of the police station, as soon as the investigation is completed, to forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report a report in the prescribed form stating the names of the parties, the nature of the information, the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances, whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom, whether the accused has been arrested, whether he has been released on bond, and whether he has been forwarded in custody.

Section 2(24) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines "corporal punishment" as the subjecting of a child by any person to physical punishment that involves the deliberate infliction of pain as retribution for an offence, or for the purpose of disciplining or reforming the child.

Section 82 makes it an offence: any person in charge of or employed in a child care institution, who subjects a child to corporal punishment with a view to disciplining the child, shall be liable, on the first conviction, to a fine of ten thousand rupees, and for every subsequent offence, to imprisonment which may extend to three months or a fine or both. Sub-section (2) provides that if a person employed in such an institution is convicted, he shall also be liable for dismissal from service and shall be debarred from working directly with children thereafter; and sub-section (3) makes the management liable where it conceals or abets such punishment.

Section 174(2): the report shall be signed by the police officer and the other persons and forwarded to the District Magistrate or the Sub-divisional Magistrate.

Section 174(3): the body shall be forwarded for post-mortem examination where there is any doubt regarding the cause of death, or where the officer considers it expedient, and in the three cases relating to the death of a woman within seven years of her marriage: a suicide by such a woman; a death in circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person committed an offence; and a case where a relative of the woman has made a request in that behalf.

Section 175 empowers the officer to summon persons acquainted with the facts, who are bound to attend and answer truly.

Magisterial inquest, section 176. Where the case is of the nature referred to in clause (i) or (ii) of section 174(3), the nearest Magistrate empowered to hold inquests shall, and in any other case mentioned in section 174(1) may, hold an inquiry into the cause of death either instead of or in addition to the police investigation.

Chapter IX of the Code, sections 125 to 128, provides a speedy, summary remedy against destitution. It is not part of any personal law and applies to persons of every religion.

Section 125(1): if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:

1. his wife, unable to maintain herself; or
2. his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself; or
3. his legitimate or illegitimate child, not being a married daughter, who has attained majority, where that child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury, unable to maintain itself; or
4. his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,

a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order him to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of such person, at such monthly rate as the Magistrate thinks fit.

Section 125(4), disqualifications: no wife shall be entitled to an allowance if she is living in adultery, or if without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. Section 125(5) allows the order to be cancelled on proof of any of these.

Section 126: proceedings may be taken in any district where he is, or where he or his wife resides, or where he last resided with his wife; evidence is taken in the presence of the person against whom the order is proposed, in the manner prescribed for summons cases, with a power to proceed ex parte and to set aside the ex parte order for good cause within three months.

Section 127: alteration in allowance on proof of a change in circumstances, and cancellation where a divorced woman has received the whole of the sum payable under any customary or personal law. Section 128: enforcement of the order by any Magistrate in any place where the person may be, on a copy being supplied.

Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 is the provision, and it is headed "Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct".

Section 4(1): when any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and the court by which he is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The related powers. Section 3, release after due admonition, where the offence is under sections 379, 380, 381, 404 or 420 of the Penal Code or is punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years or with fine or both, and no previous conviction is proved. Section 6, where the offender is under twenty-one, the court shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless satisfied that it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and must record its reasons and call for a report. Section 5, compensation and costs. Section 8, variation of the conditions of a bond within the three-year limit. Section 9, breach, on which the court may sentence him for the original offence or, on a first failure, impose a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees. Section 11, an order may be made by any court competent to try and sentence, and by the High Court or any other court in appeal or revision. Section 12, no disqualification attaching to the conviction.

An accomplice is a guilty associate or partner in the crime: a person who has himself participated in the offence charged and is then produced as a witness for the prosecution against those who took part with him. The Code does not define him, and his position rests on two provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Section 133: an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person, and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Illustration (b) to section 114: the court may presume that an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless he is corroborated in material particulars.

How they are reconciled. Section 133 is a rule of law; illustration (b) is a rule of prudence; and the settled practice, stated in Bhiva Doulu Patil v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 599, and Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637, is that the rule of prudence has become so well established that a court will practically always look for corroboration.

How he becomes a witness: sections 306 to 308 of the Code. A Chief Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation, inquiry or trial, and a Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, may tender a pardon to a person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence, on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge. Section 306(2) confines it to an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by a Special Judge, or punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or more. Section 306(4) requires the person accepting the pardon to be examined as a witness in the court of the Magistrate and in the subsequent trial, and, unless already on bail, to be detained in custody until the termination of the trial. Section 307 allows the Court of Session, after commitment and before judgment, to tender a pardon. Section 308 allows his trial where he has wilfully concealed anything essential or given false evidence, with the sanction of the High Court required for a prosecution for giving false evidence.

Anticipatory bail is a direction that a person shall be released on bail in the event of his arrest. It is granted before the arrest, on an apprehension of it, and it is contained in section 438 of the Code, inserted on the recommendation of the 41st Report of the Law Commission, 1969, because the previous Code had no such provision and influential persons were implicating rivals in false cases in order to have them detained.

Section 438(1): where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section; and that court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail.

The court must take into consideration:

1. the nature and gravity of the accusation;
2. the antecedents of the applicant, including whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction for a cognizable offence;

The two Constitution Bench decisions that govern section 438. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, the Supreme Court held that section 438 is a beneficent provision protecting the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21; that the limitations of section 437 are not to be read into it; that the applicant need not show that the accusation is false or that his case is exceptional; and that the court ought not ordinarily to limit the duration of the order. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, a five judge Bench settled the question Sibbia had left open and held that anticipatory bail, once granted, need not be limited to a fixed period and ordinarily continues till the end of the trial, unless the peculiar features of the case require a limit to be set.

Section 2(14) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines it in eleven clauses. It means a child:

1. who is found without any home or settled place of abode and without any ostensible means of subsistence;
2. who is found working in contravention of labour laws or is found begging or living on the street;
3. who resides with a person who has injured, exploited, abused or neglected the child or has violated any other law meant for the protection of children, or where there is a reasonable likelihood of his doing so;
4. who is mentally ill or mentally or physically challenged or suffering from a terminal or incurable disease, having no one to support or look after him, or having parents or guardians unfit or incapacitated to care for him;
5. who has a parent or guardian unfit or incapacitated, as determined by the Committee or the Board;

Production and inquiry. Section 31 allows a police officer, a public servant, Childline, a registered voluntary organisation, a social worker or public spirited citizen, a nurse or doctor, or the child himself, to produce him before the Committee within twenty-four hours. Section 33 requires him to be given care and protection pending the inquiry. Section 36 requires the inquiry to be completed within four months, extendable by two.

Orders, section 37. Restoration to the parent, guardian or fit person; placement in a children's home or fit facility; foster care under section 44; sponsorship under section 45; a declaration that the child is legally free for adoption under section 38; or a direction for aftercare under section 46.

Conclusion. The category is the Act's second and larger stream, and the distinction from a child in conflict with law is the whole point of it. That child has done something; this child has had something done to him, or has nobody at all. So the authority is the Committee and not the Board, the process is an inquiry into his need rather than into an offence, and the orders run to restoration, foster care and adoption rather than to admonition or a special home. The 2015 Act widened the earlier list to name child marriage, trafficking, drug abuse and armed conflict.

(i) Either. Both the court in Delhi and the court in Mumbai have jurisdiction.

(ii) The provision is section 179, read with the general rule in section 177.

Section 177 states the ordinary rule: every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Standing alone it would give jurisdiction only to Delhi, where the wounding took place.

The supporting provisions. Section 178 covers the related situations: where it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed; where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another; where it consists of several acts done in different local areas; or where it is a continuing offence continued in more than one local area. In each of those the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of the areas.

Section 186 resolves a conflict: where two or more courts have taken cognizance of the same offence and a question arises as to which of them ought to inquire into or try it, the question shall be decided, if the courts are subordinate to the same High Court, by that High Court, and otherwise by the High Court within whose appellate criminal jurisdiction the proceedings were first commenced.

Section 461(l) provides that if a Magistrate not empowered by law tries an offender, the proceedings shall be void; but section 462 is the saving provision that matters here: no finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.

(i) To the High Court.

Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, attempt to murder, is punishable with imprisonment of either description which may extend to ten years and a fine, and where hurt is caused, with imprisonment for life. Under the First Schedule it is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and triable by the Court of Session.

The acquittal is therefore an original order of acquittal of a Court of Session, and the appeal lies to the High Court.

Section 378(1)(b): the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court. Section 378(3): no such appeal shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court.

"Victim" is defined by section 2(wa) as a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the accused has been charged, and includes his guardian or legal heir. Shyam, the person against whom the attempt was made, is squarely within it.

In Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, decided 12 October 2018, the Supreme Court held that the victim's right under the proviso is unfettered and absolute; that he need not apply for leave, whether under section 378(3) or section 378(4); and that the right is available where the order of acquittal was passed after 31 December 2009, even though the offence was committed earlier. Parliament, the Court reasoned, deliberately conferred the right without conditions, and reading in a requirement of leave would defeat the amendment.

Conclusion. The appeal lies to the High Court, and there are two independent routes to it: the State through the Public Prosecutor under section 378(1)(b), which requires leave under section 378(3); and Shyam himself as the victim under the proviso to section 372, which requires none. The victim's route is the better one on these facts, because it does not depend on the State choosing to appeal and it carries no preliminary hurdle to be argued.

Section 437(1) governs an application to a Magistrate and contains a prohibition: a court other than the High Court or Court of Session may release the accused, but shall not do so if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Section 376(1) is punishable with imprisonment for life, so wherever the material discloses reasonable grounds, the Magistrate cannot grant bail.

The first and second provisos permit release even within the bar where the accused is under sixteen years of age, is a woman, or is sick or infirm, and the third proviso where the court is satisfied that it is just and proper for any other special reason. Under section 437(2), where it appears at any stage that there are not reasonable grounds for believing him guilty but there are sufficient grounds for further inquiry, he shall be released on bail.

Anticipatory bail under section 438 is available from the High Court or Court of Session for section 376(1), but section 438(4) excludes it altogether for sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB.

Any bail granted must carry conditions that comply with Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided 18 March 2021, in which the Supreme Court held that bail conditions must be confined to those in section 437(3) and must not mandate or permit any contact between the accused and the victim.

(ii) No. Rape cannot be compounded, and no permission of any court can make it compoundable.

Section 320(9) provides that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. Section 376 appears in neither the table to section 320(1) nor the table to section 320(2), so it is non-compoundable.

Conclusion. A may be released on bail, but the discretion belongs in practice to the Court of Session or the High Court under section 439, because section 437(1) shuts out the Magistrate wherever reasonable grounds appear that he is guilty of an offence punishable with life imprisonment; and his clearest entitlement arises on the ninety-first day if no chargesheet has been filed. He cannot compound the offence at all: section 320(9) makes the two tables exhaustive, rape is in neither, and Shimbhu forecloses any argument that a settlement should soften the sentence instead.

A. What bail is.

The Code does not define bail. It is judicially understood as the release of a person from the custody of the law upon an undertaking, secured by a bond with or without sureties, that he will appear and answer the charge. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has since defined it for the first time in Indian law, in section 2(1)(b), as the release of a person accused of or suspected of the commission of an offence on the execution by such person of a bond or bail bond.

The governing principle was put by Justice Krishna Iyer in State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308: "the basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail", because a person is presumed innocent and the only object of pre-trial custody is to secure his presence.

B. Bailable offences: bail as of right, section 436.

Section 2(a) defines a bailable offence as one shown as bailable in the First Schedule or made bailable by any other law.

Section 437(1): a court other than the High Court or Court of Session may release the accused, but shall not do so if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or if the offence is cognizable and he has been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, life or seven years or more, or on two or more occasions of a cognizable offence punishable with three to seven years. The provisos permit release notwithstanding, where the accused is under sixteen, a woman, or sick or infirm, or where it is just and proper for any other special reason.

Section 437(2): release where it appears there are not reasonable grounds for believing him guilty but sufficient grounds for further inquiry.

Section 437(3): where the offence is punishable with seven years or more, or falls under Chapters VI, XVI or XVII of the Penal Code, the court shall impose the conditions that he attend in accordance with the bond, not commit a similar offence, and not tamper with the evidence or threaten witnesses.

Section 437(5): the court which released him may direct that he be arrested and committed to custody.

E. Anticipatory bail, section 438. Available only from the High Court or Court of Session, on a reason to believe that the applicant may be arrested on an accusation of a non-bailable offence, having regard to the nature and gravity of the accusation, his antecedents, the possibility of his fleeing from justice, and whether the accusation is made with the object of injuring or humiliating him. Section 438(4) excludes it for sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB.

The two Constitution Bench decisions to cite are Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, which held that section 438 protects the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21, that the limitations of section 437 are not to be read into it, and that the applicant need not show that the accusation is false or his case exceptional; and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, in which a five judge Bench held that anticipatory bail once granted need not be limited to a fixed period and ordinarily continues till the end of the trial.

Conclusion. The whole of the law turns on one classification and one distinction: bailable or not, and right or discretion. In a bailable offence release is automatic on the accused being ready to give bail; in a non-bailable offence it is a judicial discretion exercised on the material and on recorded reasons, closed to the Magistrate where the offence carries death or life imprisonment and reasonable grounds appear, but open to the Court of Session and the High Court in every case. Around that core the Code has built four protections against the discretion becoming detention: section 436A for the undertrial who has served half his maximum, section 437(6) for the Magistrate's trial not concluded in sixty days, the proviso to section 167(2) for the investigation not completed in sixty or ninety days, and section 438 for the man not yet arrested. The governing statement remains Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51: bail is the rule and jail the exception.

4. Principle of best interest. All decisions regarding the child shall be based on the primary consideration that they are in the best interest of the child and to help the child to develop full potential.

5. Principle of family responsibility. The primary responsibility of care, nurture and protection of the child shall be that of the biological family or adoptive or foster parents, as the case may be.

6. Principle of safety. All measures shall be taken to ensure that the child is safe and is not subjected to any harm, abuse or maltreatment while in contact with the care and protection system, and thereafter.

7. Positive measures. All resources are to be mobilised, including those of the family and community, for promoting the well-being, facilitating development of identity and providing an inclusive and enabling environment, to reduce vulnerabilities of children and the need for intervention under this Act.

8. Principle of non-stigmatising semantics. Adversarial or accusatory words are not to be used in the processes pertaining to a child.

14. Principle of fresh start. All past records of any child under the Juvenile Justice system should be erased except in special circumstances.

15. Principle of diversion. Measures for dealing with children in conflict with law without resorting to judicial proceedings shall be promoted, unless it is in the best interest of the child or the society as a whole.

16. Principles of natural justice. Basic procedural standards of fairness shall be adhered to, including the right to a fair hearing, rule against bias and the right to review, by the Board and the Committee or as the case may be.

How the principles are enforced. They are not exhortation; each is given effect by an operative section.

Conclusion. The sixteen principles are what make the Act a code of care rather than a code of punishment, and they can be grouped in three. Four of them are about status: presumption of innocence up to eighteen, dignity and worth, equality and non-discrimination, and non-waiver of rights. Six are about process: participation, best interest, non-stigmatising semantics, privacy and confidentiality, natural justice, and diversion. And six are about outcome: family responsibility, safety, positive measures, institutionalisation as a last resort, repatriation and restoration, and the fresh start. Read together they explain why the Act gives a child presumptive bail whatever the offence, why its heaviest disposition is three years in a special home, and why the record is destroyed at the end.

When a Magistrate holding an inquiry has reason to believe that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, he shall inquire into the fact of such unsoundness, and shall cause him to be examined by the civil surgeon of the district or such other medical officer as the State Government directs, and shall then examine that surgeon or officer as a witness and reduce the examination to writing.

Section 328(1A), substituted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2008 with effect from 31 December 2009: if the civil surgeon finds the accused to be of unsound mind he shall refer him to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist for care, treatment and prognosis, and that psychiatrist or psychologist shall inform the Magistrate whether the accused is suffering from unsoundness of mind or mental retardation. The proviso allows an accused aggrieved by that information to appeal to a Medical Board consisting of the head of the psychiatry unit in the nearest government hospital and a faculty member in psychiatry in the nearest medical college.

Section 328(2): pending that examination and inquiry, the Magistrate may deal with the accused under section 330.

If at the trial before a Magistrate or a Court of Session it appears that the accused is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the court shall, in the first instance, try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity, and if satisfied of it, shall record a finding and postpone further proceedings. Section 329(1A) provides the same reference to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the same appeal to the Medical Board. Section 329(2) carries the discharge rule into the trial in the same words as section 328(3), and section 329(3) carries the mental retardation rule, closing the trial.

C. Release or custody: section 330.

Section 330(1), as substituted in 2009: whenever a person is found under section 328 or section 329 to be incapable of entering defence by reason of unsoundness of mind or mental retardation, the court shall, whether the case is one in which bail may be taken or not, order his release on bail. The proviso attaches two conditions: that the condition does not mandate in-patient treatment, and that a friend or relative undertakes to obtain regular out-patient psychiatric treatment from the nearest medical facility and to prevent him from doing injury to himself or to any other person.

Section 331: the court may at any time resume the inquiry or trial and require the accused to appear or be brought before it. Section 332(1): if he is then considered capable of making his defence, the inquiry or trial shall proceed. Section 332(2): if he is still incapable, the court shall act again under section 328 or section 329 and deal with him under section 330.

E. Where the unsoundness existed at the time of the act: sections 334 and 335.

Section 334: whenever a person is acquitted upon the ground that at the time of the act he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not.

Section 335: where the finding states that he did commit the act, the court shall, if the act would but for the incapacity have constituted an offence, order him to be detained in safe custody in such place and manner as it thinks fit, or deliver him to a relative or friend. No order of delivery shall be made except on the application of such a relative or friend who gives security that the person shall be properly taken care of, prevented from doing injury to himself or others, and produced for inspection by the officer the State Government directs.

Conclusion. The Chapter rests on a single proposition: a person who cannot understand the proceedings cannot be tried, because a trial he cannot follow is not a trial but a formality conducted over him. So the court must first try the fact of incapacity on medical evidence, now routed through a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist with an appeal to a Medical Board since 2009; it must postpone rather than continue; and it may resume the moment he becomes capable.

The 2009 amendment made three changes that carry the marks: section 328(3) and section 329(2) require a discharge where no prima facie case is made out, so that a man unfit to plead is not held indefinitely for a case that would never have succeeded; section 328(4) and section 329(3) treat mental retardation differently from unsoundness of mind, closing the proceeding rather than postponing it, because that incapacity will not lift; and section 330 now begins with bail on an undertaking of out-patient psychiatric treatment, treating custody as the exception rather than the starting point. Sections 334 and 335 deal with the different question of a man who was insane at the time of the act, requiring the finding to state whether he committed it and providing for his detention in safe custody rather than his simple release.

2. Release on probation of good conduct, section 4. Where the offence is not punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the court may, instead of sentencing at once, direct release on a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon within a period not exceeding three years, and meanwhile to keep the peace and be of good behaviour. The proviso requires a fixed place of abode or regular occupation; section 4(2) requires the probation officer's report to be considered; section 4(3) allows a supervision order for not less than one year; and section 4(5) requires the terms to be explained to the offender.

3. Compensation and costs, section 5. The court may order the released offender to pay compensation for the loss or injury caused and the costs of the proceedings, recoverable as a fine under sections 386 and 387 of the Code; and a civil court trying a suit on the same matter shall take that amount into account in awarding damages.

7. Breach, section 9. On a failure to observe the conditions, the court may issue a warrant or summons, may remand the offender or grant him bail, and on being satisfied of the breach may sentence him for the original offence, or, where the failure is the first, impose a penalty not exceeding fifty rupees without prejudice to the continuance of the bond.

8. Courts competent, appeal and revision, section 11. An order under the Act may be made by any court empowered to try and sentence the offender, and also by the High Court or any other court when the case comes before it on appeal or in revision. Section 11(3) allows an appellate court, on its own motion or on the application of the convicted person or the probation officer, to call for the record where a court has declined to deal with an offender under twenty-one under section 3 or section 4. Section 11(4) allows an appellate or revisional court to set aside an order under the Act and pass sentence instead.

9. Removal of disqualification, section 12. A person dealt with under section 3 or section 4 shall not suffer the disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction under any other law. Without this the whole scheme would fail.

The three cases to cite. Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, calls the Act a milestone in the modern liberal trend of reform in penology and holds that its benefit may be claimed for the first time in appeal or revision. Jugal Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1972) 2 SCC 633, states the object as preventing the conversion of youthful offenders into obdurate criminals through their association in prison with hardened criminals of mature age. Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 SC 1088, fixes the date on which the offender's age is reckoned for section 6: it is the date on which the trial court has to pass sentence on him, not the date of the offence.

Chapter XXXIV of the Code, sections 451 to 459, is headed "Disposal of property", and it must be read with section 102, seizure by the police, and section 165, search.

A. Seizure: section 102.

Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence. He shall report the seizure forthwith to the Magistrate having jurisdiction, and where the property cannot conveniently be transported to the court, or where there is difficulty in securing proper accommodation, or where its continued retention is unnecessary, he may give custody to any person on his executing a bond to produce the property when required.

B. Pending trial: section 451.

Section 458: where no claimant appears within six months and the person in whose possession the property was found is unable to show that it was legally acquired by him, the Magistrate may order the property to be sold and the proceeds to be at the disposal of the State Government. Section 459 allows the sale of property subject to speedy and natural decay at any time.

D. At the conclusion of the trial: section 452.

Section 452(1): when an inquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is concluded, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced before it or in its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commission of any offence.

Section 452(2): an order may be for delivery without any condition, or on condition that the person executes a bond, with or without sureties, to restore the property to the court if the order is modified or set aside on appeal or revision.

Section 452(3): a Court of Session may direct that the property be delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall then deal with it as if it had been seized by the police and produced before him.

Section 456, power to restore possession of immovable property. Where a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears that by that force or show of force or intimidation any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property, the court may order that possession be restored. The order must be made within one month from the date of conviction, or, where an appeal is presented, within one month of its disposal. Section 456(4) preserves the right of any person to a civil suit to establish title.

F. Other provisions.

Section 454, appeal against an order under section 452 or section 453, to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie, and the appellate court may stay the order pending the appeal. Section 455, destruction of libellous and other matter, including obscene objects, where a conviction is recorded under sections 292, 293, 501 or 502 of the Penal Code.

The Code deals with the two in separate chapters, and the question names both. Chapter VI, sections 61 to 90, is "Processes to compel appearance"; Chapter VII, sections 91 to 105, is "Processes to compel the production of things".

PART ONE. Processes to compel appearance.

A. Summons, sections 61 to 69.

Section 61, form: every summons shall be in writing, in duplicate, signed by the presiding officer, and shall bear the seal of the court.

Section 62, service: by a police officer, an officer of the court or other public servant; personally if practicable, by delivering or tendering one duplicate; the person served shall if required sign a receipt on the other.

Section 63, corporations: service on the secretary, local manager or other principal officer, or by registered post to the chief officer in India, service being deemed effected when the letter would arrive in the ordinary course of post.

Section 70: every warrant shall be in writing, signed by the presiding officer and sealed, and shall remain in force until cancelled or executed. Section 71: the court may endorse a direction for security, so that the officer shall release the person on his executing a bond. Sections 72 and 73: warrants ordinarily to police officers, but a warrant may be directed to any person for the arrest of an escaped convict, a proclaimed offender or a person accused of a non-bailable offence who is evading arrest. Section 75: the officer executing it shall notify its substance and, if required, show the warrant. Section 76: the person arrested shall be brought before the court without unnecessary delay and in no case beyond twenty-four hours exclusive of the journey. Sections 77 to 81: execution outside the local jurisdiction and the procedure on arrest beyond it.

C. Proclamation and attachment, sections 82 to 86.

Section 82: where a court has reason to believe that a person against whom a warrant has been issued has absconded or is concealing himself, it may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and time not less than thirty days away; the manner of publication is prescribed by section 82(2), and section 82(3) makes a written statement of due publication conclusive evidence. Section 82(4) allows the court to declare a person a proclaimed offender in the listed offences.

The consequences of non-appearance are therefore cumulative: a warrant under section 87; proclamation and attachment under sections 82 and 83; a declaration as a proclaimed offender, with the substantive offence under section 174A of the Indian Penal Code, punishable with imprisonment up to three years, or up to seven where he has been declared a proclaimed offender; forfeiture of his bond under section 446; and, where he has absconded with no immediate prospect of arrest, the recording of the prosecution evidence in his absence under section 299.

PART TWO. Processes to compel the production of things.

A. Summons to produce, section 91.

Whenever any court, or any officer in charge of a police station, considers that the production of any document or other thing is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code, such court may issue a summons, or such officer a written order, to the person in whose possession or power it is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it, or to produce it, at the time and place stated.

Section 93 allows a court to issue a search warrant in three cases: where a person summoned under section 91 will not produce; where the thing is not known to be in the possession of any person; or where a general search or inspection will serve the purposes of the proceeding. Sub-section (2) allows the place to be specified; sub-section (3) confines a warrant for a postal document to a District Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate.

Section 94, search of a place suspected to contain stolen property, forged documents, counterfeit coin or obscene objects. Section 95, search for forfeited publications. Section 97, search for a person wrongfully confined. Section 98, search for a woman or female child unlawfully detained for an immoral purpose.

C. General provisions as to searches, sections 99 to 105.

Section 100 is the important one: the occupant shall allow free ingress; if ingress cannot be obtained, the officer may break open a door; before making a search the officer shall call two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness it; a list of all things seized and of the places in which they were found shall be prepared and signed by the witnesses; and the occupant shall be given a copy of the list.

Conclusion. The two chapters answer two different needs and are built on the same principle: escalate only as far as necessary. To compel a person, the Code begins with a summons served personally, moves to substituted service, then to a warrant, then to a proclamation, then to attachment of his property, and only at the end to a declaration as a proclaimed offender and to evidence recorded behind his back. To compel a thing, it begins with a summons or a written order under section 91, and moves to a search warrant under section 93 only where the order will not be obeyed or the holder is unknown, hedging the search itself with section 100's requirement of two independent local witnesses and a signed list. The one absolute limit is constitutional: neither process may be used to compel an accused to produce a document against himself, on Shyamlal Mohanlal and Article 20(3).

Section 2(g) of the Code defines "inquiry" as every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court.

It is a definition by exclusion: whatever a Magistrate or court does under the Code before the trial, and which is not itself a trial, is an inquiry.

Section 2(u) defines a Public Prosecutor as any person appointed under section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor.

Section 24 requires the Central or State Government to appoint one for every High Court, and for each district from a panel prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Sessions Judge, the person being an advocate of not less than seven years' practice.

Section 2(20) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines "Children's Court" as a court established under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, or a Special Court under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, wherever existing, and where such courts have not been designated, the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction to try offences under the Act.

Plea bargaining is the procedure under Chapter XXIA, sections 265A to 265L, of the Code, inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 and in force from 5 July 2006, by which an accused applies for a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case, and on the court satisfying itself that the application is voluntary, the case is disposed of on a substantially reduced sentence.

Section 93(1) allows a court to issue a search warrant in three cases: where the court has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons under section 91 has been or might be issued will not produce the document or thing; where the document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person; or where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding will be served by a general search or inspection.

Constitution. Section 9, a Court of Session for every sessions division, presided over by a Judge appointed by the High Court, with Additional and Assistant Sessions Judges. Sections 11 and 12, courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first and second class in every district, presiding officers appointed by the High Court, with a Chief Judicial Magistrate and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates. Sections 16 and 17, Metropolitan Magistrates in a metropolitan area, appointed by the High Court, with a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Sections 20 and 21, Executive Magistrates appointed by the State Government, including a District Magistrate, Additional District Magistrates, Sub-divisional Magistrates and Special Executive Magistrates.

Conclusion. Section 6 is the map of the Code, because the class of court decides who may try an offence under section 26 and the First Schedule, how much it may inflict under sections 28 and 29, and where an appeal from it lies under section 374. The one division that is not about seniority is the last: Executive Magistrates try nothing at all and exist for the preventive work in Chapters VIII, X and XI, which is how the 1973 Code gave effect to the separation of the judiciary from the executive required by Article 50.

24(6): where a State has a regular Cadre of Prosecuting Officers, the State Government shall appoint from among them, and only where no suitable person is available in the cadre may it appoint from the panel.

24(7): a person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Public Prosecutor or Additional Public Prosecutor only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years.

24(8): the Central or State Government may appoint, for the purposes of any case or class of cases, an advocate who has been in practice for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor. The proviso, added in 2009, allows the court to permit the victim to engage an advocate of his choice to assist the prosecution.

Section 25, Assistant Public Prosecutors. The State Government shall appoint one or more Assistant Public Prosecutors in every district for conducting prosecutions in the Courts of Magistrates. Section 25(3) provides that where no Assistant Public Prosecutor is available, the District Magistrate may appoint any other person, but not a police officer who has taken any part in the investigation into the offence, or who is below the rank of Inspector.

On section 321, Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288, holds that the court's consent is a judicial act and not a formality: the Public Prosecutor must apply his own mind and the court must satisfy itself that the withdrawal serves the ends of justice and is not a device to shield an accused.

Conclusion. The Code separates the prosecutor from the police deliberately, and every feature of these sections carries that separation: the appointment is made by the Government but only from a panel prepared by the District Magistrate in consultation with the Sessions Judge; the qualification is seven years at the Bar, so the office is a professional one; a police officer who investigated the case cannot conduct it; and section 25A places prosecution under a Directorate rather than under the investigating agency. That is why the Public Prosecutor is treated as an officer of the court whose duty is a fair presentation of the whole case, and why his power to withdraw under section 321 is subject to the court's independent consent.

4. order the child, or his parents or guardian, to pay a fine, with a proviso that where the child is working, the labour laws must not be violated;
5. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct under the care of a parent, guardian or fit person, on a bond with or without surety, for a period not exceeding three years;
6. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct under the care and supervision of a fit facility, for a period not exceeding three years;
7. direct the child to be sent to a special home for a period not exceeding three years, for reformative services including education, skill development, counselling, behaviour modification therapy and psychiatric support, with a proviso allowing a place of safety where his conduct makes a special home unsuitable.

Section 18(2): in addition to an order under clauses (a) to (g), the Board may order the child to attend school, to attend a vocational training centre, to attend a therapeutic centre, to be prohibited from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a specified place, or to undergo a de-addiction programme.

Conclusion. Not one of the seven orders is a punishment in the ordinary sense: the lightest is an admonition and the heaviest is three years in a special home whose statutory purpose is education, counselling and psychiatric support. The Board's discretion is structured, not free, because section 18(1) directs it to the nature of the offence, the need for supervision, the social investigation report and the child's past conduct. And two provisions stand over every order: section 21, which forbids a sentence of death or of life imprisonment without the possibility of release absolutely, and section 24, which leaves the child with no disqualification and, in most cases, with the record destroyed.

Section 4(2): the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer before making the order.

Section 4(3): the court may pass a supervision order for a period of not less than one year, with such conditions as it thinks necessary.

Section 4(4) and (5): the offender shall enter into a bond to observe the conditions, and the court shall explain the terms to him and furnish a copy of the supervision order to him, to his sureties and to the probation officer.

A summary trial is one in which the ordinary procedure is abridged and only the substance of the evidence is recorded, so that petty cases are disposed of quickly. Chapter XXI, sections 260 to 265, contains the law.

Who may try summarily, section 260(1). A Chief Judicial Magistrate, a Metropolitan Magistrate, and any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the High Court, if he thinks fit.

Which offences, section 260(1). Offences not punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment exceeding two years; theft under sections 379, 380 or 381 of the Penal Code where the value of the property does not exceed two thousand rupees; receiving or retaining stolen property under section 411 and assisting in its concealment or disposal under section 414, within the same limit; offences under sections 454 and 456; insult with intent to provoke a breach of the peace under section 504 and criminal intimidation punishable with up to two years or fine under section 506; abetment and attempt of these; and an offence under section 20 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871.

J.V. Baharuni v. State of Gujarat, (2014) 10 SCC 494, is the case to cite. The Supreme Court held that Magistrates trying cases summarily must actually follow the summary procedure rather than a hybrid of their own, and that a successor Magistrate must not mechanically order a de novo trial under section 326(3), particularly in a cheque dishonour case tried summarily under section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Conclusion. The Chapter trades two things for speed, the record and the sentence. Only the substance of the evidence is written, and whatever the offence carries, the trial can end in no more than three months. Three guards keep the bargain honest: the power is confined to senior Magistrates and to a closed list of minor offences; section 260(2) obliges the Magistrate to abandon the summary course the moment the case looks unsuitable; and section 264 restores a reasoned judgment as soon as the accused pleads not guilty.

Section 64, substituted service. Where the person cannot by the exercise of due diligence be found, service may be made by leaving one of the duplicates with an adult male member of his family residing with him; the Explanation provides that a servant is not a member of the family.

Section 65. If service cannot be effected as provided in sections 62, 63 or 64, the serving officer shall affix one duplicate to some conspicuous part of the house in which the person ordinarily resides, and the court may then declare the service sufficient or order fresh service.

Sections 66 to 69. Service on a government servant in duplicate through the head of his office; service outside the local jurisdiction through a Magistrate there; proof of service by affidavit where the serving officer is not present at the hearing; and service on a witness by registered post in addition to and simultaneously with personal service.

From the High Court, Article 134(1)(a) of the Constitution gives an appeal to the Supreme Court as of right where the High Court has on appeal reversed an acquittal and sentenced the accused to death; otherwise special leave under Article 136.

(ii) The law of confirmation: Chapter XXVIII, sections 366 to 371.

Section 366(1): when the Court of Session passes a sentence of death, the proceedings shall be submitted to the High Court, and the sentence shall not be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. Section 366(2) requires the convicted person to be committed to jail custody under a warrant.

Section 28(2) is the source: a Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law, but any sentence of death shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court.

Section 367: the High Court may direct a further inquiry or the taking of additional evidence on any point bearing on the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, itself or through the Court of Session, and unless it otherwise directs, the presence of the convicted person may be dispensed with.

Conclusion. Bhagat may appeal, but he need not: the same High Court will have his whole case before it in any event, on a reference that is automatic and mandatory under section 366, and until it confirms, the sentence has no force. On the reference the High Court is not merely reviewing another court's conclusions; it must satisfy itself of his guilt or innocence on the evidence and may confirm, substitute, alter the conviction, order a retrial or acquit. If an appeal is also filed, the two are heard together, and the proviso to section 368 forbids confirmation before the appeal is disposed of.

Section 227: if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.

Four features follow. The material is fixed: the record and the documents forwarded under section 173(5), and not defence evidence. Both sides are heard. Reasons must be recorded, which makes the order reviewable. And the stage is before the charge; once a charge is framed under section 228 the remedy is acquittal at the end of the trial or the High Court's inherent power under section 482.

The test. Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4: at the stage of framing charge the judge is not a mere post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution; he must sift and weigh the material to see whether a prima facie case is made out; but he must not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons or weigh the probability of a conviction. Grave suspicion justifies a charge; mere suspicion does not. State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39, is to the same effect.

Section 306(2) confines it to an offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by a Special Judge under any other law, or punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence. Dacoity, punishable with imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to ten years and triable exclusively by the Court of Session, is within it.

Section 306(3): the Magistrate shall record his reasons for tendering the pardon, whether or not it is accepted, and furnish a copy free of cost on application.

Section 306(4): every person accepting a tender of pardon shall be examined as a witness in the court of the Magistrate taking cognizance and in the subsequent trial, and, unless already on bail, shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.

Section 307: at any time after commitment of a case but before judgment is passed, the court to which the commitment is made may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of such a person, tender a pardon on the same condition. On these facts, where the case is already before the Court of Session, section 307 is the operative provision.

(i) The nature of the offence.

Under the First Schedule, rape under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code is cognizable, so an FIR must be registered under section 154 and the police may arrest without warrant under section 41; non-bailable, so bail is not claimable as of right; non-compoundable, since section 376 appears in neither table under section 320; and triable exclusively by the Court of Session.

Section 376(1), as it stands after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment not less than ten years, which may extend to imprisonment for life, and a fine.

(ii) Bail: yes, but not from every court and not at every stage.

When bail becomes his as of right. Under the proviso to section 167(2)(a)(i), if the chargesheet is not filed within ninety days, he shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. Ninety days applies because the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, which is one of the three limbs of section 167(2)(a)(i); do not rest the point on the ten year minimum, which section 376(1) has carried only since the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, the minimum before that being seven years. This default bail is an indefeasible right flowing from Article 21: Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616. Section 173(1A) requires the investigation in a rape case to be completed within two months.

Anticipatory bail under section 438 is available for section 376(1) from the High Court or Court of Session, but section 438(4) excludes it for sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB. Any bail granted must carry conditions complying with Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided 18 March 2021, which confines conditions to those in section 437(3) and forbids any that mandate or permit contact between the accused and the victim.

(iii) No, and the reason is that the offence is not the woman's to forgive.

Conclusion. Rana's offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and exclusively triable by the Court of Session. Bail is available but the discretion belongs in practice to the Court of Session or the High Court under section 439, because section 437(1) shuts out the Magistrate wherever reasonable grounds appear; his clearest entitlement arises on the ninety-first day if no chargesheet has been filed. He cannot compound the offence at all, and no settlement will help him either as a composition under section 320 or as a ground for a lesser sentence.

A. What bail is. The Code does not define it. Bail is the release of a person from the custody of the law upon an undertaking, secured by a bond with or without sureties, that he will appear and answer the charge. The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 defines it for the first time in Indian law, in section 2(1)(b). The governing principle, from State of Rajasthan v. Balchand, (1977) 4 SCC 308, is "bail, not jail".

B. Bailable offences: a right, section 436. A person accused of a bailable offence, arrested or detained without warrant or appearing before a court, and prepared to give bail, shall be released. The proviso allows a personal bond without sureties for an indigent person, and the Explanation deems him indigent if unable to give bail within a week. Section 436(2) allows refusal where he has broken the conditions of a bond in the same case.

Section 436A: an undertrial detained for one half of the maximum period of imprisonment for the offence shall be released on his personal bond; it does not apply where the offence is punishable with death; and in no case shall a person be detained beyond the maximum period.

E. Anticipatory bail, section 438. Available only from the High Court or Court of Session, on a reason to believe that the applicant may be arrested on an accusation of a non-bailable offence, having regard to the nature and gravity of the accusation, his antecedents, the possibility of his fleeing from justice, and whether the accusation is made with the object of injuring or humiliating him. Section 438(2) allows conditions, including availability for interrogation and not leaving India without permission. Section 438(4) excludes it for sections 376(3), 376AB, 376DA and 376DB.

The two Constitution Bench decisions to cite are Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565, which held that section 438 protects the personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21, that the limitations of section 437 are not to be read into it, and that the applicant need not show that the accusation is false or his case exceptional; and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1, in which a five judge Bench held that anticipatory bail once granted need not be limited to a fixed period and ordinarily continues till the end of the trial.

Conclusion. The law turns on one classification and one distinction: bailable or not, and right or discretion. In a bailable offence release is automatic; in a non-bailable offence it is a judicial discretion on recorded reasons, closed to the Magistrate where the offence carries death or life imprisonment and reasonable grounds appear, and open to the Court of Session and the High Court in every case. Four provisions stop that discretion from becoming detention: section 436A, half the maximum; section 437(6), sixty days without a trial; the proviso to section 167(2), sixty or ninety days without a chargesheet; and section 438, for the man not yet arrested. The governing statement is Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2022) 10 SCC 51: bail is the rule and jail the exception, and an accused not arrested during the investigation should ordinarily not be taken into custody when he appears after the chargesheet.

A Magistrate of the first class, and a Magistrate of the second class specially empowered, may take cognizance upon receiving a complaint, upon a police report, or upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge. Taking cognizance means the application of the judicial mind to the allegations for the purpose of proceeding: R. R. Chari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 207.

C. Chapter XV, complaints to Magistrates, sections 200 to 203.

Section 200, examination of the complainant. A Magistrate taking cognizance on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, and the substance shall be reduced to writing and signed by the complainant, the witnesses and the Magistrate. The proviso dispenses with it where the complaint is made in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of his official duties or by a court, and where the case is made over to another Magistrate under section 192.

Section 201, Magistrate not competent to take cognizance. If the complaint is in writing, he shall return it for presentation to the proper court with an endorsement; if it is not in writing, he shall direct the complainant to the proper court.

D. Chapter XVI, commencement of proceedings, sections 204 to 210.

Section 204, issue of process. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate shall issue a summons in a summons case, and a warrant, or if he thinks fit a summons, in a warrant case. Section 204(2): no summons or warrant shall issue until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. Section 204(3): where the proceeding is on a written complaint, every summons or warrant shall be accompanied by a copy of the complaint. Section 204(4): non-payment of the process fee within a reasonable time allows the Magistrate to dismiss the complaint.

Section 205, power to dispense with the personal attendance of the accused and permit him to appear by pleader, with a power to direct his attendance at any stage. Section 206, special summons in petty cases, allowing a plea of guilty by post. Section 207, supply of copies free of cost to the accused in a police report case: the police report, the FIR, the statements under section 161 of the witnesses the prosecution proposes to examine, any confession or statement under section 164, and any other document forwarded with the report. Section 208, the equivalent in a complaint case triable exclusively by the Court of Session.

A. What an FIR is.

The expression does not appear in the Code. It is the name given in practice to the information recorded under section 154: the first information in point of time of the commission of a cognizable offence, given to the officer in charge of a police station.

Section 154(1): such information, if given orally, shall be reduced to writing by or under the officer's direction, read over to the informant, and signed by him, and its substance entered in a book kept in the prescribed form. The 2013 provisos require it to be recorded by a woman police officer where it relates to the sexual offences listed, and, where the complainant is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, to be recorded at her residence or a place of her choice in the presence of an interpreter or special educator and videographed.

Step 1, the power. Section 156(1): an officer in charge may investigate any cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate; section 156(2), no proceeding shall be questioned on the ground that he was not empowered; section 156(3), a Magistrate may order an investigation. For a non-cognizable offence, section 155(2) forbids investigation without a Magistrate's order, and section 155(4) deems a case cognizable where at least one of the offences is.

Step 2, report and proceeding to the spot: section 157. The officer shall forthwith send a report to the Magistrate and shall proceed in person or depute a subordinate to the spot to investigate the facts and, if necessary, take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender. Proviso (a) allows him not to go in person in a case that is not serious; proviso (b) allows him not to investigate at all where there is no sufficient ground, on recording his reasons and notifying the informant.

Step 5, search and seizure: sections 165, 100 and 102. Section 165, search on grounds recorded in writing that the thing cannot otherwise be obtained without undue delay, with copies sent forthwith to the nearest Magistrate; section 100, two or more independent and respectable inhabitants to witness the search and sign the list; section 102, seizure of property suspected to be stolen or found in suspicious circumstances, with a report to the Magistrate.

Step 6, arrest and custody: sections 41, 41A, 57 and 167. Arrest without warrant only on a recorded satisfaction of necessity where the offence carries up to seven years, with a notice of appearance under section 41A instead; production before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours; and remand under section 167, capped at ninety days where the offence is punishable with death, life or not less than ten years and sixty days otherwise, whereupon the accused shall be released on default bail.

Step 7, release or forwarding: sections 169 and 170. Release on a bond where the evidence is deficient; forwarding to the Magistrate with security for the appearance of the complainant and witnesses where it is sufficient.

Conclusion. The chain runs from the information to the report, and the Code puts the two ends under judicial control while leaving the middle to the police. Registration under section 154 is mandatory on Lalita Kumari; the investigation proceeds on the officer's own recorded satisfaction under sections 156, 157, 161 and 165 with no leave required; and it ends at section 173(2) with a report on which the Magistrate, and not the police, decides whether there will be a trial. The two provisions that matter most to the accused sit in the middle: section 162, which makes what the police record almost worthless as substantive evidence, and section 167, which makes custody without a completed investigation impossible beyond sixty or ninety days.

Section 228, framing of charge: if there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the Judge shall, where it is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, frame a charge and transfer the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or another first class Magistrate; and where it is exclusively triable by the court, frame a charge in writing. Sub-section (2): the charge shall be read and explained and the accused asked whether he pleads guilty.

Section 229, conviction on plea of guilty: the Judge shall record the plea and may, in his discretion, convict.

Section 230, date for prosecution evidence, with process to compel attendance of witnesses.

Section 231, prosecution evidence: the Judge shall take all such evidence as may be produced, and may defer cross-examination of a witness or recall any witness for further cross-examination.

Section 232, acquittal: if, after taking the prosecution evidence, examining the accused and hearing both sides, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, he shall record an order of acquittal.

Section 313, examination of the accused after the prosecution evidence and before the defence, so that he may personally explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him; no oath, and no punishment for refusal or a false answer.

Section 235(2), the hearing on sentence, held in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 190, to be a substantial right whose breach vitiates the sentence.

Section 366, the mandatory reference to the High Court where a sentence of death is passed, and section 354(3), the requirement of special reasons for such a sentence.

Section 327(2), in camera trial in offences under sections 376 and related provisions; section 26 proviso, such offences to be tried as far as practicable by a court presided over by a woman.

Conclusion. A sessions trial is the Code's most complete procedure and every feature of it answers the gravity of what is tried there. It cannot begin without a commitment under section 209; it must be conducted by a Public Prosecutor; it passes through a judicial filter at section 227 before the accused is put on trial and a second at section 232 before he is put to his defence; the accused is heard separately on sentence under section 235(2); and a sentence of death has no force until the High Court confirms it under section 366.

Section 374, appeals from convictions: to the Supreme Court from a High Court in its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction; to the High Court from a Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge, or from any other court where a sentence of imprisonment for more than seven years has been passed against him or any person convicted at the same trial; and to the Court of Session from a Metropolitan Magistrate, Assistant Sessions Judge or Magistrate of the first or second class, or where a sentence has been passed under section 325 or an order made under section 360 by a Magistrate not empowered to do so.

The proviso to section 372, the victim's appeal, against an order acquitting the accused, convicting for a lesser offence, or imposing inadequate compensation, to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against a conviction of that court; and in Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, decided 12 October 2018, the Supreme Court held that it requires no leave.

Section 377, appeal by the State against the inadequacy of a sentence, to the Court of Session where the sentence was passed by a Magistrate and to the High Court otherwise, with the accused given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, in which he may plead for his acquittal or a reduction.

Section 375, no appeal on a plea of guilty, except as to the extent or legality of the sentence. Section 376, no appeal in petty cases: a High Court sentence of imprisonment up to six months or fine up to one thousand rupees; a Court of Session or Metropolitan Magistrate sentence of imprisonment up to three months or fine up to two hundred rupees; a first class Magistrate's fine up to one hundred rupees; or a fine up to two hundred rupees in a summary trial; with a proviso where any other punishment is combined.

D. Procedure.

Section 382, a petition in writing with a copy of the judgment; section 383, an appellant in jail may present it to the officer in charge of the jail; section 384, summary dismissal but not without a reasonable opportunity of being heard, save in the cases stated; section 385, procedure for hearing, with notice and the record called for; section 386, the powers of the appellate court, which in an appeal from a conviction may acquit, order a retrial, alter the finding, or alter the sentence but not enhance it; section 389, suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal, with reasons in writing and notice to the Public Prosecutor where the conviction is for death, life or ten years or more; section 391, power to take further evidence.

Chapter XXV, sections 328 to 339, governs. The question it answers is procedural: section 84 of the Indian Penal Code decides whether a person was of unsound mind at the time of the offence; Chapter XXV decides what happens when he is of unsound mind at the time of the inquiry or trial and cannot defend himself.

The case to cite is Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563, which draws the line this Chapter depends on. The Supreme Court held that what section 84 of the Penal Code requires is legal insanity and not medical insanity; that the burden of establishing it lies on the accused and is discharged on a preponderance of probabilities under section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act; that the crucial time is the moment of the act; and that even where the accused fails to discharge that burden, evidence of his mental condition may still raise a reasonable doubt about the mens rea the prosecution has to prove. Chapter XXV asks a wholly different question, about his capacity now, at the inquiry or trial.

Section 328(3), unsoundness of mind: the Magistrate determines whether it renders the accused incapable of entering defence, records a finding, and examines the record of the prosecution evidence, hearing the accused's advocate but without questioning the accused; if no prima facie case appears he shall, instead of postponing the inquiry, discharge the accused and deal with him under section 330, and if a prima facie case does appear he shall postpone the proceeding for such period as, in the opinion of the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, is required for treatment.

Section 328(4), mental retardation: where that is what renders the accused incapable of entering defence, the Magistrate shall order closure of the inquiry and deal with him under section 330. Unsoundness of mind is postponed because it may lift; mental retardation is closed because it will not.

B. During a trial: section 329. The Magistrate or Court of Session shall, in the first instance, try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity, and if satisfied, record a finding and postpone further proceedings; section 329(1A) gives the same reference to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the same appeal to the Medical Board; section 329(2) repeats the discharge rule of section 328(3) for the trial; and section 329(3) repeats the mental retardation rule, closing the trial.

D. Resumption: sections 331 and 332. The court may at any time resume the proceedings; if the accused is then capable of making his defence, the trial shall proceed; if he is still incapable, the court shall act again under section 328 or 329 and deal with him under section 330.

E. Where he was insane at the time of the act: sections 334 and 335. Section 334: whenever a person is acquitted on the ground that at the time of the act he was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that it was wrong or contrary to law, the finding shall state specifically whether he committed the act or not. Section 335: where the finding states that he did commit the act, the court shall order him to be detained in safe custody, or deliver him to a relative or friend who applies and gives security that he will be properly taken care of, prevented from doing injury and produced for inspection.

The three things the 2009 amendment added are what an examiner is looking for: the discharge where no prima facie case is made out, under sections 328(3) and 329(2), so that an unfit accused is not held indefinitely for a case that would never have succeeded; the separate treatment of mental retardation under sections 328(4) and 329(3), which closes the proceeding instead of postponing it; and the rewritten section 330, which now starts at bail on an undertaking of out-patient psychiatric treatment and reaches custody only where that is impossible. Sections 334 and 335 deal with the different question of the man who was insane at the time of the act.