BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita BNSS 2025-26 Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(1)(o), BNSS, 2023: a "non-cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and a "non-cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant.

By s.174, BNSS, the police may neither investigate such a case nor arrest in it without the order of a Magistrate competent to try it; the officer records the substance of the information in the prescribed book and refers the informant to the Magistrate.

Under s.84(1), BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.82, CrPC), where a Court has reason to believe that a person against whom it has issued a warrant has absconded or is concealing himself so that the warrant cannot be executed, it may publish a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and time not less than thirty days from the date of publication.

By s.84(4), where the proclamation is in respect of a person accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment of ten years or more, imprisonment for life, or death, and he fails to appear, the Court may, after such inquiry as it thinks fit, pronounce him a proclaimed offender and make a declaration to that effect.

Section 393(1), BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.354, CrPC): every judgment referred to in s.392

• (a) shall be written in the language of the Court;
• (b) shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision;
• (c) shall specify the offence and the section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or other law under which the accused is convicted, and the punishment to which he is sentenced;
• (d) if it is a judgment of acquittal, shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.

A "reference" is the procedure by which a subordinate Court itself sends a question of law to the High Court for decision. It is governed by s.436, BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.395, CrPC).

By s.436(1), where a Court is satisfied that a case pending before it involves a question as to the validity of any Act, Ordinance or Regulation, or of any provision of one, and that such provision is invalid or inoperative but has not been so declared by the High Court or the Supreme Court, it shall state a case setting out its opinion and the reasons for it, and refer it to the High Court.

Section 12, Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: whoever commits sexual harassment upon a child shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.

The offence itself is defined in s.11, and "child" means any person below eighteen years under s.2(1)(d).

For full marks, cover: the definition in s.11 clause by clause, the Explanation on sexual intent, the punishment in s.12, the procedural protections, and the place of the offence in the scheme of the Act.

Definition: s.11, POCSO Act, 2012. A person is said to commit sexual harassment upon a child when such person, with sexual intent,

1. (i) utters any word or makes any sound, or makes any gesture or exhibits any object or part of body, with the intention that such word or sound shall be heard, or such gesture or object or part of body shall be seen, by the child; or
2. (ii) makes a child exhibit his body or any part of it so as to be seen by such person or any other person; or
3. (iii) shows any object to a child in any form or media for pornographic purposes; or
4. (iv) repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or contacts a child, either directly or through electronic, digital or any other means; or

For full marks, cover: the text of s.528, the three purposes, that the power is recognised and not conferred, the categories in Bhajan Lal, the limits, and the leading cases.

The provision: s.528, BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.482, CrPC). "Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary

1. to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or
2. to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or
3. otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

The nature of the power. The section does not confer a power; it saves and recognises a power the High Court already possesses as a court of record under Art 215 of the Constitution. That is why the section opens with "Nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect". Two consequences: the power is not available to subordinate courts, and it cannot be used to do something the Sanhita expressly forbids.

6. where there is an express legal bar to the institution or continuance of the proceeding;
7. where the proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fides or is instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance and with a view to spite the accused.

The limits. The Court in Bhajan Lal itself warned that the power is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and in the rarest of rare cases, and that the High Court must not embark upon an inquiry into the reliability or genuineness of the allegations, which is the trial court's function.

Quashing on settlement. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, a three-judge Bench held that the power under s.482 is wider than, and different from, the power to compound under s.320: where the offence is predominantly civil in flavour, arising from commercial, financial, matrimonial or partnership disputes, and the parties have settled, the High Court may quash even a non-compoundable offence. But it must not do so for heinous and serious offences such as murder, rape and dacoity, or for offences under special statutes such as the Prevention of Corruption Act, because those are crimes against society and not against an individual. Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, laid down guidelines applying this to attempt to murder.

How each is constituted.

For full marks, cover: the three levels of transfer power, the grounds in s.447(1), the procedure in s.447(2) to (7), the compensation for a frivolous application, and the governing principle.

The three levels. Chapter XXXIII of the BNSS gives the power of transfer to three courts:

1. Supreme Court, s.446: may transfer a case or appeal from one High Court to another, or from a Criminal Court subordinate to one High Court to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction subordinate to another High Court, whenever it appears expedient for the ends of justice. It acts only on the application of the Attorney-General of India or a party interested, by motion supported by affidavit.
2. High Court, s.447: transfers within the State.
3. Sessions Judge, s.448: transfers from one Criminal Court to another within his sessions division, on the report of the lower Court, on the application of a party, or on his own initiative. By s.448(3) the procedure of s.447 applies.

The grounds: s.447(1). The High Court may act whenever it is made to appear:

• s.447(3): every application shall be made by motion, supported by affidavit or affirmation, except where the applicant is the Advocate-General.
• s.447(4): where the applicant is an accused person, the High Court may direct him to execute a bond or bail bond for payment of any compensation it may award.
• s.447(5): an accused applicant must give the Public Prosecutor written notice with a copy of the grounds, and no order shall be made on the merits unless twenty-four hours have elapsed between the notice and the hearing.
• s.447(6): pending disposal, the High Court may stay the proceedings below, though the stay does not affect the subordinate Court's power of remand under s.346.
• s.447(7): if the application is dismissed as frivolous or vexatious, the High Court may order the applicant to pay compensation to the person who opposed it.
• s.447(8): where the High Court tries the case itself, it follows the same procedure the transferring Court would have followed.

For full marks, cover: the ladder of compulsion from summons to attachment, the sections at each rung, the general rule that trial requires presence, the exceptions in ss.355 and 356, and the safeguards in s.356(2) and (3).

(a) The procedure to compel attendance: Chapter VI, BNSS, 2023. The Sanhita provides a ladder, and the Court must climb it in order.

3. Proclamation, s.84. If the Court has reason to believe Nana has absconded or is concealing himself so that the warrant cannot be executed, it publishes a written proclamation requiring him to appear at a specified place and time not less than thirty days away. It is read publicly in his town or village, affixed to his house and to the Court house, and may be published in a daily newspaper.
4. Declaration as a proclaimed offender, s.84(4). Where the offence is punishable with ten years or more, life or death, and he fails to appear, the Court may declare him a proclaimed offender.
5. Attachment of property, ss.85 to 88. By s.85 the Court may, for reasons recorded in writing, order attachment of his movable or immovable property, and may do so simultaneously with the proclamation if satisfied that he is about to dispose of or remove it. Section 86 is new: the identification, attachment and forfeiture of property that is the proceeds of crime of a proclaimed person, including property outside India. Section 87 deals with claims and objections by third parties, made within six months. Then s.88 governs the outcome, and its three sub-sections must be kept apart:

The general rule is that a criminal trial requires the presence of the accused, because he must be able to hear the evidence, instruct counsel and cross-examine. Section 308, BNSS (formerly s.273, CrPC) requires that, except as otherwise expressly provided, all evidence taken in the course of a trial or other proceeding shall be taken in the presence of the accused or, when his personal attendance is dispensed with, in the presence of his advocate, including through audio-video electronic means at a place notified by the State Government. This applies to every trial, not only a warrant case, and it follows from Art 21 and the right to a fair trial.

Exception 1: attendance dispensed with, s.355, BNSS (formerly s.317, CrPC). Where the Judge or Magistrate is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that the personal attendance of the accused is not necessary in the interests of justice, or that he persistently disturbs the proceedings, he may dispense with his attendance and proceed, provided the accused is represented by an advocate. This is a dispensation the accused himself usually seeks; it is not a trial in absentia.

• s.356(4): depositions already recorded are evidence against him, but if he is arrested or appears during the trial the Court may allow him to examine any evidence taken in his absence.
• s.356(5): the depositions are, as far as practicable, recorded by audio-video electronic means, preferably a mobile phone.
• s.356(7): no appeal lies against such a judgment unless he presents himself before the appellate Court, and no appeal against conviction lies after three years from the date of judgment.

Applied to Nana. Nana has not been declared a proclaimed offender on these facts; he is simply an undertrial not attending. So the correct answer is: the Court must proceed up the ladder, issuing summons, then a warrant, then a proclamation, and it may attach his property. Only if he is declared a proclaimed offender under s.84(4), which requires the offence to be punishable with ten years or more, and only after the s.356(2) steps and the ninety-day wait, can the trial proceed in his absence. If the offence is a lesser one, s.356 is unavailable however long he stays away, and the case simply waits.

So Kamalnagar police station must register Suryakant's FIR even though the offence occurred within Zebranagar's limits. This is the Zero FIR: an FIR registered at any police station regardless of territorial jurisdiction, numbered "0" instead of with a regular serial number, and then transferred to the station having jurisdiction, which registers it afresh with its own number and investigates under ss.175 and 176.

Suryakant has a second option on these facts, and it is worth naming because it fits his difficulty exactly: s.173(1)(ii) allows the information to be given by electronic communication, taken on record on being signed within three days by the person giving it. He need not travel at all.

Two further rights: by s.173(2) a copy of the FIR must be given to him forthwith, free of cost; and the position was settled even before the BNSS in Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728, that a police officer cannot refuse to register an FIR on the ground of territorial jurisdiction.

(b) Yes, the police are bound to register it, with one qualification.

1. s.173(4), BNSS (formerly s.154(3)): send the substance of the information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police. If satisfied that it discloses a cognizable offence, the SP shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation by a subordinate officer, who then has all the powers of an officer in charge.
2. s.175(3), BNSS (formerly s.156(3)): apply to the Magistrate empowered under s.210 to order an investigation. Two requirements are new: the application must be supported by an affidavit and must follow an application under s.173(4), and the Magistrate must make such inquiry as he thinks necessary and consider the submission of the police officer. This puts into the statute the directions in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287, given to stop frivolous s.156(3) applications.
3. Private complaint to the Magistrate under s.223, who may examine the complainant on oath and proceed. Note the new proviso to s.223(1): no cognizance shall be taken on a complaint without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard.
4. Writ petition under Art 226, or a complaint to the Police Complaints Authority or the State Human Rights Commission.

For full marks, cover: the four distinct illegalities in the police action, the sections breached, the inadmissibility of the confession under the evidence law, the additional protection of s.94 and the JJ Act's own principles, and the constitutional guarantees.

(a) The police action is illegal on four separate counts.

The girl is 13, so she is a child under s.2(12) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and if suspected of theft she is a child in conflict with law under s.2(13). The Act, not the ordinary criminal procedure, governs what may be done to her.

3. She must never be in a police lockup or jail. The proviso to s.10(1) is absolute: "in no case shall a child alleged to be in conflict with law be placed in a police lockup or lodged in a jail." If she was held at the station, that alone makes the detention illegal.
4. Her parents should have been informed. Section 13(1) requires the officer in charge of the police station or the Special Juvenile Police Unit to inform the parent or guardian of the child and direct them to be present at the Board, and to inform the probation officer so that a social investigation report can be prepared. Under Rule 8 of the Juvenile Justice Model Rules, 2016, this is to be done immediately.

Two more provisions complete the answer. Under s.12, a child alleged to have committed a bailable or non-bailable offence shall be released on bail with or without surety, or placed under the supervision of a probation officer or in the care of a fit person, unless release is likely to bring her into association with known criminals, expose her to moral, physical or psychological danger, or defeat the ends of justice, and the Board must record reasons for refusing. Theft by a 13-year-old is precisely the case in which bail is the norm. And where bail is refused, s.12(2) requires that she be kept only in an observation home or place of safety, never in custody.

Third, on the JJ Act's own principles. Section 3 of the Act lists the general principles the Board and the police must follow, and three of them are breached here: the principle of presumption of innocence (a child is presumed innocent of any mala fide or criminal intent up to eighteen years), the principle of dignity and worth, and the principle of right to be heard. Section 3 also states the principle of best interest and the principle of family responsibility, which is why her parents had to be informed.

Fourth, on the Constitution.

• Art 20(3): no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. A confession extracted during unlawful custody, from a 13-year-old, without a parent or guardian and without any Magistrate, is the paradigm case of compulsion. In Nandini Satpathy v. P. L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424, the Supreme Court held that Art 20(3) extends to the investigation stage and that the accused is entitled to the presence of a lawyer during interrogation.
• Art 22(1): the right to be informed of the grounds and to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of one's choice.
• Art 22(2): production before the nearest Magistrate within twenty-four hours.

For full marks, cover: the s.2(1)(y) definition, a list of the victim's rights with sections, the specific duty in s.397, whether it covers this victim, and the general legal duty of a doctor under Art 21 and Pandurang Kalate.

(a) Definition: s.2(1)(y), BNSS, 2023. A "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of the act or omission of the accused person, and includes the guardian or legal heir of such victim.

Mr. A has suffered bodily injury by the act of the ruffians, so he is a victim. Had he died, his legal heirs would themselves be victims within the definition.

The rights of a victim under the BNSS.

(b) The hospital is under a statutory duty, and its refusal is unlawful.

Section 397, BNSS, 2023 is the direct answer: "All hospitals, public or private, whether run by the Central Government, the State Government, local bodies or any other person, shall immediately provide the first-aid or medical treatment, free of cost, to the victims of any offence covered under ss.64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 or 124(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, or under ss.4, 6, 8 or 10 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and shall immediately inform the police of such incident."

2. Article 21. In Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) 4 SCC 37, the Supreme Court held that a failure to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need violates the right to life, and awarded compensation where a man with head injuries was turned away from a series of hospitals.
3. The general law of negligence and professional discipline. A hospital that refuses emergency care may be liable in tort for negligence, before the consumer forum for deficiency in service, and to disciplinary action by the State Medical Council under the professional conduct regulations, which require a physician not to refuse emergency treatment.

The correct course for the hospital was to give first aid at once, stabilise Mr. A, and then inform the police, which is what s.397 itself requires and what s.194, BNSS contemplates in the case of an unnatural death.

For full marks, cover: the object of the section, who may claim under s.144(1)(a) to (d), who is liable, the conditions, interim maintenance, the grounds of disentitlement in s.144(4) and (5), procedure and enforcement, and the case law including the 2024 decision.

1. The provision and its object. Section 144, BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.125, CrPC) is the summary remedy for maintenance. It is not a religious or personal law provision: it applies to persons of every religion, and it exists to prevent vagrancy and destitution. As the Supreme Court put it in Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353, the object is to enable a deserted wife and helpless children to live with dignity, and the proceeding is not to be treated as an ordinary civil suit.

2. Who may claim: s.144(1). If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:

• (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself;
• (b) his legitimate or illegitimate child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself;

4. From when it is payable. Section 144(2): the allowance is payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application.

5. The four conditions. Each must be proved: (i) the person has sufficient means; (ii) he has neglected or refused to maintain; (iii) the claimant is unable to maintain herself or itself; and (iv) the relationship in clauses (a) to (d) exists. "Sufficient means" does not mean actual income: an able-bodied man is presumed capable of earning, and unemployment is no answer.

• s.145(2): evidence is taken in the presence of the person against whom the order is proposed, or his advocate, in the manner prescribed for summons cases.
• s.144(3): on failure to comply without sufficient cause, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for levying the amount as a fine, and may sentence the defaulter to imprisonment up to one month for each month's unpaid allowance, or until payment if sooner made.
• Proviso: no warrant shall issue unless application is made within one year from the date the amount became due.
• s.146: alteration of the allowance on a change in circumstances, and cancellation where a divorced wife has remarried or has received the whole sum payable under any customary or personal law.

8. Case law.

• Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945: s.125 applies to a divorced Muslim woman, and mehr paid on divorce does not discharge the husband's obligation. Parliament responded with the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.

• Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324: comprehensive guidelines, of which three must be stated: a standard Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities must be filed by both parties in every maintenance proceeding; maintenance is payable from the date of the application, not the date of the order; and where maintenance is claimed under more than one statute, the earlier award must be adjusted in the later, to avoid overlapping.
• Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353: family courts must dispose of maintenance applications as expeditiously as possible, ideally within sixty days.
• Vimala v. Veeraswamy, (1991) 2 SCC 375: where a man has married a second time, the second wife may claim, and the burden of proving that his first marriage subsists is on him.

The distinction between bond and bail bond is the presence of a surety, and it is the point of the definitions: a bond is the accused's own undertaking, a bail bond brings in a third person who stands behind him.

2. Types of bail. There are four, and they should be set out with their sections.

(i) Regular bail in a bailable offence, s.478. When a person not accused of a non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant, or appears before a Court, and is prepared to give bail, he shall be released on bail. It is a right, and the police officer in charge may grant it.

• First proviso: the Court may nonetheless grant bail to a person in clause (i) or (ii) if he is a child, a woman, or is sick or infirm.
• Second proviso: bail may be granted in a clause (ii) case for any other special reason that is just and proper.
• Third proviso: the mere fact that the accused may be needed for identification by witnesses, or for police custody beyond the first fifteen days, is not sufficient ground to refuse bail if he is otherwise entitled and undertakes to comply with directions.
• Fourth proviso: where the offence is punishable with death, life or seven years or more, no bail without giving the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of hearing.

(iii) Default or statutory bail, s.187(3). Where the investigation is not completed and the charge sheet not filed within sixty days, or ninety days for offences punishable with death, life or ten years or more, the accused shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail. This is an indefeasible right, held to be a fundamental right flowing from Art 21 in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616, though it is lost if the accused does not apply before the charge sheet is filed.

• Third proviso: in no case shall he be detained longer than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the offence.
• Explanation: the period of detention caused by delay attributable to the accused is excluded.
• s.479(2), new and restrictive: where investigation, inquiry or trial in more than one offence or in multiple cases is pending against a person, he shall not be released on bail under this section.
• s.479(3), new: the Superintendent of the jail shall himself apply in writing to the Court on completion of the one-half or one-third period. This puts the duty on the State rather than on a prisoner who may not know his rights.

4. Conditions that may be imposed. By s.480(3), where the offence is punishable with imprisonment of seven years or more, or is under Chapters VI, VII or XVII of the BNS, or is an abetment, conspiracy or attempt at such an offence, the Court shall impose the conditions that the accused attend as required by the bond, not commit a similar offence, and not tamper with evidence or threaten witnesses, and may impose such other conditions as it considers necessary in the interests of justice.

For full marks, cover: the general mode of arrest in s.43, the special rules for women, the separate route for a proclaimed offender, the full list of an arrestee's rights with sections, the constitutional guarantees, and D. K. Basu.

1. The general mode of arrest: s.43(1), BNSS, 2023. In making an arrest the police officer or other person shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there is a submission to custody by word or action. If the person forcibly resists or attempts to evade, the officer may use all means necessary to effect the arrest (s.43(2)), but s.43(4) forbids causing the death of a person not accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.

2. Arrest of women: four special rules.

Two related provisions are worth adding. Section 179, on the attendance of witnesses, provides that no woman (nor a male person under fifteen or above sixty, a person with a mental or physical disability, or a person with an acute illness) shall be required to attend at any place other than the place in which she resides, though the BNSS permits the police to examine her at that place. And in a rape case, the information under s.173(1) must be recorded by a woman police officer or any woman officer.

3. Arrest of a proclaimed offender.

• s.35(1)(d): any police officer may, without a warrant and without a Magistrate's order, arrest a person who has been proclaimed an offender either under the Sanhita or by order of the State Government. No further condition applies: the checklist in s.35(1)(b) is not attracted.
• The status arises under s.84: a proclamation under s.84(1) requiring appearance in not less than thirty days, and, where the offence is punishable with ten years or more, life or death, a declaration under s.84(4) that he is a proclaimed offender.

• D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416: eleven mandatory requirements, including accurate, visible identification of the arresting officers, a memo of arrest attested by a witness and countersigned by the arrestee, information to a friend or relative, entry in a diary, an inspection memo of injuries, medical examination every forty-eight hours in custody, and copies of all documents to the Magistrate. Breach makes the officer liable to departmental action and contempt of court. The first two of those requirements are now s.36 of the BNSS, which is the point worth making: the judgment has become the statute.
• Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273: for offences punishable up to seven years, the police must first issue a notice of appearance, and must satisfy themselves on the statutory checklist that arrest is necessary; Magistrates must not authorise detention mechanically. Sections 35(1)(b) and 35(3) of the BNSS are this judgment written into the statute.

For full marks, cover: the scheme of the Act, each substantive offence with its defining section and its punishing section, the aggravating circumstances, the abetment and reporting offences, the presumptions, and the two rules on overlap and on the Act prevailing.

1. The scheme. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 applies to any person below eighteen years, defined as a "child" by s.2(1)(d), and it is gender neutral in respect of both victim and offender. It is built on a pattern that must be reproduced: a section defines each offence, and the next section punishes it. The punishments were substantially enhanced by the POCSO (Amendment) Act, 2019.

2. The offences.

(i) Penetrative sexual assault, s.3, punished by s.4. A person commits it if he penetrates his penis into the vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a child or makes the child do so with him or any other person; inserts any object or a part of the body, not being the penis, into any of those; manipulates any part of the body of the child so as to cause penetration; or applies his mouth to those parts of a child or makes the child do so.

(iii) Sexual assault, s.7, punished by s.8. With sexual intent, touching the vagina, penis, anus or breast of the child, or making the child touch those of the offender or any other person, or any other act with sexual intent involving physical contact without penetration.

• Punishment, s.8: three to five years and fine.

(iv) Aggravated sexual assault, s.9, punished by s.10. Sexual assault in the same categories of aggravating circumstance as s.5.

• Punishment, s.10: five to seven years and fine.

(v) Sexual harassment, s.11, punished by s.12. With sexual intent: uttering a word or making a sound or gesture or exhibiting an object or part of the body intending it to be heard or seen by the child; making the child exhibit his body; showing any object for pornographic purposes; repeatedly or constantly following, watching or contacting the child, directly or electronically; threatening to use a real or fabricated depiction of the child's body or involvement in a sexual act; or enticing the child for pornographic purposes. The Explanation makes "sexual intent" a question of fact.

• Punishment, s.12: up to three years and fine.

(viii) Abetment, s.16, punished by s.17. Abetment is defined on the model of the general penal law, and by s.17 an abettor whose abetment results in the offence being committed is punished with the punishment provided for the offence itself.

(ix) Attempt, s.18. Punishable with up to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or both.

(x) Failure to report or to record a case, s.19 read with s.21. Section 19 obliges any person who has apprehension that an offence is likely to be committed, or knowledge that one has been committed, to report it to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police. Section 21(1): failure to report or to record an offence is punishable with up to six months or fine or both. Section 21(2): a person in charge of a company or an institution who fails to report an offence by a subordinate is punishable with up to one year and fine. Section 21(3) exempts a child from liability under this section. Section 19(6) requires the police to report the matter to the Child Welfare Committee and the Special Court within twenty-four hours.

4. Two rules on overlap. Section 42: where an act constitutes an offence both under this Act and under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (or ss.67B of the Information Technology Act, 2000), the offender is liable to the punishment greater in degree. Section 42A: the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of any other law, and in case of inconsistency the POCSO Act prevails.