BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 9 Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita BNSS 2024-25 Question Paper with Solutions

Section 2(1)(o), BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.2(l), CrPC): a "non-cognizable offence" means an offence for which, and a "non-cognizable case" means a case in which, a police officer has no authority to arrest without warrant.

The consequence follows from s.174, BNSS (formerly s.155, CrPC): the police may neither investigate a non-cognizable case nor arrest in it without the order of a Magistrate having power to try the case.

Section 2(1)(v), BNSS, 2023: a "Public Prosecutor" means any person appointed under section 18, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor.

Under s.18(7) a person is eligible only if he has been in practice as an advocate for not less than seven years; a Special Public Prosecutor under s.18(8) needs ten years.

Section 2(1)(t), BNSS, 2023: a "police report" means a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (3) of section 193.

That is the report at the end of investigation, known in practice as the charge sheet (or, where no offence is made out, the final report).

Section 2(1)(b), BNSS, 2023: "bail" means the release of a person accused of or suspected of commission of an offence from the custody of law upon certain conditions imposed by an officer or Court on execution by such person of a bond or a bail bond.

This is the first statutory definition of bail in Indian law. The CrPC used the word throughout and never defined it.

Section 2(1)(m), BNSS, 2023: "judicial proceeding" includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath.

1. Section 359(1): compoundable without the permission of the Court. The lighter, essentially private offences, compoundable by the person named in the third column. Examples: causing hurt (BNS s.115(2)), theft (s.303(2), by the owner), criminal trespass (s.329(3)), criminal breach of contract of service (s.357), defamation (s.356(2), compoundable by the person defamed), enticing or detaining a married woman (BNS s.84, compoundable by the husband of the woman and the woman, the woman having been added by the BNSS).
2. Section 359(2): compoundable only with the permission of the Court before which the prosecution is pending. The graver ones, where the public interest is larger. Examples: voluntarily causing grievous hurt (BNS s.117(2)), causing miscarriage (s.88), bigamy (s.82(1)), word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman (s.79, compoundable by the woman insulted), criminal breach of trust (s.316(2)), cheating (s.318(3) and (4)).

• s.359(3): abetment of a compoundable offence, and an attempt to commit it, may be compounded in the same way.
• s.359(6): a High Court or Court of Session exercising its powers of revision under s.442 may allow any person to compound an offence which he is competent to compound. This is the one route by which composition may be permitted after the case has left the trial Court.

Effect. By s.359(8) the composition has the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence was compounded. It is not a withdrawal and not a discharge: the accused stands acquitted, and Art 20(2) then bars a second prosecution.

Control and subordination, s.20(3) to (6). The Directorate is headed by the Director of Prosecution, who functions under the administrative control of the Home Department of the State. Deputy Directors are subordinate to the Director, Assistant Directors to the Deputy Directors. Public Prosecutors, Additional and Special Public Prosecutors appointed to conduct cases in the High Court are subordinate to the Director; those appointed for the District Courts, and Assistant Public Prosecutors appointed under s.19(1), are subordinate to the Deputy Director or Assistant Director.

Powers and functions, ss.20(7) to (11). This is the real innovation, and it works as a three-tier division of the case load by gravity:

The whole of ss.20(7) to (11) is new in the BNSS. The CrPC's s.25A said nothing about what the Director was actually to do. The Deputy Director's duty to scrutinise the police report is the most significant of the three, because it puts a lawyer's eye on the charge sheet before the case reaches Court.

• Qualification, s.27(4) (as substituted in 2021): a degree in child psychology, psychiatry, law, social work, sociology, human health, education, human development or special education, with seven years of active involvement in health, education or child welfare, or a practising professional with such a degree.
• Disqualification, s.27(4A): no person is eligible who has a past record of violation of human or child rights, a conviction involving moral turpitude, dismissal from government service, any history of child abuse or child labour, or who is part of the management of a child care institution in the district.
• Tenure, s.27(6): not more than three years.
• Removal, s.27(7): for misuse of power, conviction for moral turpitude, or absence from proceedings for three consecutive months or failure to attend three-fourths of the sittings in a year.
• Status, s.27(9): the Committee functions as a Bench and has the powers of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class.

Functions, s.30. Among the eighteen listed: receiving children produced before it; conducting inquiry into their safety and well-being; directing social investigation reports; declaring fit persons and fit facilities; directing placement in foster care; selecting the institution for each child; two inspection visits a month of residential facilities; certifying the surrender deed and giving parents time to reconsider; declaring an orphan, abandoned or surrendered child legally free for adoption; taking suo motu cognizance (by at least three members); and taking action for the rehabilitation of sexually abused children reported under the POCSO Act.

1. Section 23(3): liability of the publisher. The publisher or owner of the media, studio or photographic facility is jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.
2. Section 23(4): punishment. Contravention of sub-section (1) or (2) is punishable with imprisonment of either description for not less than six months, which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.

Related duty of the Court. Section 33(7), POCSO requires the Special Court itself to ensure that the identity of the child is not disclosed at any time during the investigation or trial, subject to the same power to permit disclosure in the child's interest for recorded reasons.

For full marks, cover: the right of appeal under s.415(2), the separate and automatic reference under s.407, the High Court's powers under s.409, the two-judge rule in s.410, and the proviso that ties the two proceedings together.

(a) Yes, Mayur can appeal.

Section 415(2), BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.374(2), CrPC): any person convicted on a trial held by a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge may appeal to the High Court. Mayur was convicted of murder by the Court of Session, so the appeal lies to the High Court, as of right, on both fact and law. The limitation is thirty days from the date of the sentence under the Limitation Act, 1963.

Two points to add.

3. s.408: the High Court may direct further inquiry or take additional evidence on any point bearing on the guilt or innocence of the convicted person, itself or through the Sessions Court. The presence of the convicted person may be dispensed with unless the High Court otherwise directs.
4. s.409: the powers of the High Court. It may (a) confirm the sentence or pass any other sentence warranted by law; (b) annul the conviction and convict the accused of any other offence of which the Sessions Court might have convicted him, or order a new trial on the same or an amended charge; or (c) acquit the accused.

• Proviso: no order of confirmation shall be made until the period for preferring an appeal has expired, or, if an appeal is filed, until that appeal is disposed of.

1. s.410: at least two Judges. Where the High Court consists of two or more Judges, the confirmation or any new sentence must be made, passed and signed by at least two of them.

For full marks, cover: the three-year answer with the section, the whole table in s.514(2), the three starting points in s.515(1), the exclusions in ss.516 to 518, and the extension power in s.519.

(a) Three years.

Section 514(2)(c), BNSS, 2023 (formerly s.468(2)(c), CrPC): the period of limitation is three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. Danish's offence carries two years, which falls squarely in that class. So no Court can take cognizance after three years, and by s.514(1) the bar is on the Court taking cognizance, not on the investigation.

The full table, which should be reproduced:

The Explanation to s.514 is new in the BNSS. For computing the period, the relevant date is the date of filing the complaint under s.223 or the date of recording the information under s.173, not the date on which the Court happens to take cognizance. This puts into the statute what the Constitution Bench decided in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases, (2014) 2 SCC 62, and it protects a complainant from delay in the Court's own office.

(b) When the period begins to run: s.515, BNSS (formerly s.469, CrPC).

The period of limitation, in relation to an offender, commences on whichever of these applies:

1. s.515(1)(a): on the date of the offence; or
2. s.515(1)(b): where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved or to any police officer, on the first day on which the offence comes to the knowledge of such person or police officer, whichever is earlier; or
3. s.515(1)(c): where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, on the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved or to the investigating police officer, whichever is earlier.

For full marks, cover: the flat answer that the refusal is illegal, the words of s.173(1) that make it illegal, what a Zero FIR is and how it is transferred, the duty in Lalita Kumari, the punishment for refusal, and Jiten's remedies.

(a) No. The refusal is illegal.

Section 173(1), BNSS, 2023 says that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, irrespective of the area where the offence is committed, may be given orally or by electronic communication to an officer in charge of a police station. The words "irrespective of the area where the offence is committed" are the whole answer: they were put into the section by the BNSS and did not exist in s.154, CrPC.

• Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728: a police officer cannot refuse to register an FIR on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, and may transfer the case after investigation reveals that the offence was committed elsewhere.
• Section 199, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly s.166A(c), IPC): a public servant who fails to record any information given to him under s.173(1), BNSS, relating to a cognizable offence under BNS ss.64 to 68, 70, 71, 74, 76, 77, 79, 124, 143 or 144 (the sexual offences, acid attack and trafficking), is punishable with rigorous imprisonment of not less than six months up to two years, and fine. Note that the offence is in the BNS, not the BNSS, and that it is s.198, BNS which punishes a public servant who disobeys the law with intent to cause injury.

(b) Zero FIR.

A Zero FIR is a first information report registered at any police station, regardless of where the offence took place, and given the serial number "0" instead of a regular number. It is then transferred to the police station having territorial jurisdiction, which registers it afresh with its own regular number and investigates.

The scheme under the BNSS:

For full marks, cover: the conditional yes with the two threshold conditions, the s.15 preliminary assessment, s.18(3) and s.19, the s.2(33) definition, and the protections in s.21 and s.19(3).

(a) Yes, but only after a preliminary assessment, and only if the Board so orders.

Punit is 17, so he is a child under s.2(12) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which defines a child as a person who has not completed eighteen years of age, and a juvenile under s.2(35) as a child below eighteen. The general rule is that a child in conflict with law is dealt with by the Juvenile Justice Board, not by a criminal court.

The exception, introduced by the 2015 Act after the December 2012 Delhi case, has two threshold conditions, and both are satisfied here:

1. the offence must be a heinous offence; and

• s.19(1): the Children's Court then decides for itself whether (i) there is a need to try the child as an adult, in which case it tries him under the ordinary procedure while maintaining a child friendly atmosphere; or (ii) there is no such need, in which case it conducts an inquiry as a Board and passes orders under s.18.
• s.15(2): if the Board decides to dispose of the matter itself, it follows the procedure for a summons case, and that order is appealable under s.101(2).

Two protections that survive even a trial as an adult:

• s.21: no child in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life without the possibility of release.
• s.19(3): the child is sent to a place of safety till he attains twenty-one years, and only then transferred to jail, with reformative services, education and skill development provided meanwhile.

(b) Heinous offence: s.2(33), Juvenile Justice Act, 2015.

"Heinous offences" includes the offences for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal Code or any other law for the time being in force is imprisonment for seven years or more.

• (c) where death has been caused, paying compensation to the persons entitled under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855;
• (d) in theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach of trust, cheating or receiving stolen property, compensating a bona fide purchaser who has had to restore the property.

By s.395(3), where the sentence does not include a fine, the Court may still order the accused to pay compensation. By s.395(4) the power belongs also to an Appellate Court, and to the High Court or Sessions Court in revision. By s.395(5), any sum so paid is set off against damages in a later civil suit.

3. The Victim Compensation Scheme: s.396, BNSS (formerly s.357A, CrPC). This is the heart of the answer.

1. s.396(1): every State Government, in co-ordination with the Central Government, shall prepare a scheme for providing funds for compensation to the victim or his dependents who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.
2. s.396(2): whenever the Court recommends compensation, the District Legal Services Authority or the State Legal Services Authority decides the quantum under the scheme.

4. Free treatment of victims: s.397, BNSS. All hospitals, public or private, run by the Central or State Government, local bodies or any other person, shall immediately provide first-aid or medical treatment free of cost to victims of the sexual offences in ss.64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71 and 124(1) of the BNS and of ss.4, 6, 8 and 10 of the POCSO Act, and shall immediately inform the police.

5. The other victim-centred changes in the BNSS. The question asks whether the statement is made out, so the scheme must be placed among the rest:

• Suresh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 2 SCC 227: interim compensation must be awarded under s.357A even before the trial concludes, and the Court laid down that the Legal Services Authorities must act promptly.
• Laxmi v. Union of India, (2014) 4 SCC 427: directions for compensation and treatment of acid attack victims, including that no hospital may refuse treatment, which is now s.397.
• Mallikarjun Kodagali v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 2 SCC 752: on the victim's right of appeal, holding that the proviso to s.372 CrPC is to be read purposively in favour of the victim.

For full marks, cover: the s.6 classes, the hierarchy from Supreme Court down, the constitution of each court, the sentencing powers in ss.23 to 25, the abolition of the Metropolitan Magistrate, and the executive magistracy.

1. The classes of Criminal Courts: s.6, BNSS. Besides the High Courts and the Courts constituted under any law other than the Sanhita, there shall be in every State the following classes of Criminal Courts:

1. Courts of Session;
2. Judicial Magistrates of the first class;
3. Judicial Magistrates of the second class; and
4. Executive Magistrates.

Get the two sections in the last column the right way round, because they are easy to slip: s.21 is Courts by which offences are triable, s.22 is Sentences which High Courts and Sessions Judges may pass, and s.23 is Sentences which Magistrates may pass.

• s.9: Courts of Judicial Magistrates. In every district, as many Courts of Judicial Magistrates of the first and second class as the State Government, after consultation with the High Court, may specify. Presiding officers are appointed by the High Court.
• s.10: Chief Judicial Magistrate and Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate. In every district the High Court appoints a JMFC to be the Chief Judicial Magistrate, and may appoint Additional CJMs and designate a JMFC as a Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate.
• s.11: Special Judicial Magistrates, conferred with the powers of a JMFC or JMSC on persons holding or having held a government post, for a term not exceeding one year at a time.
• s.12: local jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrates; s.13: subordination of Judicial Magistrates to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.
• s.14: Executive Magistrates. The State Government appoints Executive Magistrates in every district and appoints one of them the District Magistrate, and may appoint Additional District Magistrates and Sub-divisional Magistrates. s.15: Special Executive Magistrates.
• s.16: local jurisdiction; s.17: subordination of Executive Magistrates to the District Magistrate.

For full marks, cover: why Special Courts exist, designation under s.28, the Special Public Prosecutor under s.32, the procedure and powers in s.33, the child-friendly features in ss.33 to 37, the time limits in s.35, the presumptions in ss.29 and 30, appeal, and the interaction with the JJ Act.

1. Why a Special Court. The POCSO Act, 2012 was passed because the general criminal law tried child sexual abuse in an adult forum, by adult procedure, and children withdrew. The Act therefore creates a separate forum, a separate prosecutor, a separate procedure and a separate rule of proof. The Special Court is the centre of that design.

2. Designation: s.28, POCSO.

• s.28(1): for the purpose of providing a speedy trial, the State Government, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, shall by notification in the Official Gazette designate for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try offences under the Act.

1. s.33(1): the Special Court may take cognizance without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon a complaint or a police report. This is the key procedural short cut: the ordinary route to a Court of Session is by commitment under s.232, BNSS, and it is dispensed with.
2. s.33(2): the prosecutor or defence counsel communicates the questions to the Special Court, which puts them to the child. The child is never questioned directly by counsel.
3. s.33(3): the Court may permit frequent breaks for the child.
4. s.33(4): the Court shall create a child-friendly atmosphere by allowing a family member, guardian, friend or relative in whom the child has trust to be present.
5. s.33(5): the child shall not be called repeatedly to testify.
6. s.33(6): no aggressive questioning or character assassination of the child, and the child's dignity is to be maintained throughout.

• s.38: an interpreter, translator, special educator or expert is to be provided where needed.
• s.40: the child's family or guardian is entitled to the assistance of a legal counsel of their choice; if they cannot afford one, the Legal Services Authority provides one.

6. Time limits: s.35. The evidence of the child shall be recorded within thirty days of the Special Court taking cognizance, and reasons for any delay recorded. The Special Court shall complete the trial, as far as possible, within one year from the date of taking cognizance.

7. Presumptions: ss.29 and 30. These reverse the ordinary burden and are always worth marks.

• s.29: where a person is prosecuted for an offence under ss.3, 5, 7 or 9 (penetrative sexual assault, aggravated penetrative sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault), the Special Court shall presume that he has committed the offence, unless the contrary is proved.
• s.30: culpable mental state is presumed, and the accused must prove its absence beyond reasonable doubt, not merely on a preponderance of probability.

For full marks, cover: the meaning of arrest, the whole of s.43, the safeguards in ss.46 to 58, the two great constitutional rights, s.35 in full, the notice procedure in s.35(3) to (6), and the case law.

1. What arrest is. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody by lawful authority so that he may answer a criminal charge. The BNSS does not define it; the meaning comes from s.43(1), which describes the act.

2. Procedure of arrest: s.43, BNSS (formerly s.46, CrPC).

1. s.43(1): in making an arrest the officer shall actually touch or confine the body of the person to be arrested, unless there is a submission to custody by word or action.

• Proviso: where a woman is to be arrested, unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, her submission to custody on an oral intimation of arrest shall be presumed, and unless the police officer is a female, the officer shall not touch the person of the woman to make the arrest.

3. The safeguards that follow the arrest.

4. The two constitutional rights behind these sections. Article 22(1): no person arrested shall be detained without being informed of the grounds of arrest, nor denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Article 22(2): every person arrested and detained shall be produced before the nearest Magistrate within twenty-four hours excluding journey time, and shall not be detained beyond that period without the Magistrate's authority. Sections 47, 38 and 58 are the statutory form of these rights, and a breach makes the detention illegal.

5. When the police may arrest without warrant: s.35(1), BNSS (formerly s.41, CrPC). Any police officer may, without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest a person:

• (e) in whose possession suspected stolen property is found;
• (f) who obstructs a police officer in the execution of his duty, or has escaped or attempts to escape from lawful custody;
• (g) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from the Armed Forces;
• (h) who has been concerned in an act committed outside India which would be an offence in India and for which he is liable to be apprehended or detained;
• (i) a released convict who breaches a rule made under s.394(5);
• (j) against whom a requisition for arrest has been received from another police officer.

6. The notice procedure, s.35(3) to (6). Where the arrest of a person is not required under s.35(1), the officer shall issue a notice directing him to appear before the officer or at a specified place. The person is bound to comply, and if he complies and continues to comply, he shall not be arrested in respect of that offence unless the officer records reasons why he should be. If he fails to comply or is unwilling to identify himself, the officer may arrest him.

7. Two new restrictions in the BNSS.

• Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273: for offences punishable up to seven years, the police must issue a notice of appearance and satisfy themselves that arrest is necessary on the s.41 checklist; Magistrates must not authorise detention casually. Sections 35(1)(b) and 35(3) are Arnesh Kumar written into the statute.
• Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51: the Supreme Court found that Arnesh Kumar was still being ignored, and issued directions binding on the police, the Magistracy and the High Courts, including that non-compliance with s.41A CrPC entitles the accused to bail, that States frame standing orders to implement the checklist, and that bail applications be disposed of within two weeks. It is the case to cite for what happens when the arrest safeguards are breached in practice, and it is the most current authority on this chapter.