Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Company Law
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
BLS LLB 5 Years · Sem 7
2022-23 - ATKT Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
Mumbai University Solved Question Papers
Company Law
Previous Year Question Paper with Solution
BLS LLB 5 Years · Sem 7
2022-23 - ATKT Examination
munotes.in
Mumbai
First published on munotes.in on 11 August 2026.
Published by munotes.in, Mumbai.
Model answers written and edited by the munotes.in editorial desk.
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The University does not publish an official answer key for this paper. The answers in this volume are model answers, written to show how a full-mark answer is built. They are a study aid, not an authority on what an examiner marked.
The question paper reproduced here is the paper as set by the University of Mumbai at the 2022-23 - ATKT examination.
The answers in this volume state the law as it stands today, not as it stood when this paper was set, and in this subject that distinction decides whole answers. The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 took inability to pay debts out of the grounds for winding up and omitted voluntary winding up from the Companies Act altogether, so an unpaid creditor now applies under the Code and a solvent company ends its life under Section 59 of it. Section 195, which prohibited insider trading, was omitted with effect from 9 February 2018, and Section 3A, making members severally liable when the membership falls below the statutory minimum, was inserted the same day. The certificate to commence business gave way to a director's declaration under Section 10A from 2 November 2018. Several questions here are set on institutions that no longer exist, most often the statutory meeting, which was Section 165 of the Companies Act, 1956 and was never re-enacted; those answers give the institution as it was and say what has replaced it.
The questions below are the paper as the University of Mumbai set it at the 2022-23 - ATKT examination, in the order it was set.
MarksPage
MarksPage
The questions in this volume are the questions asked at the 2022-23 - ATKT examination, reproduced as the University of Mumbai set them, in the order it set them. Nothing has been reworded, added or left out. Only the answers are ours. See the original question paper.
Duration 2 hours · Total marks 60 · 22 questions answered
Instructions printed on the paper
How to use this volume
Solve the paper first, under exam conditions and against the clock. Then read the answers here and mark your own. Reading a solution before attempting the question feels productive and teaches very little, because recognising an answer is not the same as being able to write one.
Answer the following in not more than two sentences
Any Six · 12 Marks
Answer
A pre-incorporation contract, also called a preliminary contract, is a contract purported to be made on behalf of a company before the company is incorporated, usually by its promoters.
Because the company does not exist at that date, it has no contractual capacity, it cannot ratify the contract afterwards, and it can neither sue nor be sued on it. The promoter who signed as agent is personally liable, Kelner v. Baxter (1866).
Answer
Under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, an authorised dealer is a kind of "authorised person" under section 2(c), meaning an authorised dealer, money changer, offshore banking unit or any other person authorised under section 10(1) to deal in foreign exchange or foreign securities.
Section 10(1) empowers the Reserve Bank of India, on application, to authorise any person to be an authorised person to deal in foreign exchange, on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. In practice the authorised dealers are the banks through which every lawful dealing in foreign exchange in India is routed.
Answer
A company licensed under section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013. Section 8(1) allows the Central Government to license a person or association of persons about to be registered as a limited company, which:
to be registered as a limited company without the addition to its name of the word "Limited" or "Private Limited".
Answer
The objects clause, a compulsory clause of the memorandum under section 4(1)(c), states the objects for which the company is incorporated, and everything outside those objects is ultra vires the company and void.
It matters to a creditor because it tells him what business will generate the assets he is lending against, and it guarantees that the company's funds cannot lawfully be diverted to some different and possibly riskier venture. His money is tied to the enterprise he chose to finance.
Answer
Section 32 read with the explanation to it defines a red herring prospectus as a prospectus which does not include complete particulars of the quantum or price of the securities included therein.
A company proposing to make an offer of securities may issue one prior to the issue of a prospectus, and it must be filed with the Registrar at least three days before the opening of the subscription list and the offer.
Answer
Section 2(n) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 defines "foreign exchange" as foreign currency, and includes:
Answer
A share certificate is a document issued by a company under its common seal, or signed as prescribed, specifying the shares held by any person and stating the amount paid up on them.
Section 46(1) provides that a certificate, issued under the common seal, if any, of the company or signed by two directors or by a director and the company secretary, specifying the shares held by any person, shall be prima facie evidence of the title of that person to such shares.
Answer
Underwriting is an agreement by which a person, the underwriter, undertakes for a commission to subscribe for such of the shares or debentures offered to the public as are not taken up by it. It guarantees the company that the issue will be subscribed.
Underwriting commission is the consideration paid by the company to the underwriter for that guarantee, calculated as a percentage of the issue price of the securities underwritten, and it is payable whether or not the underwriter is in fact called upon to take up any shares.
Answer
Under section 203(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rule 8, every listed company and every other public company having a paid-up share capital of ten crore rupees or more must have the following whole-time key managerial personnel:
Rule 8A additionally requires every private company having a paid-up share capital of ten crore rupees or more to have a whole-time company secretary.
Answer
Under section 149(1) of the Companies Act, 2013:
| Company | Minimum directors | Maximum directors |
|---|---|---|
| One Person Company | 1 | 15 |
| Private company | 2 | 15 |
| Public company | 3 | 15 |
The maximum of fifteen may be exceeded by passing a special resolution, and no approval of the Central Government is required for the increase.
Write short notes on
Any two · 12 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the first auditor, the five-year term, rotation, casual vacancy, the Government company rule, and the disqualifications.
First auditor, section 139(6). Appointed by the Board within thirty days of the date of registration. If the Board fails, it shall inform the members, who shall appoint within ninety days at an extraordinary general meeting. He holds office till the conclusion of the first annual general meeting.
Government company, section 139(7). The first auditor is appointed by the Comptroller and Auditor-General within sixty days of registration; failing that, by the Board within the next thirty days; failing that, by the members within sixty days at an extraordinary general meeting.
Subsequent auditor, section 139(1). At the first annual general meeting the company appoints an individual or a firm to hold office from the conclusion of that meeting till the conclusion of its sixth annual general meeting, that is a term of five years. Before the appointment the company must obtain the auditor's written consent and a certificate that the appointment, if made, will be in accordance with the prescribed conditions, and must file Form ADT-1 with the Registrar within fifteen days.
For a Government company, the auditor is appointed each year by the CAG within one hundred and eighty days from the commencement of the financial year.
Rotation, section 139(2). Applies to every listed company, every unlisted public company with paid-up capital of ten crore rupees or more, every private company with paid-up capital of fifty crore rupees or more, and every company having public borrowings from banks or financial institutions or public deposits of fifty crore rupees or more. Such a company shall not appoint or re-appoint:
and the outgoing individual or firm is ineligible for re-appointment in the same company for five years. The cooling-off extends to a firm having a common partner with the outgoing firm.
Casual vacancy, section 139(8). Filled by the Board within thirty days. Where the vacancy is caused by resignation, the Board's appointment must also be approved by the company at a general meeting convened within three months of the Board's recommendation. In a Government company it is filled by the CAG within thirty days, failing which by the Board within the next thirty days.
Where no auditor is appointed at an annual general meeting, section 139(10) provides that the existing auditor shall continue to be the auditor of the company.
Eligibility and disqualification, section 141. Only a chartered accountant, or a firm whose majority of partners practising in India are chartered accountants, may be appointed; a limited liability partnership may be appointed but no other body corporate. Disqualified are an officer or employee of the company; a partner or employee of an officer or employee; a person or his relative or partner holding any security or interest in the company or its holding, subsidiary or associate company (a relative may hold securities of face value up to one thousand rupees), or indebted to any of them beyond five lakh rupees, or who has given a guarantee for the indebtedness of a third person beyond one lakh rupees; a person having a business relationship with any of them; a person whose relative is a director or key managerial personnel; a person in full-time employment elsewhere or already auditor of more than twenty companies; a person convicted of an offence involving fraud within the last ten years; and a person rendering any of the services prohibited by section 144.
Conclusion. The scheme of section 139 is that the members appoint the auditor and the Board only where the Act allows: the first auditor by the Board within thirty days and failing that by the members, and every subsequent auditor at the annual general meeting to hold office for five years. The eligibility conditions in section 141 and the prohibited services in section 144 exist for one purpose, to keep the auditor independent of the management whose accounts he is to examine, which is why disqualification extends to his relatives, partners and business associates.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the meaning, the three modes, the section 66 procedure with the Tribunal, the protection of creditors, the bar where deposits are in arrear, and the ways capital is reduced without section 66.
Reduction of share capital is the diminution of the issued, subscribed and paid-up share capital of a company. Because capital is the fund on which creditors rely, the general rule is that a company must maintain its capital, and reduction is permitted only under section 66 and with the confirmation of the Tribunal.
Section 66(1): a company limited by shares or limited by guarantee and having a share capital may, by a special resolution, subject to confirmation by the Tribunal on a petition, reduce its share capital in any manner, and in particular may:
Conditions and procedure:
After confirmation: the Tribunal's order is published as it directs, and the company delivers a certified copy of the order and of the minute approved by the Tribunal showing the amount of share capital, the number of shares into which it is divided, the amount of each share and the amount deemed paid up, to the Registrar within thirty days, who registers it and issues a certificate, which is conclusive evidence that the requirements of the Act have been complied with.
Penalty, section 66(10) and (11): a member of the company who conceals the name of a creditor entitled to object, or misrepresents the nature or amount of his debt, is punishable under section 447; and a company failing to comply with the publication direction is punishable with a fine.
Conclusion. Reduction of capital under section 66 is the one procedure by which a company may lawfully return capital to its members or write off capital already lost, and because it takes away the fund on which the creditors rely, it cannot be done by the members alone. A special resolution is only the beginning; the Tribunal must confirm the reduction after notice to the Central Government, the Registrar, SEBI where the company is listed, and every creditor, and the reduction takes effect only on registration of the order. Concealing a creditor entitled to object is punishable under section 447.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the definition with its two preferences, the kinds, the twenty-year rule on redemption, the conditions of redemption under section 55, and the circumstances in which preference shareholders vote.
Section 43(b) provides that the share capital of a company limited by shares shall be of two kinds, equity share capital and preference share capital. The explanation defines preference share capital as that part of the issued share capital which carries or would carry a preferential right with respect to:
Both preferences must be present; a share carrying only one of them is not a preference share.
The kinds:
| Kind | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Cumulative | Unpaid dividend of a year accumulates as arrears and must be paid before any equity dividend. Preference shares are presumed cumulative unless the articles provide otherwise |
| Non-cumulative | The dividend for a year in which no profit is earned is lost for ever |
| Participating | Entitled, after the fixed dividend, to share in the surplus profits with the equity shareholders, and often in the surplus assets on winding up. This must be expressly conferred; preference shares are presumed non-participating |
| Non-participating | Entitled to the fixed dividend and no more |
| Convertible | Convertible into equity shares after a stated period |
| Non-convertible | Not convertible |
| Redeemable | Repayable by the company at the end of a stated period |
Section 55(1): a company limited by shares shall not issue any preference shares which are irredeemable. All preference shares must therefore be redeemable.
Section 55(2): a company may, if so authorised by its articles, issue preference shares which are liable to be redeemed within a period not exceeding twenty years from the date of their issue. A company engaged in the setting up and dealing with infrastructural projects may issue preference shares redeemable beyond twenty years but not exceeding thirty years, subject to the redemption of a minimum ten per cent of such shares per year from the twenty-first year onwards, at the option of the holders.
Conditions of redemption, section 55(2) provisos:
Where a company is unable to redeem or to pay the dividend, section 55(3) allows it, with the consent of the holders of three-fourths in value of the preference shares and the approval of the Tribunal, to issue further redeemable preference shares equal to the amount due, and the unredeemed shares are then deemed to have been redeemed.
Voting rights, section 47(2). A preference shareholder has a right to vote only on resolutions placed before the company which directly affect the rights attached to his preference shares, and on any resolution for the winding up of the company or for the repayment or reduction of its equity or preference share capital. But where the dividend has not been paid for a period of two years or more, whether or not declared, the preference shareholder acquires a right to vote on all resolutions placed before the company. His voting proportion bears to the total voting power the same proportion as the paid-up preference capital bears to the total paid-up capital.
Conclusion. Preference share capital is defined in the Explanation to section 43 by the two preferences it carries, a preferential right to dividend at a fixed rate and a preferential right to repayment of capital on winding up, and both must be present. The price of that priority is the ceiling: the holder is presumed non participating in surplus, and he has no vote except on resolutions directly affecting his rights. If his dividend remains unpaid for two years, section 47(2) revives his vote on every resolution, which is the Act's recognition that a preference share whose preference is not honoured is no longer a passive investment.
Answer
For full marks, cover: who must appoint them, the definition in section 149(6) clause by clause, tenure, the code in Schedule IV, remuneration, and the limited liability under section 149(12).
Section 2(47) defines an independent director as a director referred to in sub-section (6) of section 149.
Which companies, section 149(4) and Rule 4:
A private company is not required to have any, and the requirement does not apply to a joint venture, a wholly owned subsidiary or a dormant company.
The definition, section 149(6). An independent director means a director other than a managing director, a whole-time director or a nominee director, who:
Declaration, section 149(7). Every independent director shall at the first meeting of the Board in which he participates as a director, and thereafter at the first meeting of the Board in every financial year, or whenever there is any change in the circumstances which may affect his status, give a declaration that he meets the criteria of independence.
Tenure, section 149(10) and (11). An independent director shall hold office for a term of up to five consecutive years, and shall be eligible for reappointment on the passing of a special resolution and disclosure in the Board's report. He shall not hold office for more than two consecutive terms, and shall be eligible for appointment after the expiry of three years of ceasing to become an independent director, provided that during those three years he is not appointed in or associated with the company in any other capacity, directly or indirectly.
No retirement by rotation, section 149(13). The provisions on retirement of directors by rotation in section 152(6) and (7) do not apply to an independent director.
Remuneration, section 197(5). An independent director shall not be entitled to any stock option, and may receive remuneration only by way of fees under section 197(5), reimbursement of expenses for participation in Board and other meetings, and profit related commission as may be approved by the members.
Liability, section 149(12). An independent director, and a non-executive director not being a promoter or key managerial personnel, shall be held liable only in respect of such acts of omission or commission by a company which had occurred with his knowledge, attributable through Board processes, and with his consent or connivance or where he had not acted diligently. This is a significant limitation and is the provision that makes the office acceptable to able people.
Schedule IV: the Code for Independent Directors. It sets out the guidelines of professional conduct, the role and functions, the duties, the manner of appointment, resignation or removal, and provides for separate meetings. Two features are examinable:
Conclusion. An independent director under section 149(6) is defined negatively, by the absence of any pecuniary or personal relationship with the company, its promoters, its holding, subsidiary or associate companies, and that negative definition is the whole point of the office: he is on the Board to bring an outside judgment that the executive directors cannot. The supporting machinery, the declaration under section 149(7), Schedule IV, the separate meeting of independent directors, the exclusion from stock options and from retirement by rotation, and the limitation of liability under section 149(12), all exist to preserve that independence in fact and not merely in form.
Answer the following by giving reason
Any two · 12 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the three restrictions in section 2(68), the prohibition on inviting the public and the private placement alternative, and the full conversion procedure under sections 14 and 18.
Section 2(68)(ii) requires the articles of a private company to limit the number of its members to two hundred.
Three riders:
If the number of members falls below two and the company carries on business for more than six months while so reduced, section 3A makes every member aware of it severally liable for the whole of the debts contracted during that time.
The other two restrictions of section 2(68) go with this one and should be mentioned: the articles must also restrict the right to transfer its shares, and must prohibit any invitation to the public to subscribe for any securities of the company.
A private company cannot issue a prospectus. Section 2(68)(iii) requires its articles to prohibit any invitation to the public to subscribe for any securities of the company, and a prospectus is by definition a document inviting offers from the public for the subscription or purchase of securities, section 2(70).
How a private company raises capital instead:
The conditions of section 42 are strict and worth naming: the offer must be previously approved by a special resolution; the application money must be received by cheque, demand draft or other banking channel and not in cash; it must be kept in a separate bank account and used only for allotment or repayment; the company must allot within sixty days of receipt or repay within fifteen days thereafter, failing which it pays interest at twelve per cent per annum from the expiry of the sixtieth day; the company must file a return of allotment in Form PAS-3 within fifteen days; and no company making a private placement shall release any public advertisement or utilise any media, marketing or distribution channels or agents to inform the public at large about such an offer.
Section 42(10): contravention makes the company, its promoters and directors liable to a penalty which may extend to the amount raised through the private placement or two crore rupees, whichever is lower, and the company must refund all monies to subscribers within thirty days of the order imposing the penalty.
Mr. A and Mr. B may convert later. The procedure is under section 14 read with section 18.
The consequential requirements once it is a public company, which are the practical advice:
Conclusion. On these facts the advice to Mr. A and Mr. B is that (a) a private company must by its articles limit its members to two hundred, excluding present and former employee members and counting joint holders as one, section 2(68); (b) it is prohibited from inviting the public to subscribe for its securities, so it cannot issue a prospectus at all and must raise capital privately under section 42; and (c) conversion into a public company requires a special resolution altering the articles to delete the three restrictions, filing with the Registrar, compliance with everything the Act requires of a public company, and a consequential change of name to drop the word Private.
Answer
To save the company, Directors used the fund to pay off other liabilities of the Company.
For full marks, cover: that this is Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, the proposition that a statement of intention is a statement of fact, the answer to both limbs, and the statutory remedies under sections 34, 35 and 36.
This problem is Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 with the names changed, and the answer is the answer given in that case.
Yes.
The prospectus stated that the objects of the issue were to complete alterations to the buildings and to develop the trade of the company. In truth the directors intended to use the money to pay off existing liabilities. The statement of the purpose of the issue was therefore false when it was made.
The obvious objection is that a statement of intention is not a statement of fact, and that a man who says what he means to do makes a promise, not a representation. That objection was raised in Edgington and rejected. Bowen LJ's sentence is the one to quote:
There must be a misstatement of an existing fact: but the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a man's mind is, therefore, a misstatement of fact.
So the representation was of an existing fact, namely what the directors then intended, and it was untrue.
The elements Mr. John must establish, and each is satisfied:
His remedies:
Section 27 of the Companies Act, 2013 is directly in point and should be cited. A company which has raised money from the public through a prospectus and still has any unutilised amount shall not vary the terms of a contract referred to in the prospectus or the objects for which the prospectus was issued except by special resolution, with the notice and an advertisement in the prescribed manner, and dissenting shareholders must be given an exit offer by promoters or controlling shareholders. The directors here did not vary the objects by special resolution; they simply spent the money differently, which the section forbids outright.
Yes. The motive does not make the statement true.
Fraud in the civil sense, as defined in Derry v. Peek, is a false representation made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. The directors' statement of their intention was false to their own knowledge. Motive is irrelevant to the question whether a representation was fraudulent.
The reason is not merely technical. Mr. John's money was raised for one risk and applied to another. A lender who advances money to fund improvements to a building and the development of a trade is lending against an enterprise that is expanding. A lender whose money is used to pay off existing creditors is lending to a company already in difficulty, and is in substance funding somebody else's exit. That is a materially different transaction, and it is precisely the difference the prospectus concealed.
Note that the directors may well have acted in good faith towards the company, and a court may accept that they believed they were saving it. That is a plea in mitigation, not a defence. Their duty under section 166(2) is to act in good faith for the benefit of the members as a whole, but a duty owed to the company cannot justify a misstatement to an outsider.
Fraud under the Companies Act is wider still. The explanation to section 447 defines fraud in relation to the affairs of a company as any act, omission, concealment of any fact or abuse of position committed by any person, with intent to deceive, to gain undue advantage from, or to injure the interests of, the company or its shareholders or its creditors or any other person, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss. The words "whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss" dispose of the directors' argument directly: it is no answer that nobody profited and that the company benefited.
Conclusion. On these facts Mr. John can sue, and the directors' defence fails. Where a prospectus states the objects of an issue, the money must be applied to those objects, and applying it instead to discharge the company's pressing liabilities is a departure from the statement on the faith of which the subscription was made. It is no answer that the directors acted honestly and that the company benefited, because the definition of fraud in the Explanation to section 447 expressly extends to an act done with intent to deceive or to injure the interests of the company or its creditors, whether or not there is any wrongful gain or wrongful loss. Mr. John's remedies are compensation under section 35 and rescission against the company.
Answer
For full marks, cover: that section 169 overrides the articles, the two exceptions that do not apply, the section 10 four-limb contract and why Mr. B's claim fails on limb four, Eley's case, and the damages that may nevertheless survive.
The company is entitled to succeed. Mr. B's action to be restored to the board must fail.
First and decisively, section 169 overrides the articles. Section 169(1) provides that a company may, by ordinary resolution, remove a director before the expiry of the period of his office, after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Companies Act, 2013 does not permit the articles to take that power away: an article which purports to make a director irremovable is inconsistent with the Act and, to that extent, void. The articles are subordinate to the Act, and no provision of the articles can deprive the members of a statutory power.
So the clause that Mr. B "should not be removable till 2026" cannot be enforced as a restraint on removal.
The two exceptions in section 169 do not help him:
Second, the articles are not a contract with him in this capacity. Section 10(1) makes the memorandum and articles bind the company and its members as if signed by each of them, but the contract so created is enforceable only in respect of the rights of a member as a member. It creates no contract between the company and an outsider, and none with a member in a capacity other than that of member.
Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (1876) 1 Ex D 88 is the case exactly in point. The articles provided that Eley should be the company's solicitor for life and should not be removed except for misconduct. He acted as solicitor and later became a member. When the company ceased to employ him he sued on the articles and failed: he was seeking to enforce a right conferred on him in the character of solicitor, not of member, and in that character he was an outsider to the section 10 contract. See also Beattie v. E. & F. Beattie Ltd. [1938] Ch 708, where a director could not rely on an arbitration clause in the articles in a dispute about his conduct as director.
What the company should do to make the removal unimpeachable. If the procedural steps were not taken, the company should repeat the exercise properly, because the substantive power is not in doubt but the procedure is mandatory:
What Mr. B may still have is money, not office. Section 169(8)(b) expressly provides that nothing in the section shall be taken as depriving a person removed of compensation or damages payable to him in respect of the termination of his appointment as director or of any appointment terminating with that as director, in accordance with the terms of any contract. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. v. Shirlaw [1940] AC 701 is the authority: a company may alter its articles and remove a managing director, but if in doing so it breaks a service contract, it is liable in damages for the breach. The statutory power to end the office is not a licence to break a contract.
So the advice is: the removal stands, Mr. B cannot be restored, but if he held a service agreement running to 2026 the company should expect a claim in damages for the unexpired term.
An outsider, for the purposes of the articles, is any person who is not a member of the company, and also a member who is suing in a capacity other than that of a member.
The second half is the important half. A person may be both a member and an outsider at the same time, depending on the right he is asserting:
Eley was a member and still lost, because his claim was as solicitor. Mr. B is in the same position: his claim is as director, not as member.
The four limbs of the section 10 contract set out the boundary:
| Limb | Enforceable? | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Company to member | Yes | Wood v. Odessa Waterworks Co. (1889) |
| Member to company | Yes | Borland's Trustee v. Steel Bros. & Co. (1901) |
| Limb | Enforceable? | Authority |
|---|---|---|
| Member to member | Yes | Rayfield v. Hands (1960) |
| Company to outsider | No | Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co. (1876) |
Note the practical answer for an outsider who wants a right secured by the articles: he must obtain a separate contract with the company, and the article may then be incorporated into that contract as one of its terms. That is how a managing director's tenure is protected in practice, and it is why Southern Foundries v. Shirlaw succeeded where Eley failed. Shirlaw had a service agreement; Eley had only the article.
Conclusion. On these facts the advice to the company is that Mr. B's action fails. Section 10 makes the memorandum and articles a contract binding the company and its members, but only in their capacity as members, and a clause conferring a right on a person in some other capacity, here as director, is unenforceable by him, Eley v. Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co. An outsider for this purpose means anyone suing otherwise than as a member, so Mr. B is an outsider even though he may also hold shares. Section 169 permits removal by ordinary resolution notwithstanding anything in the articles or in any agreement, and Mr. B's only route would have been a separate service contract, which is what distinguishes Southern Foundries v. Shirlaw.
Answer
White incorporates rival company in which Mr. Black is one of the Directors.
For full marks, cover: the split of the covenant into its two halves, section 27 of the Contract Act on the post-employment half, what remedies survive, and Gilford Motor v. Horne on the rival company with the Indian qualification.
The covenant must be split in two, because Indian law treats the two halves differently. This is the heart of the answer.
The first half, "while he shall hold the office of a managing director", is valid. A negative covenant operating during the subsistence of the employment is not a restraint of trade within section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; it is a term of the service itself. Niranjan Shankar Golikari v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1098 upheld such a covenant, holding that a restriction operating during the term of the agreement, and not thereafter, is not in restraint of trade and is enforceable by injunction. See also Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 545.
The second half, "or afterwards", is void. Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 provides that every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void, subject only to the exception for the sale of goodwill.
Indian law, unlike English law, has no test of reasonableness for post-employment restraints. In Superintendence Company of India (P) Ltd. v. Krishan Murgai AIR 1980 SC 1717 the Supreme Court struck down a covenant restraining an employee from a similar business for two years after his employment ended, holding that once the employment comes to an end the employee's future obligations end with it and he must remain free to pursue any lawful profession, trade or business. It makes no difference whether the restraint is for six months or six years, or covers one city or the whole country. See also Percept D'Mark (India) (P) Ltd. v. Zaheer Khan (2006) 4 SCC 227.
Mr. Black's employment has been determined. The covenant is therefore operating in its post-employment phase, and in that phase it is void under section 27. FICO cannot obtain an injunction to enforce it as such.
What FICO can still do, and this is where the marks lie, because the answer must not stop at "no remedy":
Yes, on either of two footings, but not to enforce the void covenant.
Footing 1: the company as a cloak, and the lifting of the corporate veil. Gilford Motor Co. Ltd. v. Horne [1933] Ch 935 is the case the problem is drawn from. Horne, the former managing director of Gilford Motor, had covenanted not to solicit its customers. He formed a company in the names of his wife and an employee and solicited through it. The Court of Appeal granted an injunction against both Horne and the company, holding the company to be "a mere cloak or sham" and "a device, a stratagem", formed as a channel through which he could break his covenant.
So where the rival company is shown to be a device formed to enable the individual to do what he may not do himself, the court will lift the veil and restrain the company as well. Jones v. Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832 is to the same effect.
The Indian qualification matters and must be stated. Gilford Motor proceeds on the footing that the underlying covenant was valid and enforceable under English law, which applies a test of reasonableness to post-employment restraints. In India the post-employment restraint is void under section 27, so there is nothing for the company to be a cloak for. Lifting the veil cannot manufacture an obligation that never bound the man behind it.
The veil argument therefore succeeds in India only if the underlying wrong is one that Indian law recognises, namely:
Footing 2: the tort of inducing breach of contract. If Mr. White or his company knowingly induced Mr. Black to breach a subsisting and valid obligation to FICO, for example the in-term covenant or his fiduciary duty as managing director, FICO has a direct action against them for inducing breach of contract and for conspiracy, without needing to lift any veil. Lumley v. Gye (1853) is the source of the tort.
Conclusion. On these facts FICO has a remedy against both. Against Mr. Black the covenant is enforceable so far as it restrains solicitation of the company's customers during and after his employment, and the rival company he has formed to do the very thing he promised not to do is a mere cloak or sham, so an injunction runs against the company as well as against him, Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne. FICO can therefore sue the rival company, and it need not even lift the veil to do so where the rival company knowingly induced Mr. Black to break his contract, which is the tort in Lumley v. Gye.
Answer the following
Any two · 24 Marks
Answer
For full marks, cover: the six requisites in order, each with its section and its figures, and the consequence of failing each.
A meeting of shareholders is valid only if six requirements are satisfied. Take them in order.
The authority to call a general meeting is the Board of Directors, acting by a resolution passed at a duly convened Board meeting. A meeting called by some of the directors informally, or by the managing director alone without Board authority, is not validly convened and its proceedings are void.
Three others may call a meeting:
Section 101(1): not less than clear twenty-one days' notice, in writing or by electronic mode.
Ordinary business, which needs no explanatory statement, is limited by section 102(2) to four items at an annual general meeting: consideration of the financial statements and the reports of the Board and auditors, declaration of dividend, appointment of directors in place of those retiring, and the appointment and remuneration of auditors. Everything else, and all business at an extraordinary general meeting, is special business.
Section 103(1), unless the articles provide for a larger number:
| Company | Members personally present |
|---|---|
| Private company | 2 |
| Public company, members up to 1,000 | 5 |
| Public company, 1,001 to 5,000 members | 15 |
| Public company, above 5,000 members | 30 |
The words are "personally present". A member represented by proxy is not counted towards the quorum, though a proxy may vote on a poll. A representative of a body corporate appointed under section 113 and a representative of the President or a Governor under section 112 are counted as personally present.
If a quorum is not present, section 103(2): unless the articles otherwise provide, if a quorum is not present within half an hour the meeting shall stand adjourned to the same day in the next week at the same time and place, or to such other day, time and place as the Board may determine, but if the meeting was called on the requisition of members it stands cancelled. At the adjourned meeting, if a quorum is not present within half an hour, the members present shall be the quorum. Not less than three days' notice of the adjourned meeting must be given.
A meeting held without a quorum is a nullity and its resolutions are void.
Section 104: unless the articles otherwise provide, the members personally present at the meeting shall elect one of themselves to be the chairman on a show of hands. If a poll is demanded on the election of the chairman, it shall be taken forthwith, and the chairman elected on the show of hands shall continue to preside until a new chairman is elected on the poll.
The chairman's functions are to preserve order, to decide points of order, to ascertain the sense of the meeting, to decide the validity of proxies, to order a poll where properly demanded, to adjourn the meeting where circumstances require, and to declare the result. He must act bona fide and in the interests of the company as a whole, and an adjournment used to stifle discussion may be set aside.
Section 118: every company shall cause minutes of the proceedings of every general meeting and of every meeting of the Board and its committees to be prepared and entered in books kept for that purpose within thirty days, with the pages consecutively numbered, and each page initialled or signed and the last page dated and signed by the chairman of the same meeting or, in the event of his death or inability, by a director authorised by the Board.
The minutes must contain a fair and correct summary of the proceedings and, in the case of a general meeting, the names of the directors present and, in the case of a Board meeting, the names of directors dissenting from or not concurring in a resolution. The chairman has absolute discretion to exclude matter which he considers defamatory of any person, irrelevant or immaterial, or detrimental to the interests of the company.
Section 118(7): minutes kept in accordance with the section shall be evidence of the proceedings recorded therein, and where minutes have been duly kept, the meeting is presumed to have been duly called and held and all proceedings and appointments valid.
Section 119: the minute books of general meetings shall be kept at the registered office and be open to inspection by any member without charge for not less than two hours in each business day, and any member is entitled to a copy within seven working days of his request.
Conclusion. A meeting is valid only if every one of its requisites is satisfied, and the reason the law is exacting is that a resolution binds members who voted against it and members who did not attend at all. It must be convened by the proper authority, on notice of at least twenty one clear days giving the place, date, hour and business, with an explanatory statement for special business; a quorum must be present at the commencement; there must be a proper chairman; the business must be conducted by motion, amendment and resolution with the right to demand a poll; and the proceedings must be minuted within thirty days under section 118. A defect in any of these makes the resolution liable to be set aside.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the facts, the two limbs, the four justifications, the five exceptions with cases, the derivative action as a mechanism, and the statutory remedies that have overtaken it.
Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461. Two shareholders of the Victoria Park Company, incorporated to lay out and sell land as a park, sued five directors and a solicitor, alleging that they had sold their own land to the company at an inflated price and had otherwise misapplied the company's property. They asked that the defendants be made to make good the loss.
The suit was dismissed by Sir James Wigram V-C. The company was still in existence, and it was capable of suing in its own name; the acts complained of were capable of confirmation by a majority of the members; and the plaintiffs could not therefore sue on the company's behalf.
1. The proper plaintiff rule. Where a wrong is alleged to have been done to a company, the company is prima facie the only proper plaintiff to sue for it. An individual member has suffered no legal injury of his own, and cannot sue.
2. The majority rule, or the rule of internal management. Where the alleged wrong is a transaction which the majority of the members is competent to make binding on the company by ratification or confirmation, no individual member may bring an action, because the ultimate decision belongs to the majority, and the courts will not interfere with the internal management of a company acting within its powers.
Each should be given, because the exceptions are shaped by them.
1. Ultra vires or illegal acts. No majority, however large, can ratify an act which the company has no power to do. Any member may sue or obtain an injunction to restrain it. Bharat Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kanhaiya Lal AIR 1935 Lah 792, where a member complained that the company's funds were being invested contrary to the objects clause of its memorandum, and the suit was held maintainable.
2. Acts requiring a special majority. Where the Act or the articles require a special resolution and the thing is done by an ordinary one, an individual member may sue, because the majority was not in fact competent to do it in that way. Edwards v. Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064, where a trade union's rules required a two-thirds ballot to increase subscriptions and the increase was made without one; two members were held entitled to sue.
3. Invasion of individual or personal rights. A member may always sue in his own name to enforce a right belonging to him as a member. Such rights include the right to vote and to have his vote counted, to receive a dividend once declared, to have his name on the register, to receive notice of meetings, to enforce the articles as a contract under section 10, to be offered his proportionate share of a further issue under section 62, and to inspect the statutory registers and the minutes of general meetings. Nagappa Chettiar v. Madras Race Club AIR 1949 Mad 809; Pender v. Lushington (1877) 6 Ch D 70, where the chairman refused to record votes and the member sued successfully in his own name.
4. Fraud on the minority. Where those in control of the company use their voting power to obtain a benefit for themselves at the expense of the company or of the minority, and are themselves the wrongdoers so that the company will never sue, a member may bring a derivative action. Two elements must be shown: a fraud, in the equitable sense of an abuse of power, and wrongdoer control.
Menier v. Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874) LR 9 Ch App 350: the majority shareholder in the plaintiff company used its votes to wind the company up so that a benefit under litigation would pass to another company it controlled. It was made to account.
Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554: three of four directors negotiated a railway construction contract for themselves, excluding the company, and then used their majority shareholding to pass a resolution declaring that the company had no interest in it. The Privy Council held the contract belonged in equity to the company, and that the majority could not ratify their own wrong, since to do so would be to make a present of the company's property to themselves.
Contrast Pavlides v. Jensen [1956] Ch 565, where an asset was sold at a gross undervalue but there was no allegation of fraud, and the action failed; and Daniels v. Daniels [1978] Ch 406, where directors who sold company land to one of themselves at an undervalue and profited, without fraud being pleaded, were nevertheless held answerable, so that negligence from which the directors benefit may suffice.
5. Oppression and mismanagement, now the statutory remedy under sections 241 and 242, on which see below.
6. Wrongdoer control is treated by some writers as an independent head, and some cases add that the court will allow an action where the interests of justice require it, though Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. (No. 2) [1982] Ch 204 doubted so open-ended an exception.
Exception four works through a distinct procedural device which should be explained.
A derivative action is brought by a member on behalf of himself and all other shareholders except the defendants, and the company is joined as a defendant. The member's right to sue is derived from the company's right, which is why any decree runs in the company's favour and the fruits of the action belong to the company, not to the plaintiff. It is therefore not truly an exception to the proper plaintiff rule; it is the means of enforcing that rule when the proper plaintiff has been captured by the wrongdoers.
Note that the Companies Act, 2013 has not codified the derivative action, unlike the English Companies Act, 2006, which put it on a statutory footing. It survives in India as a common law remedy, and the Indian courts have entertained it: Rajahmundry Electric Supply Corporation v. A. Nageswara Rao AIR 1956 SC 213.
1. Sections 241 and 242, oppression and mismanagement. A member may apply to the Tribunal where the affairs of the company have been or are being conducted in a manner prejudicial or oppressive to any member, or prejudicial to the public interest or to the interests of the company, or where a material change in management or control makes it likely that they will be. The eligibility threshold in section 244, one hundred members or one-tenth of the members or one-tenth of the issued share capital, may now be waived by the Tribunal. The powers in section 242 include regulating the conduct of the company's affairs, the purchase of a member's shares by the company or other members, restrictions on transfer or allotment, setting aside agreements with managerial personnel, the removal of directors, and the recovery of undue gains.
Note the widening: the 1956 Act, section 397, required conduct to be "oppressive"; section 241 says "prejudicial or oppressive" and adds prejudice to the company's own interests. The threshold is lower than under Shanti Prasad Jain v. Kalinga Tubes Ltd. AIR 1965 SC 1535, which required the conduct to be continuous and held that an isolated act would not do.
2. Section 245, class action. Members or depositors, or any class of them, may apply to the Tribunal to restrain the company from acting ultra vires or in breach of its memorandum or articles, or from acting on a resolution obtained by suppression of material facts, and may claim damages or compensation against the company, its directors, its auditors including the audit firm, and any expert or adviser. The requisite number is one hundred members or such percentage as prescribed, whichever is less.
3. Sections 210 and 213, investigation into the affairs of the company on the application of members, and section 216, investigation of ownership.
The rule in Foss v. Harbottle has never been overruled, and the principle it states, that the company is the proper plaintiff for a wrong to the company, remains the starting point in India. What has changed is that the exceptions have been largely absorbed into statute. A minority shareholder in India today will almost always proceed under sections 241 and 242, which give a direct remedy, a Tribunal with wide powers, and a threshold the Tribunal can waive, rather than attempt a common law derivative action. The rule survives as the doctrinal explanation of why he needs a statutory remedy at all.
Conclusion. The rule in Foss v. Harbottle is the procedural consequence of separate legal personality: a wrong done to the company is a wrong to the company alone, and the court will not interfere at the suit of a member with an irregularity the majority is competent to ratify. The four recognised exceptions, ultra vires or illegal acts, acts requiring a special majority, invasion of individual membership rights and fraud on the minority, are the cases in which those reasons cease to apply. In India the rule now matters chiefly as doctrine, because a member with a real grievance proceeds under sections 241 and 242 rather than by a derivative action.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the meaning and the difference from dissolution, the two modes as they now stand, the Tribunal procedure step by step with its time limits, the liquidator's powers, the section 53 waterfall, voluntary liquidation, and the distinction from CIRP.
Winding up, or liquidation, is the process by which the life of a company is brought to an end and its property administered for the benefit of its creditors and members. A liquidator is appointed, takes control of the assets, realises them, pays the debts in the statutory order and distributes any surplus among the members.
Winding up is not dissolution. Winding up is the process; dissolution is the event at the end of it, when the company ceases to exist as a legal person and its name is struck off. During winding up the company continues to exist, retains its corporate personality and its property, and may carry on business so far as is necessary for a beneficial winding up.
Section 2(94A) defines winding up as winding up under the Companies Act, 2013 or liquidation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, as applicable, which is itself the modern position in one line.
| Governing law | For whom | |
|---|---|---|
| Winding up by the Tribunal | Companies Act, 2013, sections 271 to 303 | Misconduct, default, or the company's own special resolution |
| Voluntary liquidation | Section 59, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 | A solvent company that chooses to end its life |
Under the Companies Act, 1956 there were three modes: compulsory winding up by the Court, voluntary winding up (members' or creditors'), and voluntary winding up under the supervision of the Court. The Companies Act, 2013 as enacted had two, but sections 304 to 323, on voluntary winding up, were omitted by the Eleventh Schedule to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 with effect from 15 November 2016, and voluntary liquidation moved to section 59 of the Code, notified on 30 March 2017.
Step 1: a ground under section 271. The company may be wound up if:
Inability to pay debts is no longer a ground, having gone to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, and neither is reduction of members below the statutory minimum.
The just and equitable ground has been applied to deadlock (Re Yenidje Tobacco Co. Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch 426), loss of substratum where the main object has failed or become impossible (Re German Date Coffee Co.), the company being a bubble with no real business, oppression of a minority, and the breakdown of a quasi-partnership (Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1973] AC 360).
Step 2: the petition, section 272, by the company, any contributory, the Registrar, any person authorised by the Central Government, or the Central or State Government under ground (b). It must be accompanied by a statement of affairs. The Registrar may petition only with the previous sanction of the Central Government and after giving the company a reasonable opportunity of making representations.
Step 3: the Tribunal's order, section 273. Within ninety days of presentation, the Tribunal may dismiss the petition with or without costs, make an interim order, appoint a provisional liquidator after notice to the company, make an order for winding up, or any other order it thinks fit. It shall not refuse to make an order merely because the assets have been mortgaged for an amount equal to or in excess of those assets, or because the company has no assets.
Step 4: effect of the order, sections 277 to 279. The order operates in favour of all creditors and all contributories as if made on their joint petition. A copy is filed with the Registrar within thirty days. The order is deemed a notice of discharge to the officers, employees and workmen, except where the business is continued. Under section 279, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced or continued against the company except with the leave of the Tribunal. A winding up committee is constituted to assist and monitor the liquidation.
Step 5: the Company Liquidator, sections 275 and 276. Appointed by the Tribunal at the time of the order from a panel of insolvency professionals maintained by the Central Government; his terms and fee are fixed by the Tribunal; and he may be removed for misconduct, fraud, professional incompetence, inability to act or conflict of interest.
Step 6: statement of affairs, section 274. Where the petition is by a person other than the company, the Tribunal may direct the company to file its objections with a statement of affairs within thirty days, extendable by thirty. Failure forfeits the right to oppose the petition and is punishable.
Step 7: the liquidator's report, section 281. Within sixty days of the order, he submits a report on the assets, capital issued and paid up, existing and contingent liabilities, debts due, guarantees, list of contributories, intellectual property, held-for-sale property, his opinion whether any fraud has been committed, and a report on the viability of the business and any proposal for revival.
Step 8: custody and realisation, sections 283 and 290. He takes into his custody all the property, effects and actionable claims, which are deemed to be in the custody of the Tribunal from the date of the order. With the Tribunal's sanction he may carry on the business so far as necessary, sell the property by public auction or private contract including the whole undertaking as a going concern, institute or defend suits in the company's name, raise money on the security of the assets, and invite and settle claims.
Step 9: contributories and calls, sections 285 and 295. The Tribunal settles the list of contributories, distinguishing those liable in their own right from representatives, and may make calls for money due on shares.
Step 10: distribution under section 53 of the IBC.
Step 11: dissolution, section 302. When the affairs have been completely wound up, the Tribunal orders that the company be dissolved from the date of the order, and the Company Liquidator forwards a copy to the Registrar within thirty days.
Available to a corporate person which intends to liquidate itself voluntarily and has not committed any default. It requires:
Liquidation is deemed to commence from the date of the resolution, and on completion the liquidator applies to the NCLT for an order of dissolution.
The Central Government may order a summary winding up where the assets are of a book value not exceeding one crore rupees and the company falls within a prescribed class. The Official Liquidator conducts it.
The corporate insolvency resolution process under sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Code is not a mode of winding up. Its object is the revival of the company through a resolution plan, and liquidation follows only if no plan is approved within the statutory period. A company that cannot pay its debts today goes into CIRP, not into winding up.
Conclusion. Winding up under the Companies Act, 2013 is now a narrower process than the name suggests, because only winding up by the Tribunal on the five grounds in section 271 survives; voluntary winding up has moved to section 59 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and is available only to a solvent company. The steps run from petition and admission through the appointment of the liquidator, the taking over of assets, the settling of the list of contributories, the calls, the realisation and the distribution in the section 53 waterfall, to dissolution under section 302. A company that cannot pay its debts today goes into the corporate insolvency resolution process, not into winding up.
Answer
For full marks, cover: the definition, then each characteristic with its section and at least one case, and close with the limits, namely lifting the veil and the fact that a company is not a citizen.
Section 2(20) defines a company as a company incorporated under this Act or under any previous company law. The definition being circular, the working description is: a company is an incorporated association which is an artificial legal person, having a separate legal entity, with perpetual succession, a common seal (now optional), a common capital comprised of transferable shares, and carrying limited liability.
Section 9 gives the characteristics statutory form: from the date of incorporation, the subscribers to the memorandum and all other persons who may from time to time become members shall be a body corporate capable of exercising all the functions of an incorporated company, having perpetual succession and the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, tangible and intangible, to contract, and to sue and be sued by the said name.
The first and the foundation of all the rest. On incorporation the company becomes a person in law distinct from the persons who compose it.
Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] AC 22. Salomon sold his boot business to a company he formed, taking 20,000 shares and £10,000 of debentures secured by a floating charge, his wife and five children holding one share each. On the company's failure the unsecured creditors argued that it was a sham, an alias or an agent for Salomon. The House of Lords held the company duly incorporated, not the agent or trustee of Salomon, and his secured debentures entitled to be paid first. Lord Macnaghten: the company "is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers".
The company is a person created by law, not by nature. It has no body, no mind and no soul, and therefore acts only through human agency: through its members in general meeting and its Board of Directors, and through its officers and agents.
Two consequences:
The company continues in existence until it is wound up or struck off in accordance with law. The death, insolvency, retirement or insanity of a member does not affect it: members may come and go, but the company goes on. Shares of a deceased member pass by transmission to his legal representative under section 56(2).
The limit is section 3A: if the number of members falls below seven in a public company or two in a private company and business is carried on for more than six months, every member aware of the fact becomes severally liable for the debts contracted thereafter. The company still survives; the members' limited liability does not.
The liability of a member is limited to the amount unpaid on his shares, section 2(22), or to the amount of his guarantee, section 2(21). Once his shares are fully paid, he owes the company nothing further, however great its debts.
An unlimited company under section 2(92) has full corporate personality but no limited liability, which shows that the two are distinct attributes and that limited liability is a consequence of separate personality rather than the same thing.
The company's property is its own, and a member has no legal or equitable interest in any item of it.
Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925] AC 619: the owner of practically all the shares in a company insured the company's timber in his own name. It was destroyed by fire and he recovered nothing, having no insurable interest in property that belonged to the company. Bacha F. Guzdar v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1955 SC 74 is the Indian authority: a dividend from a tea company is not agricultural income in the shareholder's hands, because he has no interest in the company's assets or income as such.
The company sues and is sued in its own name, and this is the basis of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, that for a wrong done to the company the company is the proper plaintiff. A company may sue for defamation where its trading reputation is injured, and may itself be sued in tort and, through its directing mind, be prosecuted.
Lee v. Lee's Air Farming Ltd. [1961] AC 12: Lee formed a company of which he was governing director and in which he held all but one share, and was also employed by it as its chief pilot. He was killed flying. The Privy Council held his widow entitled to workmen's compensation, because Lee and the company were two distinct legal persons capable of entering into a contract of employment. One man, two capacities, because there are two persons.
Section 44 provides that the shares or debentures or other interest of any member in a company shall be movable property, transferable in the manner provided by the articles. Free transferability is what makes the capital of a public company liquid: a member who wishes to withdraw sells his shares rather than asking the company for his money back, so the company's capital is undisturbed.
A private company must by its articles restrict the right to transfer its shares, section 2(68)(i), which is one of the three features that define it.
The seal was traditionally the company's official signature, since an artificial person cannot sign. The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2015 made it optional: where a company does not have a common seal, documents may be signed by two directors, or by a director and the company secretary where one has been appointed. The traditional textbook definition, which lists the common seal as an essential characteristic, therefore needs qualifying.
The members do not manage. Management is vested in the Board of Directors under section 179(1), which may exercise all such powers as the company is authorised to exercise, subject to the Act, the memorandum and the articles, and to the matters reserved to the members. The separation of ownership from management is a defining feature of the company as against a partnership, where every partner is both an agent of the firm and entitled to take part in management.
A company can be brought to an end only by a process recognised by law: winding up by the Tribunal, voluntary liquidation under section 59 of the Code, or removal of its name by the Registrar under section 248. It cannot be dissolved by the agreement of its members, as a partnership can.
Two qualifications complete a twelve-mark answer.
1. Lifting the corporate veil. Where the corporate form is used to evade a legal obligation, commit a fraud or defeat the public interest, the court disregards the separate personality. Judicially: Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne (company as a cloak to break a covenant), Jones v. Lipman (company used to defeat specific performance), Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre (enemy character), Sir Dinshaw Maneckjee Petit, Re (tax evasion), State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. (single economic entity). Statutorily: sections 3A, 7(7), 34, 35, 251(1), 339 and 464.
2. A company is not a citizen. State Trading Corporation of India v. Commercial Tax Officer AIR 1963 SC 1811: a company, though a legal person, is not a citizen for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution and cannot claim the rights conferred on citizens alone, such as those in Article 19. It may claim rights conferred on "persons", such as Article 14 and Article 300A, and its shareholders may assert their own rights where State action against the company affects them, Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 106.
Conclusion. The characteristics of a company are not a list of unrelated features but a set of consequences flowing from one fact, that on registration the company becomes a person in law distinct from its members. Separate property, perpetual succession, the capacity to contract and to sue in its own name, the transferability of shares and limited liability are all corollaries of that personality, and Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. is the case in which each of them was worked out. Because the personality is artificial the company acts only through human agents and takes only those rights the law gives to persons rather than to citizens.
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This volume prints the 2022-23 - ATKT Company Law paper set by the University of Mumbai for BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 7, with a model answer to each of its 22 questions.
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