BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 7 Administrative Law 2025-26 - ATKT 75/25 Question Paper with Solutions

A writ is a formal written order issued by a superior court commanding a person, authority or inferior tribunal to do or to refrain from doing something. The five writs are habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto.

They are issued by the Supreme Court under Article 32, for the enforcement of fundamental rights only, and by the High Courts under Article 226, for fundamental rights and for any other purpose, so the High Court's jurisdiction is the wider of the two.

Bias is a predisposition or leaning of the mind, arising from interest or prejudice, which prevents an authority from bringing an open mind to a decision. It offends the first rule of natural justice, nemo judex in causa sua, and the test is a real likelihood of bias, not proof of actual bias, because justice must not only be done but be seen to be done.

The types:

1. Pecuniary bias: any financial interest, however small, which disqualifies automatically. Dr. Bonham's Case (1610); Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852).
2. Personal bias: relationship, friendship, hostility or professional connection. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1970).
3. Subject-matter or official bias: a general interest in the subject decided. Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. APSRTC (1959).
4. Departmental or institutional bias: the same department investigating and deciding, tolerated unless there is a personal interest.
5. Pre-judgment of the issue: a mind closed before the hearing.

Conditional delegation, more usually called conditional or contingent legislation, is legislation which is complete in itself but whose operation is made to depend upon a condition, the fulfilment of which the legislature leaves the executive to determine. The legislature makes the law; the executive decides only when, where or to whom it shall apply.

The Central Vigilance Commission is the apex integrity and anti-corruption institution of the Union. It exercises superintendence over the vigilance administration of the central Government and over the Delhi Special Police Establishment, that is the Central Bureau of Investigation, in so far as it investigates offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and it tenders advice on vigilance matters.

2. Substantive legitimate expectation: a claim to the benefit itself. Indian courts recognise it but apply it cautiously, and it does not survive a change of policy made in the public interest.

4. What can found the expectation. An express promise or representation by the authority; a regular, consistent and settled practice; a published policy or scheme on which people have relied. A mere hope, wish or anticipation is not enough, nor is an expectation founded on a promise that is ultra vires or contrary to law.

5. The leading cases.

1. Attorney General of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu (1983): the Government announced that illegal immigrants would be interviewed and each case decided on its merits; a removal order made without an interview was quashed. Lord Fraser held that when a public authority has promised to follow a certain procedure, good administration requires it to keep its promise so long as that does not conflict with its statutory duty.
2. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1985), the GCHQ case: the unions had a legitimate expectation of consultation arising from a settled practice, but the expectation was overridden by national security.

7. Its relation to promissory estoppel. Estoppel requires that the promisee has altered his position on the faith of the promise, and can secure the benefit itself: Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979). Legitimate expectation requires no alteration of position, asks instead whether it was fair to defeat the expectation, and yields only a hearing. In practice a petitioner pleads both.

3. The criticism. The first would make modern government impossible, since discretion is unavoidable; Dicey confused arbitrary with discretionary power. The second rested on a misreading of droit administratif, whose control is in some respects stricter than the English courts'. The third describes English history, not a universal truth, and India's reverse arrangement is the stronger one, because a right guaranteed by a written Constitution cannot be removed by ordinary statute.

4. In the Indian Constitution. The Preamble; Article 13 (inconsistent laws void); Article 14 (equality before the law, and after E.P. Royappa, 1974, a guarantee against arbitrariness); Article 19 (restrictions must be reasonable and by law); Article 21 (procedure established by law, which after Maneka Gandhi, 1978, must be right, just and fair); Articles 265 and 300A; Articles 32 and 226 (enforceable remedies); Article 300 (the State may be sued); and the independence of the judiciary.

5. The Indian cases.

1. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973): part of the basic structure;
2. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): clause 4 of the 39th Amendment, which withdrew the Prime Minister's election dispute from every court, struck down;

1. The constitutional foundation. The right to information is a facet of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), because a citizen cannot form or express an opinion on public affairs of which he knows nothing. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain (1975): "the people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way by their public functionaries". S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) and Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal (1995) carried the principle further, and Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002) applied it to the disclosure of candidates' antecedents.

2. The Right to Information Act, 2005: its main features.

1. Section 2(f), "information", defined widely: records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models and data in electronic form, and information relating to a private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law;

6. Section 8, the exemptions: sovereignty and integrity, security and strategic interests, foreign relations; information forbidden by a court; breach of parliamentary privilege; commercial confidence and trade secrets; fiduciary information; information received in confidence from a foreign government; information endangering life or identifying a confidential source; information impeding investigation; cabinet papers, disclosable after the decision is taken; and personal information unrelated to public activity;
7. Section 8(2), the public interest override: exempt information, and information exempt under the Official Secrets Act, 1923, may still be disclosed where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the protected harm;
8. Section 10, severability, so that non-exempt parts must be given;
9. Sections 18 and 19, complaint to the Commission and a two-stage appeal, the second appeal lying to the Central or State Information Commission;

1. Who they are. The civil service is the body of permanent, professional, salaried officials, recruited on merit, who carry on the administration of the State under the direction of the political executive. Its characteristics are permanence, political neutrality, anonymity, merit recruitment and hierarchy.

2. Classification.

1. All India Services, common to the Union and the States: the IAS, the IPS and the Indian Forest Service. Article 312 empowers the Rajya Sabha, by a resolution supported by two-thirds of the members present and voting, to declare it necessary in the national interest to create a new All India Service, whereupon Parliament may do so by law;
2. Central Services, serving the Union alone, in Groups A, B and C: the Indian Revenue Service, the Indian Foreign Service, the Indian Audit and Accounts Service and others;
3. State Services, recruited by the State Public Service Commissions.

1. Article 311(1): no dismissal or removal by an authority subordinate to the appointing authority; the test is of rank, not identity: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh (1970);
2. Article 311(2): no dismissal, removal or reduction in rank except after an inquiry in which the person is informed of the charges and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard; since the 42nd Amendment, 1976 there is no second opportunity to show cause against the penalty;
3. the three exceptions in the second proviso: conviction on a criminal charge; a satisfaction, for reasons recorded in writing, that an inquiry is not reasonably practicable; and the security of the State. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985): the proviso excludes the inquiry, not natural justice at large, and the recorded satisfaction is justiciable;
4. Articles 14 and 16 forbid arbitrariness in service matters: E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974);
5. fixed tenures for the judges, the Comptroller and Auditor General (Article 148), the Chief Election Commissioner (Article 324) and the members of the Public Service Commissions (Article 317).

1. What the rule requires. Audi alteram partem requires notice of the charge, disclosure of the material relied on, a real opportunity to explain, and, where the case turns on the credibility of witnesses, a means of testing that evidence. It does not require that the accused be permitted to confront or converse with the complainant in person.
2. The right to cross-examine is not absolute. It arises where the case rests on oral testimony whose truth is in issue, and even then the manner in which it is exercised is regulated. A tribunal may require that questions be put through the presiding officer or in writing, may take the complainant's evidence separately, and may protect her identity. That is not a denial of the opportunity; it is a regulation of its manner.

5. The competing interest is itself a legal one. The complainants' right to dignity and to a safe educational environment is protected by Articles 14, 15 and 21. Natural justice is a flexible doctrine, and what fairness requires in one setting is not what it requires in another; here it must be shaped so as not to expose the complainant to the very conduct complained of.
6. Conclusion to write. The answer is no, provided the enquiry gave notice, disclosure, an opportunity to reply and a means of testing the evidence indirectly. The students' complaint is that the procedure was not adversarial enough, and the law does not require it to be.

(b) What would be your defence if you were the Principal of this medical college?

The Principal's defence should be put under six heads:

1. A regular enquiry was held. The order was not passed behind the students' backs; a committee was constituted, notice was given, the allegations were furnished, and the students had an opportunity to reply and to be heard.

5. Proportionality and the interests of the institution. The conduct alleged, entering a women's hostel at night and making comments of a sexual nature, is a serious breach of discipline touching the safety of the women students. The institution has a positive duty under Articles 15 and 21 and under the 2013 Act to provide a safe environment.
6. No prejudice. The students have not shown what they would have said or elicited had they been permitted to confront the complainants, or how it would have altered the outcome. S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (1980) holds that non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice, but that presupposes non-observance; where the essentials were observed and only the mode of testing the evidence was regulated, prejudice must be shown.

The Principal should also be candid about what would defeat him: if no committee was constituted, if the complaint and the evidence were never furnished, if the students were given no opportunity to reply, if the enquiry report was not supplied before the penalty (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, 1993), if the order records no reasons, or if the punishment of expulsion is disproportionate to what was proved, then the order will be quashed.

2. The constitutional provision. Article 300(1) permits the State to be sued "in the like cases" as the corresponding Province could have been sued before the Constitution. That carries the liability back through Section 176 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Section 32 of the 1915 Act to Section 65 of the Government of India Act, 1858, and so to the liability of the East India Company.
3. The sovereign and non-sovereign test. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. v. Secretary of State (1861), Sir Barnes Peacock CJ: for acts done in the exercise of sovereign powers there is no liability; for acts done in the conduct of undertakings which might be carried on by private persons there is. Providing transport for officers is plainly of the second kind.
4. The "return journey" point, which is the only thing distinctive about these facts. The driver was returning after dropping the officer. That does not take him outside the course of employment. A servant who has completed the outward part of an assigned journey and is returning to base is still acting in the course of his employment; the position would be different only on a frolic of his own, that is, a substantial deviation for his own purposes.

Its facts. A jeep owned and maintained by the State of Rajasthan for the official use of the Collector of Udaipur was being brought back from the workshop after repairs. The driver, a temporary employee, drove rashly and negligently and knocked down Lokumal, a pedestrian walking on the footpath, who died of his injuries. His widow Vidyawati and her infant daughter sued the driver and the State for damages.

The holding. The Supreme Court, affirming the High Court, held the State liable. It held that:

1. the employment of a driver to drive a car for the use of a civil servant is "in no sense" a sovereign function;
2. the State's liability under Article 300 is the same as that of any other employer for the tort of a servant in the course of employment; and
3. the old feudal maxim "the King can do no wrong" has no place in a republic which has adopted a socialistic pattern of society and in which the State runs railways, transport, factories and hospitals.

(a) Discuss the validity of such rule?

The rule is valid if it is within the rule-making power conferred by the parent Act and consistent with it, and on the law as it stands it is. The question is one of substantive ultra vires, and the leading authority is squarely in point.

1. The framework of the challenge. Delegated legislation may be struck down as substantively ultra vires where the parent Act does not authorise the rule; where the rule exceeds or contradicts the parent Act; where it violates the Constitution, being "law" under Article 13(3)(a); where it is manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary; or where it is mala fide. So the questions are: what does the parent Act authorise, and does the rule stay inside it?

4. Rule 2(ee)(iii) and the State notifications are valid for the purposes of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, so a person so notified may obtain and stock allopathic drugs;
5. but the right to practise modern scientific medicine depends on Section 15 of the Indian Medical Council Act, and a person enrolled only on a State register of Indian medicine is not entitled to practise modern scientific medicine; and
6. a notification under Rule 2(ee)(iii) cannot confer a right to practise which the Medical Council Act denies, since a rule cannot override an Act.
7. The supporting principle. Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel (1996): a person registered in one system who practises another is a quack so far as that other system is concerned, and prescribing allopathic medicine without qualification in it is negligence per se.

9. When such a rule would be bad. If the parent Act conferred no power to regulate the practice of other systems; if the rule contradicted an express provision of the Act or of another statute; if it were manifestly arbitrary, for example by discriminating between equally qualified persons; if it were made without the mandatory consultation or publication the Act requires, which is procedural ultra vires; or if it were framed by a body to whom the power had been sub-delegated without authority.
10. Conclusion to write. The rule is valid. It is within the object of the parent Act, it protects public health, it is consistent with Section 15 of the Medical Council Act as construed in Mukhtiar Chand, and it is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6). What a person of ayurvedic background may do is governed by the statute and register applicable to his own system.

2. It is the source and the measure of the delegate's power. A rule must be within the scope of the power conferred and consistent with the provisions of the parent Act; a rule that exceeds or contradicts it is void, and a rule-making power does not carry the power to make a rule the Act itself forbids: General Officer Commanding-in-Chief v. Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav (1988); State of Karnataka v. H. Ganesh Kamath (1983).

Further features worth adding: the parent Act names the authority on whom the power is conferred, so that sub-delegation is bad unless it authorises it (Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works, 1997); it may prescribe a procedure, such as prior publication or consultation, non-compliance with which is procedural ultra vires; it usually provides for laying the rules before the legislature; and its own validity is the first question, since if the parent Act is unconstitutional everything made under it falls with it.

1. A Government contract is not purely private. The State's contractual power comes from Article 298, and every exercise of it is State action subject to Article 14: Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979), where the Court held that the Government cannot act arbitrarily even in the contractual field. So a writ under Article 226 lies to challenge the decision-making, even though a pure breach of contract sounds in damages.
2. The grounds available.
3. Arbitrariness and unreasonableness under Article 14, if the cancellation is capricious, discriminatory or made on no material;
4. Breach of natural justice, if the contractor was not heard before a decision destroying his investment was taken. He may have acquired land, mobilised machinery or borrowed money;
5. Legitimate expectation, arising from the grant itself and from any assurance of a term, which entitles him at least to be heard before the expectation is defeated: Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (1993);

11. The limits of review in the contractual field. Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994): the court does not sit in appeal over a commercial or administrative decision; it reviews the decision-making process for illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety, and gives the Government freedom to make commercial judgments, including mistakes, so long as it acts bona fide and without arbitrariness.
12. The realistic conclusion. The cancellation itself is likely to be upheld, the change of circumstance being genuine. What the contractor is likely to obtain is a hearing and compensation, not restoration of the contract.

(b) What is the remedy available to the contractor against the cancellation?

1. Writ petition under Article 226, for certiorari to quash the cancellation and mandamus to compel a decision made fairly, on grounds of arbitrariness, breach of natural justice, legitimate expectation or mala fides. This is the quickest route but is confined to the decision-making process and cannot try seriously disputed facts.

5. Specific performance is generally not available. Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 excludes contracts which by their nature the court cannot supervise or which are determinable, and the court will not compel a public authority to proceed with a work it has abandoned in the public interest. Section 41(e) likewise bars an injunction to prevent the breach of a contract that could not be specifically enforced.
6. Restitution, that is, the return of any deposit, security or earnest money, and payment for materials brought to site.

For full marks, cover: the definitions with criticism; the nature of the subject; nine reasons for growth, each with a concrete illustration, since the question asks for growth and acceptance; the two institutional consequences; the position in England and India; the scope; and a conclusion.

1. What administrative law is. Ivor Jennings: "the law relating to the administration; it determines the organisation, powers and duties of administrative authorities." K.C. Davis: the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing judicial review. Sir William Wade, shortest and best: "the law relating to the control of governmental power." The Indian Law Institute adds the procedure for obtaining relief and the legislative control of the administration.

Criticism: Jennings is too wide and says nothing about control; Davis concentrates on adjudication and neglects rule-making.

3. Inadequacy of the ordinary courts. Civil litigation is slow, costly and bound by rigid procedure and evidence, while the disputes a welfare State generates are numerous, small and technical. That produced tribunals, and with them Articles 323A and 323B and the line of cases from S.P. Sampath Kumar (1987) to L. Chandra Kumar (1997).
4. Technicality of modern administration. Drug schedules, food standards, pollution limits, telecom tariffs, banking prudential norms and aircraft safety need expertise that neither legislators nor generalist judges possess. That produced the expert regulator: the RBI, SEBI, TRAI and the Competition Commission.
5. Industrialisation, urbanisation and planning. Land acquisition, slum clearance, zoning, rationing, price control and industrial licensing each created new powers and generated their own case law: Olga Tellis (1985) on pavement dwellers, Ramana Dayaram Shetty (1979) on the allotment of public largesse.

4. The two institutional consequences. The growth expressed itself in two forms: the administration began to legislate (delegated legislation) and to adjudicate (tribunals and departmental adjudication). Both offend the doctrine of separation of powers, and administrative law is the law that permits them under conditions: the essential legislative function must remain with the legislature, and the High Court's power of review must remain with the High Court.

5. In England and in India. Dicey, writing in 1885, denied that England had any administrative law at all, because in a laissez faire State there was little executive power to control. Within fifty years the Committee on Ministers' Powers (Donoughmore), 1932 and the Franks Committee, 1957 had been appointed precisely because delegated legislation and tribunals had grown so large. In India the same growth was compressed into the decades after 1950 and driven by the Directive Principles, and it was accompanied from the outset by a written Constitution with enforceable rights and guaranteed remedies under Articles 32 and 226. That is why Indian administrative law is more constitutional in character than English: a breach of natural justice here is also a breach of Articles 14 and 21.

For full marks, cover: the definition with Justice Douglas; the characteristics; the classification under three heads with real Indian examples; the reasons for creating them; then control, with the government control asked for in most detail but the parliamentary, judicial and public controls named too; the Article 12 case law; and the autonomy-accountability conclusion.

1. Definition. A public corporation is a body corporate created by a special statute, or registered under the Companies Act with a controlling Government shareholding, to carry on a commercial, industrial, developmental or regulatory undertaking on behalf of the State, having a separate legal personality, its own funds, and freedom from ordinary departmental and budgetary procedure.

Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court described it as a device combining "the public ownership, public accountability and devotion to public purpose of a governmental agency, with the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise".

2. Statutory corporations, created by a special Act which fixes their objects, powers, capital and management: the Life Insurance Corporation of India (1956), the Reserve Bank of India (1934), the Food Corporation of India (1964), the Damodar Valley Corporation (1948), the Airports Authority of India, and the State Road Transport Corporations under the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950;
3. Registered or Government companies, incorporated under the Companies Act. Section 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013: a company in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government, a State Government or both, including its subsidiaries: Steel Authority of India, Bharat Heavy Electricals, Coal India, ONGC.

(b) By function: commercial and industrial (Steel Authority, Indian Oil); financial (Reserve Bank, LIC, NABARD); developmental and promotional (Damodar Valley Corporation, National Highways Authority); regulatory (SEBI, TRAI, the Competition Commission, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission); and social service (State transport, housing and hospital corporations).

3. Financial control: approval of the budget, the capital programme, borrowings and major contracts; the pattern of investment; and the disposal of surplus and profits;
4. Approval of regulations made by the corporation, and in some Acts a power to make rules binding it;
5. Inspection, inquiry and returns: power to call for information and accounts and to depute officers to inspect;
6. Supersession of the board where the corporation persistently defaults or fails to carry out the directions given;
7. Appointment of Government directors and nominees on the board, and the placement of civil servants as chief executives;
8. Audit: the accounts are audited by auditors appointed on the advice of the Comptroller and Auditor General, who may also conduct a supplementary audit, and, for Government companies, under Section 143(5) to (7) of the Companies Act, 2013;
9. Winding up or transfer of the undertaking, or amendment of the constituting statute.

6. The other three heads of control, which must be named for completeness.

7. When is a corporation "the State"? Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lal (1967) held a statutory corporation to be "other authorities" under Article 12. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram (1975) applied it to ONGC, LIC and the Industrial Finance Corporation and held their regulations to have the force of law. Ramana Dayaram Shetty (1979) developed the instrumentality test, and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) collected it into six factors: the entire share capital held by the Government; financial assistance meeting almost the whole expenditure; a monopoly conferred or protected by the State; deep and pervasive State control; functions of public importance closely related to governmental functions; and a Government department transferred to the corporation. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002), seven judges, restated the test as whether the body is functionally, financially and administratively dominated by the Government, the control being deep and pervasive and not merely regulatory.

For full marks, cover: the doctrine and its author; its three propositions; the position in the United States and England; then the Indian political scenario, which the question asks for, under two lists, what reflects and what departs from the doctrine; six judicial decisions; the modern functional statement; and a conclusion.

1. The doctrine. Baron de Montesquieu, L'Esprit des Lois (1748), building on Aristotle, Locke and his reading of the English constitution. Its three propositions:

1. one organ should not exercise the functions of another;
2. one organ should not interfere with the functions of another; and
3. one person should not be a member of more than one organ.

The purpose was liberty: "when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty", because power tends to be abused.

5. Article 361: the President and the Governors are not answerable to any court for the exercise of their powers;
6. the independence of the judiciary: Articles 124 to 147 and 214 to 231, security of tenure, salaries charged on the Consolidated Fund, removal only by the process in Article 124(4), the bar on discussion in the legislature, and the bar on practice after retirement.

4. The Indian scenario: what departs from it.

1. the executive is drawn from, and collectively responsible to, the legislature: Articles 74, 75, 163 and 164. In a parliamentary system the executive is a committee of the legislature, which is the largest single departure;
2. ordinance-making power of the President and the Governors under Articles 123 and 213, a legislative power in executive hands, and one whose repeated re-promulgation was condemned in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) and Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017);
3. the legislature's judicial functions: punishment for its own contempt, the impeachment of the President under Article 61, and addresses for the removal of judges under Article 124(4);

2. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975). Clause 4 of the 39th Amendment declared the election of the Prime Minister valid and beyond challenge in any court. It was struck down: the adjudication of a specific dispute is a judicial function which Parliament cannot exercise even by constitutional amendment.
3. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) and I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007): separation of powers is part of the basic structure.
4. Asif Hameed v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1989): the three organs must function within their spheres, and the judiciary must not enter the field of policy.
5. State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014): a legislature cannot directly overrule a judicial decision, though it may retrospectively remove the basis on which the decision rested.

7. Conclusion. Separation of powers in India is a principle of constitutional interpretation and a basic feature, and not a rule of the text. It appears in the cases as a ground for striking down an amendment or a statute rather than as an Article a litigant can point to. And administrative law exists precisely because it is not applied rigidly: the constitutional answer to an administration that legislates and adjudicates is control, not prohibition.

2. Constitutional basis. Article 323A empowers Parliament to provide for administrative tribunals for disputes on the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services of the Union, the States and local and other authorities. Article 323B empowers Parliament or a State legislature to provide for tribunals in respect of taxation, foreign exchange, import and export, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms, ceiling on urban property, elections to the legislatures, essential goods, and offences connected with those subjects. Both were inserted by the 42nd Amendment, 1976, and the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was made under Article 323A.

3. Characteristics. Statutory creation, with only such powers as the statute confers; the "trappings of a court", that is, a lis, evidence, and power to summon witnesses and compel production; a mixed composition of judicial and technical members; freedom from the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act but a binding duty to observe natural justice; a duty to decide objectively and pass a speaking order; appointment and tenure fixed under the parent Act; amenability to certiorari and prohibition and to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227; and decisions that are generally not binding precedents.

1. They carry a very large part of the adjudicatory load. Service disputes go to the Central and State Administrative Tribunals; tax to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the GST Appellate Tribunal; company and insolvency matters to the National Company Law Tribunal and the NCLAT under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; securities to the Securities Appellate Tribunal; environment to the National Green Tribunal under the Act of 2010; consumer disputes to the Commissions under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019; and telecom to the TDSAT. Without them the High Courts could not function.
2. Expertise. Modern regulation is technical. An insolvency resolution, a transfer-pricing dispute, a spectrum tariff or an environmental clearance cannot be decided well by a generalist. The technical member is not a concession to the executive but a necessity of the subject matter.
3. Access to justice. Low fees, simple procedure, appearance in person and shorter timelines make tribunals usable by workmen, consumers, pensioners and small investors, who would be defeated by a civil suit. That is the practical content of Article 39A.

6. The criticism, which must be given. Members may lack legal training; the State is often the other party and appoints the adjudicators; there is a threat to independence through executive control of appointment, tenure, reappointment, salary and infrastructure; procedure varies from tribunal to tribunal; reasons are not always given and there is no consistent system of precedent; the multiplication of tribunals fragments the legal system; and in practice there are long vacancies, few benches, and inadequate infrastructure, so that the promised speed is often not delivered.

7. The constitutional case law.

1. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987) upheld the Administrative Tribunals Act on the footing that a tribunal may substitute for the High Court only if it is an effective institutional alternative.
2. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), seven judges, held that judicial review under Articles 226, 227 and 32 is part of the basic structure; struck down the exclusion clauses in Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d); and held that tribunals are courts of first instance whose decisions are subject to review by a Division Bench of the High Court. This modified Sampath Kumar: a tribunal is a supplement to, not a substitute for, the High Court.

For full marks, cover the three things the question names: the definition and forms; eight reasons for growth with illustrations; and then the three control mechanisms, parliamentary, procedural and judicial, in detail, with a case for every head.

1. Definition. Delegated legislation is law made by an executive or administrative authority under a power conferred by the legislature. Salmond: subordinate legislation "proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power, and is therefore dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority". Sir Cecil Carr: "a growing child called upon to relieve the parent of the strain of overwork, and capable of attending to minor matters, while the parent manages the main business."

Its forms are rules, regulations, bye-laws, orders, notifications, schemes and directions, and Indian statutes use the terms loosely. Its species are normal and exceptional delegation, conditional or contingent legislation, and sub-delegation.

3. The constitutional limit, which frames all three controls. In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1951): the legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function, the laying down of the policy of the law; having laid it down it may delegate the working out of details; and the power to repeal or modify an Act is in general beyond the permissible limit. Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India (1960) is the standard illustration of a delegation struck down for want of any standard.

4. CONTROL MECHANISM ONE: Parliamentary control.

(a) At the stage of delegation. Parliament fixes the policy and standard in the parent Act, and also the authority, the subject matter, the duration and the conditions of the power. The delegation clause is debated when the Bill is passed, and that is the point at which a Henry VIII clause or an unusually wide power should be resisted.

(b) Laying before the House, in three forms:

1. simple laying, for information only, the rule taking effect regardless;

1. Prior publication of the draft and consideration of objections, where the parent Act requires it. Section 23 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 lays down the standard procedure where rules are to be made "after previous publication".
2. Consultation of an affected interest or a named advisory body. Whether the requirement is mandatory or directory depends on the object of the provision and the consequences of non-compliance: Raza Buland Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board, Rampur (1965); compare Banwarilal Agarwalla v. State of Bihar (1961).
3. Publication in the Official Gazette, generally mandatory. Harla v. State of Rajasthan (1951): a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the former Jaipur State had never been published, and the Supreme Court held it unenforceable, since natural justice requires that a law be made known before a person can be convicted under it. State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George (1965) on the mode and sufficiency of publication.

6. CONTROL MECHANISM THREE: Judicial control, which is the effective one, through the doctrine of ultra vires.

(a) Substantive ultra vires, that the content is beyond the power:

(c) The presumption of validity. Subordinate legislation is presumed valid, the burden lies on the challenger, and the court will not strike down a rule merely because it thinks it unwise or capable of improvement. It reviews legality, not merit.

(d) The remedies. A writ petition under Article 226 or 32 for a declaration that the rule is void, with certiorari to quash an order made under it and prohibition to restrain its enforcement; a civil suit for a declaration and an injunction; and a collateral challenge by way of defence to a prosecution or a demand founded on the rule.

7. Which control actually works. Parliamentary control is weak: several thousand instruments are laid each year, the negative resolution procedure requires a member to move a motion in a crowded House and is almost never used successfully, and the committees can only report. Procedural control operates only where the parent Act provides for it. Judicial control does the real work, and within it the ground that succeeds most often is the plainest, that the rule contradicts or exceeds the parent Act.