BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 7 Administrative Law 2025-26 Question Paper with Solutions

Delay is simply the lapse of time between the cause of action and the filing of the petition. Laches is delay plus something more: unexplained or unreasonable delay from which the court infers that the petitioner has acquiesced or slept on his rights, and by reason of which the position of the other side or of third parties has altered to their prejudice.

Delay is a fact; laches is a defence in equity and a ground on which the court, exercising a discretionary jurisdiction, refuses relief.

A corporation is an artificial or juristic person created by law, having perpetual succession and a common seal, distinct from the natural persons who compose it, and capable of holding property, entering into contracts, and suing and being sued in its own name.

Legitimate expectation is the doctrine that where a public authority has made an express promise, or has followed a regular and settled practice, a person affected may reasonably expect it to be honoured or continued, and that expectation cannot be defeated without fairness, which at the least means a hearing.

It is not an enforceable right to the benefit; it is a ground of judicial review, and in India an aspect of the non-arbitrariness required by Article 14.

The sources are:

1. the Constitution, which is the primary source: Articles 12 and 13, 14, 19 and 21, 32 and 226, 299 and 300, 308 to 323, and 323A and 323B;
2. statutes, which create administrative authorities and confer their powers;
3. delegated legislation, that is, the rules, regulations, bye-laws and orders made under those statutes;
4. judicial decisions and precedent, which are the source of nearly the whole of natural justice, ultra vires and the control of discretion, none of which is enacted in India; and
5. administrative directions, circulars and departmental practice, which bind the administration internally and may found a legitimate expectation.

1. Meaning. Sub-delegation is the delegation by a delegate of the power that the parent statute delegated to him. The legislature delegates to authority A; A delegates further to B. Where the parent Act itself provides for it, the resulting rules are called sub-delegated or second-stage legislation.

2. The rule. Delegatus non potest delegare, "a delegate cannot further delegate". Sub-delegation is therefore invalid unless the parent Act authorises it, expressly or by necessary implication.

The reason is that the legislature selected a particular authority because it trusted that authority's judgment and its accountability. To permit it to pass the power on would substitute a judgment the legislature never chose.

5. Limits and safeguards, even where sub-delegation is authorised. The sub-delegate cannot exceed the delegate's own power; the sub-delegated rule must be consistent with the parent Act and with the rules under which it is made; and it must be published, since Harla v. State of Rajasthan (1951) holds that an unpublished law cannot be enforced against a person who had no means of knowing it.

6. Criticism. Sub-delegation carries law-making a further stage from the elected legislature; rules made at the third and fourth tiers are rarely laid before the House or examined by the Committee on Subordinate Legislation; and their publication is often inadequate, so that a citizen may be punished under a rule he could not have found.

7. A necessary distinction. The maxim applies to the delegation of legislative or discretionary power. It does not prevent an authority from performing ministerial or executive acts through subordinates. A Collector who directs a clerk to issue notices is not sub-delegating his discretion; a Collector who lets the clerk decide whom to notice is.

1. Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. v. Union of India (1976): the Supreme Court held that "the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice", and that where a quasi-judicial authority decides without recording reasons the order is liable to be quashed.
2. S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990), a Constitution Bench, is the settled statement: except where the requirement is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, an administrative authority exercising a power that affects rights must record reasons; but the reasons need not be elaborate, and where an appellate or revisional authority affirms an order it may not be necessary to give separate reasons.
3. Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner (1978): an order must be judged by the reasons stated in it, and cannot be supported by fresh reasons supplied later by affidavit. "Public orders publicly made... are not like the proverbial old soldier; they must be judged by what they say."

1. The doctrine. Montesquieu, L'Esprit des Lois (1748): the legislative, executive and judicial powers should be vested in three separate organs; no organ should exercise the functions of another; and no person should be a member of more than one organ. His object was liberty: "when the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty".

2. Comparative. The United States applies it strictly by constitutional text, moderated by checks and balances. England has never applied it: the Cabinet sits in Parliament, and the House of Lords was the final court of appeal until 2009. India takes a middle position, differentiating the functions without insulating the organs.

3. What reflects the doctrine in India. Article 50 (separation of the judiciary from the executive, a Directive Principle); Articles 53 and 154 (executive power vested in the President and the Governors); Articles 121 and 211 (no discussion of a Judge's conduct in the legislatures); Articles 122 and 212 (no judicial inquiry into legislative procedure); Article 361 (immunity of the President and Governors); and the independence of the judiciary under Articles 124 to 147 and 214 to 231.

5. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015): the 99th Amendment creating the NJAC struck down.
6. Most recently, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, decided 19 November 2025, struck down the core provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 on appointment, tenure and service conditions as giving excessive executive control over tribunals and so violating judicial independence and the separation of powers.

6. Conclusion. In India separation of powers is a principle of interpretation and a basic feature, not a rule of the text. What is forbidden is not overlap but the assumption by one organ of the essential function of another.

4. Technicality of modern administration. Drug schedules, pollution limits, telecom tariffs, banking norms and aircraft safety require expert knowledge that neither legislators nor generalist judges possess. That produced the expert regulator: the RBI, SEBI, TRAI and the Competition Commission.
5. Industrialisation, urbanisation and planning: land acquisition, slum clearance, zoning, rationing, price control and licensing, each of which created new powers and new litigation.
6. Emergency and crisis. War, partition, famine, epidemic and economic crisis have repeatedly required rapid executive law-making; the rules made under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 during the COVID-19 pandemic are the most recent instance.
7. The value of experiment. A new social scheme cannot be got right at once; rule-making lets the administration try, observe and adjust at a speed the legislative process cannot match.

In England and India. Dicey, writing in 1885, denied that England had any administrative law at all. Within fifty years the Donoughmore Committee (1932) on Ministers' Powers and the Franks Committee (1957) on tribunals and inquiries had been appointed precisely because delegated legislation and tribunals had grown so large. In India the same growth was compressed into the decades after 1950 and was accompanied from the start by a written Constitution with guaranteed remedies under Articles 32 and 226.

(a) Was any principle of law violated here? Explain.

Prima facie the rule of audi alteram partem has not been observed. But the college has a defence, because the students absconded and made service impossible, and impracticability is a recognised exception. The answer turns on what the college actually did to reach them, and on whether the order is a suspension or a final punishment.

1. The rule. Audi alteram partem: no person shall be condemned unheard. It requires notice of the charge and of the proposed action, and a reasonable opportunity to answer. Suspension or expulsion affects a student's career and reputation, so the rule plainly applies.

5. The nature of the order is decisive. A suspension pending inquiry is an interim preventive measure, and it is settled that a prior hearing is not required for such a measure, provided the inquiry follows within a reasonable time and the student is heard in it. A final punishment imposed in absence requires much more.
6. The competing interest. The complainants are girl students alleging serious misconduct. Where the allegation is of sexual harassment, the procedure must protect them: the internal committee mechanism under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, and the UGC Regulations of 2015 on curbing sexual harassment in higher educational institutions, follow Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan (1997) and require confidentiality and protection of the complainant. Natural justice for the accused does not entitle him to confront or cross-examine the complainants directly.
7. Conclusion to write. The suspension is sustainable if the college can document genuine efforts at service followed by substituted service, and if the students are heard on their return. It is bad if the college simply recorded that they were absconding and proceeded, or if a final punishment was imposed with no attempt at substituted service.

4. What the students may demand on return. Notice of the specific charges; the material relied on; an opportunity to explain and to lead evidence; an inquiry by an impartial body; and a speaking order. They cannot demand the quashing of the interim suspension merely because they were not heard before it was passed.
5. The remedy if it is refused. A petition under Article 226 for certiorari and mandamus, on the ground of breach of natural justice, want of jurisdiction, or unreasonable prolongation of the suspension.

1. The facts. Thomas Bonham, a doctor of physic of the University of Cambridge, practised in London without the licence of the Royal College of Physicians. The College, acting under its charter and a statute, fined him and afterwards committed him to prison. By the statute, the fines imposed were to be divided equally, one half to the King and one half to the College.
2. The holding. Coke CJ held that the College could not be judge, minister and party at once: it judged the case, imposed the penalty, and took half the fine. "One cannot be judge and party in his own cause", because no man should be a judge in a matter in which he has an interest.
3. The principle it establishes: pecuniary bias. Any financial interest, however small, in the outcome disqualifies the decision-maker automatically, and the court does not inquire whether the interest actually influenced him. The reason is practical: a financial interest is definite and measurable, but its effect on a mind cannot be proved or disproved, so the law removes the question by disqualifying outright.

1. Pecuniary bias. Any financial or proprietary interest, however small, in the subject matter or in a party. It disqualifies automatically and without inquiry. Dr. Bonham's Case (1610); Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852); Jeejeebhoy (1965).
2. Personal bias. Arising from relationship, friendship, hostility, or a business or professional connection with a party. Here the test is a real likelihood of bias, and the court weighs the facts. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1970): a candidate for selection sat on the Selection Board that judged his rivals; the selection was quashed, and it did not save it that he withdrew when his own name came up. Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand (1957): the chairman of a disciplinary tribunal had appeared as counsel for the complainant. Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1960): the Minister who cancelled a mining licence had earlier prosecuted the licensee's proprietor.

The exceptions. Statutory authorisation, where the legislature has itself entrusted the decision to an interested authority; waiver, where a party who knows of the interest takes part without objection; and the doctrine of necessity, where the disqualified authority is the only one competent and the alternative is that no decision can be made at all: Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India (1990); and Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985), where a Public Service Commission member related to a candidate was required to withdraw only from that candidate's assessment.

1. Why there is no claim on the contract. Article 299(1) requires that a contract made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or a State be expressed to be made by the President or the Governor, be executed on their behalf, and be executed by an authorised person. These requirements are mandatory. A contract at the oral request of a senior officer satisfies none of them, so it is void, unenforceable, and incapable of ratification: Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1968); Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Co-operative Society v. Sipahi Singh (1977).
2. Why a claim nevertheless lies. Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act: "Where a person lawfully does anything for another person, or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered."
3. The three conditions are satisfied here. The building was constructed lawfully, at the request of a government officer; it was plainly not intended as a gift; and the Government took possession and used it for official purposes, which is enjoyment of the benefit.

6. Limits. Section 70 does not apply where the person acted officiously or intended a gift, nor where the transaction is forbidden by law or opposed to public policy, since the court will not indirectly enforce what the law forbids: Mulamchand (1968).
7. An alternative route. Section 65 of the Contract Act, restoration of a benefit received under an agreement discovered to be void, is often pleaded alongside, but Section 70 is the surer ground because it does not depend on there ever having been an agreement.

(b) Cite the applicable Constitutional and legal provisions.

1. Article 298 of the Constitution: the executive power of the Union and of each State extends to the carrying on of any trade or business, to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property, and to the making of contracts for any purpose. This is the source of the power to contract.
2. Article 299(1): the form in which such contracts must be made, in the three limbs set out above.
3. Article 299(2): neither the President nor the Governor, nor the person executing the contract, shall be personally liable in respect of it.

(a) Is the dismissal of Mr. Suresh valid? Give reasons.

No. The dismissal is void and liable to be quashed.

1. Article 311 applies to him. A senior clerk in a District Collector's office holds a civil post under a State, so he has the benefit of Article 311. (Contrast an employee of a municipal corporation or a statutory corporation, who is not covered.)

5. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985), a Constitution Bench, is the leading authority. It held that the second proviso dispenses with the inquiry, not with natural justice at large; that the reasons for invoking clause (b) must be recorded and are open to judicial review; and that the satisfaction must be based on material and reached honestly.
6. Article 311(1) must be satisfied as well: he cannot be dismissed by an authority subordinate to the one that appointed him, the test being one of rank and not identity: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh (1970).
7. The doctrine of pleasure is no answer. Article 310 opens with "except as expressly provided by this Constitution", and Article 311 is that express provision.
8. The consequence. The order is a nullity. The court sets it aside and the department is free to hold a proper inquiry from the stage at which the illegality occurred. The court does not decide whether he took a bribe; it decides only whether the State was entitled to decide that question the way it did.

(b) On what grounds can Mr. Suresh file a petition in the High Court?

He may file a writ petition under Article 226. The grounds are:

The reliefs to ask for: a writ of certiorari quashing the order of dismissal; a writ of mandamus directing reinstatement with continuity of service and consequential benefits; and, in the alternative, a direction that any fresh inquiry be held according to law. Back wages are discretionary and are often moulded.

The forum. Where a State Administrative Tribunal has been constituted under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, it is the court of first instance, and the High Court's jurisdiction is exercised on review by a Division Bench: L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997).

For full marks, cover: what discretion is and why it is unavoidable; the two great heads of control; five sub-heads under each with a case; the standards of unreasonableness and proportionality; the treatment of subjective satisfaction; and the limits of review.

1. Administrative discretion. It is the power of an authority to choose between courses of action, or to decide whether to act at all, where the law leaves the choice to its judgment. Statutes confer it in the language of "if the Government is satisfied", "as it thinks fit", "reasonable cause", "in the public interest" and "where it appears to the authority".

2. Why it exists and why it must be controlled. No legislature can foresee every case, and a welfare State must license, allot, exempt, subsidise, regulate and plan on facts that vary case by case. Dicey thought discretion the enemy of the rule of law; the modern answer is that the enemy is unstructured and unreviewable discretion, and the remedy, in Davis's phrase, is to confine, structure and check it.

3. Non-application of mind, including the mechanical repetition of statutory language and orders passed without considering the material.
4. Unlawful sub-delegation of the discretion: Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works (1997).
5. Surrender of the discretion by contract or estoppel: an authority cannot bind itself not to exercise a statutory power.

5. Second head: abuse of discretion. The authority has exercised the power, but improperly.

1. Mala fides, malice in fact (personal spite or dishonest motive) and malice in law (use of the power for an object outside the statute). S. Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab (1964): action against a civil surgeon taken out of the personal hostility of the Chief Minister was quashed. State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980): land acquisition pressed against a political opponent; Krishna Iyer J. equated the misuse of power for an unauthorised purpose with legal malice. The burden is heavy, the charge must be specifically pleaded with particulars, and the officer must be impleaded: E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), where the allegation failed.

6. Subjective satisfaction: how far is it reviewable? Where a statute makes the power depend on the authority's own satisfaction, the court cannot substitute its own opinion, but it can ask:

1. whether the satisfaction was reached on material at all, since a satisfaction founded on no material is no satisfaction: Barium Chemicals (1967);
2. whether the material has a rational connection to the grounds specified in the statute;
3. whether the authority took irrelevant matters into account; and
4. whether the satisfaction was mala fide or reached without applying the mind.

Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. S.D. Agarwal (1969) applied Barium Chemicals, and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad (1961) struck down a provision conferring a discretion without a definition of the class to which it applied. In preventive detention, Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal (1975) held that the existence of the grounds and their relevance are justiciable even though the sufficiency is not.

9. The limits of review. The court reviews legality, rationality and procedural propriety, not merits. It will not sit in appeal on policy, on expert or technical judgment, on the allocation of resources, or on the sufficiency of material behind a subjective satisfaction. It will refuse relief for laches, for suppression, where there is an adequate alternative remedy, or where the question is academic. And where it finds the discretion wrongly exercised, its normal order is to quash and remit, not to exercise the discretion itself.

2. Article 226: every High Court may issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any other purpose, that is, for the enforcement of ordinary legal rights as well. The High Court's writ jurisdiction is therefore wider than the Supreme Court's, and by Article 226(2) it extends to an authority outside its territory where the cause of action arises within it.

2. The significance of writs in administrative law.

1. They convert a right into a remedy. A guarantee without a remedy is a declaration. Article 32 makes the remedy itself a fundamental right, so the guarantee cannot be legislated away.
2. They are the principal instrument of judicial control of administrative action. Every ground of review, ultra vires, breach of natural justice, abuse of discretion, is enforced through a writ.
3. They are quick. A writ petition is decided on affidavits, without a trial, and can be moved and heard in days where a suit would take years.
4. They are flexible. The relief is discretionary and can be moulded to the case, and under Article 226 the High Court is not confined to the technical limits of the English writs: Comptroller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jagannathan (1986).

(i) Habeas corpus, "you may have the body". A command to a person detaining another to produce him before the court and justify the detention. It lies against the State and a private person. It is the great remedy for personal liberty under Articles 21 and 22. Locus standi is relaxed: a friend, a relative or any person may apply, and in Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration (1980) a letter from a prisoner was treated as a petition. Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling (1974): production of the body is not always essential and legality may be examined on the record. ADM Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla (1976) denied the remedy during the Emergency and is now regarded as wrongly decided, having been overruled in K.S. Puttaswamy (2017).

(iv) Certiorari, "to be certified". A writ by which a superior court quashes an order already made by an inferior court, tribunal or quasi-judicial authority. It is curative, where prohibition is preventive, and the two often issue together. The grounds are want or excess of jurisdiction, breach of natural justice, and error of law apparent on the face of the record. Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (1964) is the leading Indian statement, and holds that certiorari does not lie for a mere error of fact. Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas Advani (1950) on when a function is quasi-judicial, a requirement much relaxed after A.K. Kraipak (1970).

(v) Quo warranto, "by what authority". A writ calling on the holder of a public office of a substantive character to show by what authority he holds it, and ousting him if he has no title. Conditions: a public office created by the Constitution or a statute; of a substantive character; actually held; and held contrary to law or without the prescribed qualification: University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao (1965). Locus standi is relaxed, so any member of the public acting bona fide may apply.

For full marks, cover: the definition and forms; the classification; the reasons for growth; the constitutional question and the Delhi Laws Act test; then two lists, permissible and impermissible, each head with a case; and the controls in short.

1. Definition. Delegated legislation is law made by an executive or administrative authority under a power conferred on it by the legislature. Salmond: subordinate legislation "proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power, and is therefore dependent for its continued existence and validity on some superior or supreme authority". Sir Cecil Carr called it "a growing child called upon to relieve the parent of the strain of overwork".

It takes the form of rules, regulations, bye-laws, orders, notifications, schemes and directions.

2. having laid down the policy, it may delegate the power to fill in details and to work the policy out; and
3. the power to repeal or modify an existing law is, in general, beyond the permissible limit, because it involves the exercise of legislative judgment itself.

The test is therefore whether the parent Act lays down a policy and a standard to guide the delegate. Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India (1984) restated it, and Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax (1974) discussed the competing "policy and guidelines" and "abdication" formulations, the former prevailing.

5. Permissible delegation. The legislature may validly delegate the power to:

1. commence an Act, or to extend it to a specified area, class or period, which is conditional legislation and involves no transfer of legislative power at all;
2. supply details: forms, fees, procedure, conditions, returns and registers, which is the ordinary case;
3. grant exemptions and exceptions, where the standard is laid down in the Act;
4. suspend the operation of a provision in stated circumstances;

2. the power to repeal an Act, or to modify it in its essential features: Delhi Laws Act;
3. the power to impose a tax, since Article 265 requires that no tax be levied except by authority of law, though the fixing of a rate within statutory limits may be left to the executive;
4. the power to create an offence and prescribe a punishment without legislative guidance as to the conduct penalised and the maximum penalty;
5. the power to give a rule retrospective effect where the Act does not expressly say so;
6. the power to oust the jurisdiction of the courts;
7. the power to make rules inconsistent with the parent Act or with the Constitution, delegated legislation being "law" under Article 13(3)(a): Air India v. Nergesh Meerza (1981);
8. the power to sub-delegate without authority, on the maxim delegatus non potest delegare: Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works (1997); and
9. any power the exercise of which would amount to an abdication by the legislature of its own function, or the creation of a parallel legislature.

For full marks, cover: what the civil service is and its historical origin; its classification and organisation; the constitutional provisions in Part XIV; the recruitment machinery; the functions; the doctrine of pleasure and the Article 311 safeguards; the controls over the services; and the criticisms and reform proposals.

1. Meaning. The civil service is the body of permanent, professional, salaried officials, recruited on merit, who carry on the administration of the State under the direction of the political executive. Its characteristics are permanence, political neutrality, anonymity, merit recruitment and hierarchy.

2. Origin. The Indian civil service descends from the covenanted service of the East India Company; the Charter Act of 1853 introduced open competition; the Macaulay Committee, 1854 designed the examination; and the Indian Civil Service was the "steel frame" of British India. After independence, Sardar Patel secured the retention of an All India service, and the Indian Administrative Service and Indian Police Service were constituted under the All India Services Act, 1951.

2. Article 309: the appropriate legislature may regulate recruitment and conditions of service; until it does, the President or the Governor may make rules, which are statutory and enforceable;
3. Article 310: the doctrine of pleasure, subject to express constitutional provision;
4. Article 311: the safeguards, discussed below;
5. Article 312: All India Services;
6. Articles 315 to 323: the Public Service Commissions.

2. Implementation and administration. Collecting revenue, maintaining order, running services, disbursing welfare, and enforcing regulation.
3. Delegated legislation. Almost all rules, regulations and notifications are drafted in the departments, so the service is in practice the draftsman of most of the law that binds the citizen.
4. Quasi-judicial adjudication. Assessment, licensing, permits, allotments, departmental appeals and disciplinary proceedings, in all of which the officer must observe natural justice and pass a speaking order.
5. Financial administration: preparation of estimates, control of expenditure and accounting.
6. Continuity and institutional memory across changes of government, which is the constitutional justification for permanence and neutrality.
7. Delegated executive discretion, exercised subject to the whole of the law discussed under judicial review of discretion.

7. Tenure: the doctrine of pleasure and its exceptions. Article 310 enacts that civil servants hold office during the pleasure of the President or the Governor, but the Article opens with the words "except as expressly provided by this Constitution", and the exceptions are large:

4. Fixed tenures for the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, the Comptroller and Auditor General (Article 148), the Chief Election Commissioner (Article 324) and the members of the Public Service Commissions (Article 317).
5. Articles 14 and 16 forbid arbitrary or discriminatory treatment in service matters, including transfer and promotion: E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974).

8. Controls over the services. Political, through ministerial responsibility; legislative, through questions, debates and the financial committees; financial, through the Comptroller and Auditor General; judicial, through Article 226 and the Administrative Tribunals under Article 323A, subject to review by a Division Bench of the High Court after L. Chandra Kumar (1997); institutional, through the Central Vigilance Commission, the Lokpal and Lokayuktas and the Central Bureau of Investigation; and public, through the Right to Information Act, 2005 and citizens' charters.

For full marks, cover: what a tribunal is and its constitutional basis; seven advantages and seven disadvantages; then the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 in detail; and the case law, ending with the decision of 19 November 2025 which struck its core provisions down.

1. What a tribunal is. A statutory adjudicating body outside the ordinary court hierarchy, which decides disputes between the citizen and the administration or in a specialised field, judicially in substance but by a simpler procedure. Articles 323A and 323B, inserted by the 42nd Amendment, 1976, authorise them: Article 323A for service matters, by Parliament alone; Article 323B for taxation, foreign exchange, industrial and labour disputes, land reforms, ceiling on urban property, elections, essential goods and connected offences, by Parliament or a State legislature.

2. Advantages.

1. Speed. Free of the Code of Civil Procedure and of the crowded lists of the ordinary courts.

3. Threat to independence through executive control of appointment, tenure, reappointment, salary and infrastructure. This is the central problem and the whole of the modern case law is about it.
4. No uniform procedure: each tribunal has its own, so the citizen cannot know what to expect.
5. Reasons not always given, and no consistent system of precedent, so like cases may be decided unlike.
6. Fragmentation of the legal system into scores of separate jurisdictions, and the exclusion of the ordinary courts.
7. Practical failures: benches sitting at few places, long vacancies in the offices of chairperson and member, and inadequate infrastructure, which have repeatedly been the subject of judicial directions.

4. The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021: salient features as enacted. The Act received assent on 13 August 2021 and was given effect from 4 April 2021, replacing an Ordinance of that date.

5. Minimum age of fifty years for appointment as chairperson or member, which excluded advocates in their forties from consideration.
6. Upper age limits of seventy for a chairperson and sixty-seven for a member.
7. Power in the Central Government to remove a member on the recommendation of the Search-cum-Selection Committee.
8. Rule-making power in the Central Government to fix qualifications, appointment, salaries, allowances, resignation, removal and other conditions of service.

5. The constitutional history, and why the Act was struck down.

1. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India (1987) upheld the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, on the footing that a tribunal may substitute for the High Court only if it is an effective institutional alternative.
2. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), seven judges, held that judicial review under Articles 226, 227 and 32 is part of the basic structure, struck down the exclusion clauses in Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d), and held that tribunals are courts of first instance subject to review by a Division Bench of the High Court.

5. Parliament re-enacted the same provisions in the Act of 2021 notwithstanding those decisions, which is what made the Act constitutionally vulnerable: a legislature may remove the basis of a judgment but may not simply overrule it: State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala (2014).
6. On 19 November 2025, in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 1330, the Supreme Court struck down the core provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 governing appointment, tenure and conditions of service, holding that they gave excessive executive control over tribunals and violated judicial independence, financial autonomy and the separation of powers, all of them part of the basic structure. The Court restored the safeguards laid down in its earlier Madras Bar Association judgments, and directed the Union to constitute a National Tribunal Commission within four months to oversee appointments and administration.