BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 5 Torts 2019-20 Question Paper with Solutions

A wrongful act is an act or omission which infringes a legal right of another person. It must be a legal wrong and not merely a moral, religious or social one, because the law of torts gives no remedy for a breach of a merely moral obligation.

The wrongful act is the first of the three essentials of a tort, the other two being legal damage, that is injuria, and a legal remedy in the form of an action for unliquidated damages.

Waiver is one of the modes by which tortious liability is discharged. Where a person injured by a wrong has two or more alternative remedies, and he elects to pursue one of them, he is taken to have abandoned the other, and cannot afterwards fall back on it.

The classic instance is waiver of tort: where the tort has resulted in a gain to the wrongdoer, for example conversion of the plaintiff's goods which the wrongdoer has sold, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue instead in quasi-contract for money had and received.

An injunction is an order of a court directing a person to do, or more usually to refrain from doing, a particular act. It is a judicial remedy in tort and an equitable and discretionary one, so it is granted not as of right but where damages would be an inadequate remedy.

Kinds.

• Temporary or interim, granted during the pendency of the suit to preserve the position until it is decided, under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and perpetual, granted by the decree at the hearing and on the merits, under Sections 37 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
• Prohibitory, restraining the defendant from doing a wrongful act; and mandatory, compelling him to undo what he has already done, for example to pull down a wall he has built.

Section 2(1)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defines "appropriate laboratory" as a laboratory or organisation:

1. recognised by the Central Government;
2. recognised by a State Government, subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by the Central Government; or
3. any laboratory or organisation established by or under any law for the time being in force, which is maintained, financed or aided by the Central Government or a State Government,

for carrying out analysis or test of any goods with a view to determining whether such goods suffer from any defect.

Section 2(1)(j) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defines "manufacturer" as a person who:

1. makes or manufactures any goods or parts thereof; or
2. does not make or manufacture any goods but assembles parts thereof made or manufactured by others and claims the end product to be goods manufactured by himself; or
3. puts or causes to be put his own mark on any goods made or manufactured by any other manufacturer and claims such goods to be goods made or manufactured by himself.

The Explanation provides that where a manufacturer despatches goods or parts to a branch office maintained by him, the branch office shall not be deemed to be the manufacturer even though the parts despatched to it are assembled there and sold or distributed from there.

Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defines an unfair trade practice as a trade practice which, for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or the provision of any services, adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice, including the practices the section lists.

The listed practices are, in substance:

1. falsely representing that goods are of a particular standard, quality, quantity, grade, composition, style or model;
2. falsely representing that services are of a particular standard, quality or grade;
3. falsely representing rebuilt, second-hand, renovated, reconditioned or old goods as new;
4. representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, performance, characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits which they do not have;
5. representing that the seller or supplier has a sponsorship, approval or affiliation which he does not have;

Libel is defamation in a permanent form: the publication of a defamatory statement in a lasting medium addressed to the eye, such as writing, print, a picture, a caricature, a photograph, a statue, an effigy, a film or a broadcast.

Essentials. The plaintiff must prove the three ingredients of defamation:

1. the statement is defamatory, that is it tends to lower him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or to make them shun or avoid him, or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule;
2. it refers to the plaintiff, and it is enough that reasonable people would take it to refer to him, the defendant's intention being irrelevant (Hulton v Jones, 1910); and
3. it is published, that is communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.

Libel and slander distinguished.

Defences. Justification or truth; fair comment on a matter of public interest; absolute privilege (parliamentary, judicial and State communications) and qualified privilege (statements made in the discharge of a legal, moral or social duty to a person with a corresponding interest, defeated by proof of malice); apology under the Libel Acts; consent; and innocent dissemination.

• The Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 gives the wife, husband, parent and child of a person killed by a wrongful act a new and independent cause of action for the loss to them, in addition to any claim surviving to the estate.
• The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides its own machinery for claims arising out of the death of a person in a motor accident.

2. Waiver. Where the plaintiff has alternative remedies he must elect, and by electing one he abandons the other. Where the tort has brought a gain to the wrongdoer, the plaintiff may waive the tort and sue in quasi-contract for money had and received.

3. Accord and satisfaction. Accord is the agreement to accept some consideration in place of the right of action; satisfaction is the actual payment or performance of it. Accord without satisfaction discharges nothing, and the accord must be free from fraud, coercion or undue influence.

4. Release. The giving up of the right of action by the injured party's own act. Under English law a release required a deed; in India, by virtue of Section 63 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a promisee may dispense with or remit performance wholly or in part, so a release without consideration is effective.

Damnum sine injuria means damage without legal injury: the plaintiff has suffered actual and even substantial loss, but no legal right of his has been infringed. Such damage is not actionable, because there is no cause of action at all, and the size of the loss is irrelevant.

Damnum means loss of money, comfort, health, service or the like; injuria means the infringement of a legal right. The law of torts protects rights, not interests, so where there is no right there is no wrong.

Cases.

• Gloucester Grammar School Case (1410): the defendant set up a rival school in the same town; the plaintiff's fees fell from 40 pence to 12 pence. Held, no action, because the defendant had done nothing unlawful and lawful competition is not a wrong.
• Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor, Gow and Co (1892) AC 25: a combination of shipowners drove the plaintiff out of the China tea trade by rebates and reduced freight. Held, no actionable wrong, because the means used were lawful and the object was to advance their own trade.

Both are forms of trespass to the person, the third being false imprisonment, and both are actionable per se, that is without proof of any damage.

Assault is an act of the defendant which causes the plaintiff reasonable apprehension of the infliction of immediate and unlawful force upon his person. The essentials are:

1. an act which puts the plaintiff in reasonable fear of immediate force;
2. an apparent present ability to carry the threat into effect; and
3. intention to create the apprehension.

Pointing a loaded pistol, advancing with a clenched fist, and raising a stick within striking distance are assaults. Pointing an unloaded pistol is an assault if the plaintiff does not know it is unloaded, because the test is the reasonable apprehension created and not the actual danger.

Battery is the intentional and direct application of force to the person of another without lawful justification. The essentials are:

Defences. Consent, express or implied, which covers lawful games, medical treatment and the ordinary contact of daily life; self-defence and defence of others or of property, using reasonable and proportionate force; lawful arrest; parental and quasi-parental authority to administer reasonable correction; statutory authority; and necessity.

Objects (Section 6). The objects of the Council are to promote and protect the rights of consumers, namely the right to safety, the right to be informed, the right to choose, the right to be heard, the right to seek redressal, and the right to consumer education.

Parallel bodies. Section 7 provides for a State Consumer Protection Council in each State, chaired by the State Minister in charge of consumer affairs, which shall meet at least twice a year; Section 8A, inserted in 2002, provides for a District Consumer Protection Council in each district, chaired by the Collector, which shall also meet at least twice a year.

The six rights in full (Section 6). The objects of the Council are to promote and protect:

1. the right to safety, against the marketing of goods and services hazardous to life and property;
2. the right to be informed about the quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods and services, so as to protect the consumer against unfair trade practices;
3. the right to choose, that is to be assured, wherever possible, of access to a variety of goods and services at competitive prices;

3. Period immaterial. The tort is actionable per se, so no damage need be proved and half an hour is enough; the duration goes only to the quantum of damages.
4. Knowledge of the plaintiff is not essential. Herring v Boyle (1834) held otherwise, but the modern view, from Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co (1919) and confirmed in Murray v Ministry of Defence (1988), is that a person may be falsely imprisoned although he does not know it at the time. On these facts Raju plainly knew.

Is there any justification? The school will rely on the authority of a schoolmaster in loco parentis to impose reasonable discipline, which is a recognised defence covering reasonable correction and reasonable detention. The defence fails here for two reasons. First, the purpose: detaining a child for failing to do homework is a disciplinary purpose, but locking him up goes beyond what is reasonable, and the law requires the measure to be proportionate to the object. Second, and decisively, locking a child of the seventh standard in a room alone after school hours, without informing his parents and without any means of leaving, is not reasonable discipline by any standard, and it exposes the child to obvious risk.

2. A writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution, which is the remedy while the detention continues, to secure immediate release. On these facts the detention was over in half an hour, so this is of historical rather than practical use, but it is the constitutional counterpart of the tort and should be named.
3. Self-help, that is escape, which the law permits a person unlawfully restrained to attempt, using reasonable force.

He may in addition set the criminal law in motion: wrongful confinement is an offence under Section 340 of the Indian Penal Code, punishable under Section 342, and the civil and criminal proceedings are independent of each other.

2. Locality. This is a residential society, where the standard of comfort a resident is entitled to expect is at its highest. Sturges v Bridgman (1879), that what is a nuisance in Belgrave Square would not necessarily be so in Bermondsey, cuts in the residents' favour.
3. Duration. The state of affairs continued for a substantial period and was continuing when they tried to reach him.
4. Fault is not the test. In nuisance the question is the unreasonableness of the state of affairs, not the care taken. It is therefore no answer that Venugopal did not intend it and did not know of it.

Is it his nuisance? Yes, on two independent grounds. He created the state of affairs by locking a sick animal in a closed flat and leaving for fifteen days, which is an act whose consequence any reasonable person would foresee. And as occupier he is liable for a nuisance arising on his premises which he has created or, having the means of knowledge, allowed to continue; Sedleigh-Denfield v O'Callaghan (1940) establishes that an occupier who adopts or continues a nuisance is liable for it.

1. Injunction. The principal civil remedy, because what the residents want is the nuisance stopped. A mandatory injunction would direct Venugopal to remove the carcass and clean the premises; a prohibitory injunction would restrain a repetition. It may be sought as a temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure pending suit and made perpetual under Sections 37 to 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
2. Damages for the discomfort and inconvenience suffered, and for any actual loss, such as the cost of alternative accommodation or of cleaning.
3. Abatement, the extra-judicial remedy of removing the nuisance themselves. The law permits it, but hedges it: notice must ordinarily be given to the occupier before entering his premises, except in an emergency; no more damage may be done than is necessary; and where two methods are available, the less mischievous must be chosen. On these facts, with the occupier uncontactable and a health hazard developing, the residents could justify entry, and in practice they would do so with the society's managing committee and the police present.

(a) What is the remedy available to Mr. Ajit? Explain.

Ajit has two concurrent remedies, and he may choose between them.

1. A complaint before the consumer forum for deficiency in service.

• He is a consumer. He hired a service for consideration by buying an air ticket: Section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Transport is expressly within the definition of "service" in Section 2(1)(o).

Because this is international carriage, Mumbai to Bangkok and back, the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 applies. It gives the force of law in India to the Warsaw Convention (First Schedule), the Hague-amended Convention (Second Schedule) and, since the 2009 amendment, the Montreal Convention, 1999 (Third Schedule), which governs carriage between States that are parties to it. Under the Montreal Convention:

• the carrier is liable for damage to, destruction of, or loss of checked baggage if the event which caused it took place on board the aircraft or during any period within which the baggage was in the charge of the carrier;
• liability is strict, subject to the defence that the damage resulted from an inherent defect, quality or vice of the baggage itself;

One caution about the contents. Airlines' conditions of carriage, and the Convention regime, do not contemplate valuables, jewellery, cash, documents or electronics being carried in checked baggage, and a passenger who puts them there without declaring them will find both the airline's tariff and the Convention limit ranged against him. He is not without a remedy, because removal of the contents is not an accident but a theft, and a carrier who receives baggage intact and returns it rifled has to explain how that happened. That is res ipsa loquitur in a bailment setting, and it takes the case out of the ordinary limitation on liability where wilful misconduct by the carrier's servants can be shown.

(b) Is HighFly Air Company liable? Why?

Yes.

2. The condition on delivery speaks for itself. Baggage handed over intact and returned damaged and rifled raises an inference of want of care, and the evidential burden shifts to the carrier to explain: res ipsa loquitur.
3. Vicarious liability. If the contents were removed by employees or handling agents, the airline is answerable for the acts of its servants and agents in the course of their employment. The rule in Lloyd v Grace, Smith and Co (1912) is directly in point: a master is liable for the fraudulent or dishonest act of a servant committed in the class of work he was employed to do, and it is no answer that the servant acted for his own benefit.

The airline's defences would be that the loss was caused by an inherent defect in the baggage, that Ajit failed to give written notice within seven days, or that it is protected by the Convention limit because no special declaration was made. The first is untenable on these facts. The second is procedural and is why a passenger must complain at the airport and obtain a Property Irregularity Report before leaving. The third caps the amount but does not defeat liability, and does not apply where wilful misconduct is established.

Even where the plaintiff proves every ingredient of a tort, the defendant may escape liability by establishing a general defence, that is one available across the law of torts rather than peculiar to a single tort. The recognised general defences are the following.

1. Volenti non fit injuria (consent). No injury is done to one who is willing. Where the plaintiff has freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk, agreed to run it, no action lies.

Two elements: knowledge and consent. Mere knowledge is not enough, as scienti non fit injuria is not the law. In Smith v Baker (1891) a workman knew that stones were being swung over his head by a crane and continued to work; the House of Lords held he had not consented, because a man working on under economic compulsion is not a volunteer. In Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club (1933) a spectator at a motor race injured when two cars collided was held to have accepted the inherent risks. The Indian illustration is Padmavati v Dugganaika (1975 ACJ 222).

4. Act of God (vis major). An operation of natural forces without human intervention, so extraordinary that no human foresight could reasonably anticipate it and no reasonable care could guard against it. Nichols v Marsland (1876), extraordinary rainfall bursting ornamental lakes, succeeded; Greenock Corporation v Caledonian Railway (1917), where the rainfall was heavy but not unprecedented, failed. Ramalinga Nadar v Narayana Reddiar (AIR 1971 Ker 197): the act of an unruly mob is the act of man, not of God. Unlike inevitable accident, act of God is an exception to Rylands v Fletcher.

5. Private defence. A person may use reasonable and proportionate force to defend his own person or property, or that of another. The force must match the threat: setting a spring gun without notice is not private defence (Bird v Holbrook), and shooting a boy scrumping apples is not.

6. Mistake. As a general rule mistake, of fact or of law, is no defence in tort: a person who enters land honestly believing it to be his own is still a trespasser. The exceptions are torts in which the defendant's state of mind is an ingredient, notably malicious prosecution and deceit, and the qualified privilege defence in defamation, where honest belief negatives malice.

10. Parental and quasi-parental authority. A parent, and a person in loco parentis, may impose reasonable correction and restraint, a defence now much narrowed in India by Section 17 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

11. Acts causing slight harm: de minimis non curat lex. The law takes no account of trifles.

A servant is a person employed by another to work for him under the control and direction of the employer as to the manner in which the work is to be done. He is engaged under a contract of service. An independent contractor works under a contract for services: he undertakes to produce a given result, and the employer has no right to control the manner in which he does it. As a rule a person is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor.

• The control test. The traditional test: does the employer control not only what is to be done but how it is to be done? It works well for manual labour and badly for skilled professionals, since a hospital cannot direct a surgeon how to operate.
• The organisation or integration test. Formulated by Denning LJ in Stevenson, Jordan and Harrison Ltd v Macdonald and Evans (1952): is the person's work an integral part of the business, or merely accessory to it? A ship's master, a chauffeur and a staff reporter are employed under a contract of service; a pilot brought in to take a ship into harbour, a taxi driver and a freelance contributor are engaged under a contract for services.

• Casual delegation. An owner who asks another to drive his car on his behalf may be liable, because the driver is treated as his agent: Ormrod v Crosville Motor Services (1953).

2. In the course of employment.

An act is done in the course of employment if it is either:

• an act expressly or impliedly authorised by the master; or
• an unauthorised mode of doing an act authorised by the master; or
• an act necessarily incidental to something the servant is employed to do.

The case law works by contrast, and the following pairs should be learned together.

• Bayley v Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Railway (1873): a porter, wrongly believing a passenger to be on the wrong train, pulled him off violently. Employer liable: an excessive and mistaken performance of an authorised act.
• Poland v Parr and Sons (1927): a carter struck a boy he believed to be stealing sugar from his employer's wagon. Employer liable, because a servant has implied authority to protect his master's property, though only by reasonable means.
• Theft by a servant. Where goods are entrusted to the servant in the course of his employment and he steals them, the master is liable: Morris v C W Martin and Sons Ltd (1966), the case of the mink stole sent for cleaning and stolen by the cleaner's employee.

The modern close connection test. In Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd (2001) the House of Lords held a school liable for sexual abuse of pupils by a warden, asking whether the wrongful conduct was so closely connected with the employment that it would be fair and just to hold the employer liable. That test now supplements the old formulations and explains the cases of deliberate wrongdoing.

5. The State as master. In India the liability of the State for the torts of its servants turns on Article 300 of the Constitution, which preserves the position as it stood before the Constitution, and therefore on the distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign functions drawn in Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co v Secretary of State for India (1861). State of Rajasthan v Vidhyawati (AIR 1962 SC 933) held the State liable for the negligence of a government driver, treating the function as non-sovereign; Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1965 SC 1039) held the State not liable where police officers negligently lost seized gold, treating the function as sovereign. Kasturi Lal has been steadily eroded, and in the constitutional tort line beginning with Rudul Sah v State of Bihar (1983) 4 SCC 141 and Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa (1993) 2 SCC 746 the Supreme Court has awarded compensation for violation of Article 21 without regard to the sovereign function defence.

"The person who for his own purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."

In the House of Lords Lord Cairns LC affirmed the rule and added that it applies where the defendant has made a non-natural use of his land, that is a special use bringing increased danger, and not the ordinary use of land or such use as is proper for the general benefit of the community.

Essentials.

1. A dangerous thing, that is something likely to do mischief if it escapes. Water, gas, electricity, explosives, fire, poisonous fumes, vibrations, sewage and even a flag pole and a chair-o-plane have qualified.

4. Act of a third party, that is the unforeseeable act of a stranger over whom the defendant has no control. Box v Jubb (1879); Rickards v Lothian (1913).
5. Statutory authority, subject to the terms of the enactment and to the absence of negligence. Green v Chelsea Waterworks Co (1894).

B. Absolute liability: M C Mehta v Union of India (1987).

Facts. In December 1985 oleum gas escaped from a plant of Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries in a densely populated part of Delhi, injuring several people and killing an advocate practising in the Tis Hazari courts. The escape occurred within a year of the Bhopal gas disaster, and the question came before the Supreme Court on a public interest petition under Article 32.

Held. M C Mehta v Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395. Bhagwati CJ, delivering the judgment of a Constitution Bench, held that the Court was not bound to follow the nineteenth century rule in Rylands v Fletcher, which had evolved in a different social and economic setting, and laid down a new and stricter rule:

D. The Indian development after M C Mehta.

• Union Carbide Corporation v Union of India (1989 and 1991), the Bhopal litigation, and the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985, by which the Union took over the claims of the victims as parens patriae.
• Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (1996) 3 SCC 212, the Bichhri case, which applied absolute liability to chemical units that had poisoned groundwater, and adopted the polluter pays principle, holding the polluter liable both to compensate the victims and to meet the cost of restoring the environment.

Trespass is a direct and unlawful interference with the person, land or goods of another. It is one of the oldest forms of action, and its three modern branches are trespass to the person, trespass to land and trespass to goods.

Two features are common to all of them.

1. The interference must be direct. Trespass lies where the injury follows immediately from the defendant's act. Where it follows only consequentially, the remedy is an action on the case, of which negligence and nuisance are the modern descendants. Throwing a log onto the highway which strikes a passer-by is trespass; leaving the log there so that a passer-by later falls over it is nuisance.
2. It is actionable per se. No damage need be proved. The reason is that trespass protects possession, bodily integrity and liberty, which the law treats as valuable in themselves.

Trespass to the person takes three forms.

A. Assault.

Cole v Turner (1704): the least touching of another in anger is a battery. Throwing water on a person, spitting at him, snatching a book from his hand, pulling away his chair as he sits, and administering medical treatment without consent are all batteries. No harm need result, and the requirement is not hostility but the absence of consent, which is why the ordinary contact of a crowded street is not a battery.

Assault and battery contrasted: assault is apprehension, battery is contact. Every battery preceded by a perceived threat includes an assault; a blow struck from behind is a battery with no assault; a threat never carried out is an assault with no battery.

C. False imprisonment.

The total restraint of a person's liberty, for however short a time, without lawful justification.

Essentials:

1. Total restraint. The confinement must be complete, with no reasonable means of escape. Bird v Jones (1845): part of a public bridge was fenced off and the plaintiff was prevented from going in the direction he wished but could have gone another way; held, no false imprisonment, because a partial obstruction is not imprisonment.

Defences to trespass to the person. Consent, express or implied, covering lawful games, surgical treatment and ordinary social contact; self-defence and defence of others or of property, with force proportionate to the threat; lawful arrest, whether with or without warrant, in accordance with Sections 41 to 60 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; parental and quasi-parental authority to administer reasonable correction; statutory authority; necessity; and inevitable accident, since trespass requires intention or negligence (Stanley v Powell, 1891).

Pecuniary jurisdiction (Section 11(1)). Where the value of the goods or services and the compensation claimed does not exceed Rs. 20 lakh.

Territorial jurisdiction (Section 11(2)). Where the opposite party resides, carries on business, has a branch office or personally works for gain; or where there are several opposite parties, where any of them does so, with the permission of the Forum or the acquiescence of the others; or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises.

Procedure (Section 13). The complaint is referred to the opposite party, who must respond within thirty days, extendable by fifteen. Goods requiring analysis are sealed and sent to an appropriate laboratory, with the fee deposited by the complainant; the report is furnished to both sides and objections are heard. The Forum has the powers of a civil court in respect of summoning and enforcing attendance, examination on oath, discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit and requisitioning public records. Its proceedings are judicial proceedings under Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 13(3A) requires disposal within three months, or five months where analysis is needed.

Appeal (Section 19). To the National Commission, within thirty days of an order in original jurisdiction, on deposit of fifty per cent of the amount ordered or Rs. 35,000, whichever is less.

3. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (Sections 20 to 23).

Composition (Section 20). A President who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Court, appointed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, and not less than four members, one of whom shall be a woman.

Jurisdiction (Section 21). Original, where the value exceeds Rs. 1 crore; appellate, over the State Commissions; and revisional, over State Commissions on the same three grounds.

Appeal (Section 23). To the Supreme Court within thirty days of an order in original jurisdiction, on deposit of fifty per cent or Rs. 50,000, whichever is less.

Common features.

• Section 22 gives the National Commission, and by Section 18 the State Commission and by Section 13 the District Forum, the powers of a civil court.

Why the Act was needed. Before 1986 the consumer's remedy existed only on paper. A suit under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 or in tort meant court fees, lawyers, the full rigour of the Code of Civil Procedure and years of delay, for a claim often worth a few hundred rupees. Caveat emptor, let the buyer beware, placed the risk on the party least able to investigate. Privity of contract barred the ultimate consumer from suing the manufacturer, since his contract was with the retailer. And the seller's standard-form contract, drafted by him and signed by a consumer with no bargaining power, disposed of most disputes before they began. The Act was passed to give the consumer a forum he could actually reach and remedies that would actually help him.

The Preamble declares it to be "an Act to provide for better protection of the interests of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumers' disputes and for matters connected therewith".

The aims and objects.

2. To provide redressal that is speedy, simple and inexpensive. Every procedural feature serves this object: a nominal fee; a complaint in writing by the consumer himself, without a lawyer; principles of natural justice instead of the whole Code of Civil Procedure; decision on affidavit evidence; and time limits under Section 13(3A) of three months, or five where a laboratory report is required. Section 26 keeps the door from being abused by allowing dismissal of a frivolous or vexatious complaint with costs.

3. To establish consumer councils as advisory bodies. The Central Council under Section 4, chaired by the Union Minister in charge of consumer affairs and meeting at least once a year; State Councils under Section 7, chaired by the State Minister and meeting at least twice a year; and District Councils under Section 8A, chaired by the Collector and meeting at least twice a year.

4. To create a three-tier adjudicatory machinery. The District Forum, State Commission and National Commission under Sections 9 to 23, with defined pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction, appeal at each level, execution as a decree of a civil court under Section 25, and punishment for non-compliance under Section 27.

7. To reach the consumer wherever the harm occurs. "Service" in Section 2(1)(o) is defined inclusively and very widely, covering banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging, housing construction, entertainment, amusement and the purveying of news or other information, and excluding only services free of charge or under a contract of personal service. Judicial decisions have brought within it medical services (Indian Medical Association v V P Shantha, 1995), housing and development authorities (Lucknow Development Authority v M K Gupta, 1994) and statutory bodies acting as service providers.