BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 5 Labour Laws 2025-26 - 60/40 Question Paper with Solutions

Two examples from Part I of Schedule I to the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, every injury in which is deemed to result in permanent total disablement:

1. Loss of both hands, or amputation at higher sites; and
2. Amputation of an arm through the shoulder joint.

Others in Part I: loss of a hand and a foot; double amputation through legs or thighs, or through leg or thigh on one side and loss of the other foot; loss of sight to such an extent as to render the claimant unable to perform any work for which eyesight is essential; very severe facial disfigurement; and absolute deafness.

The appellate authority, under Section 6 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

Section 2(a) defines "appellate authority" as an authority appointed by the appropriate Government by notification to exercise, in such area as may be specified, the functions of an appellate authority under the Act.

Section 6(1): any employer, workman, trade union or other prescribed representative of the workmen aggrieved by the order of the Certifying Officer under Section 5(2) may appeal within thirty days from the date on which copies are sent under Section 5(3). The appellate authority, whose decision shall be final, shall by order in writing confirm the standing orders either in the form certified by the Certifying Officer or after amending them by making such modifications or additions as it thinks necessary to render them certifiable.

Section 6(2): within seven days of its order it sends copies to the employer, to the trade union or other prescribed representatives, and to the Certifying Officer, who shall amend the register and send authenticated copies to the parties.

Others include insisting on a good conduct bond from workmen who were on a legal strike (Item 4); favouritism or partiality to one set of workers regardless of merit (Item 5); employing workmen as badlis, casuals or temporaries and continuing them as such for years to deprive them of permanent status (Item 6); and discriminating against an employee for testifying against the employer (Item 7).

Under the central Act, the corresponding list is Part I of the Fifth Schedule, made an offence by Sections 25T and 25U.

Two powers of the Commissioner for Employees' Compensation are:

1. Powers of a civil court. Section 23: the Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purpose of taking evidence on oath, enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of documents and material objects, and he is deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2. Power to settle claims and disputes. Section 19(1): any question as to the liability of any person to pay compensation, or as to whether a person is an employee, or as to the amount or duration of compensation, shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner, and by Section 19(2) no civil court has jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any such question.

Section 2(f) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946: "model standing orders" means the standing orders prescribed by the appropriate Government under the Act, framed by rules made under Section 15.

They have two functions:

1. under Section 3(2), the employer's draft standing orders must be, so far as is practicable, in conformity with them; and
2. under Section 12A, from the date the Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment until its own standing orders are certified, the model standing orders shall be deemed to be adopted in that establishment.

Two industries specified in the First Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are banking and coal.

Others include transport other than railways, cement, cotton textiles, foodstuffs, iron and steel, defence establishments, service in hospitals and dispensaries, fire brigade service, India Government Mints, the India Security Press, and the mining of copper, lead, zinc and iron ore.

Under Section 2(n)(vi), an industry specified in the First Schedule becomes a public utility service only where the appropriate Government, by notification, declares it to be one, where public emergency or public interest so requires, for a period not exceeding six months at a time.

The statutory foundation. Section 3(1) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 requires that the accident arise in the course of the employment, which is a question of time and place. Read literally that would confine liability to working hours within the four walls of the workplace, and would make compensation depend on which side of the factory gate a workman was standing when he was hurt.

The doctrine. The employment may be notionally extended in point of time and in point of place, so that:

1. it begins before the workman actually reaches his place of work and starts his duty, from the moment he enters the employer's premises or an area under the employer's control by an access reasonably used for that purpose; and
2. it continues after he has left his post, while he leaves by the same route and for so long as he remains within that area or uses a conveyance provided by the employer.

The leading cases.

2. Control: whether the area, route or conveyance was under the employer's control or provided by him.
3. Character of the risk: whether it was peculiar to or increased by the employment, or shared with the general public.
4. Contractual entitlement: whether the facility used was one to which the contract of employment entitled him.

Limits. The general rule remains that travelling to and from work is not in the course of employment; notional extension is an exception. It does not cover public roads or public transport, nor a deviation for the workman's own purposes. And it answers only the "in the course of" limb: the claimant must still prove that the accident arose out of the employment, since Section 3(1) requires both.

Section 10A(2). If any dispute arises regarding the subsistence allowance payable, the workman or the employer concerned may refer the dispute to the Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 having jurisdiction, and the Labour Court shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide the dispute, and such decision shall be final and binding. The Labour Court is to decide it, as far as practicable, within a period of three months.

Section 10A(3). Where any other law, award, agreement, contract of service or standing order provides for the payment of a higher amount, the workman shall be entitled to that higher amount.

Illustration. A workman drawing Rs. 20,000 a month is suspended pending an inquiry that lasts six months. He receives Rs. 10,000 a month for the first ninety days, and, if the delay is not his fault, Rs. 15,000 a month for the remaining ninety.

3. Wider participation. Section 10A(3A): where an industrial dispute has been referred to arbitration and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the persons making the reference represent the majority of each party, it may, within the time referred to in sub-section (3), issue a notification so that employers and workmen who are not parties to the agreement but are concerned in the dispute are given an opportunity to present their case before the arbitrator.
4. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs. Section 10A(4A): where such a notification has been issued, the appropriate Government may prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with the dispute which is already in existence. A strike or lock-out continued in contravention of such an order is illegal under Section 24(1)(ii).

Constitution. Section 4 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971: the State Government shall constitute an Industrial Court consisting of such number of members as it thinks fit, one of whom shall be the President. A member must be qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, or have held a judicial office in India for not less than ten years, or have been an advocate for not less than ten years.

Jurisdiction and duties. Section 5. It shall be the duty of the Industrial Court:

1. to decide complaints relating to unfair labour practices, except those relating to Item 1 of Schedule IV, which fall to the Labour Court under Section 7. Its jurisdiction therefore covers the whole of Schedule II (employers, interference with the right to organise), the whole of Schedule III (trade unions), and Items 2 to 10 of Schedule IV;

Powers. Section 30: on finding an unfair labour practice, the Court may declare it, direct the person to cease and desist, direct him to take affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without back wages, and grant interim relief pending the final decision. Section 43 confers further powers; Section 35 makes the law it declares binding on Labour Courts; Section 50 allows money due under its orders to be recovered as arrears of land revenue; and by Section 28(7) its order in an unfair labour practice complaint is final and shall not be called in question in any civil or criminal court.

(a) Will Mr. P get retrenchment compensation? Give Reasons

On these facts, no retrenchment compensation under Section 25F, but he is not to be turned out with nothing.

1. Section 2(oo)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 excludes from the definition of retrenchment the termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. If the Roadways has terminated him because his eyesight has permanently deteriorated, the termination is not retrenchment, and Section 25F, with its notice, fifteen days' average pay and notice to the Government, does not apply.

3. But the Court did not leave the drivers without a remedy. It held the terminations unjustified and inequitable, and directed that the affected employees be given their retirement and terminal benefits, and either alternative employment in a post they were fit to hold or, where no vacancy existed, compensation, with liberty to be offered a post later on returning the compensation.
4. The employer bears the burden. The Roadways must prove, by medical evidence, that the impairment is continued, that is lasting and not correctable, and that it genuinely unfits him for a driver's work. Eyesight is central to driving and the safety of passengers depends on it, so on these facts that is readily established. If it cannot be established, the termination is retrenchment, Section 25F was not complied with, the retrenchment is void, and he is entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service.

Conclusion. Mr. P will not get retrenchment compensation as such, but he is entitled to his retirement benefits and to alternative employment or compensation in the manner Anand Bihari directs.

4. In addition, Section 25F(a) requires one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons, or wages in lieu, and Section 25F(c) requires notice to the appropriate Government.
5. In a Chapter VB establishment (one hundred or more workmen), Section 25N requires three months' notice and the prior permission of the appropriate Government, with compensation at the same fifteen-day rate.

Illustration. A driver with nine years and seven months of continuous service, whose average pay is Rs. 21,000 a month. The part year exceeds six months, so it counts: ten years. Fifteen days' average pay is Rs. 10,500. Compensation is 10 x Rs. 10,500 = Rs. 1,05,000, plus one month's notice or Rs. 21,000 in lieu.

On the bare words "loss of left arm", the natural reading is amputation of the whole arm, and the disablement is therefore permanent total disablement. State the distinction and then the conclusion; the examiner is testing whether you know the Schedule turns on the site of the amputation.

Either way the disablement is permanent, not temporary, since a lost limb does not return.

(b) Is the employer liable to give compensation? Give reasons

Yes.

1. Section 3(1) makes the employer liable where personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Liability is strict.
2. He is an "employee" under Section 2(1)(dd): work in a bakery is an employment within Schedule II, and his employment is neither casual nor outside the employer's trade or business.
3. It was an accident: being struck by a truck is an unlooked-for mishap, not expected or designed.

Amount. If the disablement is permanent total, Section 4(1)(b) gives sixty per cent of monthly wages multiplied by the relevant factor in Schedule IV, or Rs. 1,40,000, whichever is more, with monthly wages capped at the notified ceiling of Rs. 15,000. If permanent partial, Section 4(1)(c)(i) gives that percentage of the permanent total figure which the Schedule specifies for the injury. Section 4A requires payment as soon as it falls due, failing which the Commissioner may award interest at twelve per cent and a penalty of up to fifty per cent.

3. The argument that he is a workman: a doctor employed to treat the estate's workers does technical work, which is one of the seven enumerated categories. If he simply attends patients and has no power to appoint, dismiss, sanction leave or bind the employer, he is not employed in a managerial or administrative capacity, and the exclusions do not apply.
4. The argument that he is not: in H.R. Adyanthaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. (1994) a Constitution Bench held that a person must be employed to do work of one of the enumerated categories, and the courts have been cautious about extending "technical work" to independent professional practice, where the professional exercises his own judgement and is not subject to control as to the manner of his work. If the doctor runs the estate hospital, supervises staff and administers the medical department, he is employed mainly in an administrative capacity and is excluded.
5. The test in either case is the dominant nature of the duties actually performed, not the designation: Ananda Bazar Patrika v. Its Workmen (1970).

3. If he is not a workman, the union cannot convert his grievance into an industrial dispute. Section 2(k) requires a dispute connected with the employment, non-employment or terms of employment of workmen, and in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management (1958) the Supreme Court held that the words "any person" in Section 2(k) mean a person in whose employment the workmen raising the dispute have a direct and substantial interest, and who is ordinarily a workman. On those facts, a dispute about a dismissed Assistant Medical Officer of a tea estate was held not to be an industrial dispute.
4. In Maharashtra, where there is a recognised union, Section 20(2)(b) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 makes it the sole channel of representation in Industrial Disputes Act proceedings, but that restriction is expressly not applied to proceedings about dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination or suspension. So in a termination case any union, or the man himself, may act.

The worker's union challenges the standing orders.

(a) Which of the standing orders will be held valid? Give reasons

The certified standing orders of the establishment prevail over the model standing orders, but only so far as they are lawful and were properly certified. On these facts the 10-hour shift clause is bad; the 10-minute break clause is open to challenge as unreasonable.

Why certified standing orders ordinarily prevail.

2. A standing order that is contrary to statute is void to that extent, and the Certifying Officer had no power to certify it. It may be attacked by an application for modification under Section 10, and its validity may be raised before the Labour Court under Section 13A on a question of application or interpretation, or by writ.

Why the 10-minute break clause is arguable.

1. Since the 1956 amendment to Section 4, it is the function of the Certifying Officer and the appellate authority to adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness of the provisions. A break materially shorter than the model provides is not automatically void, but the burden is on the employer to justify it, and the Certifying Officer may refuse to certify or may modify it.
2. Note also Section 55 of the Factories Act, 1948, which requires an interval for rest of at least half an hour so arranged that no period of work exceeds five hours. That statutory interval is separate from, and unaffected by, any shorter "restroom break" the standing orders may allow, and it cannot be reduced by a standing order.

Others: shift working; attendance and late coming; conditions of and procedure for applying for leave; requirement to enter by certain gates and liability to search; closing and reopening of sections and temporary stoppages of work; and means of redress for workmen against unfair treatment or wrongful exactions by the employer or his agents.

For full marks, cover: the seven authorities in the order the Act creates them, with composition and function; the reference power in Section 10 and voluntary arbitration in Section 10A; the common powers in Section 11 and Section 11A; the law on awards and settlements in Sections 15 to 19; and what the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 changes.

The Act builds a ladder from prevention through conciliation and investigation to adjudication.

1. Works Committee. Section 3. In an establishment employing one hundred or more workmen, the appropriate Government may by general or special order require the employer to constitute a Works Committee with equal numbers of employers' and workmen's representatives, the workmen's chosen in consultation with the registered trade union. Its duty is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations and to compose material differences of opinion. It is bipartite and advisory and cannot bind. Role: prevention.

5. Labour Court. Section 7. Constituted by the appropriate Government to adjudicate matters in the Second Schedule; one person with prescribed judicial qualifications. Second Schedule matters: propriety or legality of an order under standing orders; application and interpretation of standing orders; discharge or dismissal including reinstatement or relief; withdrawal of a customary concession; legality of a strike or lock-out; and all matters not in the Third Schedule.

6. Industrial Tribunal. Section 7A. Constituted by the appropriate Government for matters in the Second or Third Schedule; one person, being or having been a High Court Judge or a District Judge of three years; up to two assessors. Third Schedule matters: wages, allowances, hours of work and rest intervals, leave and holidays, bonus, provident fund and gratuity, shift working, classification by grades, rules of discipline, rationalisation, retrenchment and closure.

7. National Industrial Tribunal. Section 7B. Constituted by the Central Government for disputes involving questions of national importance or affecting establishments in more than one State; one person who is or has been a High Court Judge. Under Section 10(6), once a dispute is referred to it, proceedings on the same matter before a Labour Court or Tribunal stand quashed.

Awards and settlements. Section 15 requires expeditious proceedings; Section 16 that the award be in writing and signed; Section 17 publication within thirty days; Section 17A enforceability on the expiry of thirty days from publication; Section 18 who is bound, a settlement in conciliation and an award binding everyone employed in the establishment, a private settlement binding only the parties; Section 19 the period of operation, a settlement for the agreed period or six months, an award ordinarily for one year.

Under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. Chapter VII simplifies the structure: Section 43 conciliation officers; Section 44 the Industrial Tribunal, now of two members, one Judicial and one Administrative; Section 46 the National Industrial Tribunal. Boards of Conciliation, Courts of Inquiry and Labour Courts as separate bodies disappear, their work passing to the Tribunal, and Section 4 adds a Grievance Redressal Committee in establishments employing twenty or more workers, to which an aggrieved worker may apply within one year.

The Indian legal framework.

1. Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: a settlement reached in the course of conciliation proceedings binds all parties, all summoned parties, the heirs and successors of the employer, and all persons employed in the establishment on the date of the dispute and thereafter; a settlement outside conciliation binds only the parties.
2. Section 19: the period of operation, the agreed period or six months, continuing until two months after notice of termination.
3. Section 2(p) defines settlement; Section 12 obliges the conciliation officer to promote one; Section 36 governs representation.
4. Sections 17 and 18 of the Trade Unions Act, 1926: immunity from criminal conspiracy and from civil suit for acts done in furtherance of a trade dispute, without which organisation and bargaining would be impossible.
5. MRTU and PULP Act, 1971: a recognised union with exclusive rights under Sections 20 and 21; an employer's refusal to bargain with it is an unfair labour practice under Item 5 of Schedule II; the recognised union's refusal to bargain in good faith is one under Item 3 of Schedule III.

1. Multiplicity of unions. Under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 any seven members could register a union, which produced fragmentation and rivalry, and an employer faced with four unions could plausibly say it did not know with whom to bargain.
2. Outside political leadership of unions, which has often subordinated bargaining to political calculation.
3. The ease of compulsory adjudication. Because the appropriate Government may refer any dispute under Section 10, and the award binds everyone, both sides have often preferred to litigate: the union avoids the risk of a strike, the employer avoids conceding.
4. A very large unorganised sector outside the reach of any union.
5. No general legal duty to bargain outside Maharashtra until 2020.
6. Weak enforcement of agreements made outside conciliation.

For full marks, cover: the text of Section 2(j) and why it needed interpretation; the cases in chronological order with what each added or removed; the triple test and dominant nature test in Bangalore Water Supply; what remains excluded; the 1982 amendment that is not in force; and the pending reference in Jai Bir Singh.

The definition. Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: "industry" means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen.

Why it needed interpretation. The definition is circular: an industry is an undertaking of employers and includes an avocation of workmen. It supplies no test. Yet it is the gateway to the entire Act: without an industry there is no industrial dispute under Section 2(k), no workman under Section 2(s), no reference under Section 10, no Labour Court jurisdiction, and none of the protections in Chapters VA and VB. The courts therefore had to supply the meaning.

5. Secretary, Madras Gymkhana Club v. Workmen (1968) and Cricket Club of India v. Bombay Labour Union (1969). Members' clubs were held not to be industries, being self-serving bodies rendering services to their own members. Removed: clubs.
6. Management of Safdarjung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi (1970). The sharpest narrowing. A government hospital devoted to training and research was held not to be an industry, and Hospital Mazdoor Sabha was doubted; only activities producing material goods or material services analogous to business qualified. Removed: hospitals not run on business lines.
7. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978). A Bench of seven Judges overruled Safdarjung, University of Delhi and Cricket Club to the extent of conflict, and settled the law with the triple test: where there is (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by cooperation between employer and employee, (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes, there is an industry. Absence of profit motive is irrelevant, and so is the character of the employer.

What Bangalore Water Supply added.

After 1978. Parliament substituted a new Section 2(j) by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, excluding hospitals and dispensaries, educational and research institutions, khadi and village industries, charitable and social service institutions, sovereign functions and units with fewer than ten workmen. That amendment has never been brought into force. And in State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh (2005) a five-Judge Bench referred the correctness of Bangalore Water Supply to a larger Bench, observing that the triple test had swept in institutions where the employer and employee relationship is not commercial; that reference is still pending. Bangalore Water Supply therefore remains binding law.

1. to decide complaints relating to unfair labour practices, except those falling under Item 1 of Schedule IV. Its jurisdiction therefore covers the whole of Schedule II (employers' practices against the right to organise), the whole of Schedule III (trade unions' practices) and Items 2 to 10 of Schedule IV;
2. to decide applications under Chapter III: recognition (Sections 11 and 12), cancellation (Section 13), recognition of another union (Section 14), re-recognition (Section 15) and recognition for more than one undertaking (Section 18);
3. to decide references made to it by the State Government or by a Labour Court;
4. to exercise superintendence over Labour Courts (Section 44) and to transfer proceedings between them (Section 45); and
5. to make regulations for its proceedings (Section 33).

It also hears appeals under Section 42 against a conviction by a Labour Court, an acquittal in its special jurisdiction, or for enhancement of sentence, in each case within thirty days; and under Section 35 the law it declares binds Labour Courts.

3. Investigating Officers. Sections 8 and 9. The State Government may appoint such number of Investigating Officers for any area as it considers necessary, to assist the Industrial Court and Labour Courts. Under Section 9 the Officer is under the control of the Industrial Court and it is his duty to assist the Industrial Court in the verification of membership of unions, to assist the Industrial and Labour Courts in investigating complaints of unfair labour practices, and to report the existence of any unfair labour practice with the names and addresses of those engaged in it. Under Section 28(4) he may visit the undertaking, make enquiries and attempt to promote a settlement; Section 37 gives him powers of entry and inspection; and Section 49 makes it an offence, punishable with fine up to five hundred rupees, wilfully to refuse him entry or to obstruct him.