BLS LLB 5 Years Sem 5 Labour Laws 2021-22 Question Paper with Solutions

Answer: (a) Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb.

Sidney and Beatrice Webb were British social reformers, founders of the Fabian Society tradition and of the London School of Economics. They coined the expression "collective bargaining" in History of Trade Unionism (1894) and developed it in Industrial Democracy (1897), describing it as the method by which workers, acting through their organisation, replace the individual bargain in which each worker faces the employer alone.

Why the others are wrong. Options (b), (c) and (d) are invented combinations, mixing the correct surname Webb with "Teller" and "Taylor". There is no labour reformer of that period named Sidney Teller, Beatrice Teller or Ludwig Taylor. The only real names in the list are Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and only option (a) pairs them correctly.

Why the others are wrong. Section 12 deals with the duties of conciliation officers, not with the binding effect of what they achieve. Section 11 deals with the procedure and powers of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts, Labour Courts and Tribunals. Section 19 deals with the period of operation of settlements and awards, that is how long the settlement lasts, not with whom it binds.

Answer: (c) Two years.

Section 10(1) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 provides that no claim for compensation shall be entertained by a Commissioner unless notice of the accident has been given as soon as practicable after its happening, and unless the claim is preferred before him within two years of the occurrence of the accident or, in the case of death, within two years of the date of death. In the case of a contracted disease, the accident is deemed to have occurred on the first of the days during which the employee was continuously absent in consequence of the disablement caused by the disease.

Answer: (c) Certifying Office, meaning the Certifying Officer.

Section 2(c) of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 defines the Certifying Officer as a Labour Commissioner or a Regional Labour Commissioner, and any other officer appointed by the appropriate Government by notification to perform his functions. Under Section 5 it is he who receives the draft submitted by the employer under Section 3, forwards it to the trade union or the workmen for objections within fifteen days, hears the parties, decides what modifications are necessary to render the draft certifiable, certifies the standing orders, and within seven days sends authenticated copies to both sides.

Answer: (c) Industrial Court.

Section 42(1) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971: notwithstanding anything in Section 40, an appeal shall lie to the Industrial Court (a) against a conviction by a Labour Court, by the person convicted; (b) against an acquittal by a Labour Court in its special jurisdiction, by the complainant; and (c) for enhancement of a sentence awarded by a Labour Court in its special jurisdiction, by the State Government.

Section 42(2): every appeal shall be made within thirty days from the date of the conviction, acquittal or sentence, with power in the Industrial Court to admit a late appeal for sufficient reason.

Answer: (c) Both Industrial Court and Labour Court.

Section 8 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971: the State Government may appoint such number of Investigating Officers for any area as it considers necessary, to assist the Industrial Court and Labour Courts in the discharge of their duties.

Section 9 sets out those duties: he is under the control of the Industrial Court; it is his duty to assist the Industrial Court in matters of verification of membership of unions, and to assist the Industrial and Labour Courts in investigating into complaints relating to unfair labour practices; and to report to the Industrial Court or, as the case may be, the Labour Court the existence of any unfair labour practice, with the names and addresses of those engaged in it.

Answer: (c) Banking Services.

Section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines "public utility service" as (i) any railway service or any transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air; (ii) any service in, or in connection with the working of, any major port or dock; (iii) any section of an industrial establishment on the working of which the safety of the establishment or the workmen depends; (iv) any postal, telegraph or telephone service; (v) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public; (vi) any system of public conservation or sanitation; and (vii) any industry specified in the First Schedule which the appropriate Government may, by notification, declare to be a public utility service for a period not exceeding six months at a time, where public emergency or public interest so requires.

Answer: (d) Places of worship.

In Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978) a Bench of seven Judges laid down the triple test: where there is (i) systematic activity, (ii) organised by cooperation between employer and employee, (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes, there is an industry. The third limb expressly excludes activities directed at spiritual or religious wants, and also wants supplied free of charge. A place of worship, carrying on religious activity, therefore falls outside.

Why the others are wrong.

Answer: (d) Quasi-Judicial Bodies.

Labour Courts under Section 7 and Industrial Tribunals under Section 7A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are quasi-judicial because they possess many but not all of the attributes of a court.

They are like courts in that: they are presided over by persons with judicial qualifications; they must act judicially, giving notice, hearing both sides and observing natural justice; they have the powers of a civil court under Section 11(3) in respect of enforcing attendance, examining witnesses on oath, compelling production of documents and issuing commissions; and they are deemed civil courts for certain purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Answer: (a) Appropriate Government should withhold the publication of the award on being informed jointly by the parties that a settlement has been arrived at.

Answer: (d) Half of basic pay plus the dearness allowance for the number of days laid off.

Section 25C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: a workman, other than a badli or casual workman, whose name is borne on the muster rolls of an industrial establishment and who has completed not less than one year of continuous service, is entitled, for all days during which he is laid off except weekly holidays, to compensation equal to fifty per cent of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid off.

Answer: (d) One per cent of the total number of workmen employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum number of one hundred protected workmen.

Answer: (d) 6 months, illegal.

Section 12(6) of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971: "The Industrial Court shall not recognise any union, if, at any time, within six months immediately preceding the date of the application for recognition, the union has instigated, aided or assisted the commencement or continuation of a strike which is deemed to be illegal under this Act."

Why the others are wrong. The period is six months, not one month, so options (a) and (c) fail on the first blank. The strike must be illegal, not legal, so options (a) and (b) fail on the second. Only option (d) satisfies both.

Why the others are wrong. "Some", "certain" and "partly" all suggest a limited grant. The section confers the powers in full for the purposes named, and the reference to Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Criminal Procedure Code reinforces that he is treated as a civil court for those purposes.

Why the others are wrong. All three are unfair labour practices on the part of workmen or unions, not employers.

1. To incite or indulge in wilful damage to the employer's property connected with the industry is a practice on the part of workmen.
2. A trade union advising, actively supporting or instigating an illegal strike is Item 1 of Schedule III, on the part of trade unions.
3. A recognised union refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the employer is Item 3 of Schedule III, again on the part of trade unions. Note the mirror image: the employer's refusal to bargain with the recognised union is a practice on the employer's part under Schedule II.

Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 makes a settlement binding. Section 18(1): a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and the workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Section 18(3): a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings, an arbitration award which has become enforceable, and an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable, shall be binding on all parties to the industrial dispute, all other parties summoned to appear, the heirs and successors of the employer, and all persons employed in the establishment on the date of the dispute and all who subsequently become employed in it.

Why the others are wrong. Section 19 fixes the period of operation of settlements and awards, not their binding force. Section 20 deals with the commencement and conclusion of proceedings. Section 21 requires certain matters to be kept confidential.

The Court held they were, and laid down the control test: the prima facie test of the relationship of master and servant is the existence of the right in the master to supervise and control the work done by the servant, not only in the directing of what work the servant is to do but also the manner in which he shall do his work. Whether the relationship exists must be decided on the facts of each case, having regard to the nature of the work, and the absence of control over details is not decisive where the nature of the work does not admit of it.

Why the others are wrong. Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee, Algu Ram v. State of Punjab and S.N. Goyal v. Bank of Baroda are decisions on other questions and are offered here only because they are labour cases with recognisable names. None is the authority for the control test.

Section 2A(2), inserted in 2010, allows such a workman to apply directly to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he made an application to the conciliation officer, without waiting for a reference by the appropriate Government, and Section 2A(3) requires the application to be made within three years of the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination.

Why the others are wrong. Section 5 deals with Boards of Conciliation. Section 2(a) defines "appropriate Government". Section 2(b) defines "award".

Amputation of an arm through the shoulder joint is one of the injuries listed in Part I of Schedule I, carrying one hundred per cent loss of earning capacity. It is therefore deemed to be permanent total disablement, and no further enquiry into the man's residual capacity is required.

The result is reinforced by the facts: a carpenter works with both hands, and the loss of an entire arm at the shoulder incapacitates him for all the work he could do before.

Why the others are wrong. It is not permanent partial, because that requires an injury in Part II of the Schedule, which reduces earning capacity in every employment without extinguishing it. It is not temporary partial or temporary total, because the amputation of a limb is by its nature permanent; temporary disablement is disablement that ends, and is compensated under Section 4(1)(d) by half-monthly payments of twenty-five per cent of monthly wages.

Conciliation officers are appointed by the appropriate Government under Section 4 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, charged with mediating in and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes. Their duties are in Section 12. Three functions are:

1. To hold conciliation proceedings. Where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the officer may, and where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice of strike or lock-out under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.

Definition. Section 2(kkk) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: "lay-off" means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched, on account of the grounds set out below.

The Explanation deems a workman to have been laid off for a day where his name is on the muster rolls, he presents himself for work at the appointed time and is not given employment within two hours.

Grounds. The section specifies:

1. shortage of coal, power or raw materials;
2. the accumulation of stocks;
3. the break-down of machinery;
4. natural calamity; and
5. any other connected reason.

The answer has two stages, and both must be given.

Stage one: this is probably not "retrenchment" at all. Section 2(oo)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 excludes from the definition of retrenchment termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health. If the transport corporation has terminated him because his eyesight has permanently failed, that termination falls outside Section 2(oo), it is not retrenchment, and the conditions in Section 25F, one month's notice, fifteen days' average pay per completed year and notice to the appropriate Government, do not apply to it.

On these particular facts there is a further point in the workman's favour. He is a conductor, not a driver. The ill-health exclusion applies where the condition makes the workman unfit for the work he is employed to do. Defective vision is disqualifying for a driver because the safety of passengers depends on it, and that is exactly the reasoning of Anand Bihari. A conductor issues tickets and collects fares; the employer must therefore prove that the degree of visual impairment actually incapacitates him for a conductor's duties. If it does not, the ground is not made out, the exclusion does not apply, and the termination is retrenchment, so non-compliance with Section 25F renders it void and he is entitled to reinstatement.

Conclusion. The government has a valid ground only if it proves that the impairment genuinely and permanently unfits him for a conductor's work. Even then it must deal with him equitably in the manner Anand Bihari directs, by offering an alternative post or compensation and his retirement benefits. If it cannot prove that, the termination is retrenchment without compliance with Section 25F and is bad.

5. during voluntary arbitration proceedings before a Labour Court or the Industrial Court under the Bombay Act, or before an arbitrator under the central Act, and until the arbitration is concluded or the award comes into operation, whichever is later;
6. during compulsory arbitration under Sections 72, 73 or 73A of the Bombay Act, on the same footing;
7. during the pendency of adjudication proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court under the central Act, in respect of matters covered by the notice of strike; and
8. during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any matter covered by it.

Declaration. Section 25 provides that where employees have proposed to go on strike or have commenced one, the State Government or the employer may make a reference to the Labour Court for a declaration whether the strike is illegal, and the Labour Court shall decide it.

Section 24(3): a lock-out declared in consequence of an illegal strike, and a strike declared in consequence of an illegal lock-out, shall not be deemed to be illegal.

The Industrial Court is constituted by the State Government under Section 4 of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971, its members being persons qualified to be a Judge of a High Court, or having held judicial office for ten years, or having been an advocate for ten years, one of whom is the President. Its duties are set out in Section 5. Three functions are:

1. To decide complaints of unfair labour practices, other than those relating to Item 1 of Schedule IV, which belong to the Labour Court under Section 7. This covers all the practices in Schedule II (employers, interference with the right to organise), Schedule III (trade unions), and Items 2 to 10 of Schedule IV.
2. To decide applications concerning recognition of unions under Chapter III: applications for recognition under Sections 11 and 12, cancellation of recognition under Section 13, recognition of another union in place of the recognised one under Section 14, and re-recognition under Section 15.
3. To exercise superintendence over Labour Courts under Section 44, and to transfer proceedings from one Labour Court to another under Section 45.

Section 10 of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, headed duration and modification of standing orders.

1. The bar. Section 10(1). Standing orders finally certified under the Act shall not be liable to modification until the expiry of six months from the date on which they, or the last modifications of them, came into operation, except on agreement between the employer and the workmen, or a trade union or other representative body of the workmen.
2. Who may apply. Section 10(2). Subject to sub-section (1), an employer or any workman, or a trade union or other representative body of the workmen, may apply to the Certifying Officer to have the standing orders modified. The application must be accompanied by copies of the modifications proposed and, where the modifications are proposed by agreement, by a certified copy of that agreement.

Three advantages of collective bargaining as a method of settling labour disputes are:

1. The settlement is made by the parties themselves, so it is workable and is observed. Terms arrived at by negotiation reflect what both sides can actually live with, unlike an award imposed by a Tribunal which may satisfy neither. Compliance is therefore better, and the parties have an interest in making it work.

Is the employer liable under the Employee compensation Act, to pay compensation to the injured employee?

The claim is made out under Section 3(1), and the answer then turns entirely on the proviso.

The claim. Section 3(1) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 makes the employer liable where personal injury is caused to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. All the ingredients are present: welding in a ship yard is an employment within Schedule II, so he is an "employee" under Section 2(1)(dd); the burns are a personal injury; the event was an accident, being an unlooked-for mishap; it occurred in the course of the employment, at his work station in working hours; and it arose out of it, because burns are the characteristic risk of welding. Liability under the Act is without fault, so the employer's care in providing gear does not by itself answer the claim.

2. That the disobedience was wilful. Wilful means deliberate, a conscious decision to disregard a known rule. Forgetfulness, haste, discomfort in hot conditions, or a general laxity that the employer has tolerated, is not wilful disobedience. Evidence that supervisors regularly allowed welders to work without helmets would defeat the defence entirely.
3. That there was an express order or rule for safety, and that the accident is directly attributable to its breach. Merely providing equipment is not the same as expressly ordering its use and enforcing that order. And causation must be direct: if the burns were caused by an explosion that a helmet would not have prevented, the breach did not cause the injury.

Conclusion. The employer is liable unless it proves all three. On the facts as stated, the most that is shown is that gear was provided and that the welder did not wear his helmet, which establishes neither an express order nor wilfulness, and does not address whether a helmet would have prevented burns of this extent. Compensation is payable, computed under Section 4 according to the nature of the disablement, and under Section 4A it must be paid as soon as it falls due, failing which the Commissioner may add interest at twelve per cent and a penalty of up to fifty per cent.

Is a change of weekly holiday a Fourth Schedule matter? Yes, on two counts. The Fourth Schedule includes "hours of work and rest intervals" and "withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege or change in usage". Shifting the weekly day of rest from Monday to Sunday alters the pattern of rest and takes away a long-standing arrangement on which the workmen have ordered their lives. It is squarely within the Schedule.

Was there compliance? Two things are required and each must be examined.

1. Notice in the prescribed manner. Under the rules made under the Act, notice of change is to be given in the prescribed form and displayed conspicuously. A bare notice announcing the change is not notice of a proposed change in the prescribed form. Display may be a permissible mode, but the document must be the prescribed notice of change, not a management circular.
2. Twenty-one days. Even a properly framed notice does not permit the change to be effected within twenty-one days of giving it. The problem states that the employer "changed" the non-working day by displaying a notice, which indicates an immediate change and therefore a breach of the second limb.

The doctrine. For an employer to be liable under Section 3(1) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, the accident must arise in the course of the employment, which is a question of time and place. Read literally, that would confine liability to the hours of work and the four walls of the workplace, and would deny compensation to a workman injured a moment before he clocked in or a few steps outside the gate.

The doctrine of notional extension avoids that result. It holds that the employment may be notionally extended both in point of time and in point of place, so that:

1. it begins before the workman actually reaches his place of work and starts his duty, when he enters the employer's premises or an area under the employer's control by an access reasonably used for that purpose; and
2. it continues after he has left his post, while he is leaving by the same route, for so long as he remains within that area.

Leading authorities.