Infancy

In one line

A child under seven can commit no offence at all, and a child of seven to twelve can commit none if he lacks the maturity to judge what he is doing.

In the wording a student can write in an exam: section 20 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age, which is a conclusive and irrebuttable rule; and section 21 provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven and under twelve who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion, which is a rebuttable presumption operating on the facts of the particular occasion.

The two sections

Section 20. Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age.

Section 21. Nothing is an offence which is done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve years of age, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of his conduct on that occasion.

The difference between them

Kakoo v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1976) 2 SCC 215, decided on 27 February 1976, states the scheme.

Facts. Kakoo, aged thirteen, was convicted of committing rape on a child of two and sentenced to four years' rigorous imprisonment, a conviction the High Court maintained. He appealed by special leave limited to sentence. It was argued that prolonged detention of a minor with hardened criminals would defeat the reformative object of punishment; the State stressed the manner of the crime.

Held, on the scheme. Under the Penal Code an infant under seven is conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing crime, being at that age not endowed with any discretion to distinguish right from wrong; and a child between seven and twelve who may not have attained sufficient maturity of understanding to entertain a criminal intent, doli incapax, is presumed to be incapable of committing an offence.

Held, on sentence. Although the sordid features of the case tended to steel the heart of the law for a sterner sentence, the Court could not overlook that the appellant was hardly thirteen, and an inordinately long prison term is sure to turn him into an obdurate criminal; in the case of child offenders current penological trends command a more humanitarian approach. Enactments treating juvenile offenders differently existed in several States but none was in force in Himachal Pradesh.

Why it matters here. It states the two provisions as one scheme, conclusive under seven and rebuttable between seven and twelve, and it is also the authority for treating youth as a sentencing consideration where no juvenile statute applies.