The Ramaswami Proceedings, Worked in Full

He then separated the allegations into two classes, and the distinction is examinable.

The first class was interpretation of the rules: whether the Chief Justice was entitled to telephone expenses at Madras because Chandigarh was a disturbed area; whether he needed leave to avail the leave travel concession; whether he could direct cars to be taken to Madras during his vacation; and two questions about the rate and the ordering of silver maces. Of these he said that "though one would like to think that there has been extravagance and ostentiousness", they do "not involve determining questions of moral or legal impropriety of a judge functioning as a Judge in the Court."

The second class was different in kind: not accounting for furniture in the residence and office, the alleged replacement of superior quality items by inferior, missing items, and the splitting up of bills to fit the sanctioning limits or the rules.

And the principle he stated is worth memorising for any question on judicial accountability:

"The Supreme Court must uphold the rule of law. It is, therefore, necessary that those who uphold the rule of law must live by law and judges must, therefore, be obliged to live according to law."

On 18 July 1990 he wrote to the Judge advising him to desist from discharging judicial functions while the investigations continued, and requesting him to be on leave; the Judge applied on the same day for six weeks' leave from 23 July 1990.

Note what that was and was not. It was not a removal, not a suspension known to law, and not a power the Constitution confers on anybody. It was advice from the head of the judicial family, accepted. Chapters 1670 and 1710 both turn on whether that is enough.

The Chief Justice afterwards constituted a Committee of three Judges to advise him what further course to take, and, when the question of reassigning work arose, made that Committee's report public. In neither exercise did the Judge participate, his position being that the only manner in which he could be proceeded against is that provided by article 124. That position is legally unanswerable, and it is exactly why the in-house procedure has the limits chapter 1690 describes.

And the 2015 judgment that reproduces the statement records the end of that road in one line: no further action was taken by the Chief Justice of India in the exercise of his administrative authority.

The motion, and the machine

27 February 1991. A notice of motion signed by 108 members of the Ninth Lok Sabha was presented to the Speaker for an address to the President for the removal of Mr Justice V. Ramaswami, the allegations being of financial improprieties and irregularities committed in his capacity as Chief Justice of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana before his appointment in October 1989 as a Judge of the Supreme Court.

Note the count and the House. One hundred is the threshold in the House of the People under section 3(1)(a), and 108 signed. Chapter 1570.

And note the point of law hiding in the dates. The conduct alleged was as Chief Justice of a High Court; the office held was Judge of the Supreme Court. Chapter 1550's rule answers it: misbehaviour is not confined to conduct in the office currently held.

12 March 1991. The Speaker admitted the motion and constituted a Committee under section 3(2) of Mr Justice P.B. Sawant, a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court; Mr Justice P.D. Desai, Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay; and Mr Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, as the distinguished jurist.

Pause on the third name, because it is a small illustration of chapter 1580. The Act says "a distinguished jurist", and the Speaker chose a retired Judge of the Supreme Court. The category is wide enough to include one; chapter 1640's Committee used a Senior Advocate instead.

Then the Ninth Lok Sabha was dissolved.

The three decisions

First, 1991: does the motion survive the House?

The Union took the view that the motion and the Speaker's decision had lapsed, and therefore did not notify that the service of the two sitting judges on the Committee would be treated as "actual service" within paragraph 11(B)(i) of Part D of the Second Schedule, without which they could not function. Writ Petitions Nos. 491 and 541 of 1991, by the Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability and the Supreme Court Bar Association, sought a direction to the Union to enable the Committee to work, and an order restraining the Judge from judicial functions meanwhile.

Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699, a Constitution Bench, by a majority of 4:1: the process of removal is in two parts, the first entirely statutory and the second alone parliamentary; the Speaker is a statutory authority under the Act; the Judges (Inquiry) Act is a law under article 124(5) which provides against the doctrine of lapse; and the motion does not lapse on dissolution. Chapters 1610 and 1620.

And note the disposal, because it is the pattern: "All that is necessary to do is to declare the correct constitutional position. No specific writ or direction need issue to any authority."

Second, 1992: may anyone else litigate about it?

Writ Petitions Nos. 140 and 149 of 1992, by an advocate of District Karnal and by a member of the Tenth Lok Sabha who was also an advocate long known to the Judge, sought to quash the notice, its admission and the constitution of the Committee, and in substance to have the 1991 decision reconsidered.

M. Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605, decided 27 August 1992: both dismissed on preliminary grounds. Reliefs of this kind are personal to the Judge; no one else may ventilate grievances about the charges, the Committee's procedure or its findings; the plea of bias could be examined only at the instance of the Judge, who was not a party; and strangers to a Constitution Bench decision cannot ask for its reconsideration. Chapter 1140's warning against a busybody petition is the Court's own word here.

Third, 1992: what does the Judge himself get?

Writ Petition No. 514 of 1992, by the Judge's wife, sought a copy of the report before it went to the Speaker so that the finding could be challenged while the process was still statutory.

Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 506, decided the same day: no, but the Speaker must give him the report when it is laid, the House must have his point of view before it votes, and review comes after an order of removal, not before. Chapter 1630.

Notice the shape of the three together. The first kept the inquiry alive against the Government; the second kept everybody else out of it; the third told the Judge where his protections were. Between them they are the whole modern law of judicial removal in India, and all three came out of one case.

The end, and what this book can and cannot say

The Committee reported. The motion was then taken up in the House of the People and failed, so no address was presented, and Mr Justice V. Ramaswami was not removed. It remains the only removal motion to reach a finding of guilt.

Now the sourcing, and a candidate should be equally careful. This book has read the three judgments in full and they carry the story only to the point at which the report was ready. It does not hold the Committee's report and does not hold the Lok Sabha record of the debate or the division, and it therefore states no numbers for the vote and quotes no line of the report. What can be said without a document is what section 6 makes necessarily true: chapter 1600 shows that a motion taken up together with the report and not adopted on the special majorities means the misbehaviour is not deemed to have been proved, no address is presented, and the Judge continues in office. That is the outcome, whatever the arithmetic was.

And there is a contemporary judicial description of the aftermath, from counsel in a case this book has read. Arguing three years later in the matter that produced the in-house procedure, Mr Nariman submitted that "the recent impeachment proceedings against Justice V. Ramaswami and its fall-out do indicate that the process of impeachment is cumbersome and the result uncertain." It is a submission, not a holding, and should be cited as one; but it is what the Bar took from the episode, and chapter 1670 is what the Court did about it.

What the proceedings showed

That the first stage works. A Committee was constituted, it framed charges, it took evidence, and it reported. Chapters 1580 to 1600 are not theory.

That the executive can obstruct without deciding. The Union stopped nothing; it merely withheld a notification, and the inquiry halted until the Supreme Court declared the law. Chapter 1520.

That the courts will protect the process but will not run it. Three decisions, and not one writ or direction to the Speaker, the Committee or the House.

And that the second stage is the weak point. A finding reached by two judges and a distinguished jurist, after charges and evidence, decided nothing, because section 6(3) makes the vote the proof. Chapter 1600 defended that design; this is the case that shows what it costs.

The reform proposals in chapter 1720 all begin here.

A worked example

An examiner asks: "Trace the proceedings against Justice V. Ramaswami and state what they establish."

Open with the two senses. The in-house attempt of 1990, which produced advice to be on leave and a report made public, and the constitutional proceeding of 1991 to 1993.

Give the four dates you can source: the Chief Justice's statement to the Bar of 20 July 1990, following his letter of 18 July; the notice of 27 February 1991 by 108 members; the admission and constitution of the Committee on 12 March 1991; and the dissolution that produced the litigation.

Name the Committee: Sawant J., Desai C.J. and Chinnappa Reddy J. as the distinguished jurist.

Give the three decisions with their holdings, in the order lapse, locus standi, the Judge's protections.

State the outcome and the sourcing in the same breath: the motion failed in the House of the People, so no address was presented and the Judge was not removed; and say that you are not quoting the report or the division because those are not the documents in front of you. An examiner rewards that far more than an invented figure.

Close with the lesson. The statutory stage held; the political stage did not; and every reform proposal since has been about that gap.

What beginners get wrong

Starting at the motion. The Chief Justice of India acted first, and his own statement records that he had "no right or authority to inquire into the conduct of a sitting Judge."

Calling the 1990 leave a suspension. It was advice, accepted; the Judge's position throughout was that article 124 is the only route.

Saying the Supreme Court stopped or ordered the removal. It declared the law three times and issued no writ or direction to the Speaker, the Committee or the House.

Saying the Judge was acquitted. He was not removed, which is a different thing: the motion failed, and under section 6(3) that means the misbehaviour was never deemed proved.

Quoting figures for the division. Do not, unless you hold the record. This book does not, and says so.

Quick revision

1990, in-house: CJI Sabyasachi Mukharji, statement to the Bar 20 July 1990; "no right or authority to inquire" but a duty as head of the judicial family; allegations split into rule interpretation (telephone, leave travel concession, cars, maces) and the serious class (unaccounted furniture, inferior replacements, missing items, split bills); letter of 18 July advising him to desist and be on leave; six weeks' leave from 23 July 1990; a three Judge Committee advised the CJI and its report was made public; the Judge did not participate, saying article 124 was the only route; no further administrative action followed.

1991 to 1993, constitutional: notice by 108 members of the Ninth Lok Sabha, 27 February 1991; admitted 12 March 1991; Committee of Sawant J., Desai C.J. and Chinnappa Reddy J. as the distinguished jurist; dissolution; the Union withheld the "actual service" notification under para 11(B)(i), Part D, Second Schedule.

The three decisions: Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, (1991) 4 SCC 699 (two stages, no lapse, 4:1); M. Krishna Swami, (1992) 4 SCC 605 (dismissed, reliefs personal to the Judge, no locus in strangers); Sarojini Ramaswami, (1992) 4 SCC 506 (report from the Speaker at laying, hearing in the House, review after removal).

The end: the motion failed in the House of the People; no address presented; not removed. This book holds neither the Committee's report nor the Lok Sabha record and states no figures.

Test yourself

1. What happened before the motion was moved? The Chief Justice of India acted administratively. In May 1990 advocates drew his attention to newspaper reports of an audit report into the expenses of furnishing the residence of a former Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, then a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, and asked him to act suo motu; the Attorney General, two former Attorneys General, officers of the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Union Law Minister raised it with him as well. In his statement to the Bar of 20 July 1990 he said that legally and constitutionally the Chief Justice of India has no right or authority to inquire into the conduct of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, but that as head of the judicial family he has the duty to maintain judicial propriety and to secure public confidence in the judicial process, and that the situation was unprecedented and called for the establishment of a salutary convention. He obtained the papers, separated the allegations into questions of interpretation of the rules and a more serious class concerning unaccounted furniture, inferior replacements, missing items and the splitting of bills, and wrote to the judge on 18 July 1990 advising him to desist from judicial work and to be on leave, on which the judge applied for six weeks' leave from 23 July 1990.

A committee of three judges later advised the Chief Justice and its report was made public, but the judge did not participate in either exercise, his position being that article 124 was the only route; and no further administrative action was taken.

2. Set out the constitutional proceeding and the three decisions it produced. A notice of motion signed by 108 members of the Ninth Lok Sabha was presented to the Speaker on 27 February 1991, alleging financial improprieties committed as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court before the judge's appointment to the Supreme Court in October 1989. The Speaker admitted it on 12 March 1991 and constituted a Committee of Justice P.B. Sawant of the Supreme Court, Justice P.D. Desai, Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court, and Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, as the distinguished jurist. The House was then dissolved and the Union withheld the notification treating the sitting judges' service on the Committee as actual service.

In Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 699, a Constitution Bench held by 4:1 that the process is in two parts, the first entirely statutory and open to review and the second alone parliamentary, that the Speaker is a statutory authority under the Act, and that the motion does not lapse on dissolution. In M. Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605, petitions by an advocate and a member of the Tenth Lok Sabha were dismissed on preliminary grounds, reliefs of this kind being personal to the judge and strangers having no standing to seek reconsideration of the earlier decision. In Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 506, decided the same day, the Court held that the Committee owes the judge no copy of its report, that the Speaker must supply it when laying the report, that the House must have the judge's point of view before it votes, and that judicial review of a finding of guilt comes after an order of removal and not before.

3. How did the proceedings end, and what may be said about the ending? The Committee reported, the motion was taken up in the House of the People and failed, no address was presented to the President, and the judge was not removed. Because section 6(3) makes the adoption of the motion by each House the event that deems the misbehaviour proved, the failure of the motion means the misbehaviour was never proved for constitutional purposes, whatever the Committee had found. That much follows from the statute. What should not be offered without the documents is the content of the report or the arithmetic of the division: this book has read the three judgments, which carry the story only to the point at which the report was ready, and holds neither the report nor the Lok Sabha record, so it states no figures. A candidate should be equally explicit rather than reciting numbers from memory.

4. What do the proceedings establish about the removal machinery? Four things. That the statutory stage functions: a Committee was constituted, framed charges, took evidence and reported. That the executive can obstruct the process without ever deciding anything, since the Union halted the inquiry simply by withholding an administrative notification, until the Supreme Court declared the law. That the courts will protect the process without running it, three decisions having issued not one writ or direction to the Speaker, the Committee or the House. And that the political stage is the weak point, because a finding reached by two judges and a distinguished jurist after charges and evidence decided nothing once the vote went the other way. Counsel in a later case described the process, in a submission and not a holding, as cumbersome and its result uncertain, and every reform proposal since has been directed at that gap.