Legislative Control in a State

Difference two: the Council's financial position

Article 203(2): so much of the estimates as relates to expenditure other than charged expenditure shall be submitted in the form of demands for grants to the Legislative Assembly, which shall have power to assent, refuse to assent, or assent subject to a reduction; and article 203(3): no demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of the Governor.

Note the words: to the Legislative Assembly. A Legislative Council has no part in the Demands for Grants at all.

And on a Money Bill, the Council may only recommend, within a limited period, and the Assembly may accept or reject the recommendations; the Bill is then deemed passed.

So financial control in a State is exercised by one chamber, and everything chapter 1200 said about article 113(3) applies with the Governor for the President: the House may assent, refuse or reduce, and may not increase or propose.

Difference three: the Governor's discretion

Article 163(1): there shall be a Council of Ministers with the Chief Minister at the head to aid and advise the Governor "except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion."

That exception has no counterpart in article 74(1). The President has no such sphere; a Governor does.

Article 163(2): if any question arises whether a matter is one in which the Governor is required to act in his discretion, the decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by him shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion.

Article 163(3): the question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Ministers to the Governor shall not be inquired into in any court, mirroring article 74(2).

Why it belongs in a chapter on legislative control. Because a sphere in which the Governor acts without ministerial advice is a sphere in which the Council of Ministers is not answerable, and therefore one the Assembly cannot reach through article 164(2). The gap in responsibility corresponds exactly to the area of discretion, and an answer that notices it has found the one structural difference between Union and State control that goes beyond the composition of chambers.

The State committee system

Article 208(1): a House of the Legislature of a State may make rules for regulating, subject to the provisions of this Constitution, its procedure and the conduct of its business.

Everything in chapters 1000 to 1130 follows in the same way. The committees are creatures of rules made under article 208; a State Legislature has its own Public Accounts Committee, Estimates Committee, Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Committee of Privileges and the rest; and article 194(3) supplies the privilege that makes a summons enforceable as a contempt.

And the audit link is identical. Article 151(2): the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General relating to the accounts of a State are submitted to the Governor, who shall cause them to be laid before the Legislature of the State; and the State Public Accounts Committee examines them, chapter 1010.

Note what article 151(2) proves. The auditor is one officer for the Union and every State, article 148 creating a Comptroller and Auditor General of India. So the State's principal instrument of financial verification is an officer no State Government appoints, pays or can remove, which is a stronger position than any State institution in this paper occupies.

Maharashtra, and the connection with Module I

Chapter 250 read the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act 1971, and chapter 270 the Maharashtra Lokayukta Act 2023, published as Mah. XLVI of 2025, of which only sections 1, 3 and 4 are in force, so that section 66 has not repealed the 1971 Act.

The point for this chapter. A Lokayukta is a statutory institution of the State, created by the State Legislature and reporting to it. It is therefore itself a product of the State Legislature's control function, and chapter 710 established that Maharashtra has no State vigilance commission on a statutory footing and that its anti-corruption investigation is done by a wing of the State police.

So the State picture is this. The devices of legislative control are the Union's, article for article. The institutions those devices supervise are weaker: no statutory vigilance commission, an investigating wing inside the State Government, and a Lokayukta whose findings do not bind. The control is the same and the machinery it controls is thinner, and that is a good closing observation for a question about "our country" rather than about the Union.

A worked example

A State Government's scheme fails with heavy loss.

Questions and motions. The same devices, in the Legislative Assembly and in the Legislative Council where there is one; but a motion of no-confidence lies only in the Assembly, under article 164(2).

The money. Article 202 the annual financial statement; article 203(1) charged expenditure not submitted to the vote; article 203(2) demands for grants to the Legislative Assembly, which may assent, refuse or reduce; article 203(3) no demand except on the recommendation of the Governor; article 204 the Appropriation Bill.

A member of the Legislative Council wants to move a cut. He cannot. The Demands go to the Assembly.

The audit. Article 151(2): the report goes to the Governor, laid before the State Legislature, and the State Public Accounts Committee examines the Secretary.

A committee summons an officer who refuses. Article 194(3) supplies the contempt power, and chapter 990's law applies: including that the House has no general warrant, because of articles 32 and 226.

The Government legislates between sessions. Article 213: the Governor's ordinance power, with the same six-week rule.

And the Governor acts without ministerial advice on a matter he says is in his discretion. Article 163(2): his decision in his discretion is final, and the validity of what he does shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. The Assembly's hold under article 164(2) does not reach that act at all, because there is no ministerial advice for which anyone is answerable.

What beginners get wrong

That a Legislative Council can pass a motion of no-confidence. Article 164(2): responsibility runs to the Legislative Assembly.

That the Demands go to both Houses. Article 203(2): to the Legislative Assembly.

That the Governor is in the same position as the President. Article 163(1) excepts functions he is required to exercise in his discretion, and article 163(2) makes his decision on that question final.

That the State auditor is a State officer. Article 148 creates a Comptroller and Auditor General of India, whose reports on State accounts are laid under article 151(2).

That State control is weaker because the devices are weaker. The devices are the same; the institutions they supervise are thinner.

Quick revision

The mirror: 164(2) for 75(3); 167 for 78; 208 for 118; 194 for 105; 212 for 122; 202, 203, 204 for 112, 113, 114; 151(2) for 151(1); 213 for 123; 176 for 87.

Three differences: 1. Responsibility runs to the Legislative Assembly alone, so a Legislative Council cannot bring a Government down; it is a chamber of exposure, not of decision. 2. Demands for grants go to the Assembly under art 203(2), and no demand except on the recommendation of the Governor under art 203(3); a Council may only recommend on a Money Bill. 3. Art 163(1) excepts functions the Governor exercises in his discretion, art 163(2) makes his decision on that question final and unchallengeable on that ground, and art 163(3) mirrors art 74(2). No ministerial advice means no ministerial responsibility, so the Assembly's hold does not reach that sphere.

Committees: created by rules under art 208, with art 194(3) supplying the contempt sanction; and a State Public Accounts Committee examining the reports laid under art 151(2) by an officer of the Union.

Maharashtra: the Lokayukta Act 1971 still governs, the 2023 Act having only ss.1, 3 and 4 in force; no statutory State vigilance commission; anti-corruption investigation by a wing of the State police. Same control, thinner machinery.

Test yourself

1. How does legislative control in a State differ from that in the Union? The devices are the same, article for article: article 164(2) mirrors article 75(3) on collective responsibility, article 167 mirrors article 78 on the duty to inform, article 208 mirrors article 118 on the rules under which committees are created, article 194 mirrors article 105 on privilege, article 212 mirrors article 122, articles 202 to 204 mirror articles 112 to 114 on financial procedure, article 151(2) mirrors article 151(1) on audit reports, article 213 mirrors article 123 on ordinances and article 176 mirrors article 87 on the address. Three differences matter. Responsibility runs to the Legislative Assembly alone, so a Legislative Council cannot carry a motion of no-confidence. The demands for grants are submitted to the Legislative Assembly alone under article 203(2), no demand being made except on the recommendation of the Governor, and a Council's power over a Money Bill is confined to recommendation. And article 163(1) excepts from the requirement of ministerial advice those functions the Governor is required to exercise in his discretion, which has no counterpart in article 74(1).

2. Why does the Governor's discretion matter to legislative control? Because the Assembly's hold on the executive runs through ministerial responsibility. Article 164(2) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Assembly, and the Assembly reaches an executive act because a Minister advised it and answers for it. Where the Governor is required by or under the Constitution to exercise a function in his discretion, there is no ministerial advice, and therefore nobody answerable to the Assembly for the act. Article 163(2) reinforces the gap by providing that if a question arises whether a matter falls within his discretion, his decision in his discretion is final, and that the validity of anything done by him shall not be called in question on the ground that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. The area of discretion is accordingly an area in which the ordinary chain of responsibility does not operate, and it is the one structural difference between Union and State legislative control that goes beyond the composition of the chambers.

3. What is the position of a Legislative Council? It may question, discuss, censure and scrutinise, and it participates in ordinary legislation; it may not decide the fate of a Government or of the Demands. Article 164(2) makes the Council of Ministers collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly, so no motion of no-confidence lies in the Legislative Council; article 203(2) submits the demands for grants to the Assembly alone; and on a Money Bill a Council may only make recommendations, which the Assembly may accept or reject. It is therefore a chamber of exposure rather than of decision, which, given that legislative control is strong where it operates by exposure and weak where it operates by decision, makes it a real participant in the half of the function that actually works.

4. What does the State picture add to an assessment of legislative control? That the devices are the Union's and the institutions they supervise are thinner. A State Legislature has the same committees under rules made under article 208, the same privileges under article 194, the same financial procedure under articles 202 to 204 and the same audit under article 151(2), which is performed by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, an officer no State Government appoints, pays or can remove and who is accordingly the strongest independent institution in the State's field. Against that, the machinery a State legislature supervises is weaker than the Union's: as this book's own State shows, Maharashtra has no statutory State vigilance commission, its anti-corruption investigation is conducted by a wing of the State police within the State Government, and its statutory ombudsman is a Lokayukta under the Act of 1971 whose findings do not bind, the Act of 2023 having only sections 1, 3 and 4 in force so that its repealing section has not operated.