Before 2003: the Resolution of 1964
Chapter Sixty-One
Syllabus topic 3, "Vigilance Commissions"
Pages 299 to 302 of 1033
In one line
For thirty-nine years India's anti-corruption watchdog existed because a Government resolution said so, and could have been abolished the same way.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: the Central Vigilance Commission was constituted by a Government of India resolution dated 11 February 1964, on the recommendation of the Committee on Prevention of Corruption chaired by K. Santhanam which reported on 31 March 1964, with Nittoor Srinivasa Rau as the first Central Vigilance Commissioner; it functioned without statutory foundation until the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003, having been given interim statutory footing by the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance 1998 and the Ordinance of 1999 following the directions of the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226.
The Santhanam Committee, in the vigilance frame
Chapter 60 set out the Committee's appointment in June 1962, its report of 31 March 1964 and its four principal recommendations. Two of them created the machinery this module is about.
A Central Vigilance Commission, an apex body to exercise general check and superintendence over vigilance and anti-corruption work in the Ministries, Departments and public sector undertakings of the Union, headed by an officer of the status of a Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission, to advise on disciplinary cases and to have its own machinery for inquiry.
A Chief Vigilance Officer in every Ministry, Department and undertaking, to be the Commission's arm inside the organisation. Chapter 690 reads what became of that.
And a finding that runs through this whole module. The Committee found the existing machinery scattered: the Administrative Vigilance Division of the Home Ministry, the Delhi Special Police Establishment and the vigilance units of individual Ministries all did parts of the work and nobody coordinated them. The Commission was created to be the coordinating apex, and it is worth noticing that the problem it was created to solve was fragmentation rather than absence.
The Resolution of 1964
The Central Vigilance Commission was constituted by a Government of India resolution dated 11 February 1964, before the Committee's report was even formally submitted at the end of March, the recommendation having been accepted in advance.
Nittoor Srinivasa Rau, a retired Chief Justice of the Mysore High Court, became the first Central Vigilance Commissioner.
The word to hold on to is "resolution". Not an Act. Not a constitutional provision. An executive order of the Government of India, creating a body to supervise the vigilance work of that same Government.
Apply the checklist, and see what fails
Chapter 50 built the eight attributes of an independent watchdog and chapter 310 applied them to this Commission as it now stands. Applied to the Commission as it stood between 1964 and 2003, three fail at once.
Before 2003: the Resolution of 1964
Created by law: fails. A resolution can be amended, narrowed or withdrawn by a later resolution, by the same authority, without anybody voting.
Appointment by or on the advice of the legislature: fails. The Government appointed.
Security of tenure and salary by law: fails. Terms rested on the resolution.
And a fourth, subtler failure. A body created by resolution has no statutory powers. It could not summon anybody, could not require a document as of right, and could not compel a department to do anything. Its whole authority was the authority the Government chose to lend it, plus the personal standing of a retired Chief Justice.
Which is why the answer to the standing examination question is what it is. India had a vigilance body from 1964 and did not have a statutory anti-corruption institution until 2003, and did not have an ombudsman until 2013.
What the Commission nevertheless achieved
An answer that treats the pre-2003 Commission as a nullity is wrong and will read as unbalanced.
Its advice was usually followed. A department that disregarded the advice of a body headed by a retired Chief Justice, and had to record that it had done so, generally preferred not to.
It built the vigilance system that still exists. The Chief Vigilance Officer network, the classification of complaints, the two stages of advice, the concept of the vigilance angle, and the annual report all date from this period and were carried into the statute.
And it produced the evidence for its own reform. The Commission's reports through the 1980s and 1990s recorded the sanction delays and the refusals that eventually reached the Supreme Court.
The honest formulation. Between 1964 and 2003 the Commission was influential and not independent. Influence rests on the goodwill of the body influenced; independence does not. That distinction is worth a sentence in any answer on this label.
The route from resolution to statute
1997. The Supreme Court, in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, directed that the Commission be given statutory status and be entrusted with the superintendence of the Delhi Special Police Establishment's functioning in corruption cases. Chapter 580 works that decision in full.
1998. The Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance 1998 was promulgated to give effect to the directions. An Ordinance is a law made by the President under article 123 when Parliament is not in session; it has the force of an Act but ceases to operate six weeks after Parliament reassembles unless replaced by an Act.
1999. The Ordinance lapsed and the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance 1999, Ordinance 4 of 1999, was promulgated. That too ceased to operate.
Before 2003: the Resolution of 1964
1999 to 2003. The Commission continued under a Government of India Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III dated 4 April 1999, as amended by a Resolution of even number dated 13 August 2002. Back to a resolution.
2003. The Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003 was passed. Its section 3(1) recites the whole of that history: the Commission constituted under the Ordinance of 1999 which ceased to operate, and continued under the Resolution of 4 April 1999 as amended on 13 August 2002, shall be deemed to be the Commission constituted under this Act.
That single sub-section is worth reading in an examination answer, because it is the statute admitting in its own words that the body it creates had been running on an executive order for thirty-nine years. And section 3(5) carries the point further: persons appointed under the Ordinance or the Resolution are deemed to have been appointed under this Act on the same terms, so the sitting Commissioners simply continued.
A worked example: what changed on 11 September 2003
A department proposes to impose a minor penalty on an officer against the Commission's advice.
Before 2003. The Commission's advice rested on the Resolution. The department recorded its disagreement, and the disagreement appeared in the Commission's annual report, which the Government laid before Parliament because it chose to.
After 2003. The advice rests on section 8 of an Act. The annual report is required by section 14, and the Government must lay it before each House together with a memorandum explaining the reasons for non-acceptance of any advice. Chapter 660 reads that section. The department's freedom to disagree is unchanged; its freedom not to explain has gone.
And the officers changed nothing. By section 3(5) the sitting Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners were deemed appointed under the Act. The institution was the same people in the same building with a different foundation.
What beginners get wrong
That the Commission was created in 2003. It was created in 1964 and given statutory status in 2003.
That the Ordinances made it statutory. They gave it temporary statutory footing and both ceased to operate; the Commission was back on a Resolution from April 1999 until the Act.
That statutory status changed what the Commission does. It changed the foundation, the tenure, the removal and the duty to explain. The functions are recognisably those the Santhanam Committee proposed.
That the pre-2003 Commission was powerless. It was influential without being independent, and the distinction is the point.
Quick revision
Committee on Prevention of Corruption, chairman K. Santhanam, appointed June 1962, reported 31 March 1964.
Central Vigilance Commission constituted by a Government of India resolution dated 11 February 1964; first Central Vigilance Commissioner Nittoor Srinivasa Rau, a retired Chief Justice of the Mysore High Court.
Before 2003: the Resolution of 1964
Apply chapter 50's checklist: creation by law, appointment on the advice of the legislature, and statutory tenure all fail; and a body created by resolution has no statutory powers at all.
The route to the statute: Vineet Narain (1997) directs statutory status; Ordinance of 1998; Ordinance 4 of 1999; both cease to operate; Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III of 4 April 1999, amended 13 August 2002; Act of 2003.
Section 3(1) of the Act recites that whole history and deems the existing Commission to be the Commission constituted under the Act; section 3(5) deems the sitting Commissioners appointed under it.
Test yourself
1. How was the Central Vigilance Commission created, and why does the manner matter? By a Government of India resolution dated 11 February 1964, on the Santhanam Committee's recommendation, with Nittoor Srinivasa Rau as the first Central Vigilance Commissioner. It matters because a body created by executive resolution can be narrowed or withdrawn by a later resolution of the same authority without any vote, has no statutory tenure or salary protection, and has no statutory powers at all: it cannot summon a person or require a document as of right.
2. Trace the route from the Resolution of 1964 to the Act of 2003. The Supreme Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226, directed in December 1997 that the Commission be given statutory status and entrusted with superintendence over the Delhi Special Police Establishment in corruption cases. The Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance 1998 followed, then Ordinance 4 of 1999, and both ceased to operate. The Commission then continued under Government Resolution No. 371/20/99-AVD.III of 4 April 1999, amended on 13 August 2002, until the Central Vigilance Commission Act 2003.
3. What does section 3(1) of the Act tell you about that history? That the statute acknowledges it. Section 3(1) constitutes the Commission and then provides that the Commission constituted under the Ordinance of 1999, which ceased to operate, and continued under the Resolution of 4 April 1999 as amended on 13 August 2002, shall be deemed to be the Commission constituted under this Act. Section 3(5) further deems the persons appointed under the Ordinance or the Resolution to have been appointed under the Act on the same terms, so the sitting Commissioners continued without reappointment.
4. Was the pre-2003 Commission a failure? Answer with reasons. No, and the accurate description is that it was influential without being independent. Its advice was usually followed because a department disregarding a body headed by a retired Chief Justice had to record that it had done so; it built the vigilance system that still exists, including the Chief Vigilance Officer network, the two stages of advice and the annual report; and its own reports supplied the evidence of sanction delays that eventually reached the Supreme Court. But influence rests on the goodwill of the body influenced, and independence does not.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.