Nemo Judex in Causa Sua: The Rule Against Bias

In one line

Nobody may judge a case in which he has an interest, because a judge with an interest is not a judge.

In the wording a student can write in an exam: nemo judex in causa sua, that no one shall be a judge in his own cause, requires that a person deciding a matter shall have no interest in it and no prejudice about it; the rule is broken not only where bias is shown to have operated but where a reasonable person would apprehend that it might have, because justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.

MU's question

The University sets it as part of a whole question: that the rule against bias and the reasoned decision play a significant role in fair administration of justice in India, to be explained. The reasoned decision is in [Failure to Give Reasons: The Reasoned Decision]; this chapter is the rule, and the kinds and the test follow in the next two.

Why the appearance matters as much as the fact

Because the purpose of the rule is confidence. A litigant who loses before a judge with an interest will never accept that the interest made no difference, and no evidence can persuade him, since nobody can prove what went on in another mind. So the law does not try. It disqualifies on the appearance, and in doing so protects both the litigant and the adjudicator.

The classic Indian statement

Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, AIR 1957 SC 425.

Facts. A complaint of professional misconduct was made against an advocate. The Chief Justice appointed a tribunal under the Bar Councils Act, and a senior advocate was appointed its chairman. That chairman had earlier appeared once for the complainant in the very case out of which the complaint arose. No objection to the constitution was taken before the tribunal. The tribunal found the advocate guilty and the High Court directed that his name be struck off the rolls.

Held. The constitution of the tribunal suffered from a serious infirmity because of the chairman's earlier appearance. Every member of a tribunal called upon to try issues in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings must be able to act judicially, and it is of the essence of judicial administration that judges act impartially, objectively and without bias. The test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him. On the facts, however, the appellant knew the material facts, took no objection and took his chance before the tribunal, so he had waived the objection, and a fresh enquiry was directed rather than the finding simply being set aside.