The Protections Given to Women

Articles 330A, 332A and 334A, inserted by the Constitution (One Hundred and Sixth Amendment) Act 2023, in force from 16 APRIL 2026. Article 330A reserves seats for women in the House of the People: as nearly as may be ONE-THIRD of the seats reserved under article 330(2) for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be reserved for women of those classes, and as nearly as may be one-third, INCLUDING those seats, of the total number of seats to be filled by direct election. Article 332A does the same for the Legislative Assembly of every State.

And article 334A is the timing provision, which is what a candidate must get right. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions, the reservation of seats for women in the House of the People, in a State Legislative Assembly and in the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi SHALL COME INTO EFFECT AFTER AN EXERCISE OF DELIMITATION IS UNDERTAKEN FOR THIS PURPOSE AFTER THE RELEVANT FIGURES FOR THE FIRST CENSUS TAKEN AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT of the Amendment Act have been published, and SHALL CEASE TO HAVE EFFECT ON THE EXPIRATION OF FIFTEEN YEARS from such commencement. Rotation of the reserved seats takes effect after each subsequent delimitation as Parliament may by law determine.

So the position is precise, and precision earns marks. The articles are in the Constitution and in force. The reservation does not yet operate, and will not until a census is taken, its figures published, and a delimitation undertaken for the purpose.

The judicial line: from protection to autonomy

The old approach protected women by excluding them. Air India v. Nergesh Meerza is its high point, holding that a rule resting on sex COUPLED WITH OTHER CONSIDERATIONS does not attract article 15(1), while striking down the termination on first pregnancy as official arbitrariness under article 14.

The turn is C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India, (1979) 4 SCC 260; AIR 1979 SC 1868. Facts. A senior woman officer of the Indian Foreign Service, denied promotion, challenged a rule requiring a woman member to obtain the Government's written permission before marrying, and another permitting refusal of promotion. Held. The rules were DISCRIMINATORY: if a married man has a right to be considered for a post, so has a married woman, and to make MARRIAGE A DISQUALIFICATION FOR ONE SEX ALONE is in defiance of articles 14, 15 and 16. The Court called on the executive to remove the stains of sex discrimination from the service rules WITHOUT WAITING FOR LITIGATION.

The method is settled in Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India, (2008) 3 SCC 1; AIR 2008 SC 663. Facts. Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act 1914 prohibited the employment of any man under twenty-five and of ANY WOMAN in premises where liquor was consumed by the public. Held. The prohibition on the employment of women was unconstitutional: legislation framed as PROTECTION invites STRICT SCRUTINY; parens patriae will not sustain a total exclusion; the proper course is to MAKE THE WORKPLACE SAFE rather than to keep women out of it; a law presuming women incapable of working in certain places is grounded in STEREOTYPE rather than in any relevant difference; and the tension between security and AUTONOMY must be resolved so that the essence of the guarantee, including the right to choose a profession, is not lost.

And it is applied at the highest level in Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469; AIR 2020 SC 1000. Facts. Women officers of the Indian Army held Short Service Commissions; a 2019 policy offered permanent commissions prospectively, and the Union resisted extending them to serving officers and to command appointments, arguing physiological limitations, the composition of the rank and file, and the demands of family. Held. The appeal failed, with directions that every serving woman Short Service Commission officer be considered irrespective of length of service; that those with more than fourteen years who do not opt continue to twenty years of pensionable service; that the restriction of women to STAFF APPOINTMENTS ONLY not be enforced; and that all specialisations be open on the same terms as for men. An ABSOLUTE BAR on women seeking criteria or command appointments does not comport with articles 14 and 16, and the Union's submissions were rejected as founded on SEX STEREOTYPES.

Sexual harassment: from guidelines to statute

In Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 3011, in the absence of any statute the Court laid down binding guidelines for the prevention of sexual harassment at the workplace, drawing on India's obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and held that they would be binding until legislation was enacted.

In Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India the Court monitored compliance and issued further directions where the guidelines had not been implemented.

And Parliament enacted the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013. Its scheme:

• Section 3 provides that NO WOMAN SHALL BE SUBJECTED TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT ANY WORKPLACE, and lists circumstances which, if they occur in relation to any act of sexual harassment, may amount to it.
• Section 4 requires every employer of a workplace to constitute an INTERNAL COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE by written order; section 6 provides for a Local Committee in each district for workplaces where no Internal Committee exists and for complaints against the employer.
• Section 9 provides for the making of a complaint, within a period from the date of the incident, extendable for reasons recorded.
• Section 11 provides for the inquiry, and section 12 for interim action during its pendency.
• Section 13 provides for the inquiry report and the action to be taken on it.
• Section 19 sets out the DUTIES OF THE EMPLOYER, including providing a safe working environment, displaying the penal consequences, organising awareness programmes and assisting a complainant who wishes to file a criminal complaint.
• Section 26 provides a PENALTY FOR NON-COMPLIANCE, with a heavier consequence, including cancellation or non-renewal of a licence or registration, on a second contravention.

Section 14 punishes a false or malicious complaint, which is the provision to mention when the objection about misuse is raised.

Reform of personal law and of the family

Succession. Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, a Bench of three, held that the right conferred on a daughter by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act 2005 is BY BIRTH, so it does not depend on the father being alive on 9 September 2005, the coparcenary right being unobstructed heritage; earlier decisions to the contrary were overruled.

Maintenance. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum and Danial Latifi v. Union of India, worked in Module III's first half.

Marriage. Shayara Bano v. Union of India, setting aside talaq-e-biddat, and the Act of 2019.

Guardianship. Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, reading "after him" in section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act 1956 as meaning in the absence of the father rather than after his death.

Criminal law. Joseph Shine v. Union of India, striking down section 497 of the Indian Penal Code because it treated a wife as her husband's property.

A worked example

"Discuss the different protections given to the backward classes, women and Scheduled Tribes in Indian pluralistic society." How should the women's third of the answer run?

Structure it by track, not by case. Equality: articles 15(1), 16(2) and 15(3). Directive: articles 39(a), 39(d) and 42. Representation: articles 243D and 243T, then 330A, 332A and 334A. Statutory: the Act of 2013, with the Maternity Benefit Act, the Equal Remuneration provisions and the Domestic Violence Act named.

Give the method, not just the list. The judicial approach has moved from protection by exclusion to scrutiny of stereotype: Nergesh Meerza, then C.B. Muthamma, then Anuj Garg, then Babita Puniya.

Show one statute in detail. The Act of 2013 is the best choice, because it lets you trace guidelines under article 32 in Vishaka, monitoring in Medha Kotwal Lele, and enactment.

Be exact about the legislative reservation. Articles 330A, 332A and 334A are in force from 16 April 2026; the reservation itself awaits a census, publication of its figures, and a delimitation undertaken for the purpose, and then runs for fifteen years from the commencement of the Amendment Act.

And close on the limit. Article 15(3) permits ANY special provision for women, so the constitutional obstacle to reform is small. What has been lacking is not power but its exercise, which is the point about protective legislation Anuj Garg makes from the other direction.

Distinctions

What it does NOT mean

It does not mean women's reservation in Parliament is operating. The articles are in force; article 334A(1) postpones the reservation until after a delimitation following the first census after the commencement of the Amendment Act.

It does not mean article 15(3) is confined to advancement. Unlike article 15(4), it permits ANY special provision for women and children.

It does not mean protective legislation is always valid. Anuj Garg subjects it to strict scrutiny and treats stereotype as the vice.

It does not mean the sex-plus reading survives. Anuj Garg, Joseph Shine and Navtej Johar have moved decisively away from it, though Nergesh Meerza has not been formally overruled on that point.

And it does not mean the protections are only constitutional. Most of the operative law is statutory, and the Act of 2013 is the model: a right declared by a court under article 32, monitored, and then enacted.

Quick revision

Equality: articles 15(1), 16(2); article 15(3) permits ANY special provision for women and children. Directive: article 39(a), men and women equally to have an adequate means of livelihood; 39(d), equal pay for equal work; 42, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. Duty: article 51A(e), to renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.

Representation: articles 243D and 243T, not less than one-third of seats and of chairperson offices in panchayats and municipalities. Articles 330A and 332A, One Hundred and Sixth Amendment 2023, in force 16 April 2026: as nearly as may be one-third of the seats reserved under article 330(2), and one-third including those, of the seats filled by direct election. Article 334A: takes effect only after a delimitation undertaken for the purpose following publication of the figures of the first census after the commencement, and ceases after fifteen years from that commencement.

Cases: C.B. Muthamma 1979, marriage as a disqualification for one sex alone defies articles 14, 15 and 16. Anuj Garg 2007, protective legislation invites strict scrutiny; make the workplace safe rather than exclude; stereotype is not a relevant difference; autonomy must be preserved. Babita Puniya 2020, an absolute bar on criteria or command appointments does not comport with articles 14 and 16. Vishaka 1997, guidelines binding until legislation. Medha Kotwal Lele, monitoring. Act of 2013: sections 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 19 and 26. Personal law: Vineeta Sharma, Githa Hariharan, Danial Latifi, Shayara Bano, Joseph Shine.

Test yourself

1. Which clause permits the widest special provision for women, and how does it differ from article 15(4)? Article 15(3), which permits ANY special provision for women and children, without being confined to advancement as article 15(4) is, or to admission as article 15(5) is.

2. What do articles 243D and 243T reserve? Not less than one-third of the seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for women of those classes; not less than one-third of the total seats for women; and not less than one-third of the offices of chairperson.

3. When do articles 330A and 332A take effect? The articles are in force from 16 April 2026, but by article 334A(1) the reservation comes into effect only after an exercise of delimitation undertaken for the purpose, following the publication of the relevant figures of the first census taken after the commencement of the One Hundred and Sixth Amendment Act, and ceases on the expiration of fifteen years from that commencement.

4. What method does the Court now apply to protective legislation? Strict scrutiny. Parens patriae will not sustain a total exclusion; the workplace must be made safe rather than women excluded from it; a law presuming incapacity is grounded in stereotype and not in any relevant difference; and security must be reconciled with autonomy. Anuj Garg.

5. How did the law on sexual harassment develop? By guidelines laid down under article 32 in Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, drawing on India's obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and binding until legislation; monitored in Medha Kotwal Lele; and enacted as the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act 2013.

6. Name five provisions of the Act of 2013 and say what each does. Section 3, no woman shall be subjected to sexual harassment at any workplace; section 4, the Internal Complaints Committee; section 9, the complaint; section 13, the inquiry report and action on it; section 19, the duties of the employer; and section 26, the penalty for non-compliance, with cancellation or non-renewal of a licence on a second contravention.

7. What answers the objection that the Act of 2013 will be misused? Section 14, which punishes a false or malicious complaint and false evidence.