Multiculturalism, and the Indian Version of It
Chapter Sixty-Eight
Syllabus topic 3, "Pluralism".
Pages 348 to 351 of 780
In one line
Multiculturalism is the doctrine that a State should not merely tolerate its groups but actively support their identity, and India adopted most of that in 1950, thirty years before the word was current.
In the wording a student can write in an exam: multiculturalism is the political theory that in a society of several cultures the State should go beyond formal equality and non-discrimination, and should recognise groups, accommodate their practices and support their institutions, on the ground that a person's identity is bound up with a culture and that leaving culture to the market disadvantages the weaker one. Its principal exponents are Will Kymlicka, who distinguishes the rights of national minorities from those of immigrant groups, Charles Taylor, who argues that recognition is a vital human need and misrecognition an injury, and Bhikhu Parekh, who argues for a dialogue between cultures rather than the assimilation of one into another.
The three positions a State can take
Assimilation. Difference is tolerated privately and disregarded publicly; the State recognises individuals and not groups, and expects difference to fade. The French model is the usual example.
Toleration or benign neglect. The State neither hinders nor helps: it protects the individual's freedom to practise a culture and does nothing more. This is formal equality applied to culture.
Multiculturalism. The State recognises groups, adjusts general rules to accommodate them, and supports their institutions with money and legal status.
India took the third, and did so in the founding document rather than as a later policy. Articles 29 and 30 recognise groups as bearers of rights; article 30(2) forbids the State to discriminate in granting aid against a minority institution; article 350A obliges States to provide mother-tongue instruction; and articles 371A and 371G let a State's Assembly block an Act of Parliament on customary law.
What Kymlicka's distinction does for an Indian answer
Kymlicka distinguishes two kinds of group claim. A national minority, which was a self-governing society incorporated into a larger State, may claim self-government. An immigrant group, which chose to move, may claim accommodation but not territory.
India's arrangement maps onto that distinction surprisingly well. The Sixth Schedule's Autonomous District Councils and article 371A are self-government claims recognised territorially. Articles 29 and 30 are accommodation claims recognised personally, without territory.
And it explains an Indian anomaly. Religious minorities in India are dispersed rather than territorial, so their protection is institutional under article 30 rather than territorial. Linguistic minorities are partly territorial, which is why linguistic reorganisation was possible and religious reorganisation was not.
Taylor's contribution is different and is worth one sentence. If recognition is a vital human need and misrecognition is a form of harm, then a State that treats a group's identity as invisible is not neutral; it is imposing the majority's identity as the default. That is the strongest theoretical argument for articles 29 and 30, and it is the argument the assimilationist has to answer.
Multiculturalism, and the Indian Version of It
The Indian departures from the theory
India recognises groups but resists defining them. The Constitution nowhere defines "minority", and Bal Patil v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3172; (2005) 6 SCC 690. Facts. Jains sought a direction that the Central Government notify them as a minority under section 2(c) of the National Commission for Minorities Act 1992, as five other communities had been. Held. No such direction would issue. The Court held that minority status under the Act is for the Central Government to notify, that the Commission's recommendation is not binding, and that the constitutional scheme is directed at securing equality rather than at multiplying group identities; it observed that the whole object of the special rights in articles 29 and 30 is to place minorities on a footing of equality with the majority, and cautioned against a proliferation of claims to minority status. Why it matters here is that it is the clearest Indian statement that group recognition is a means to equality and not an end in itself, which is a real departure from the strong multiculturalist position.
India supports institutions but subjects them to regulation. In The Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717; AIR 1974 SC 1389. Facts. The Gujarat University Act required affiliated colleges to accept university control over the appointment and dismissal of staff, the medium of instruction, admissions and discipline; a Jesuit society running a college challenged it under articles 29 and 30. Held. By nine judges, that article 30(1) includes the right to choose the governing body, the teachers and the students, subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of educational standards; regulations that serve the institution and academic excellence are permissible, those that take away the right of administration are not; and several provisions could not be applied to minority institutions. Why it matters here is that Indian multiculturalism is support with conditions rather than autonomy, and the line is regulation against displacement.
And India subordinates group practice to individual equality in defined places. Article 17 abolishes untouchability whatever any group says; article 25(2)(b) permits laws for social welfare and reform; and Module III is largely about where individual equality wins.
A worked example
A community asks the State for four things: legal recognition as a minority; State funding for its schools on the same terms as others; an exemption from a general law that conflicts with its practice; and reserved seats in the legislature. Which does the Indian arrangement give?
Multiculturalism, and the Indian Version of It
Recognition: partly, and not on demand. Minority status under the Act of 1992 is for the Central Government to notify, and Bal Patil holds that no direction to notify will issue. Status under article 30 does not depend on notification at all: a community numerically under half a State's population is a minority there on In re The Kerala Education Bill, 1957.
Funding on equal terms: yes, and this is the strongest of the four. Article 30(2) provides that the State shall not, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority.
Exemption from a general law: only where the Constitution provides it. Articles 371A and 371G do so for Nagaland and Mizoram; the Sixth Schedule does so within a district; article 25 does so where the practice is essential and the law is not one of social welfare and reform. There is no general power of exemption.
Reserved seats: no. Political reservation under articles 330 and 332 is for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only. Reservation for religious minorities as such was considered and rejected by the Constituent Assembly in 1949.
That last answer is the sharpest departure from strong multiculturalism, and it is worth stating: India gives cultural and institutional recognition generously and political representation by group hardly at all.
Distinctions
| Assimilation | Toleration | Multiculturalism | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recognises groups | No | No | Yes |
| Adjusts general rules | No | No | Yes |
| Funds group institutions | No | No | Yes |
| Indian position | Rejected | Exceeded | Substantially adopted |
| What India gives | What India withholds |
|---|---|
| Article 29(1): conserving language, script, culture | Political reservation for religious minorities |
| Article 30(1) and (2): institutions, and non-discrimination in aid | A general power of exemption from laws |
| Article 350A: mother-tongue instruction | Recognition as a minority on demand: Bal Patil |
| Articles 371A, 371G and the Sixth Schedule: territorial self-government to named groups | Autonomy from regulation: St. Xavier's |
What it does NOT mean
It does not mean India adopted a theory. Articles 29 and 30 were drafted in 1949 and the multiculturalist literature is of the 1990s. The theory is a useful description, not a source.
It does not mean group rights outrank individual rights. Bal Patil treats the special rights as a means to equality, and article 17 and article 25(2)(b) subordinate group practice outright in defined places.
It does not mean recognition is available on demand. Notification under the Act of 1992 is an executive decision and the courts will not direct it.
And it does not mean multiculturalism is uncontested. The standard objections are that it freezes group boundaries, that it empowers a group's internal elites against its own dissenters, and that it substitutes recognition for redistribution. All three are live in Indian debate and a good answer states them.
Multiculturalism, and the Indian Version of It
Quick revision
Multiculturalism: the State should recognise groups, accommodate their practices and support their institutions, rather than merely tolerate them. Kymlicka distinguishes national minorities, which may claim self-government, from immigrant groups, which may claim accommodation; Taylor argues that recognition is a vital human need and misrecognition an injury; Parekh argues for dialogue rather than assimilation. Three State positions: assimilation, toleration, multiculturalism. India substantially adopted the third in 1950: articles 29(1), 30(1) and (2), 350A, 350B, 371A and 371G, and the Sixth Schedule. Departures: it does not define minority and will not direct notification (Bal Patil, which treats the special rights as a means to equality); it regulates supported institutions (St. Xavier's, regulation permitted, displacement not); and it gives no political reservation to religious minorities, that having been considered and rejected in 1949.
Test yourself
1. Distinguish assimilation, toleration and multiculturalism. Assimilation disregards difference publicly and expects it to fade. Toleration protects the individual's freedom to practise a culture and does nothing more. Multiculturalism recognises groups, adjusts general rules for them and supports their institutions.
2. What is Kymlicka's distinction and how does it map onto India? Between national minorities, which may claim self-government, and immigrant groups, which may claim accommodation. In India the Sixth Schedule Councils and article 371A are self-government claims recognised territorially, while articles 29 and 30 are accommodation claims recognised institutionally without territory.
3. What did Bal Patil decide, and why is it a departure from strong multiculturalism? That no direction would issue requiring the Central Government to notify Jains as a minority under the Act of 1992, the Commission's recommendation not being binding; and it observed that the object of the special rights in articles 29 and 30 is to place minorities on a footing of equality with the majority, cautioning against a proliferation of minority claims. It treats recognition as a means to equality rather than an end.
4. Name the strongest single multiculturalist provision in the Constitution. Article 30(2), which forbids the State, in granting aid to educational institutions, to discriminate against any institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority.
5. Does India give political representation by religious group? No. Articles 330 and 332 reserve seats for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only, and reservation for religious minorities was considered and rejected by the Constituent Assembly in 1949.
6. State the three standard objections to multiculturalism. That it freezes group boundaries; that it strengthens a group's internal elites against its own dissenters; and that it substitutes recognition for redistribution.
The rest of this subject
These notes are cut from the University's printed syllabus. Open the syllabus itself, or the past papers, for the same subject.