Central Control Against State Autonomy

A revenue share settled by an independent body under article 280, and simultaneous taxing power under article 246A.

And the basic structure. Federalism is a basic feature, so an amendment abolishing the division would be void.

The three moments when the balance moved

1976 and 1978: two amendments in opposite directions. The Forty-second Amendment moved education, forests, weights and measures, the protection of wild animals and birds, and the administration of justice from the State List to the Concurrent List, and those transfers are permanent. The Forty-fourth Amendment tightened article 352 and inserted article 356(5) requiring an Election Commission certificate for continuance beyond a year, and it removed the clause that had made the President's satisfaction final and conclusive.

1994: S.R. Bommai. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1918; (1994) 3 SCC 1. Facts. Proclamations under article 356 dismissing the governments of Karnataka, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh. Held, in twelve conclusions. The satisfaction is subjective but conditioned, that relevant material is a precondition, that a Proclamation may be struck down if mala fide or based on wholly irrelevant or extraneous grounds, that the majority is to be tested on the floor of the House, that the Assembly should not be dissolved before both Houses approve, and that federalism and secularism are basic features. Why it matters here is that it changed the practice more than any amendment: the annual rate of article 356 Proclamations fell sharply after 1994, and the floor test replaced the Governor's opinion.

2016 onwards: the fiscal balance moved twice, in opposite directions. The goods and services tax gave the States simultaneous taxing power in article 246A, which Union of India v. Mohit Minerals Pvt Ltd, (2022) 10 SCC 700, held to be a real power that the Council's recommendations do not displace, describing Indian federalism as a dialogue between equal participants. But the growth of surcharges and cesses, which article 271 puts wholly outside the divisible pool, has reduced the share of Union revenue the States actually receive.

And 2025 added a fourth moment, on the assent lever. In In re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President, the advisory opinion pronounced on 20 November 2025. Facts. A Presidential reference of fourteen questions following the Tamil Nadu decision. Held. The Governor has discretion under article 200 and is not bound by ministerial advice; that the function is not justiciable on the merits; that a court may not prescribe timelines under article 200 or article 201; that article 142 does not permit a deemed assent; but that a limited mandamus lies where inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite. Why it matters here is that the assent lever, which the April 2025 judgment had substantially disabled, was largely restored seven months later.

A worked example

A State passes a law regulating an industry, which the Governor reserves for the President; the President neither assents nor withholds for two years. Meanwhile the Union announces a centrally sponsored scheme on the same subject with conditional funding, and the State's request to borrow for its own scheme is refused. Identify the levers and the remedies.

The reserved Bill. Article 201 puts no time limit on the President and the 2025 Reference holds that a court may not impose one. The remedy is a limited mandamus to act within a reasonable time where the inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite, with no direction as to the outcome.

The scheme. Article 282 permits a grant for any public purpose even outside legislative competence. The State is not obliged to join and loses the money if it does not. There is no legal remedy at all; the forum is article 263 or the political process.

The borrowing. Article 293(3) requires the Union's consent while any Union loan or guarantee is outstanding, which it almost always is. The consent is a real discretion and there is little scope for review.

Now the point of the example. Not one of the three levers can be resisted in court in any substantial way, and none of them is unconstitutional. That is the honest answer to MU's stem: the central-control question in India is mostly not a question about the validity of Union action but about the absence of remedies against lawful Union action.

And the counterweight is worth naming. The State's own answer is political and institutional: the Council of States, the Finance Commission, the Inter-State Council, and the fact that a State government is elected and can say so publicly.

Distinctions

What it does NOT mean

It does not mean the Union acts unlawfully. Nearly every lever in this chapter is expressly conferred, and the constitutional question is usually about the absence of a remedy rather than about validity.

It does not mean the States are helpless. They hold an exclusive List, a chamber of their own, an entrenched amending procedure, a share of revenue settled by an independent body, and simultaneous power over the goods and services tax.

It does not mean the direction of travel is one way. Four of the eight rows in the table above run the other way, and two of them are from the last decade.

And it does not mean the answer is a list. MU asks for the dynamic. A candidate who lists ten articles without saying what has actually changed, and when, has described the machinery and not the question.

Quick revision

Levers on legislation: articles 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254. On a Bill: articles 200 and 201, with no time limit on the President. On administration: articles 256, 257, 258(2), 312 and 365. On the government: articles 155, 156 and 356. On money: articles 271, 282 and 293(3). On territory: article 3. Counterweights: an exclusive List of sixty-one entries with a court as umpire, the proviso to article 368(2), the Council of States under articles 249 and 312, the Finance Commission under article 280, article 246A, and federalism as a basic feature. Four moments: the Forty-second and Forty-fourth Amendments; S.R. Bommai 1994, which made article 356 reviewable and substituted the floor test; the goods and services tax with Mohit Minerals 2022, against the growth of surcharges and cesses outside the divisible pool; and the Presidential Reference of 20 November 2025, which restored the Governor's discretion under article 200 while leaving a limited mandamus for indefinite inaction.

Test yourself

1. Group the Union's levers by what they act on, with one article for each group. Legislation, article 249; a Bill, article 200; administration, article 256; the government itself, article 356; money, article 282; and territory, article 3.

2. Which lever is least discussed and why is it effective? The reservation of a Bill under article 200 and the withholding of assent under article 201, because there is no time limit, no obligation to give reasons, and a Bill that never receives assent never becomes law, so there is nothing to challenge.

3. How did S.R. Bommai change the practical balance? By holding the satisfaction under article 356 conditioned and reviewable on the relevance of the material, substituting the floor of the House for the Governor's assessment, and requiring that the Assembly not be dissolved before both Houses approve. The use of article 356 fell sharply afterwards.

4. Name one fiscal change since 2016 in each direction. Towards the States, article 246A giving them simultaneous power over the goods and services tax, held in Mohit Minerals to be a real power the Council cannot displace. Towards the Centre, the growth of surcharges and cesses, which article 271 keeps wholly outside the divisible pool.

5. What did the Presidential Reference of 20 November 2025 restore, and what did it leave? It restored the Governor's discretion under article 200, held the function non-justiciable on the merits, forbade courts to prescribe timelines and rejected deemed assent under article 142. It left a limited mandamus to act within a reasonable time where inaction is prolonged, unexplained and indefinite.

6. Why is "the Union acted unlawfully" usually the wrong frame for this question? Because nearly every lever is expressly conferred by the Constitution. The real issue is the absence of a remedy against lawful Union action, which is why the counterweights that matter are institutional and political rather than judicial.