Places of Worship, and the Character Frozen in 1947

Section 5, the exception. The Act shall not apply to the place of worship commonly known as the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid situated in Ayodhya, and to any suit, appeal or other proceeding relating to it.

Section 6. Contravention of section 3 is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years and with fine, with provisions for abetment and for offences by companies.

Section 7. The Act has effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act.

Section 8. Power to make rules.

And section 4(3) excludes four categories from the operation of section 4, including an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act 1958, and a place of worship whose dispute has already been finally settled or acquiesced in.

What the Act is for

Facts. M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1, decided 9 November 2019 by a Bench of five. The appeals concerned the title suits about the disputed site at Ayodhya; the judgment devotes a separate Part to the Places of Worship Act.

Held, on the point this book uses. The Court set out the Act's long title, an Act to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on the 15th day of August 1947, and recorded the commencement dates. It also rejected the submission that it should interpret religious doctrine in an absolute and extreme form and question the faith of worshippers, saying that our Court is founded on and owes its existence to a constitutional order, and that nothing would be as destructive of the values underlying article 25.

Why it matters here. The judgment treats the Act as an affirmation of the secular commitment of the Constitution and as a legislative instrument for preserving public order and equality between faiths, which is the framing an examiner is looking for.

The argument about the Act

For it. A country in which the religious character of every place of worship remains permanently open to litigation cannot be at peace. Historical wrongs, if adjudicable at all, are adjudicable without end, because every site has a history and every history has a claimant. A rule of finality removes the incentive to make a claim.

And it is not without precedent. Every legal system uses limitation, prescription and adverse possession for the same reason: at some point the law prefers settled expectations to a perfect reconstruction of the past.

Against it. It bars a remedy without inquiring whether a wrong occurred, which is a denial of access to a court and can be argued to offend article 14 and article 25. It fixes on a date, 15 August 1947, that has no significance for the wrongs alleged. And section 5 excepts the one dispute the Act was passed in the middle of, which invites the objection that a legislature that made an exception for the largest case has not really committed itself to the principle.

The answer to the last objection. That the excepted dispute was already in litigation and that Parliament chose not to interfere with a pending adjudication, which is a defensible legislative choice and is how the Ayodhya judgment describes it.

A worked example

In 2026 a suit is filed claiming that a mosque built in the sixteenth century stands on the site of a temple and seeking a declaration that the site is a temple.

Section 4(2). No suit with respect to the conversion of the religious character of a place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 lies on or after the commencement of the Act. The suit does not lie.

Unless one of the exceptions applies. If the conversion is alleged to have taken place AFTER 15 August 1947, the proviso to section 4(2) preserves the proceeding. If the site is an ancient and historical monument or an archaeological site covered by the Act of 1958, section 4(3) takes it out of section 4. If the dispute was finally settled or the conversion acquiesced in before the commencement, section 4(3) again applies. And section 5 applies to the Ayodhya site alone.

What a suit CANNOT do. It cannot ask a court to determine the religious character of the site as it stood before 1947, because section 4(1) has declared what that character is deemed to be: whatever it was on 15 August 1947.

And the drafting point students should notice. The Act bars a suit about CONVERSION of religious character. A suit about ownership, possession or management, which does not seek to change the religious character, is a different thing, and the line between the two is where the modern litigation on this Act is being fought.

What this does NOT mean

It does not mean every religious dispute is barred. Only proceedings with respect to the conversion of the religious character of a place of worship existing on 15 August 1947.

It does not mean the Act settles who owns a site. It settles what the site's religious character is deemed to be, which is a different question from title.

And it does not mean the Act is beyond challenge. Its validity has been questioned, and an answer should record that the challenge exists without asserting an outcome.

Quick revision

Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act 1991, eight sections. Long title: to prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947. Section 2(c) defines place of worship. Section 3 prohibits conversion, including between sections of the same religion. Section 4(1) declares the character as on 15 August 1947 continues. Section 4(2) abates pending proceedings and bars fresh ones, with a proviso for post-1947 conversions and settled disputes. Section 4(3) excludes ancient monuments and archaeological sites under the Act of 1958 and settled or acquiesced disputes. Section 5 excepts the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid. Section 6, up to three years and fine. Section 7, overriding effect. Sections 3, 6 and 8 in force from 18 September 1991, the rest deemed from 11 July 1991.

Test yourself

1. What is the object of the Act, in its own words? To prohibit conversion of any place of worship and to provide for the maintenance of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on the 15th day of August 1947, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.

2. State sections 3, 4(1) and 4(2). Section 3 forbids any person to convert a place of worship of any denomination or section into one of a different section of the same denomination or of a different denomination. Section 4(1) declares that the religious character of a place of worship existing on 15 August 1947 shall continue as it existed on that day. Section 4(2) abates every pending suit, appeal or proceeding with respect to such a conversion and bars any fresh one.

3. What are the exceptions? The proviso to section 4(2), for a conversion after 15 August 1947 and for a dispute already settled or a conversion acquiesced in before the commencement; section 4(3), which excludes ancient and historical monuments and archaeological sites covered by the Act of 1958 and settled disputes; and section 5, which excepts the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid and every proceeding relating to it.

4. Give the argument for and against the Act. For: permanent litigability of religious sites makes peace impossible, and every legal system uses finality devices such as limitation and prescription for the same reason. Against: it bars a remedy without inquiring whether a wrong occurred, fixes on a date with no connection to the wrongs alleged, and excepts the very dispute it was passed during.

5. What did the Ayodhya judgment say that this book uses? It set out the Act's long title and commencement, treating the Act as an affirmation of the constitutional commitment to secularism, and it rejected the submission that the Court should interpret religious doctrine in an absolute and extreme form and question the faith of worshippers, saying that nothing would be as destructive of the values underlying article 25.