Principles of Natural Justice: Definition, Nature and Scope

3. The statute. Many Acts prescribe their own procedure. Where they do, that procedure governs, and natural justice fills the gaps rather than displacing what the statute says.

The nature of the principles

Four propositions, each of which is examinable.

They are not embodied rules and have no fixed content

Facts. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818, concerned the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951, which allows the Union in the public interest to take under its control the industries in the First Schedule, of which item 23 is textiles. Section 15 permits a full investigation where the Government is of opinion that production has substantially fallen, quality has markedly deteriorated, prices have risen without justification, resources of national importance need conserving, or an undertaking is being managed in a manner highly detrimental to the industry or to the public interest, and section 16 permits directions afterwards. The Central Government took over the management of the company's undertaking under section 18AA(1)(a) without any prior investigation and without hearing the company.

Held. By the majority, Chinnappa Reddy J dissenting, there had been non-compliance with the implied requirement of the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage, and the order could have been struck down on that ground alone; in view of the concession that a hearing would be given, the case was remitted for a full, fair and effective hearing. The phrase natural justice is not capable of a static and precise definition and cannot be imprisoned in the straitjacket of a cast-iron formula; its rules are not embodied rules and no exhaustive catalogue of them can be made. The two fundamental maxims are audi alteram partem and nemo judex in re sua. Audi alteram partem is a rule devised to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power, and its reach should not be narrowed nor its applicability circumscribed. The rules of natural justice operate only in areas not covered by any validly made law, and a statutory provision may exclude them specifically or by inevitable implication.

Why it matters. It is the fullest Indian statement of the nature of the principles, and it supplies the two limits that matter: natural justice yields to a valid statute, and a statute excludes it only by express words or inevitable implication.

They apply to administrative action, not only to quasi-judicial action

This is the largest development in the modern law and it happened in two steps.

Facts. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, concerned a Special Selection Board constituted to select officers of the Jammu and Kashmir forest department for the Indian Forest Service. One member was the Acting Chief Conservator of Forests, who was himself a candidate and had obtained his acting post by superseding another Conservator whose appeal was pending. He withdrew when his own name was considered but sat when his rivals' claims were considered and when the order of preference was settled. He was placed at the top; three rivals were left out. Those left out petitioned under Article 32.

Held. The rules of natural justice operate in areas not covered by any validly made law and supplement rather than supplant it. There is no reason why they should not apply to administrative proceedings as well as quasi-judicial ones, especially as it is not easy to draw the line demarcating the two, and an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have a more far reaching effect than one in a quasi-judicial enquiry. What rule of natural justice applies depends on the facts, the framework of the law and the constitution of the body concerned. On the facts there was a conflict between interest and duty, the member was a judge in his own cause, and his participation must have influenced the result.

Then the second step.

Facts. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, concerned a passport issued to the petitioner in June 1976 and impounded in July 1977 by an order under section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act 1967 which said only that it was done "in public interest". She was given no hearing, and when she asked for reasons the Government declined to give them, saying it was not in the interest of the general public to do so.

Held. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action: equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, one belonging to the rule of law in a republic and the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to conform to Article 14, and it must be right and just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. The Passports Act does not provide for a hearing before impounding, but that is not conclusive: even where a statute is silent the law may imply the principle and apply it, natural justice being a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness. There can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose.

Why it matters. Together these two cases moved natural justice from a rule attaching to a category of decision into a general requirement of fair administrative procedure with a constitutional foundation. After them the question is not "was this quasi-judicial?" but "what did fairness require here?"

They apply where rights or legitimate expectations are affected

Natural justice is not owed to the world. It is owed to a person whose rights, interests or legitimate expectations are affected by the decision. That is why it does not attach to rule making, which affects a class: [Classification of Administrative Functions].

The interests protected extend well beyond legal rights in the strict sense: a licence, a job, a seat in a college, a pension, membership of a body, a reputation, and a legitimate expectation of a benefit or of a procedure are all sufficient.

They may be excluded, but only clearly

Because natural justice fills gaps rather than overriding statutes, a statute can displace it. But the displacement must be by express words or inevitable implication, and a court will not infer it lightly, because the presumption is that the legislature intends fair procedure. The recognised situations are treated in [Exceptions to the Principles of Natural Justice].

The third principle: reasons

Indian law now treats the duty to give reasons as a third requirement, and it is treated in [Reasoned Decisions]. It is convenient to note here that the two classical maxims are a pair from the common law and that reasons is an Indian and modern addition, since an examiner asking for "the principles of natural justice" expects all three.

The scope: where natural justice applies

A worked example

The University withdraws Anjali Rane's admission to a postgraduate course six months into the year, on the ground that her marksheet was found to be irregular. She is sent a one-line letter and is not told what irregularity is alleged.

Is natural justice owed? Yes. An admission already granted is an interest, and cancelling it affects her directly. It does not matter whether the Registrar's act is classified as administrative or quasi-judicial, because after A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, the distinction does not decide the question.

What does it require here? Notice of the specific irregularity alleged, disclosure of the material relied on, which means the report on the marksheet, an opportunity to answer, a decision by somebody not personally involved in the allegation, and reasons.

Does it require an oral hearing, a lawyer and cross-examination? Not necessarily. That is what "no fixed content" means: the requirements scale with what is at stake and with the nature of the dispute. Where the allegation is of forgery and the evidence is a witness, cross-examination may be needed; where it is a mismatch between two documents, written representations may be enough.

What if the University's statute says the Registrar may cancel an admission "without notice"? Then the statute has excluded natural justice expressly, and the question becomes whether that exclusion is constitutional under Articles 14 and 21, which after Maneka Gandhi it may well not be.

What it does NOT mean

It does not mean a full trial. Natural justice is a minimum standard, not the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not import pleadings, oral evidence on oath, or the law of evidence.

It does not mean the decision must be favourable. It governs how the decision is reached, not what it is. An authority that hears fairly and decides against the person has complied.

It does not mean natural law. The phrase is a term of art meaning fair procedure.

It does not apply to everything. Rule making, ministerial acts and, in the recognised cases, emergencies are outside it.

Quick revision

1. Two maxims: nemo judex in causa sua, no one a judge in his own cause; audi alteram partem, hear the other side. Indian law adds reasons as a third principle.
2. Sources: the common law; the Constitution, Articles 14, 21 and 311; and the statute in question.
3. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818: natural justice is not capable of a static and precise definition, cannot be imprisoned in a cast-iron formula, and its rules are not embodied rules; it operates only in areas not covered by a valid law and can be excluded specifically or by inevitable implication.
4. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150: it applies to administrative as well as quasi-judicial proceedings, because the line between them is not easy to draw.
5. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597: the procedure under Article 21 must be right, just and fair; natural justice may be implied into a silent statute; there is no distinction between quasi-judicial and administrative functions for this purpose.
6. It protects rights, interests and legitimate expectations, and does not attach to rule making.
7. It is a minimum standard of procedure, not a trial, and it governs how a decision is reached and not what it is.

Test yourself

1. What is meant by the principles of natural justice? State their nature. They are the minimum standards of fair procedure required of an authority deciding a matter affecting a person's rights or interests, resting on the maxims nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, to which Indian law adds a duty to give reasons. Their nature was described in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818: they are not embodied rules, they cannot be reduced to an exhaustive catalogue or imprisoned in a cast-iron formula, and what they require depends on the facts, on the framework of the statute and on the constitution of the deciding body. They operate only in areas not covered by a validly made law, and a statute may exclude them expressly or by inevitable implication.

2. Do the principles of natural justice apply to administrative action? Yes. Formerly they attached only to judicial and quasi-judicial acts. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, the Supreme Court held that they apply to administrative proceedings as well, because the line demarcating administrative from quasi-judicial enquiries is not easy to draw and an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have a more far reaching effect. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, the Court held that there can be no distinction between a quasi-judicial function and an administrative function for this purpose, and that natural justice may be implied even where the statute is silent.

3. What is the constitutional basis of natural justice in India? Article 14, which strikes at arbitrariness in State action, so that an unfair procedure is itself arbitrary; Article 21, under which a deprivation of life or personal liberty must be by a procedure established by law, which after Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, must be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; and Article 311, which writes a specific hearing requirement into the Constitution for civil servants. This constitutional basis is what distinguishes the Indian position from the English, where the rules rest on the common law alone.

4. Can natural justice be excluded by statute? Yes, but only clearly. Natural justice supplements the law and does not supplant it, so it yields to a validly made statutory provision. Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818, holds that exclusion must be either specific or by inevitable implication, and courts will not infer it lightly, because the presumption is that the legislature intends a fair procedure. Even an express exclusion remains open to challenge under Articles 14 and 21.

5. "Natural justice has no fixed content." Explain. The requirements vary with the situation. What fairness demands depends on the facts of the case, on the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and on the constitution of the body deciding, as A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, put it. A serious charge affecting livelihood, turning on the evidence of a witness, may require an oral hearing with an opportunity to cross-examine; a narrow question turning on documents may require no more than an opportunity to make written representations. That is why Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818, said the principles cannot be imprisoned in the straitjacket of a cast-iron formula.