Accountability and Responsiveness: Problems and Perspectives

The problems

Six, and they are structural.

1. Security of tenure against accountability

Article 311 exists because a civil service that can be dismissed at will cannot be politically neutral, and neutrality is what permanence is for. But the same protection makes removal for incompetence difficult, and a departmental inquiry with charges, evidence and a reasonable opportunity is a heavy instrument for ordinary inefficiency.

There is no costless solution. Weakening Article 311 to make dismissal easier would place the officer at the mercy of the politician, which is the problem the Article was written to prevent. The realistic answers are better performance assessment, a genuine review at fixed points in the career, and lateral entry, rather than removing the constitutional protection.

2. Procedure displacing purpose

Rules exist to secure fairness, consistency and the protection of public money. Where the rule becomes the object, the citizen is refused because a document is missing rather than because he is not entitled. Sociologists of administration call this goal displacement, and everybody who has dealt with an office recognises it.

3. Diffusion of responsibility

A decision that passes through a clerk, a section officer, an under secretary and a joint secretary is nobody's decision. The file records that each recorded a view. When it goes wrong, no individual is responsible, and the safest course for each is to add a caveat and pass it on.

4. Absence of measurement

Until recently there was no measurement of how long a department took to do anything, and what is not measured is not managed. Grievance portals and citizens' charters changed that by publishing timelines and disposal figures.

5. The incentive structure

Promotion by seniority, transfers used as reward and punishment, and no consequence for delay produce exactly the behaviour observed. The officer who decides quickly takes a risk; the officer who does not decide takes none.

6. The generalist and the specialist

A service recruited as generalists and posted across unrelated departments accumulates administrative skill and not subject knowledge, which becomes a serious limitation as regulation grows technical.

The perspectives, or the reform proposals

Six answers to the six problems.

1. Citizens' charters. A published statement by each department of the services it provides, the standards it undertakes, the time within which each service will be delivered, the officer responsible, and the remedy if the standard is not met. Its weakness is that a charter without a consequence is a leaflet, which is why the proposal for a statutory right to time bound service delivery, with penalty for default, has been pressed repeatedly and enacted by several States in their own public services guarantee legislation.

2. Statutory grievance redress with timelines. Grievance portals with a number, an assigned officer, a deadline and an appeal, so that a complaint is trackable and its disposal auditable.

3. Performance management. Measurable objectives for departments and for officers, published results, and a genuine review of an officer's record at fixed points in the career.

4. Transparency. Section 4 of the Right to Information Act 2005 is the largest single reform of responsiveness India has made, because it requires proactive publication of the norms set for the discharge of functions, of the rules, instructions and manuals used, and of the reasons for administrative and quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons: [Obligations of Public Authorities and How a Request Is Made]. A department that must publish its norms must first have them.

5. Administrative reform. The Administrative Reforms Commission of 1966, which produced the Lokpal and Lokayukta proposal, and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission, which reported in the 2000s on subjects including the right to information, ethics in governance, citizen centric administration and personnel administration, are the standing sources of proposals, and naming them is worth doing.

6. Simplification and technology. Reducing the number of steps, forms and approvals, and delivering services electronically, which removes discretion at the counter and creates a record of delay.

The constitutional dimension of responsiveness

Responsiveness is not merely a management goal in India; it has a legal edge.

Facts. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, concerned a passport impounded under section 10(3)(c) of the Passports Act 1967 by an order reciting only that it was "in public interest", with no hearing and with reasons refused on the ground that supplying them was not in the interest of the general public.

Held. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment; equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, one belonging to the rule of law in a republic and the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to conform to Article 14, being right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; and natural justice may be implied even where the statute is silent.

Why it matters here. An administration that treats one citizen differently from another in the same position, or refuses to explain itself, is not merely unresponsive; it is acting unconstitutionally. That is what converts responsiveness from an administrative virtue into a legal obligation, and it underlies the duty to give reasons in [Reasoned Decisions].

A worked example

A district office takes an average of nine months to issue an income certificate for which the rules prescribe fifteen days.

Is anybody accountable? In the formal sense, yes. The Collector answers to the Divisional Commissioner, the minister answers to the assembly, the auditor can examine the expenditure, and a citizen can seek a mandamus. In the practical sense, nobody, because none of those mechanisms is triggered by delay alone.

What makes it responsive?

1. A citizens' charter stating fifteen days and naming the responsible officer.
2. Measurement: a portal that records the date of application and the date of disposal, and publishes the average.
3. A grievance mechanism with an appeal to a named superior and a deadline.
4. A statutory right to time bound service with a penalty on the defaulting officer, which several States have enacted.
5. Transparency: any applicant may obtain the file notings under the Right to Information Act 2005 and see exactly where the nine months went, which is the single most effective discipline on delay yet devised in India.

Notice that only the last two carry a consequence. That is the recurring conclusion of this part of the syllabus, and it is the same one reached in [Public Accountability].

What it does NOT mean

It does not mean accountability produces responsiveness. It can reduce it, by making officials avoid decisions.

It does not mean the fault lies with individuals. The problems are structural: tenure, procedure, diffusion of responsibility, absence of measurement and the incentive structure.

It does not mean Article 311 should be weakened. It exists to protect neutrality, and weakening it would subordinate the officer to the politician.

It does not mean a citizens' charter is a remedy. It is a standard; without a consequence for breach it changes little.

Quick revision

1. Accountability is answerability to a superior, a minister, an auditor, a committee or a court. Responsiveness is attention to the citizen's needs. They can pull against each other, since fear of being held accountable produces avoidance of decisions.
2. Mechanisms for the civil service: hierarchical, political under Articles 75(3) and 164(2), financial under Articles 148 and 151, disciplinary subject to Article 311, criminal under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988, vigilance through the Central Vigilance Commission, judicial review, and the Right to Information Act 2005.
3. Problems: security of tenure against removal for incompetence; procedure displacing purpose; diffusion of responsibility through the hierarchy and the file; absence of measurement; an incentive structure that rewards not deciding; and generalists administering technical fields.
4. Perspectives: citizens' charters, and statutory time bound service delivery with penalties as several States have enacted; grievance redress with timelines and appeal; performance management; transparency under section 4 of the Right to Information Act 2005; the Administrative Reforms Commission of 1966 and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission; and simplification with electronic delivery.
5. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597: Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies, and the procedure under Article 21 must be right, just and fair. Unequal or unexplained treatment is unconstitutional and not merely unresponsive.

Test yourself

1. Distinguish accountability from responsiveness, and explain why they may conflict. Accountability is the obligation of an official to answer for the exercise of his authority to somebody entitled to demand an account, whether a superior, a minister, an auditor, a committee or a court, and it is measured by whether rules were followed, money was accounted for and decisions are reviewable. Responsiveness is the readiness of the administration to attend and adapt to the needs of the citizen, and it is measured by the time taken, accessibility, courtesy and whether the citizen's problem was actually solved. They conflict because an official who fears being held to account for a wrong decision will avoid deciding: he will refer the file upwards, seek another opinion and require one more document, which produces a perfectly auditable and entirely unresponsive administration.

2. State the problems of accountability and responsiveness in the Indian civil service. That the security of tenure secured by Article 311, which exists to protect political neutrality, also makes removal for incompetence difficult, since a departmental inquiry with charges and a reasonable opportunity is heavy machinery for ordinary inefficiency. That procedure displaces purpose, so that a citizen is refused for a missing document rather than because he is not entitled. That responsibility is diffused through a hierarchy and a file, so that a decision passing through four officers is nobody's decision. That performance was historically not measured, and what is not measured is not managed. That the incentive structure rewards not deciding, since the officer who decides quickly takes a risk and the officer who delays takes none. And that a generalist service administers increasingly technical fields.

3. What reforms have been proposed to improve responsiveness? Citizens' charters, publishing each department's services, the standards and timelines it undertakes, the officer responsible and the remedy for default; statutory rights to time bound delivery of services with a penalty on the defaulting officer, enacted by several States in public services guarantee legislation, which supply the consequence a charter alone lacks; grievance redress systems with a tracking number, a named officer, a deadline and an appeal; performance management with measurable objectives and published results; transparency, in particular section 4 of the Right to Information Act 2005, which requires proactive publication of the norms set for discharging functions, of rules, instructions and manuals, and of the reasons for decisions to affected persons; the recommendations of the Administrative Reforms Commission of 1966 and of the Second Administrative Reforms Commission; and simplification of procedure with electronic delivery, which removes discretion at the counter and creates a record of delay.

4. Should Article 311 be diluted to improve accountability? The argument for dilution is that the requirement of an inquiry with charges and a reasonable opportunity makes it difficult to remove an officer for incompetence, and that the protection therefore shields inefficiency. The argument against is stronger. Article 311 exists because a service that can be dismissed at will cannot be politically neutral, and neutrality is the reason for permanence; weakening it would place the officer at the mercy of the politician, which is precisely the mischief the Article was written to prevent. The realistic answers lie elsewhere: genuine performance assessment, a real review of an officer's record at fixed points in the career, lateral entry for specialised posts, and measurement of departmental performance, none of which requires the constitutional protection to be removed.

5. How has the Right to Information Act 2005 affected responsiveness? More than any other single measure. Section 4 requires proactive publication, including of the norms a public authority has set for the discharge of its functions, of the rules, regulations, instructions and manuals it uses, and of the reasons for its administrative and quasi-judicial decisions to affected persons. A department that must publish its norms must first have them, which forces the standards to exist. Beyond that, any applicant may obtain the notings on his own file and see exactly where the delay occurred and who caused it, which removes the anonymity that made diffusion of responsibility comfortable. It also supplies the raw material for every other mechanism, since a question in the legislature, an audit objection, a complaint to a Lokayukta or a writ petition all need evidence, and the Act is where the evidence now comes from.