Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
Chapter Fifty-Four
Syllabus topic 4.4, "Object and features of Limitation Act, 1963"
Pages 319 to 325 of 365
In one line
The Limitation Act 1963 fixes the time within which a claim must be brought, and its purpose is not to destroy rights but to compel their timely enforcement.
The object, which is what MU asked
Three maxims are traditionally given, and an answer should name them and then say what each is doing.
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, it is in the interest of the State that there be an end to litigation. Society cannot function if any transaction may be reopened at any distance of time.
Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, the law assists the vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights. A person who sits on a claim for twenty years has, in practical terms, abandoned it.
Lex dilationes semper exhorret, the law always abhors delay.
Behind the maxims lie two practical objects worth stating in your own words.
Evidence decays. Witnesses die, memories fade, receipts are lost. A claim tried thirty years after the event is not tried well, and the defendant is the one who suffers, because he must disprove something he can no longer document.
People must be able to close their affairs. A person who has held property or run a business for decades must at some point be safe from stale claims, and be able to sell, mortgage or bequeath what he holds.
So the Act is described as a statute of repose, of peace, and of rest. That phrase is worth using, because it captures what the Act is for better than any description of its mechanics.
The feature that defines the Act: remedy, not right
The Limitation Act bars the REMEDY; it does not extinguish the RIGHT. That single proposition is the most examined feature of the Act, and it has practical consequences.
A time-barred debt is still a debt. It cannot be sued upon, but it does not cease to exist. So:
- if the debtor pays it voluntarily, he cannot recover the money back, because he has paid something he genuinely owed
- a creditor holding security may still be able to realise it, because he is not suing
- a time-barred debt may still be capable of being set off or otherwise relied on, according to the provision under which the question arises
Section 27 is the one exception, and it must always be given with the general rule. At the determination of the period limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to that property is extinguished. So in the case of adverse possession, limitation does destroy the right. See [Acquisition of Ownership by Possession].
That is the shape of a good answer: the Act bars the remedy and not the right, except under section 27, where the right itself is extinguished.
Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
The second defining feature: the court applies it itself
Section 3(1): subject to sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, ALTHOUGH LIMITATION HAS NOT BEEN SET UP AS A DEFENCE.
Those last words are the feature. Limitation is not an ordinary defence that a defendant must plead and may waive by silence. The court must apply it of its own motion. A judge who notices that a suit is out of time must dismiss it even if the defendant never mentioned it.
That is why Order VII Rule 1(e) requires the plaint to state when the cause of action arose: so that the court can see on the face of the plaint whether the suit is in time. And it is why Order VII Rule 11(d) allows the plaint to be rejected where the suit appears from the plaint itself to be barred by any law. See [The Plaint].
The scheme of the Act
The Act has 32 sections and a Schedule, and the division of labour between them is worth knowing as a map.
Section 2 defines the working vocabulary. Two definitions matter most. "Period of limitation" means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule. "Prescribed period" means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
The difference between those two is not a quibble and MU has asked for the definition of "prescribed period". The period of limitation is the raw figure in the Schedule. The prescribed period is that figure after applying the Act's rules on computation, exclusions and disability. So the Schedule tells you three years; the Act tells you three years from when, and what is left out.
The other definitions in section 2
Five more have been set as two-mark questions or are relied on elsewhere in the Act, and each is a single line.
"Plaintiff", section 2(i), includes any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue, and any person whose estate is represented by the plaintiff as executor, administrator or other representative. Note the word includes: it does not replace the ordinary meaning, it extends it, so that time running against a predecessor in title runs against the plaintiff too.
"Defendant", section 2(e), includes any person from or through whom a defendant derives his liability to be sued, and any person whose estate is represented by the defendant as executor, administrator or other representative. The mirror image.
Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
"Applicant", section 2(a), includes a petitioner, any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply, and any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor, administrator or other representative. "Application", section 2(b), includes a petition.
"Good faith", section 2(h), and this is the one the Act itself leans on hardest: nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with DUE CARE AND ATTENTION. The definition is negative and it sets a real standard. Honesty alone is not good faith. This is what section 14 requires of a plaintiff who prosecuted a proceeding in the wrong court, and what section 5 has in mind when it asks for sufficient cause. See [Computation of the Period of Limitation].
"Easement", section 2(f), includes a right NOT ARISING FROM CONTRACT by which one person is entitled to remove and appropriate for his own profit any part of the soil belonging to another, or anything growing in, or attached to, or subsisting upon, the land of another. Two things follow. An easement under this Act does not arise from contract, which is the answer when the question is put that way. And the definition expressly brings in what the general law calls a profit a prendre, the right to take something from another's land. See [Acquisition of Ownership by Possession].
"Bill of exchange", section 2(c), includes a hundi and a cheque; "bond", section 2(d), includes any instrument by which a person obliges himself to pay money to another on condition that the obligation shall be void if a specified act is or is not performed; and "foreign country", section 2(g), means any country other than India.
Sections 3 to 5 are the bar and its two relaxations: the mandatory dismissal, the court being closed, and condonation of delay for sufficient cause. See [Bar of Limitation and Condonation of Delay].
Sections 6 to 9 deal with legal disability, minority, insanity and idiocy. See [Legal Disability].
Sections 12 to 24 deal with the computation of the period: what is excluded and what postpones the start. See [Computation of the Period of Limitation].
Sections 18 to 20 are the part of computation that supplies a fresh starting point, on acknowledgment in writing or part payment. See [Effect of Acknowledgment and Part Payment].
Sections 25 to 27 deal with the acquisition of ownership by possession, including easements and adverse possession. See [Acquisition of Ownership by Possession].
Section 29(2) is the bridge to other statutes: where a special or local law prescribes a period different from that in the Schedule, section 3 applies as if that period were prescribed by the Schedule, and sections 4 to 24 apply only in so far as they are not expressly excluded by that special or local law.
Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
The Schedule contains the actual periods, in 137 Articles arranged in three Divisions, and it is the part a practitioner uses every day. See [The Schedule: How to Find a Period of Limitation].
Features, gathered
A question asking for the "features" of the Act is asking for a list, so here is one, each item stated so it can be expanded.
One, it prescribes periods rather than creating rights. The right comes from the general law; the Act says when it must be enforced.
Two, it bars the remedy and not the right, except under section 27.
Three, it is applied by the court of its own motion, even if not pleaded, by section 3.
Four, it is a procedural statute, which is why the periods apply to proceedings begun after it came into force even in respect of earlier causes of action, subject to the transitional provisions in section 31.
Five, it allows relief against its own rigour in defined cases: section 4 where the court is closed, section 5 for sufficient cause, sections 6 to 8 for disability, sections 12 to 17 for exclusions, and sections 18 to 20 for fresh periods.
Six, it applies to suits, appeals and applications, and by section 29(2) it extends to special and local laws so far as they do not exclude it.
Seven, it deals with prescription as well as limitation, in sections 25 to 27, where possession over time creates and destroys title.
A worked example
Nandita lent Pravin Rs. 2,00,000 in March 2020, repayable on demand, and did nothing about it.
What does the Act do to her claim? It fixes the period within which she must sue, taken from the Schedule and then computed under the Act. If she is out of time, section 3 requires the court to dismiss the suit even if Pravin never pleads limitation.
Is her right gone? No. The Act bars the remedy, not the right. If Pravin voluntarily pays her, he cannot afterwards recover the money as having been paid under a mistake, because the debt was real; only the remedy was gone.
Would that be so if the claim were to recover land Pravin had been occupying for years? Not necessarily. Section 27 is the exception: at the determination of the period limited for a suit for possession, her right to the property is extinguished, and Pravin's possession ripens into title.
She points out that Pravin never raised limitation in his written statement. Section 3(1): limitation applies although it has not been set up as a defence.
Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
Her plaint does not say when the cause of action arose. Order VII Rule 1(e) requires it, and the omission invites an objection, since the court cannot see from the plaint whether the suit is in time.
Her claim is under a special statute with its own period. Section 29(2): section 3 applies as if that period were in the Schedule, and sections 4 to 24 apply only so far as that special law does not expressly exclude them.
What it does not mean
The Act does not create rights or liabilities. It fixes the time for enforcing them.
It does not extinguish rights, except under section 27 for suits for possession.
It is not an ordinary defence. The court applies it even if it is not pleaded.
"Period of limitation" and "prescribed period" are not the same. The first is the Schedule's figure; the second is that figure computed under the Act.
It is not confined to the Schedule. Section 29(2) carries it into special and local laws that do not exclude it.
Quick revision
Object: an end to litigation, the law aids the vigilant, and the law abhors delay. Practically: evidence decays and people must be able to close their affairs. A statute of repose, peace and rest.
Central feature: the Act bars the remedy, not the right, except section 27, which extinguishes the right to property at the end of the period for a suit for possession.
Section 3(1): a suit, appeal or application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Order VII Rule 1(e) and Rule 11(d) support this.
Section 2: "period of limitation" is the Schedule's figure; "prescribed period" is that period computed in accordance with the Act. "Plaintiff", "defendant" and "applicant" each include the person from or through whom the right or liability is derived and the person whose estate is represented; "application" includes a petition; "good faith" means nothing is done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention; and "easement" includes a right not arising from contract to remove and appropriate part of the soil of another or anything growing on or attached to it.
Scheme: 3 to 5 the bar, court closed, condonation; 6 to 9 disability; 12 to 24 computation; 18 to 20 fresh start on acknowledgment or part payment; 25 to 27 acquisition of ownership by possession; 29(2) application to special and local laws; the Schedule, 137 Articles in three Divisions.
Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
Test yourself
1. What is the purpose behind the enactment of the Limitation Act 1963? To require claims to be brought within a fixed time, so that there may be an end to litigation, so that stale claims are not tried on decayed evidence, and so that persons may close their affairs and deal with their property with security. It is described as a statute of repose, of peace and of rest, and it assists the vigilant rather than those who sleep over their rights.
2. Does the Act destroy the right or only the remedy? As a general rule it bars the remedy and does not extinguish the right, so that a time-barred debt remains a debt and money voluntarily paid on it cannot be recovered back. The exception is section 27, under which the right to property is extinguished at the determination of the period limited for instituting a suit for possession of it.
3. Must limitation be pleaded by the defendant? No. Section 3(1) provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence, so the court applies it of its own motion.
4. Define "prescribed period". Under section 2, the "prescribed period" means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act, as distinct from the "period of limitation", which is the period prescribed for a suit, appeal or application by the Schedule.
5. Define "plaintiff" and "good faith" under the Limitation Act. Under section 2(i) "plaintiff" includes any person from or through whom a plaintiff derives his right to sue, and any person whose estate is represented by the plaintiff as executor, administrator or other representative. Under section 2(h), nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention, so honesty alone is not enough.
6. Does a right of easement arise out of contract? Not under this Act. Section 2(f) defines "easement" as including a right not arising from contract, by which one person is entitled to remove and appropriate for his own profit any part of the soil belonging to another, or anything growing in, or attached to, or subsisting upon, the land of another.
7. Does the Act apply to special and local laws? Yes, by section 29(2). Where a special or local law prescribes a period different from that in the Schedule, section 3 applies as if that period were prescribed by the Schedule, and sections 4 to 24 apply only in so far as they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law.
Object and Features of the Limitation Act 1963
8. Name four features of the Act. It prescribes periods for suits, appeals and applications rather than creating rights; it bars the remedy and not the right, except under section 27; it is applied by the court of its own motion under section 3; and it provides relief against its own rigour through section 4 where the court is closed, section 5 for sufficient cause, sections 6 to 8 for legal disability, sections 12 to 17 for exclusions, and sections 18 to 20 for a fresh period on acknowledgment or part payment.
The rest of this subject
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