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INTRODUCING ADVANCEMENTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY-I

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

A social-psychological way of looking at reality involves examining how social factors, group dynamics, and individual psychology interact to shape people's perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors within a social context. This perspective emphasizes that human cognition and behavior are influenced by the social environment and the people around us.

1.1 KEY CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL WAY OF LOOKING AT REALITY

1. **Social Influence:** Social psychologists study how people are influenced by others in their social environment. This includes concepts like conformity (changing one's behavior to match that of others), compliance (agreeing to a request from another person), and obedience (following the orders of an authority figure).

   Social influence is a fundamental concept within the field of social psychology, which examines how individuals are affected by the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of others in their social environment. It plays a central role in shaping the way people perceive and interact with the world around them.

   Mentioned is an explanation of social influence as a key component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality:

   - **Definition of Social Influence:** Social influence refers to the process through which individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are influenced by the presence, actions, or opinions of others. It encompasses a wide range of social interactions and

can manifest in various forms, including conformity, compliance, obedience, and persuasion.

- **Conformity:** Conformity is a type of social influence where individuals change their attitudes or behaviors to match those of a larger group. This can occur due to the desire to fit in, avoid social rejection, or simply because people tend to follow the crowd. Psychologist Solomon Asch's classic conformity experiments demonstrated how people would conform to the incorrect judgments of a group when faced with a unanimous opinion.

- **Compliance:** Compliance involves a person agreeing to a request or suggestion from another individual or group, often due to social pressure or a desire to be liked. Techniques like persuasion, flattery, and reciprocity are commonly used to elicit compliance. For example, salespeople may use persuasive tactics to encourage customers to make a purchase.

- **Obedience:** Obedience is a more extreme form of social influence, where individuals follow the orders or commands of an authority figure, even if it goes against their personal values or beliefs. The Milgram obedience experiments illustrated how people could be induced to administer harmful electric shocks to others when instructed to do so by an authority figure.

- **Persuasion:** Persuasion is the deliberate attempt to change someone's attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors through communication and argumentation. Social psychologists study the factors that make persuasive messages effective, such as credibility, emotional appeals, and the use of social norms.

- **Informational and Normative Social Influence:** Social influence can be further categorized into informational and normative influence. Informational influence occurs when people conform or change their beliefs because they perceive the information provided by others as correct or valuable. Normative influence, on the other hand, occurs when individuals conform to social norms and expectations to gain social approval or avoid social disapproval.

- **Implications for Understanding Reality:** Social influence has a profound impact on how individuals perceive and interpret reality. It can lead to the adoption of beliefs, values, and behaviors that align with those of their social groups, even if these beliefs are inaccurate or irrational. This phenomenon can shape collective attitudes, political ideologies, cultural norms, and societal trends.

In summary, social influence is a key component of the social-psychological perspective on reality as it highlights the powerful role of social interactions and group dynamics in shaping individuals'

thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. It underscores the idea that people often look to others for cues on how to navigate the complexities of the social world, and this influence can significantly impact their perception of reality.

2. **Social Cognition:** Social psychologists explore how individuals perceive, interpret, and make sense of social information. This includes studying cognitive biases, such as confirmation bias (tendency to seek out information that confirms our existing beliefs) and attribution theory (how we attribute causes to events or behaviors).

   Social cognition is a fundamental concept within the realm of social psychology, which is the scientific study of how individuals think, feel, and behave in social situations. It plays a pivotal role in understanding how people perceive, interpret, and make sense of the social world around them. When we talk about social cognition as a key component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality, we are referring to its significance in shaping our understanding of human behavior within a social context.

   Here are key aspects of social cognition and its role in the social-psychological perspective:

   - Information Processing: Social cognition involves the mental processes through which individuals acquire, store, process, and use information related to social interactions. This includes how we perceive and remember others, their actions, and their intentions.

   - Social Perception: One of the central elements of social cognition is social perception. It encompasses the processes by which we form impressions of other people based on their physical appearance, behavior, and verbal and nonverbal cues. For instance, when we meet someone new, we quickly form judgments about their trustworthiness, friendliness, or competence.

   - Attribution: Social cognition also deals with attribution, which refers to the explanations or attributions we make for our own and others' behaviors. This includes determining whether someone's behavior is due to internal factors (personality, abilities) or external factors (situational influences). The way we attribute causes to behavior can have significant implications for our interactions and relationships.

   - Schemas and Stereotypes: Social cognition is influenced by cognitive structures known as schemas and stereotypes. Schemas are mental frameworks that help us organize and interpret information about social categories and events. Stereotypes are simplified and often biased beliefs about groups

of people. Both schemas and stereotypes can affect how we perceive and interact with others.

- Theory of Mind: Social cognition encompasses the ability to understand and predict the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of others, often referred to as having a "theory of mind." This is crucial for successful social interactions because it allows us to empathize with others, anticipate their actions, and respond appropriately.

- Perspective-Taking: Social cognition involves the capacity to take the perspective of others, putting oneself in someone else's shoes to understand their viewpoint and emotions. This skill is essential for empathy and effective communication.

- Biases and Heuristics: Social cognition also explores the various cognitive biases and heuristics that influence our social judgments and decision-making. These biases can lead to errors in our understanding of others and sometimes result in prejudice or discrimination.

- Social Influence: Understanding how people are influenced by others, both consciously and unconsciously, is another aspect of social cognition. This includes examining conformity, obedience, and persuasion in social contexts.

In summary, social cognition is a vital component of the social-psychological perspective because it helps us dissect and comprehend the cognitive processes underlying human social behavior. By studying how people think about, interpret, and interact with others, social psychologists gain insights into the complexities of social dynamics, relationships, and societal issues. This perspective enables us to better understand and address a wide range of social phenomena and challenges in our daily lives.

3. **Group Dynamics:** Understanding how groups function and how they influence individual behavior is a central focus of social psychology. Concepts like groupthink (the tendency of a group to prioritize consensus over critical thinking), in-group/out-group dynamics (how we categorize people as part of our group or not), and social identity theory (how our self-concept is tied to group membership) are studied.

Group dynamics is a fundamental concept in social psychology that examines how individuals behave, think, and feel within the context of a group. It is a key component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality because it helps us understand how social interactions, relationships, and the presence of others can influence our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. Here's an explanation of group dynamics in this context:

- **Social Influence:** Group dynamics explores how individuals are influenced by the presence and actions of others in a group.

This influence can take various forms, such as conformity (adjusting one's behavior to fit group norms), compliance (following requests or commands), and obedience (complying with authority figures). Social psychologists study how these forms of influence operate and how they affect decision-making and behavior.

- **Norms and Roles:** Groups develop norms (shared expectations of behavior) and roles (positions and responsibilities within the group). Group members often conform to these norms and adopt specific roles to facilitate smooth interactions. For example, a sports team may have norms about teamwork and roles like captain and coach. Group dynamics research delves into how these norms and roles shape individual behavior and group functioning.

- **Leadership and Power:** Group dynamics explores the emergence and impact of leadership within groups. It examines how leaders gain authority, maintain their positions, and influence group members. Understanding leadership dynamics is crucial for comprehending how leaders can shape group goals, decision-making processes, and overall group cohesion.

- **Conflict and Cooperation:** Groups are not always harmonious; conflicts can arise due to differences in opinions, goals, or personalities. Group dynamics research investigates the causes of conflicts and the strategies used to manage or resolve them. Additionally, it examines the factors that promote cooperation within groups, such as shared objectives and effective communication.

- **Identity and Social Identity:** Group dynamics considers how group membership contributes to an individual's social identity. People often derive part of their self-concept from the groups they belong to (e.g., nationality, religion, or ethnicity). This can lead to in-group favoritism and out-group biases, influencing attitudes and behaviors toward members of other groups.

- **Groupthink and Decision-Making:** Group dynamics can shed light on phenomena like groupthink, where a desire for consensus within a group can lead to poor decision-making. Researchers examine the conditions under which groupthink is likely to occur and propose strategies to mitigate its negative effects.

- **Social Facilitation and Social Loafing:** Group dynamics includes the study of how the presence of others can impact individual performance. Social facilitation suggests that the presence of an audience or co-workers can enhance performance on simple tasks, whereas social loafing occurs when individuals exert less effort in a group context, assuming

others will pick up the slack. Understanding these phenomena helps explain variations in individual productivity in group settings.

- **Group Cohesion:** This aspect of group dynamics focuses on the emotional bonds and interpersonal relationships within a group. High group cohesion can lead to increased satisfaction and commitment among group members, while low cohesion can result in conflicts and reduced group effectiveness.

In summary, group dynamics is a crucial component of the social-psychological perspective because it provides insights into how individuals are influenced by and interact with others in various group contexts. This understanding helps us make sense of the complex ways in which social factors shape our perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in our interactions with others, ultimately contributing to a more comprehensive view of human social behavior and reality.

4. **Social Norms:** Social psychologists examine the unwritten rules and expectations that guide behavior within a society or group. Deviation from these norms can result in social consequences, such as approval or disapproval from others.

Social norms are a fundamental concept in the social-psychological way of looking at reality. They represent the unwritten rules and expectations that govern behavior within a particular society or group. These norms provide a framework for understanding how individuals and groups function in social contexts and are a key component of social psychology, which explores how people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by their social environment.

Below are the key areas to consider when understanding social norms within the context of the social-psychological perspective:

- **Definition of Social Norms:** Social norms encompass the accepted and expected behaviors, values, and beliefs within a society or group. They dictate what is considered appropriate or inappropriate in various situations. Social norms can be explicit (written rules and laws) or implicit (unspoken but widely understood expectations).

- **Socialization:** Social norms are learned through a process called socialization. Individuals acquire these norms from their families, peers, media, and other social institutions. As people grow and develop, they internalize these norms, which guide their behavior in different social contexts.

- **Normative Influence**: Social norms exert a powerful influence on individuals' behavior. This influence is known as normative influence, and it often leads people to conform to societal expectations to gain approval, avoid disapproval, or fit in with

a group. Non-compliance with social norms can result in social sanctions, such as criticism, ostracism, or legal consequences.

- **Role in Social Identity:** Social norms play a crucial role in shaping an individual's social identity. People often categorize themselves and others based on adherence to or deviation from social norms. These norms can contribute to the formation of group identities, which can be a source of pride and solidarity or conflict and discrimination.

- **Variability across Cultures:** Social norms can vary significantly across different cultures and subcultures. What is considered normal behavior in one society may be considered deviant in another. This cultural relativity highlights the importance of considering cultural context when studying social norms.

- **Changing Social Norms:** Social norms are not static; they can change over time in response to societal shifts, new information, or evolving values. Social psychologists study how and why social norms change, as well as the psychological processes that underlie such changes.

- **Deviance:** Deviance refers to behaviors that violate established social norms. Social psychologists study deviance to understand why some individuals engage in deviant behavior, the consequences of deviance, and how society responds to it. The perception of deviance can lead to labeling and stigmatization, which can, in turn, affect an individual's self-concept and behavior.

- **Normative Behavior:** In addition to understanding deviance, social psychologists also study normative behavior. They explore why people conform to social norms, the factors that influence conformity, and the psychological mechanisms that drive individuals to comply with societal expectations.

In summary, social norms are a central concept in the social-psychological way of looking at reality because they provide a framework for understanding how individuals and groups interact within a society or culture. They shape behavior, influence social identities, and are subject to change and adaptation over time. Social psychologists study social norms to gain insights into human behavior, group dynamics, and the impact of society on individuals' thoughts, feelings, and actions.

5. **Social Perception:** This area explores how people form impressions of others and make judgments about their traits and intentions. Stereotypes (cognitive schemas about groups of people) and prejudice (negative attitudes or beliefs about a particular group) are key topics in this area.

Social perception is a fundamental component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality. It refers to the process by which individuals interpret and make sense of the social world around them. This concept is central to social psychology, which is the scientific study of how people think, feel, and behave in social situations.

Here are some key aspects of social perception within the social-psychological framework:

Perception of Others: Social perception involves how individuals perceive and form impressions of other people. This includes judgments about their personalities, intentions, emotions, and behaviors. For example, when you meet someone for the first time, you may quickly assess whether they are friendly, trustworthy, or competent based on your initial perceptions.

- **Attribution:** Attribution is a key component of social perception. It refers to the process of explaining the causes of people's behavior. Social psychologists are interested in understanding whether individuals attribute behavior to internal factors (e.g., personality traits) or external factors (e.g., situational circumstances). The way people make attributions can significantly influence their attitudes and behaviors toward others.

- **Stereotyping:** Social perception also involves the use of stereotypes, which are generalized beliefs or assumptions about a group of people. Stereotypes can affect how individuals perceive and interact with others, often leading to biases and discrimination. Social psychologists study how stereotypes are formed, maintained, and how they impact interpersonal relationships and societal attitudes.

- **Prejudice and Discrimination:** Social perception plays a crucial role in the development of prejudice and discrimination. Prejudice refers to negative attitudes and emotions toward individuals or groups based on their perceived characteristics. Discrimination involves unfair or biased treatment of individuals or groups due to their perceived differences. Social psychologists explore the cognitive processes underlying these behaviors and work to understand how they can be reduced or mitigated.

- **Impression Management:** People often engage in impression management, which involves consciously or unconsciously presenting themselves in a favorable way to others. Social perception encompasses not only how we perceive others but also how we present ourselves to be perceived by others. This can involve strategies like self-presentation, self-disclosure, and impression formation.

- **Social Cognition:** Social perception is closely related to social cognition, which encompasses the mental processes involved in perceiving, interpreting, and remembering information about the social world. Social cognition includes not only perception but also processes such as memory, judgment, and decision-making in social contexts.

In summary, social perception is a key component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality because it provides insights into how individuals understand and navigate the complex social world. It sheds light on the cognitive processes, biases, and stereotypes that influence our interactions, attitudes, and behaviors in social situations. By studying social perception, social psychologists aim to better understand human behavior and promote more positive and equitable social relationships.

6. **Social Behavior:** Social psychologists investigate how social factors influence behavior, including aggression, altruism, attraction, and cooperation. They also examine the role of situational factors in shaping behavior.

Social behavior is a fundamental concept in the social-psychological way of looking at reality. This perspective focuses on understanding how individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by the social environment and the people around them. Social psychology explores the ways in which individuals interact with and are influenced by others, as well as how these interactions shape their perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Here are key components of social behavior within the social-psychological framework:

- **Social Influence:** Social psychology emphasizes the impact of others on an individual's thoughts, emotions, and actions. It examines how people conform to group norms, follow authority figures, and are influenced by peer pressure. Social influence can manifest in various forms, such as conformity, compliance, and obedience.

- **Social Cognition:** Social psychologists study how people process and interpret information about themselves and others in social situations. This includes examining the formation of stereotypes, prejudice, and attitudes, as well as how people make judgments and decisions based on social information.

- **Social Perception:** Social behavior is shaped by how individuals perceive and interpret the behavior and intentions of others. Social perception involves the process of attributing causes to behavior, forming impressions of people, and understanding social cues such as facial expressions and body language.

- **Social Interactions:** Social behavior occurs within the context of interactions with others. These interactions can be

cooperative or competitive, and they involve complex processes such as communication, conflict resolution, and cooperation. Social psychologists study how individuals navigate and adapt to different social situations.

- **Social Identity:** People often define themselves and others in terms of social categories, such as race, gender, ethnicity, and nationality. Social identity theory explains how these group memberships influence individuals' self-concept and behavior. It also examines the dynamics of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.

- **Social Relationships:** The study of social behavior includes examining the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of social relationships. This encompasses romantic relationships, friendships, family dynamics, and broader social networks. Social psychology explores the factors that contribute to relationship satisfaction and stability.

- **Aggression and Altruism:** Social psychologists investigate the factors that lead to aggressive behavior, including the role of frustration, social learning, and situational factors. Additionally, they explore altruism and prosocial behavior, examining why individuals sometimes act in ways that benefit others without apparent personal gain.

- **Group Dynamics:** Social behavior often occurs within the context of groups. Social psychologists study how group dynamics influence decision-making, group cohesion, leadership, and the emergence of social norms within groups.

- **Social Change and Social Influence:** Social psychology also explores how individuals and groups can bring about social change through processes like persuasion, activism, and social movements. This involves understanding the mechanisms by which beliefs and attitudes can be shifted to promote positive societal outcomes.

In summary, social behavior is a central component of the social-psychological perspective, which seeks to understand how individuals' thoughts, emotions, and actions are influenced by their social environment and interactions with others. This framework helps us comprehend the complexities of human behavior in various social contexts and sheds light on the intricate interplay between the individual and society.

7. **Social Interaction:** This aspect looks at the dynamics of social interactions, including communication, persuasion, and conflict resolution. It explores how people communicate and the impact of communication on relationships and outcomes.

Social interaction is a fundamental concept in the social-psychological way of looking at reality. This perspective, rooted in the field of social psychology, examines how individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by the presence and actions of others. Social interaction is considered a key component of this perspective because it helps us understand the intricate ways in which people shape and are shaped by their social environment.

Here are some key aspects of social interaction within the social-psychological framework:

- **Social Influence:** Social interaction encompasses the various ways people influence each other. This can occur through processes like conformity, where individuals adjust their behavior or beliefs to align with group norms, or compliance, where people conform to direct requests from others. Understanding these processes helps us grasp how individuals adapt to societal expectations and norms.

- **Social Perception**: Social interaction involves the way people perceive and interpret the actions and behaviors of others. Social psychologists study how individuals form impressions of others, make judgments about their intentions, and attribute causes to their actions. These perceptions can significantly impact how people interact with and respond to one another.

- **Social Cognition:** Social interaction also includes the cognitive processes involved in understanding and processing social information. This includes processes like social categorization (grouping people into categories based on characteristics), social schemas (mental frameworks for organizing social information), and attribution (assigning causes to behaviors). Social cognition helps explain how individuals make sense of their social world.

- **Communication:** Effective communication is a crucial element of social interaction. This includes verbal and non-verbal communication, such as facial expressions, body language, and tone of voice. Social psychologists study how people encode and decode these messages, as well as how miscommunications or misunderstandings can occur.

- **Social Roles and Norms:** Social interaction is influenced by the roles individuals play in different social contexts and the norms that govern behavior within those roles. Roles define the expectations and responsibilities associated with a position (e.g., teacher, parent, friend), while norms are shared guidelines for appropriate behavior within a specific group or culture. Social psychologists explore how conformity to these roles and norms can impact behavior.

- **Group Dynamics:** Social interaction often takes place within groups. Group dynamics involve the study of how individuals behave in groups, the emergence of leaders, group cohesion, and the influence of group processes on individual behavior. Understanding these dynamics helps explain collective behavior and decision-making.

- **Social Influence on Emotions:** Social interaction can also influence emotions. People's emotions are not solely determined by their internal states but can be influenced by the emotions of those around them. This phenomenon is known as emotional contagion, where individuals "catch" the emotions of others through social interaction.

In summary, social interaction is a central component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality because it underscores how individuals are profoundly affected by their interactions with others. By examining the various facets of social interaction, social psychologists gain insights into human behavior, attitudes, and emotions in social contexts, providing a comprehensive understanding of how individuals navigate and contribute to their social worlds.

8. **Cultural and Cross-Cultural Perspectives:** Social psychologists also consider how cultural norms, values, and beliefs impact social behavior and perception. Cross-cultural research examines how these factors vary across different societies.

Cultural and cross-cultural perspectives are key components of the social-psychological way of looking at reality. These perspectives emphasize the influence of culture and cultural differences on human behavior, thoughts, emotions, and social interactions. Let's break down these concepts further:

1. **Cultural Perspective:**

   - Definition: The cultural perspective within the social-psychological framework recognizes that individuals are shaped by the cultural context in which they are raised and live. Culture refers to the shared beliefs, values, customs, norms, and practices of a particular group of people.

   Key Components:

   - **Cultural Norms:** Each culture has its own set of norms and expectations for behavior. These norms dictate what is considered appropriate or acceptable behavior within that culture.

   - **Cultural Values:** Cultural values reflect the principles and ideals that guide a culture's members. These values

influence people's priorities, decision-making, and attitudes.

- **Cultural Identity:** Cultural identity refers to an individual's sense of belonging to a particular cultural group. It can have a profound impact on self-esteem and psychological well-being.

- **Cultural Influences on Cognition and Perception:** Culture can shape the way people perceive the world, process information, and interpret events. This can lead to cultural variations in cognition and perception.

- **Examples:** Different cultures may have varying attitudes towards family, individualism vs. collectivism, communication styles, and even concepts of self-esteem. For instance, some cultures may prioritize harmony and cooperation, while others may prioritize individual achievement and competition.

2. Cross-Cultural Perspective:

- Definition: The cross-cultural perspective expands on the cultural perspective by examining how cultures interact with and influence each other. It involves the study of cultural differences, similarities, and the impact of cultural diversity on human behavior and social dynamics.

Key Components:

- **Cultural Universal:** While cultures differ in many ways, there are also commonalities or cultural universals that exist across societies. These may include basic emotions, social hierarchies, and the need for communication.

- **Cultural Relativism:** This perspective emphasizes that behavior should be understood within the cultural context in which it occurs. What is considered normal or abnormal can vary greatly between cultures.

- **Acculturation:** Acculturation refers to the process by which individuals or groups from one culture come into contact with and adapt to another culture. It can lead to changes in identity, behavior, and attitudes.

- **Intercultural Communication:** Understanding how to effectively communicate and interact with people from different cultures is a key aspect of the cross-cultural perspective. Misunderstandings can arise due to differences in communication styles and cultural norms.

Examples: The study of cross-cultural psychology might involve comparing parenting practices in different cultures, exploring how cultural diversity impacts workplace dynamics, or examining the influence of culture on mental health and well-being.

In summary, cultural and cross-cultural perspectives are essential components of the social-psychological approach to understanding human behavior and social interactions. They highlight the significance of culture in shaping individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, as well as the complex interplay between cultures in our interconnected world. These perspectives help researchers and practitioners better understand and navigate the rich tapestry of human diversity and behavior.

9. **Social Change:** Social psychology often explores how attitudes and behaviors can be changed at a societal level. This includes research on topics like social activism, prejudice reduction, and behavior change campaigns.

Social change is a key component of the social-psychological way of looking at reality. This perspective combines insights from social psychology and sociology to understand how individual behavior and attitudes interact with broader societal forces to shape and drive change within societies. Here's a more detailed explanation of how social change is viewed within this framework:

- **Individual Behavior and Attitudes:** Social psychology focuses on understanding how individual behavior and attitudes are influenced by social factors. It examines how people's thoughts, feelings, and actions are shaped by their interactions with others, their social identity, and their perceptions of social norms and expectations.

- **Micro-level Analysis:** At the micro-level of analysis, social psychology explores how individual psychological processes, such as attitudes, beliefs, prejudice, and interpersonal relationships, contribute to social change. It emphasizes that social change often starts with changes in individual attitudes and behaviors.

- **Influence of Social Norms:** Social norms are an important concept within social psychology. They are the unwritten rules and expectations that guide behavior in a given society or group. Social psychologists examine how individuals conform to or deviate from these norms and how such conformity or deviation can drive social change.

- **Persuasion and Attitude Change:** Social psychologists study the processes of persuasion and attitude change, which are critical for understanding how new ideas or social movements gain traction and lead to social change. They explore how individuals can be persuaded to adopt new beliefs, values, or behaviors.

5. **Group Dynamics:** Groups play a significant role in social change. Social psychologists investigate how group dynamics, such as leadership, conformity, and groupthink, influence collective decision-making and action. Social movements and activism often involve group dynamics that drive change.

- **The Power of Social Influence:** Social psychology also looks at the power of social influence, including factors like authority, social pressure, and conformity. Understanding how individuals can be influenced by others or by societal institutions is crucial for comprehending social change processes.

- **Macro-level Impact:** While social psychology primarily focuses on individual-level processes, it acknowledges the connection between individual actions and broader societal change. It recognizes that collective change emerges when a critical mass of individuals adopts new behaviors or attitudes.

- **Feedback Loop:** Social-psychological perspectives often emphasize the cyclical nature of social change. As individuals change their attitudes and behaviors, they can also influence the broader social context, reinforcing or challenging existing norms and systems. This feedback loop can sustain or accelerate social change.

- **Applications:** Social psychologists work on a wide range of societal issues, including prejudice reduction, social justice, health behavior change, and conflict resolution. Their research informs interventions and strategies aimed at promoting positive social change.

In summary, the social-psychological way of looking at reality recognizes the vital role of individual psychology and behavior in driving social change. It explores how individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and actions interact with social norms, group dynamics, and societal forces to shape the evolution of societies. This perspective highlights the interconnectedness of individual and collective processes in understanding and promoting social change.

10. **Social Experiments and Research Methods:**

Social psychologists frequently use experimental methods to study human behavior in controlled settings. They also conduct surveys, field studies, and other research methods to investigate real-world social phenomena.

Social experiments and research methods are key components of the social-psychological way of looking at reality. This approach combines insights from both sociology and psychology to understand how individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by their social environment. Here's an explanation of these components within this perspective:

1. Social Experiments:

Social experiments involve manipulating variables in a controlled setting to observe and understand how individuals or groups of people respond to specific social situations or stimuli. These experiments are designed to test hypotheses and establish causal relationships. Key elements of social experiments include:

- Randomization: Participants are often randomly assigned to different experimental conditions or groups to ensure that the groups are comparable, minimizing bias.
- Independent and Dependent Variables: Researchers manipulate an independent variable (the factor being tested) to observe its effect on a dependent variable (the outcome of interest).
- Control Groups: Control groups are used to establish a baseline for comparison, ensuring that any observed effects are not due to extraneous factors.
- Ethical Considerations: Ethical guidelines are followed to protect the rights and well-being of participants, including informed consent and debriefing after the experiment.

Social experiments can help uncover the underlying psychological mechanisms that drive social behavior, such as conformity, obedience, and group dynamics. Classic experiments like the Stanford Prison Experiment and the Milgram Experiment are examples of how social psychologists have used this method to gain insights into human behavior within a social context.

2. Research Methods:

Social psychologists use a variety of research methods to investigate social phenomena. These methods include:

- Surveys and Questionnaires: Researchers collect data by asking participants to respond to structured questions. Surveys can provide insights into attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors on a larger scale.
- Observational Studies: Researchers observe and record behavior in natural settings. This method is valuable for studying behavior as it occurs without experimental manipulation.
- Archival Research: Researchers analyze existing records, documents, and historical data to investigate social trends and changes over time.

- Correlational Studies: Researchers examine the relationships between variables without experimental manipulation. Correlation does not imply causation, but it can reveal associations and patterns.

- Longitudinal Studies: These studies follow individuals or groups over an extended period to investigate changes and developments in behavior and attitudes.

Social psychologists employ these research methods to explore a wide range of topics, such as prejudice, social influence, interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and more. These methods allow researchers to gather empirical evidence and generate theories to explain and predict social behavior.

The social-psychological perspective emphasizes the interplay between individual psychological processes and the social context in which they occur. By conducting social experiments and employing various research methods, social psychologists aim to uncover the complex interactions that shape human behavior, ultimately contributing to our understanding of how individuals function in society. This approach helps address questions related to social norms, identity, discrimination, cooperation, and conflict, among others, and has practical applications in fields like education, marketing, and public policy.

1.2 DATA ANALYSIS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:

Data analysis in social psychology involves the process of collecting, organizing, and interpreting data to gain insights into human behavior, attitudes, and social interactions.

Mentioned below are the steps involved in data analysis in social psychology:

1. **Research Design:** Before data collection, researchers must carefully plan their studies. This includes defining research questions or hypotheses, selecting appropriate research methods (e.g., experiments, surveys, observations), and deciding on the variables to be measured.

2. **Data Collection:** Once the research design is in place, data is collected using the chosen methods. This can involve surveys, experiments, observations, or interviews. Researchers must ensure that the data collection process is rigorous, ethical, and consistent with their research goals.

3. **Data Cleaning and Preparation:** Raw data often contains errors, missing values, or inconsistencies. Data cleaning involves identifying

and correcting these issues to ensure the dataset is reliable and ready for analysis. This step may also involve coding and categorizing variables.

4. **Data Analysis Techniques:** Social psychologists use various statistical and analytical techniques to examine their data. The choice of technique depends on the research questions and the type of data collected. Common techniques include:

   - **Descriptive Statistics:** These techniques summarize and describe the main features of the data, such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and frequency distributions.
   - **Inferential Statistics:** Inferential statistics are used to make inferences or draw conclusions about a population based on a sample. Common techniques include t-tests, ANOVA, regression analysis, and chi-square tests.
   - **Content Analysis:** This method involves systematically analyzing textual or qualitative data to identify patterns, themes, or trends.
   - Qualitative Data Analysis: Qualitative data, such as interview transcripts or open-ended survey responses, are often analyzed using techniques like thematic analysis or grounded theory.

5. **Interpretation:** Once the data analysis is complete, researchers interpret the results in the context of their research questions. They draw conclusions and discuss the implications of their findings.

6. **Reporting:** Researchers typically write up their findings in research papers, reports, or presentations. It is important to communicate the methods used, the results obtained, and the implications of the research accurately and transparently.

7. **Peer Review and Publication:** Before publication, research is often subject to peer review, where experts in the field assess the quality and validity of the study. Once accepted, the research may be published in academic journals or presented at conferences.

8. **Replication and Meta-Analysis:** Replication of studies by other researchers is essential for confirming the validity of findings. Meta-analysis involves combining the results of multiple studies on the same topic to draw more robust conclusions.

9. **Ethical Considerations:** Throughout the data analysis process, researchers must adhere to ethical guidelines. This includes obtaining informed consent from participants, ensuring participant confidentiality, and minimizing harm.

10. **Continuous Learning:** Social psychologists should stay updated with the latest research methods and statistical techniques. The field of social psychology is dynamic, and new approaches to data analysis are continually emerging.

1.4 SUMMARY

Overall, a social-psychological perspective emphasizes the intricate interplay between individual psychology and the social environment. It helps us understand how people's perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors are shaped by the society and the social groups to which they belong, and how individuals, in turn, can influence and shape the social reality they inhabit.

Data analysis in social psychology is a systematic and structured process that involves collecting, cleaning, analyzing, and interpreting data to gain insights into human behavior and social phenomena. Properly conducted data analysis is crucial for advancing our understanding of social processes and contributing to the body of knowledge in the field.

1.5 QUESTIONS

1. Explain the key concepts and principles associated with the social psychological way of looking at reality
2. Define and explain social influence
3. What is conformity?
4. What are the key aspects of social cognition and its role in the social-psychological perspective?
5. Why is group dynamics considered as a fundamental concept in social psychology?
6. Define and explain social norms.
7. Explain aggression and altruism.
8. Discuss the cultural and cross-cultural perspective
9. What are the various methods that social psychologists use to investigate social phenomena?
10. Explain data analysis in the field of social psychology

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2

SOCIAL STRUCTURE, PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS-II

Unit Structure:

2.0 Introduction

2.1 Social structure and personality

2.1.1 Social structure and its components

2.1.2 Personality and its components

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

Social structure and personality are two interrelated concepts within the field of psychology that help us understand how individuals interact with and are influenced by the larger society in which they live. These concepts shed light on the ways in which social forces, norms, and institutions shape human behavior and personality development.

Social structure refers to the organized patterns of relationships, roles, and institutions that make up a society or a social group. It encompasses the various levels of organization within a society, from the macro-level, which includes institutions like family, education, religion, and the economy, to the micro-level, which involves individual interactions and relationships.

Personality refers to an individual's unique and enduring patterns of thinking, feeling, and behaving. It encompasses a person's characteristics, traits, motivations, and behaviors that distinguish them from others. Personality is shaped by a combination of genetic factors and environmental influences, including socialization within the broader social structure.

2.1 SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND PERSONALITY

Social structure and personality are two key concepts within the field of social psychology that help us understand how individuals interact with and are influenced by the social world around them.

Social structure refers to the organized patterns of relationships, roles, and institutions that shape human interactions within a society or group. It encompasses the various hierarchies, norms, and expectations that guide people's behavior in social contexts. Social structure can be seen as the

framework within which individuals and groups operate, and it has a profound impact on how people perceive themselves and others.

Personality refers to the unique and relatively stable patterns of thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that characterize an individual over time and across different situations. Social psychologists are interested in how an individual's personality interacts with and is influenced by their social environment.

2.1.1 Key components of social structure

- **Roles:** These are sets of expectations and behaviors associated with a particular position or status within a society. For example, the roles of a parent, teacher, or police officer come with specific expectations.
- **Norms:** Norms are socially accepted rules and standards of behavior that guide individuals' actions. They vary across cultures and can be either explicit or implicit.
- **Institutions:** These are formalized structures and organizations that serve specific functions in society, such as government, education, and religion.

Social psychologists study social structure to understand how it influences individuals' attitudes, behaviors, and self-concept. They investigate how people conform to or deviate from social norms, how social hierarchies impact power dynamics, and how social structures can shape prejudice, discrimination, and inequality.

2.1.2. Key components of personality:

- Trait Theories: These theories examine the enduring traits or dimensions of personality (e.g., extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness) and how they affect social behavior. For example, an extraverted person may be more inclined to seek out social interactions.
- Social Identity: Social identity theory explores how individuals derive their self-concept and self-esteem from their group memberships. People often define themselves in terms of their race, gender, nationality, or other social categories.
- Self-Concept: Social psychologists study how individuals perceive themselves and how these self-conceptions are influenced by social feedback, comparisons with others, and societal standards.

Personality can influence how people respond to social situations, interact with others, and form social relationships. Social psychologists investigate how personality traits and individual differences impact behavior in group settings, social influence processes, and the formation of stereotypes and biases.

2.1.3 The Relationship Between Social Structure and Personality:

The interaction between social structure and personality is complex and reciprocal. Social structure exerts a significant influence on personality development through processes like socialization, which is the transmission of cultural norms, values, and behaviors from one generation to the next. The roles and statuses individuals occupy within society shape their self-concept and identity, ultimately influencing their personality traits and behaviors.

Conversely, individual personalities can also impact social structure by affecting the roles individuals take on and the positions they achieve within various social institutions. For example, a person with strong leadership traits may be more likely to occupy a leadership role in their workplace or community.

In conclusion, social structure and personality are intertwined aspects of human existence. Understanding how these two elements interact can provide valuable insights into how societies function and how individuals navigate the complex web of social relationships and expectations. Researchers in sociology and psychology continue to explore these dynamics to gain a deeper understanding of human behavior and societal organization.

Understanding how these two concepts are interconnected is crucial for gaining insights into human behavior within a societal context. This correlation can be understood in the following area:

1. **Socialization and Personality Development:** Socialization is the process through which individuals acquire the norms, values, beliefs, and behaviors of their culture or society. It plays a pivotal role in shaping an individual's personality. Social structure, such as family, schools, religious institutions, and peer groups, serves as agents of socialization. These institutions impart certain norms and values that influence the development of personality traits and characteristics. For example, a child raised in a strict religious household is more likely to develop a personality that aligns with the values and beliefs of that religion.

2. **Social Roles and Identity:** Social structure assigns individuals' various roles within society, such as parent, teacher, student, employee, and citizen. These roles come with certain expectations and responsibilities.

   People often adapt their personalities to align with the expectations of the roles they occupy. This adaptation is known as role identity. For instance, an individual who becomes a parent may adopt a more responsible, nurturing, and protective personality, as these traits are associated with the parental role.

3. **Social Norms and Conformity:** Social structure establishes norms, which are shared expectations about appropriate behavior within a

society. People are often influenced by these norms, leading to conformity. Personality traits like agreeableness and conscientiousness may make individuals more likely to conform to social norms and expectations.

Conversely, personality traits like rebelliousness or non-conformity may lead individuals to challenge or reject societal norms, potentially leading to social change.

4. **Social Hierarchies and Power Dynamics:** Social structure often includes hierarchies and power dynamics that can shape an individual's personality. Individuals occupying positions of power may develop personality traits such as assertiveness, dominance, and confidence. Conversely, those in subordinate positions may develop traits like submissiveness and deference. These personality traits can, in turn, reinforce and perpetuate social hierarchies.

5. **Social Identity Theory:** Social identity theory, proposed by Tajfel and Turner, highlights the importance of group membership in shaping an individual's identity and personality. People derive a significant portion of their self-concept and self-esteem from the groups they belong to. The identity associated with these groups can influence personality traits, attitudes, and behaviors. For example, someone strongly identifying with a political party may adopt the party's values and develop personality traits associated with those values.

6. **Social Influence and Socialization Agents:** Social structure introduces individuals to various socialization agents, including family, peers, media, and institutions. These agents expose individuals to different socialization processes, which can shape personality. For example, exposure to media and popular culture can influence an individual's attitudes, preferences, and behaviors, which, in turn, contribute to their personality.

In summary, the correlation between social structure and personality is complex and bidirectional. Social structure influences the development and expression of personality traits, while individual personalities can also impact how people interact with and contribute to the social structure. This interplay between social structure and personality is a central focus of social psychology, as it helps us understand how individuals navigate and shape the social world they inhabit.

2.2 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTIONS

The social psychology of emotions is a subfield within psychology that focuses on understanding how emotions are influenced by social factors, interactions, and contexts. It explores the ways in which individuals' emotional experiences, expressions, and regulation are shaped by their interactions with other people and the broader social environment. Here are some key aspects and concepts related to the social psychology of emotions:

1. **Emotional Contagion:** This is the phenomenon where people tend to "catch" or mimic the emotions of those around them. For example, if you're in a room full of happy people, you're more likely to feel happy, and conversely, if you're around sad or anxious individuals, those emotions can become contagious.

    - **Emotional contagion** is a concept within the field of social psychology that refers to the phenomenon where one person's emotions and related behaviors can directly trigger similar emotions and behaviors in others. It's a fundamental aspect of human social interaction and plays a significant role in how we connect with and influence each other emotionally. Let's discuss the components of emotional contagion within the broader context of the social psychology of emotions:

    - **Emotional Mimicry:** One of the primary components of emotional contagion is emotional mimicry. This occurs when individuals unconsciously imitate the facial expressions, body language, and vocal tones of the people around them. For example, if someone in a group is smiling and appears happy, others are likely to mimic this expression and feel happier themselves. This mimicry helps create a sense of emotional connection among individuals.

    - **Automaticity:** Emotional contagion typically operates at an automatic or subconscious level. People often pick up on the emotions of others without consciously realizing it. This automaticity makes emotional contagion a powerful and pervasive social phenomenon, as it can occur without individuals being fully aware of it.

    - **Empathy:** Empathy is closely linked to emotional contagion. While emotional contagion involves the automatic sharing of emotions, empathy involves the cognitive and emotional ability to understand and share in the feelings of another person. Empathy can enhance the effects of emotional contagion, as individuals who are more empathetic are often more prone to experiencing and responding to the emotions of others.

    - **Affective Feedback Loop:** Emotional contagion can create a feedback loop. When one person's emotions are mirrored by others, it can intensify and perpetuate those emotions. For example, if someone starts laughing in a group, others may join in, and the collective laughter can become more contagious and robust.

    - **Social Norms and Expressive Display Rules:** Social norms and expressive display rules play a role in emotional contagion. These norms dictate how emotions should be expressed and managed in various social contexts. For example, in some cultures, it may be considered inappropriate to express sadness

openly, so individuals may suppress their emotions. Conversely, in other cultures, the expression of emotions like joy or sadness may be encouraged and shared more freely.

- **Mirror Neurons:** Some researchers believe that mirror neurons, which are a type of brain cell that fires both when we perform an action and when we see someone else perform the same action, may be involved in emotional contagion. Mirror neurons might help explain how we can "mirror" the emotions and actions of others, fostering a sense of shared emotional experience.

- **Positive and Negative Contagion:** Emotional contagion can involve both positive and negative emotions. Positive emotions like joy and enthusiasm can spread easily within a group, promoting a positive social atmosphere. On the other hand, negative emotions such as fear or anxiety can also be contagious, leading to collective stress or unease.

- **Individual Differences:** Not everyone is equally susceptible to emotional contagion. Individual differences, such as personality traits, emotional intelligence, and personal experiences, can influence how strongly one experiences and expresses emotional contagion.

In summary, emotional contagion is a critical concept in the social psychology of emotions. It highlights the ways in which emotions are shared and spread within social groups, contributing to social bonding, communication, and the overall emotional atmosphere of a given context. Understanding emotional contagion can provide insights into how emotions influence interpersonal relationships, group dynamics, and social behavior.

2. **Social Norms and Emotions:** Societal and cultural norms play a significant role in shaping how people express and regulate their emotions. Different cultures may have varying expectations regarding which emotions are acceptable to display in certain situations.

Social norms and emotions are two important concepts in the field of social psychology, and they are closely intertwined. Social norms are unwritten rules or expectations within a society or group that dictate how individuals should behave in various situations. These norms guide our interactions with others and help maintain social order. Emotions, on the other hand, are complex psychological and physiological responses to internal and external stimuli, which play a crucial role in shaping our social interactions and adherence to social norms.

Here's a more detailed exploration of how social norms and emotions are connected in social psychology:

- **Emotions as Social Signals:** Emotions serve as social signals that convey information to others about our inner states and intentions. When we experience emotions like happiness, sadness, anger, or fear, our facial expressions, body language, and tone of voice often reflect these feelings. Others use these cues to interpret our emotional states and respond accordingly.

- **Conformity to Social Norms:** Emotions can influence our behavior by motivating us to conform to social norms. Social norms often dictate how we should express and manage our emotions in various situations. For example, in many cultures, it's considered appropriate to express happiness at a friend's success and sympathy when someone is going through a difficult time. Deviating from these emotional norms can lead to social sanctions or ostracism.

- **Emotion Regulation:** People engage in emotion regulation strategies to align their emotions with social norms and expectations. Emotion regulation involves modifying the intensity, duration, or expression of emotions to fit the context. For example, someone may suppress their anger at work to maintain professionalism or amplify their enthusiasm during a social event to conform to the expected emotional tone.

- **Norm Violation and Emotional Responses:** When individuals violate social norms, they often evoke emotional responses from others. These emotional reactions can vary depending on the severity of the norm violation and cultural factors. For instance, someone who loudly disrupts a quiet library may provoke annoyance or anger in others. These emotional reactions can serve as a form of social control, encouraging individuals to conform to established norms.

- **Emotional Contagion:** Emotions can spread among individuals in social settings through a process known as emotional contagion. When we observe others expressing certain emotions, we tend to "catch" those emotions ourselves. This phenomenon can reinforce social norms by promoting emotional alignment within groups.

- **Emotions and Group Dynamics**: In group settings, emotions can play a crucial role in influencing group dynamics. Group members often experience collective emotions that shape their behavior and decision-making processes. For example, a group feeling enthusiastic and motivated may be more productive and cohesive, while a group experiencing fear or anger might make risk-averse or confrontational decisions.

In summary, social norms and emotions are interconnected in social psychology, as emotions are both influenced by and influential in our adherence to societal expectations. Emotions serve as important cues for understanding and conforming to social norms, and they play a central role in our daily social interactions and group dynamics. Researchers in social psychology continue to explore the complex relationship between these two phenomena to gain a deeper understanding of human behavior in social context.

3. **Emotion Expression:** Social psychology explores how people express their emotions through facial expressions, body language, and verbal communication. It looks at how these expressions are interpreted by others and how they, in turn, affect social interactions.

Emotion expression in the context of social psychology refers to the outward display of one's emotional state through various nonverbal and verbal cues. It encompasses the way individuals communicate their feelings to others, either consciously or unconsciously, and how these expressions can impact social interactions, relationships, and the overall social environment. Emotion expression is a fundamental aspect of human communication and plays a crucial role in interpersonal dynamics. Here are some key points to understand about emotion expression in social psychology:

- **Nonverbal cues**: Nonverbal expressions of emotion include facial expressions, body language, gestures, eye contact, and tone of voice. For example, a smile can convey happiness, while a furrowed brow may indicate anger or confusion. These nonverbal cues often provide important information to others about our emotional state.

- **Cultural and contextual factors:** The way people express emotions can vary significantly across cultures and social contexts. Some expressions may be universally recognized, such as a smile indicating happiness, while others may be culture-specific. Cultural norms and social rules influence how and when people express their emotions, and misinterpretation of these expressions can lead to misunderstandings.

- **Emotional contagion:** Emotion expression can be contagious, meaning that when one person expresses a particular emotion, it can trigger a similar emotional response in others. For example, if someone starts laughing, those around them are more likely to feel amused as well. Emotional contagion plays a role in building emotional connections and rapport among individuals.

- **Social influence:** Emotion expression can be influenced by social factors, such as conformity and social norms. People may modify their emotional expressions to fit in with a group or adhere to societal expectations. This is often referred to as emotional regulation, where individuals adjust their emotional expressions to align with the demands of a given situation.

- **Display rules:** Display rules are societal and cultural guidelines that dictate when and how emotions should be expressed. These rules can vary widely between cultures and can influence whether individuals choose to hide, amplify, or minimize their emotional expressions in specific social situations.

- Emotional communication: Emotion expression is a form of emotional communication. It allows individuals to convey their feelings to others, thereby fostering understanding and empathy. Effective emotional communication is essential for building and maintaining healthy relationships.

- **Emotional intelligence:** Understanding and accurately interpreting emotion expressions in others is a component of emotional intelligence. People with high emotional intelligence are adept at recognizing and responding to the emotions of those around them, which can enhance their social interactions and relationships.

In summary, emotion expression is a crucial aspect of social psychology that involves the outward display of emotions through nonverbal and verbal cues. It is influenced by cultural norms, social context, and individual differences and plays a significant role in interpersonal communication, emotional contagion, and the development of social relationships. Understanding emotion expression is essential for comprehending how emotions impact our social interactions and interactions with others.

4. **Emotion Regulation:** Individuals often engage in emotion regulation strategies to manage their emotional experiences in social situations. These strategies may include suppression, reappraisal, and seeking social support. The effectiveness of these strategies can depend on social context and cultural norms.

Emotion regulation is a fundamental concept in social psychology that refers to the processes and strategies individuals use to manage, modulate, or control their emotional experiences and expressions. It involves the ways people influence, adjust, or cope with their emotions in various social and interpersonal situations. Emotion regulation is crucial for understanding how individuals navigate social interactions, relationships, and the impact of emotions on their behavior and well-being.

Here are some key aspects of emotion regulation within the realm of social psychology:

- **Emotion Awareness:** The first step in emotion regulation is being aware of one's emotional state. People must recognize and label their emotions accurately before they can effectively regulate them. This self-awareness is important in social contexts because it allows individuals to understand their emotional responses to others and situations.

- **Emotion Suppression:** One common emotion regulation strategy is suppression, where individuals attempt to conceal or inhibit the outward expression of their emotions. For example, someone might hide their frustration during a challenging conversation to maintain a harmonious social atmosphere. While suppression can be useful in some situations, overusing it can lead to negative consequences, such as increased stress or strained relationships.

- **Emotion Expression:** On the other hand, sometimes it is appropriate and beneficial to express emotions in a social context. Expressing emotions can communicate important information to others, foster understanding, and promote empathy. For instance, sharing feelings of joy at a friend's success can strengthen social bonds.

- **Cognitive Reappraisal:** Cognitive reappraisal involves changing the way one thinks about a situation to alter their emotional response. In social psychology, this can be particularly relevant when people reinterpret events or social interactions in less emotionally charged ways. For example, someone who is rejected by a romantic partner might reframe the situation as an opportunity for personal growth.

- **Emotion Regulation Strategies:** Individuals can employ various strategies to regulate their emotions in social situations. These strategies can be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on the context and effectiveness. Examples include distraction, problem-solving, seeking social support, and relaxation techniques.

- **Emotion Regulation and Relationships**: Emotion regulation plays a crucial role in interpersonal relationships. How individuals regulate their emotions can impact the quality and longevity of relationships. Effective emotion regulation can lead to better conflict resolution, empathy, and overall relationship satisfaction.

- **Cultural Influences:** Emotion regulation is also influenced by cultural norms and values. Different cultures may endorse specific emotion regulation strategies and expressions. Understanding these cultural variations is essential in a diverse and globalized world.

- **Emotion Regulation and Well-being:** Effective emotion regulation is associated with better psychological well-being and mental health. Poor emotion regulation can contribute to conditions like anxiety and depression. Social support and therapy often focus on teaching individuals healthier ways to regulate their emotions.

In conclusion, emotion regulation is a complex and multifaceted process within social psychology. It plays a vital role in how individuals navigate social interactions, build and maintain relationships, and manage their emotional well-being. Researchers in social psychology continue to investigate the various strategies and factors that influence emotion regulation to better understand human behavior in social contexts.

5. **Emotional Intelligence:** Social psychologists study how individuals perceive, understand, and manage emotions in themselves and others. This concept is often referred to as emotional intelligence and is believed to be important for successful social interactions.

Emotional intelligence (EI), often referred to as emotional quotient (EQ), is a concept within the field of social psychology that focuses on an individual's ability to recognize, understand, manage, and effectively use their own emotions as well as the emotions of others in social interactions. It plays a crucial role in our everyday lives, influencing our relationships, decision-making, and overall well-being. Here's an explanation of emotional intelligence in the context of social psychology:

- **Recognition of Emotions:** Emotional intelligence begins with the ability to recognize and accurately identify emotions, both in oneself and in others. This involves being attuned to facial expressions, body language, tone of voice, and other non-verbal cues that convey emotional states.

- **Understanding Emotions:** Understanding emotions involves going beyond mere recognition and delving into the deeper aspects of what those emotions mean. It includes understanding the causes and triggers of emotions, as well as the impact they can have on behavior and decision-making. People with high emotional intelligence can empathize with others and comprehend the complexities of emotions.

- **Emotion Regulation:** Emotional intelligence encompasses the skill of regulating one's own emotions effectively. This means being able to manage and control emotional reactions, especially in challenging or high-pressure situations. It involves strategies like stress management, impulse control, and emotional self-awareness.

- **Empathy:** Empathy is a core component of emotional intelligence. It involves the ability to not only understand but also share in the emotions of others. This skill allows individuals to connect with others on a deeper level, providing emotional support and fostering positive relationships.

- **Effective Communication:** Emotional intelligence plays a crucial role in effective communication. People with high EI can express their own emotions clearly and assertively while

also being sensitive to the emotions of others. This enhances the quality of interactions and reduces the likelihood of misunderstandings or conflicts.

- **Social Skills:** Social skills are closely linked to emotional intelligence. Those with high EI tend to excel in building and maintaining relationships, resolving conflicts, and working effectively in teams. They are skilled at influencing others positively and navigating social situations with ease.

- **Motivation and Resilience:** Emotional intelligence is associated with intrinsic motivation and resilience. People with high EI are often better at setting and achieving goals, as well as bouncing back from setbacks. They use their emotions as a source of motivation and are less likely to be derailed by negative emotions or failures.

In summary, emotional intelligence is a multifaceted concept in the realm of social psychology. It involves recognizing, understanding, managing, and using emotions effectively in interpersonal interactions. High emotional intelligence can lead to more fulfilling relationships, improved communication, better decision-making, and enhanced overall well-being. It's a valuable skill set that can be developed and refined over time, contributing to personal and professional success.

6. **Emotions and Stereotyping:** Social psychologists investigate how emotions can influence stereotypes and prejudice. For example, fear or anger can lead to negative attitudes and biases toward certain groups of people.

Emotions and stereotyping are two interconnected concepts in the field of social psychology. Emotions play a significant role in shaping our perceptions of others and can influence the development and perpetuation of stereotypes. Let's explore how these two concepts are related:

Emotions as Influences on Stereotyping:

Emotions can affect how we perceive and interact with individuals or groups. When we encounter someone or something that elicits a strong emotional response, it can influence our cognitive processes, including the formation and activation of stereotypes.

Here's how:

- **Affect-as-Information Theory:** According to this theory, people often rely on their current emotional state as a source of information when making judgments or decisions. If someone is experiencing a negative emotion like fear or anxiety, they may be more likely to stereotype others as a way to simplify their understanding of the situation. For example, if someone is

feeling anxious about a particular group of people, they might be more prone to rely on stereotypes about that group to make sense of their feelings.

- **Stereotype Content Model:** This model proposes that stereotypes are shaped by two dimensions: warmth (likability) and competence. Emotions can influence where a group or individual falls on these dimensions. For instance, if someone feels empathy or sympathy toward a group, they are more likely to perceive that group as warm, whereas if they feel threatened or anxious, they may perceive the group as less warm and less competent.

Emotions and Confirmation Bias:

Emotions can also lead to confirmation bias, where individuals seek out and interpret information in a way that confirms their existing beliefs or emotional states. If someone has a negative emotional bias towards a particular group due to stereotypes, they may unconsciously seek out evidence that reinforces those stereotypes, further perpetuating them.

Emotions and confirmation bias are two interconnected concepts within the field of social psychology. Let's explore how they relate to each other:

1. **Emotions in Social Psychology:** Emotions are complex psychological and physiological responses to specific events or situations. They play a fundamental role in human social interactions and decision-making processes. Social psychologists study emotions to understand how they influence our thoughts, behaviors, and perceptions within a social context.

2. **Confirmation Bias:** Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias that refers to the tendency of individuals to seek, interpret, and remember information in a way that confirms their preexisting beliefs or hypotheses while ignoring or discounting contradictory evidence. In other words, people are more likely to notice, remember, and give weight to information that supports their existing views, and they may actively avoid or dismiss information that challenges these views.

   Now, let's explore the relationship between emotions and confirmation bias in social psychology:

   - **Emotional Influence on Confirmation Bias:** Emotions can significantly impact how confirmation bias operates in our cognitive processes. When individuals experience strong emotions, such as fear, anger, or joy, their cognitive processes become more focused on the information that aligns with their emotional state. This can intensify confirmation bias because people are more likely to seek out and process information that elicits emotions consistent with their current mood.

     For example, if someone is fearful about a particular social issue, they may be more inclined to pay attention to news

articles or opinions that confirm their fears, while dismissing or ignoring information that suggests the situation is less dire.

- **Emotional Regulation and Confirmation Bias:** Emotional regulation is the ability to manage and control one's emotions. Research in social psychology has shown that individuals with better emotional regulation skills are less prone to confirmation bias. They can approach information more objectively, even when emotions are involved.

  For instance, someone with strong emotional regulation may be able to consider opposing viewpoints without letting their emotions excessively influence their judgment. They are more likely to engage in critical thinking and open-mindedness, reducing the impact of confirmation bias.

  In summary, emotions and confirmation bias are interconnected in the field of social psychology because emotions can significantly influence how confirmation bias operates. Emotions can lead individuals to selectively process information that aligns with their emotional state, potentially reinforcing preexisting beliefs and attitudes. Recognizing this relationship is important for understanding how emotions can shape our perceptions and decision-making in social contexts and for developing strategies to mitigate the impact of confirmation bias.

- **Emotions and Emotional Contagion:** Emotions are contagious, meaning that we often "catch" the emotions of those around us. When people within a social group express similar emotions, it can reinforce group cohesion but also lead to the spread of shared stereotypes. If a group collectively experiences anger or fear towards another group, these emotions can strengthen existing stereotypes or even create new ones.

  Emotions are complex psychological and physiological states that are characterized by a subjective feeling, physiological arousal, and often, a behavioral expression. These states are a fundamental part of human experience and play a crucial role in our social interactions and decision-making processes. Social psychology, a subfield of psychology, focuses on how individuals' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by the presence and actions of others. Understanding emotions in a social context is a key area of study within social psychology.

  Emotional Contagion is a concept within social psychology that explores how emotions can spread from one person to another within a social group or context. It suggests that individuals can "catch" or "transfer" emotions from others, often without conscious awareness. Emotional contagion occurs through various mechanisms, including nonverbal cues, facial expressions, body language, and even through online interactions and communication.

Here are some key aspects of emotional contagion:

- **Nonverbal Communication:** Much of emotional contagion occurs through nonverbal cues. When we observe someone's facial expressions, body language, or tone of voice, our brain tends to mirror and mimic those cues, leading us to experience similar emotions. For example, if you see someone smiling and looking happy, you may start to feel happier as well.

- **Mirror Neurons:** Mirror neurons in the brain are thought to play a significant role in emotional contagion. These neurons fire both when we perform an action and when we see someone else perform the same action. When we observe someone experiencing an emotion, our mirror neurons may activate, causing us to "mirror" their emotional state.

- **Empathy:** Empathy is closely related to emotional contagion but involves a deeper understanding of another person's emotional state. While emotional contagion is more automatic and immediate, empathy involves a conscious effort to understand and share someone else's emotions.

- **Group Dynamics:** Emotional contagion can be particularly powerful in group settings. When individuals are part of a group that shares a common emotional experience, the emotions can intensify and spread rapidly. This phenomenon can have both positive and negative effects, influencing the collective mood of a group.

- **Online Social Media:** In the age of social media, emotional contagion can occur through online interactions. Posts, comments, and emojis can convey emotions and influence the emotional states of others who read or interact with the content. This can lead to viral emotional trends and the rapid spread of emotions across online communities.

- **Emotional Regulation:** Understanding emotional contagion can be useful in various contexts, including business and leadership. Leaders and individuals in positions of influence need to be aware of how their emotions can impact their teams and organizations. They can use this knowledge to regulate their emotions and create a positive emotional climate.

In summary, emotions are a central aspect of human social interaction, and emotional contagion is a phenomenon within social psychology that explains how emotions can spread from one person to another. It highlights the importance of nonverbal communication, empathy, group dynamics, and even online interactions in shaping our emotional experiences in social contexts. Understanding emotional contagion can help us become more aware of how our emotions influence and are influenced by others, leading to improved social interactions and emotional well-being.

Emotion Regulation and Stereotyping:

Emotion regulation refers to the ability to manage and control one's emotions. People who struggle with emotion regulation may be more prone to stereotype others as a way to cope with their emotional experiences. For example, if someone has difficulty managing their anger, they may be more likely to stereotype and blame others for their emotional state.

Emotion Regulation and Stereotyping are two important concepts in the field of social psychology that play significant roles in how individuals perceive and interact with others in various social situations.

Emotion Regulation:

Emotion regulation refers to the processes and strategies individuals use to manage, control, and modify their emotions. This concept recognizes that emotions are not fixed and uncontrollable but can be influenced and regulated by cognitive and behavioral strategies. Emotion regulation plays a critical role in social psychology because it impacts how people navigate social interactions, make decisions, and form relationships.

There are several strategies people use to regulate their emotions:

- **Cognitive Reappraisal:** This strategy involves reframing the way one thinks about a situation to change their emotional response. For example, if someone receives negative feedback at work, they might reframe it as an opportunity for growth rather than a personal failure.
- **Suppression:** This involves consciously inhibiting the outward expression of one's emotions. For instance, someone might hide their frustration during a challenging conversation to maintain a calm demeanor.
- **Distraction:** People often use distractions, such as engaging in a hobby or activity, to redirect their attention away from distressing emotions.
- **Social Support:** Seeking support from friends or loved ones can be an effective emotion regulation strategy as it provides emotional comfort and validation.
- The effectiveness of these strategies can vary depending on the context and individual differences. Emotion regulation is closely tied to social interactions because how people regulate their emotions can affect how they are perceived by others and influence the dynamics of social relationships.
- **Stereotyping:** Stereotyping is a cognitive process where individuals categorize people into groups based on perceived characteristics, traits, or attributes associated with that group. Stereotypes can be based on various factors such as race, gender, age, occupation, or cultural background. These cognitive shortcuts help individuals make

sense of the complex social world by simplifying their understanding of others.

However, stereotyping can lead to biases and prejudice when individuals make generalized assumptions about individuals based on their group membership. This can result in unfair treatment, discrimination, and negative attitudes toward members of stereotyped groups.

Social psychology research on stereotyping often explores:

- **Implicit Bias:** These are automatic, unconscious biases that influence how individuals perceive and interact with others. Implicit biases can lead to unintentional discrimination and reinforce stereotypes.

- **Stereotype Threat:** This phenomenon occurs when individuals from stereotyped groups experience anxiety and decreased performance due to the fear of confirming negative stereotypes about their group.

- **Ingroup and Outgroup Dynamics**: Stereotypes can also influence the formation of ingroups (groups to which individuals belong) and outgroups (groups to which individuals do not belong). This can lead to intergroup conflict and prejudice.

It's important to recognize and challenge stereotypes and biases in order to promote more equitable and inclusive social interactions. Social psychologists study these processes to better understand how stereotypes develop, their impact on behavior, and strategies to reduce their negative effects.

In summary, emotions and stereotyping are intertwined in the field of social psychology. Emotions can both influence the development and activation of stereotypes and be influenced by existing stereotypes. Understanding the complex relationship between emotions and stereotyping is crucial for addressing issues related to prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup relations in society. Researchers and practitioners in this field work to uncover strategies for mitigating the negative impact of emotions on stereotyping and promoting more positive intergroup interactions.

2.3 SUMMARY

In summary, social structure and personality are fundamental concepts in social psychology. Social structure provides the context within which individuals navigate their social worlds, while personality shapes how individuals perceive, interpret, and respond to those social contexts. The interplay between these two factors is a central focus of research within the field, helping us better understand human behavior and social interactions.

Overall, the social psychology of emotions seeks to understand how emotions are not just individual experiences but are deeply intertwined with social interactions, relationships, and the broader cultural and societal context. This field helps shed light on the complex ways in which emotions shape and are shaped by the social world.

2.4 QUESTIONS

1. Explain in detail social structure and personality
2. Explain/ discuss the Relationship Between Social Structure and Personality
3. Briefly state the social identity theory
4. Define the following:
   a) Emotional contagion
   b) Emotional Mimicry
   c) Emotional expression
5. Discuss Social Norms and Emotions along with its key components
6. Explain in detail the key aspects of emotion regulation within the realm of social psychology.
7. Discuss emotional intelligence in the context of social psychology.
8. State the Affect-as-Information Theory.
9. What is the Stereotype Content Model?
10. How do emotions and confirmation bias correlate to each other?
11. State and discuss the various strategies people use to regulate their emotions
12. What does social psychology research on stereotyping often explore?

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3

BASIC PROCESSES I

Unit Structure:

3.0 Objectives

3.1 Social Perception : Introduction

3.2 Person Schemas and Group Stereotypes

3.3 Implicit Personality Theories and Mental Maps.

3.4 Group Stereotypes

3.5 Common Stereotypes.

3.6 Origins of Stereotypes.

3.7 Errors Caused by Stereotypes.

3.8 Social Cognition

3.9 Social Cognition as an Approach

3.10 The Information-Processing Model

3.11 The Core of Social Cognition Attribution Theory

3.12 Errors and Biases

3.13 Status of Attribution Theory

3.14 Summary

3.15 Questions

3.16 Reference

3.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

- ➢ Describe Person Schemas and Group Stereotypes
- ➢ Understand the Core of Social Cognition Attribution Theory
- ➢ Explain Errors and Biases

3.1 SOCIAL PERCEPTION: INTRODUCTION

Social perception refers to relating and exercising social cues to make judgments about social roles, rules, relationships, environment, or the characteristics (e.g., trustworthiness) of others. This sphere also includes social knowledge, which refers to one's knowledge of social roles, norms, and schemas surrounding social situations and interactions. In this chapter we discuss personal schemas and group stereotypes and also, we move towards cognition, Attribution Process and errors.

3.2 PERSON SCHEMAS AND GROUP STEREOTYPES

Person schemas are cognitive structures that describe the personalities of other individuals. There are several distinct types of person schemas. Some person schemas are very specific and pertain to particular people. For example, Sarah is a 17-year-old high school student, and Joan is her mother. After years of interacting with Joan, Sarah has an elaborate schema of her mother. She can usually predict how Joan will react to new situations, information, or problems and plan accordingly. Similarly, we often have individual schemas for public figures or for famous historical figures (for instance, Abraham Lincoln, political leader during the Civil War, honest, determined, opposed to slavery, committed to holding the Union together).

Other person schemas are very abstract and focus on the relations among personality traits. A schema of this type is an implicit personality theory-a set of unstated assumptions about which personality traits are correlated with one another (Anderson & Sedikides, 1991; Grant & Holmes, 1981; Sternberg, 1985). These theories tend to also include beliefs about the behaviors associated with various personality traits (Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Recent research explored the beliefs that teachers in Germany associate with giftedness (Baudson & Preckel, 2013). When a student was described as "gifted," teachers were more likely to also perceive the student as emotionally deficient. Although teachers believed gifted students would be more open to new experiences than students of average ability, they also saw them as more introverted, less emotionally stable, and less agreeable. These beliefs are considered implicit, or automatic, because we seldom subject our person schemas to close examination and are usually not explicitly aware of the schemas contents. Therefore, the teachers were likely unaware of their biased judgments of gifted students and how these implicit assumptions were influencing their behavior toward the students in class.

3.3 IMPLICIT PERSONALITY THEORIES AND MENTAL MAPS.

As do all schemas, implicit personality theories enable us to make inferences that go beyond the available information. Instead of withholding judgment, we use them to flesh out our impressions of a person about whom we have little information. For instance, if we learn someone has a warm personality, we might infer she is also likely to be sociable, popular, good-natured, and so on. If we hear that somebody else is pessimistic, we may infer he is humourless, irritable, and unpopular, even though we lack evidence that he actually has these traits. We can depict an implicit personality theory as a mental map indicating the way traits are related to one another. Traits thought to be similar are located close together within our mental map, meaning we expect people who have one trait to have the other. Traits thought to be dissimilar are located far apart, meaning we believe they rarely occur together in one person.

Early research believed that the two distinct evaluative dimensions traits fell upon were social and intellectual. For instance, the traits "warm" and "cold" differ mainly on the social dimension, whereas "frivolous" and "industrious" differ on the intellectual dimension (Rosenberg & Sedlak, 1972). Traits usually tend to be either good on both dimensions (like "important") or bad on both dimensions (like "unreliable," explaining a common bias in impression formation). We tend to judge persons who have several good traits as generally good and persons who have several bad traits as generally bad. Once we have a global impression of someone as, say, generally good, we assume that other positive traits (located nearby in the mental map) also apply. This tendency for our general or overall liking for a person to influence our subsequent assessment of more specific traits of that person is called the halo effect (Lachman & Bass, 1985; Thorndike, 1920). The halo effect produces bias in impression formation; it can lead to inaccuracy in our ratings of others' traits and performances (Cooper, 1981; Fisicaro, 1988).

In the decades since Rosenberg's mental map was published, social psychologists have worked to refine the dimensions and test impression formation across different cultures and groups. There is growing consensus that the two universal dimensions are better conceived of as warmth and competence (rather than social and intellectual). As early research (Asch, 1946, discussed later in this chapter) found. warmth is a highly influential trait in impression formation, and it appears to take precedence over competence, both in how rapidly it is judged and how much weight it carries in impressions (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick 2007). Immediately upon encountering someone else, we must determine whether they are more likely to harm or help us. To do so, we gauge their level of warmth because it is the dimension that is tied to our perceptions of another's intent. The warmth dimension captures traits like friendliness, helpfulness, and sincerity. The competence dimension, however, is related to ability and includes traits like intelligence, creativity, and skill. Although everyone lends primacy to the warmth dimension in forming impressions, women and individuals from collectivist cultures appear particularly cued in to forming impressions, women and individuals from collectivist cultures appear particularly cued into warmth (Abele, 203).

Our impressions influence the emotions we feel toward others. We are likely to pity those who we consider high on warmth but low on competence and envy those who are high on competence and low on warmth. We admire those who we believe are high on both dimensions and hold contempt for those who are seen as low on both (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Similar emotions are directed toward groups that we classify using the same two dimensions. We envy the rich (high-competence, low-warmth), admire the middle-class (high-competence, high-warmth), pity the elderly (low-competence, high- warmth), and have contempt for welfare recipients (low-competence, low-warmth).

3.4 GROUP STEREOTYPES

"Politicians are liars and cheaters, with no compassion for ordinary people."

"Asian women are 'tiger moms,' demanding perfection from their kids."

"People on welfare are lazy, wasteful, and unemployed."

Arabs and Muslims are terrorists who hate America."

"Jocks might be strong and athletic, but they're stupid and arrogant."

An unfortunate reality in our society is that we have all heard remarks like these-categorical, extreme, inaccurate characterizations. Each of these is an example of a group schema or stereotype. A stereotype is a set of characteristics attributed to all members of some specified group or social category (McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980; Taylor, 1981). Just like other types of schemas, stereotypes simplify the complex social world. Rather than encouraging us to treat each member of a group individually, stereotypes encourage us to think about and treat all politicians, welfare recipients, or jocks the same way. By helping us quickly place people into categories, stereotypes enable us to form impressions of people and predict their behavior with only minimal information-the groups to which they belong.

Stereotypes, however, involve overgeneralization. They lead us to think that all members of a particular group or social category possess certain attributes. Although stereotypes might contain a kernel of truth-some members of the stereotyped group may have some of the imputed characteristics- it is almost never the case that all members have those characteristics. For this reason, stereotypes often lead to inaccurate inferences. Consider, for instance, all the feminists you know. Perhaps one of them is- as the stereotype suggests-a radical who would like to have the gender binary completely eradicated, and maybe another is lesbian. It is certainly false, however, that all your feminist acquaintances are as politically active or eschew relationships-romantic or otherwise-with men. It is also false that all feminists are women.

Throughout our daily lives, we are constantly categorizing people who we encounter into existing roups to conserve mental attention. Walking down the street, we pass men and women, Blacks and Whites, young people and the elderly. Without much conscious thought, we sort these strangers into groups based on distinguishing characteristics and then draw on group schemas (stereotypes) to decide how to respond to these others without giving our actions much consideration (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). We tend to not notice the work that our minds are doing until we encounter someone who does not neatly fit into one of our group schemas: an individual whose gender, race, or age is ambiguous. In these situations, because we need to gather additional information, processing takes longer and becomes more conscious. If it is difficult to determine a person's gender from a cursory glance, we may look for other nonverbal or vocal clues. If we are unable to classify someone-a running joke on *Saturday Night Live* with the infamous,

gender-ambiguous character, Pat-we grow increasingly uncomfortable. Thinking back to moments when we sought such clarification and considering how seldom such moments occur demonstrates the ubiquity of categorization and stereotypes in our everyday lives.

Although stereotypes are overgeneralizations, we still constantly use them and are often unaware of their impact on our judgments of others (Hepburn & Locksley, 1983; Bornstein & Pittman, 1992). And although there is nothing inherent in stereotypes that requires them to be negative, many stereotypes do contain negative elements. Of course, some stereotypes are positive ("Asians excel at math"; "Blacks are gifted athletes"), but many others diminish the group stereotype. Stereotypes can have many negative effects, especially when they are used to limit access to important social roles-for example, when an individual applies for a job or for admission to college.

To explore the effect of gender stereotypes on women's underrepresentation in science, a group of scientists recently asked science faculty at research-intensive universities to rate the materials of a student applying for a lab manager position (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). The scientists used an experimental design and created fake applications that were randomly assigned a masculine (John) or student applying for a lab manager position (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012). The scientists used an experimental design and created fake applications that were randomly assigned a masculine (John) or feminine (Jennifer) name. Other than the name, the application materials sent out were identical. Both men and women faculty who received John's application rated the applicant as significantly more competent and hireable than those who received Jennifer's (identical) application. Faculty also reported that they would offer a higher starting salary and more mentoring to John than to Jennifer. None of the faculty actively disliked women. In fact, faculty perceived Jennifer as a more likeable applicant than John. However, the pervasive gender stereotypes of women being less competent at science unintentionally influenced the raters' evaluations. This is just one study of many suggesting that stereotypes can negatively affect work-related outcomes (see also Correll, Benard & Paik, 2007).

When people act on their stereotypes, this can produce many negative effects for those who are the subjects of these stereotypes. Members of racial groups may be denied jobs or promotions because of the stereotypes employers hold of their racial group (Pager, Western, & Bonikowski, 2009). As damaging as these direct uses of stereotypes can be, researchers have recently discovered a second, less direct negative effect of stereotypes called stereotype threat (Steele, 1997, 1999).

Stereotype threat occurs when a member of a group suspects that he or she will be judged based on a common stereotype that is held of that group. For example, one stereotype of women is that they are less proficient at mathematics than men are. If a woman enters a situation in which her mathematical ability is being judged and she believes the judgment will be negatively affected by the stereotype about women's mathematical ability, even without any conscious thought about the stereotype, her performance

on the exam may suffer (Spencer. Steele, & Quinn. 1999). To test for this kind of effect, Steele and Aronson (1995) gave Stanford University students a very difficult test using questions from the Graduate Record Examination in literature. The difficulty of the test provided a stereotype threat for Black students because poor performance would confirm a stereotype that they were not as able as White students. Even though the White and Black students were matched on ability, the Black students scored much lower than the White students. However, when researchers told the students that the test was part of a study to understand how people solved problems and that it did not measure ability, the stereotype threat was removed and the Black and White students did equally well.

In a follow-up study, students took the exam on a computer, so the researchers could time how long the students took with each question. The results showed that under conditions of stereotype threat, Black students were exerting extra effort and were overthinking the questions. They reread questions, changed their answers, and generally became less efficient at taking the test (Steele, 1999). This result also made sense of a finding that stereotype threat affected academically strong students more than academically weak students-for those students who saw academics as an important part of their self-concept, the threat was much more meaningful than for those who cared less about academics (Steele, 2010).

The negative effects of stereotype threat are not limited to women or racial minorities, nor is it exclusively seen in academic spheres. In a novel application of stereotype threat, social psychologists tested racial stereotypes about athletic performance (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). Black and White students were recruited to take an athletic test (simply ten rounds of miniature golf) in the laboratory. Black students who were told that this task was a diagnostic of "natural athletic ability" performed significantly better than those who were told that the task measured "sports intelligence." White participants, however, performed better in the "sports intelligence" condition than the "natural athletic ability" condition. Although stereotypes about Whites are generally more favorable than those about Blacks, students were aware of the stereotype that favors Blacks over Whites in athletic ability, and this caused differences in performance. Another study found that when primed with a stereotype of older people's propensity for memory problems, older adults performed worse on a recall test than either younger people or older adults who had not had a threat induced by a prime (Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003).

Outside the laboratory, it may be possible to reduce stereotype threat and to even the playing field. One way of doing this is to convince students who may be experiencing stereotype threat that the test being used is not biased. This is not easy to do given current deeply held beliefs about the unfairness of testing and the pervasiveness of racial stereotypes. However, Cohen, Steele, and Ross (1999) found that they could reduce stereotype threat by informing students that the evaluations of their performance would use very high standards and that they believed the students could perform up to those standards. Such an approach lets the student know that assessment is based

on standards rather than stereotypes and that the student will not be viewed stereotypically. Another approach is to have individuals shift away from viewing themselves stereotypically by giving them the opportunity to construct a narrative of their selves that is about other positive attributes and values rather than the stereotyped characteristic. Simply asking individuals to write their primary values and why these are important to them before engaging in a threatening situation can improve performance (Steele, 2010).

Stereotypes can also have less direct effects on members of stereotyped groups through a process called stereotype threat (Steele, 1997, 2010). When a member of a group believes there is a real threat of being judged based on group stereotypes, this can negatively affect their performance and actually cause an individual to perform more poorly than he or she would when not under stereotype threat.

3.5 COMMON STEREOTYPES

As the foregoing examples suggest, in American society, some widely known stereotypes pertain to ethnic, racial, and gender groups. Ethnic (national) stereotypes held by Americans might include, for example, the view that Mexicans are undocumented immigrants who struggle to speak English, the French are cultured and romantic, and Vietnamese people are hardworking and friendly. Investigators have studied ethnic, racial, and gender stereotypes for many years, and the results show that the content of stereotypes changes over time (Diekman, Eagly, Mladinic, & Ferreira, 2005). For instance, few of us now believe-as many once did that the typical Native American is a drunk, the typical African American is superstitious, or the typical Chinese American is conservative and inscrutable. Stereotypes may not have disappeared over time, but they have changed form (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996).

Just as stereotypes about ethnic and racial groups are commonly held in our society, so also are stereotypes about gender groups. Usually, our first judgment when meeting people involves classifying them as men or women. This classification is likely to activate an elaborate stereotype. This stereotype depicts men as more independent, dominant, competent, rational, competitive, assertive, and stable in handling crises. It characterizes women as more emotional, sensitive, expressive, gentle, helpful, and patient (Ashmore, 1981; Martin, 1987; Minnigerode & Lee, 1978). Research on the nature of these gender stereotypes is discussed in Box 6.2. Within gender, stereotypes are linked to subtle cues like titles and surnames. For instance, research conducted in the 1980s found that women labeled “Ms." were seen as more achieving, more masculine, and less likable than women labeled "Mrs." (Dion & Schuller, 1991). These impressions were consistent with the high-competence, low-warmth stereotype of feminists in general (Fiske. Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), who were often associated with the term. However, today's college students are more likely to see "Ms." as related to marital status rather than concerns about sexism and, therefore, rate "Ms." as positively as "Mrs." or "Miss" (Lawton,Blakemore, & Vartanian, 2003).

Perhaps a more contemporary example related to the nuances of titles is the use of hyphenated surnames. Research finds that women who hyphenate their surnames after marriage are assumed to be well-educated and more likely to have a career as well as more friendly, good-natured, industrious, and intellectually curious than married women who do not hyphenate. Men with hyphenated surnames are also perceived as good-natured, as well as more nurturing and more committed to their marriages than married men who do not hyphenate (Forbes, Adams-Curtis, White & Hamm, 2002). Gender, ethnicity, and race are only a handful of the groups that are stereotyped in our culture. People also stereotype groups defined by occupation, age, political ideology, mental illness, hobbies, musical tastes, majors, school attended, and so on (Miller, 1982; Rahn, 1993; Rothbart 1996; Rentfrow & Gosling, 2007).

3.6 ORIGINS OF STEREOTYPES

Some theorists suggest that stereotypes arise out of direct experience with some members of the stereotyped group (Campbell, 1967). We may once have known an Italian who was passionate, someone from Japan who was polite, or a southerner who was bigoted. We then build a stereotype by generalizing-that is, we infer that all members of a group share the attribute we know to be characteristic of some particular members.

Other theorists (Eagly & Steffen, 1984) suggest that stereotypes derive in part from a biased distribution of group members into social roles. Consider professional athletes. After professional sports integrated, Blacks quickly dominated a number of popular sports. In the late 1990s, 60% of professional football players and 85% of professional basketball players were African American (Sailes, 1998). The impressive athletic performances meant that Blacks also dominated the sports coverage in newspapers and on television (Davis & Harris, 1998). Roles have associated characteristics-professional sports players are athletically gifted-and eventually those characteristics are attached to the persons occupying the roles. The overwhelming athletic success and related images contributed to and helped maintain the stereotype that Blacks are athletically superior to other racial groups. If a social group is concentrated in roles with negative characteristics, an unflattering stereotype of that group may emerge that ascribes the negative characteristics of the role to members of the group.

Stereotyping may also be a natural outcome of social perception (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears, 2002). When people have to process and remember a lot of information about many others, they store this information in terms of group categories rather than in terms of individuals (Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978). In trying to remember what went on in a classroom discussion, you may recall that several women spoke and a Black person expressed a strong opinion, although you cannot remember exactly which women spoke or who the Black person was. Because people remember behavior by group category rather than by individual, they attach the behavior to the groups (Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, & Birrell, 1978). Remembering that women spoke and a Black person expressed a strong

opinion, you might infer that in general, women are talkative and Blacks are opinionated. You would not form these stereotypes if you recalled these attributes as belonging to individuals rather than remembering them as attached to group membership.

3.7 ERRORS CAUSED BY STEREOTYPES

Because stereotypes are overgeneralizations, they foster various errors in social perception and judgment. First, stereotypes lead us to assume that all members of a group are alike and possess certain traits. Yet individual members of a group obviously differ in many respects. One person wearing a hard hat may shoulder you into the stairwell on a crowded bus; another may offer you his seat. Second, stereotypes lead us to assume that all the members of one group differ from all the members of another group. Stereotypes of football players and ballet dancers may suggest, for instance, that these groups have nothing in common. But both groups contain individuals who are athletic, hardworking, intelligent, and so on. If we see the two groups as non overlapping, we neglect to realize that there are ballet dancers who also play football.

Although stereotypes can produce inaccurate inferences and judgments in simple situations, they are especially likely to do so in complex situations when our minds are attending to a lot of stimuli. This is because we rely on stereotypes for efficiency (Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff & Frost, 1998). If an observer uses a stereotype as a central theme around which to organize information relevant to a decision, he or she may neglect information that is inconsistent with the stereotype (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). A process like this can contribute to bias in educational admissions or hiring decisions, like with the faculty ratings of lab assistant applications discussed earlier. With a large amount of material to be read and significant detail in each, our minds take shortcuts wherever they can. The stereotype that favors men with regard to scientific competence (and disfavors women) may overshadow specific evidence of competence from the applications.

Research also indicates that people of higher status have a tendency to use stereotypes more than people of lower status do. This seems to occur because people of higher status have more people competing for their attention and, thus, have more incentive to use shortcuts. They may also be able to afford to make more mistakes because of their power (Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000). This dynamic occurs even when subjects are randomly assigned to higher and lower-status roles (Richeson & Ambady, 2003).

Studies of sex stereotyping have established a number of characteristics that people associate differently with men and women. In the chart opposite, 20 characteristics are listed that are consistently associated with men or women.

The Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI; Bem, 1974) is a widely used measure of sex-role stereotyping and self-perceptions. Although there has been some weakening of the distinctions between stereotypes of men and women over

time, gender differences endure (Bergen & Williams, 1991; Holt & Ellis, 1998). The first five traits in the chart *(defends beliefs* to *individualistic*) are seen as more typical of men, whereas the next five (*cheerful* to *childlike*) are considered more typical of women. Although there are subtle differences, the first seven traits are seen as desirable for both men and women. The next three (gullible, *shy*, and childlike), however, are rated as both feminine and generally undesirable (Colley, Mulhern, Maltby, & Wood, 2009). The next five *(affectionate* to compassionate) are seen as feminine and more desirable for women than for men, and the last five (assertive to *has leadership* abilities) are considered more desirable for men than for women. In general, research finds that traits associated with men are more desirable than those associated with women (Broverman et al., 1972).

Although stereotypes involve overstatement and overgeneralization, they resist change even in the face of concrete evidence that contradicts them. This occurs because people tend to accept information that confirms their stereotypes and ignore or explain away information that disconfirms them (Lord, Lepper, & Mackie, 1984; Snyder, 1981; Weber & Crocker, 1983). Suppose, for example, that Omar stereotypes gay men as effeminate, nonathletic, and artistic. If he stumbles into a gay bar, he is especially likely to notice the men in the crowd who fit this description, thereby confirming his stereotype. It is possible that these individuals might challenge his stereotype, but reconstructing schemas is a lot of work, and Omar is more likely to find a way around this challenge. He might scrutinize those who don't fit his stereotype for hidden signs of effeminacy. He might underestimate their number or even assume they are straight. He may also engage in subtyping, a process through which perceivers create subcategories of stereotyped groups who serve as exceptions to the rule without threatening the overarching stereotype (e.g., these are “atypical gay men"). Through cognitive strategies like these, people explain away contradictory information and preserve their stereotypes.

3.8 SOCIAL COGNITION

Social cognition is both a subarea of social psychology and an approach to the discipline as a whole. As a subarea, social cognition encompasses new approaches to classic research on attribution theory (how people explain behavior and events), impression formation (how people form impressions of others), stereotyping (how people think about members of groups), attitudes (how people feel about various things), and the self (how people think about themselves). What binds these areas together is their emphasis on the social implications of peoples’ thoughts and subjective perceptions of reality (i.e., their phenomenology).

Today’s approaches to these issues rely heavily on concepts, theories, and methods borrowed from the field of cognitive psychology, a discipline that has existed only since about , when Neisser published the first cognitive psychology text. In contrast, earlier work necessarily employed concepts,

methods, and theories created by social psychologists specifically for the domains of interest.

3.9 SOCIAL COGNITION AS AN APPROACH

The core principles of this approach were that (1) researchers ought to employ general concepts and theories rather than idiosyncratic microtheories; (2) cognitive processes are a major determinant of human judgments and behavior; (3) the information processing model provides a universally useful structure for examining cognition; (4) mediating processes should be measured (generally using methods borrowed from cognitive psychology) rather than just assumed; all of which together imply that (5) there should be one universal set of concepts, principles, and practices underlying most, if not all, psychological theorizing and research. The construal of social cognition as an approach (see Sherman, Judd, & Park,) explains why it transformed research within those domains that it subsumed (e.g., attribution theory). But it also explains why social cognition enthusiasts saw their principles as applying beyond the borders of their own subdiscipline, arguing that these principles should govern other areas of psychology as well. Moreover, the argument for a universal set of concepts and principles raised for some the specter of a scientific imperialism, with the social cognition approach threatening to impose its own core principles on the entire field of psychology. This imperialistic attitude did not sit well with everyone. Many senior social psychologists had resisted behaviorists to construct their own individual cognitive approaches even before there was a formal field of cognitive psychology. Conflict between old and new approaches to science is almost inevitable (Kuhn,).

In the present case (as, perhaps, with most scientific revolutions), the flames of conflict were fanned by a variety of incidental events and circumstances, including the kinds of incendiary remarks previously noted. The new adherents to social cognition had an evangelical zeal characteristic of those who have recently "found religion." The phrases that Ostrom (, p. vii) used to describe the first Handbook of Social Cognition applied to the whole subfield: "revolutionary," "confrontational and passionate," and "fists and sinew demanding recognition and acceptance." The zeal of the social cognition devotees produced conferences that some perceived as exclusive, editorships that some perceived as demands on resources (e.g., federal grants, journal space, jobs) that some viewed as excessive. In retrospect, it is apparent why non-social-cognitionists sometimes felt threatened, and why coolness, if not actual hostility, sometimes permeated the relationship between social cognition and other subdisciplines.

Still, these early reactions dissipated over the years, leaving the younger generation of psychologists wondering what all the basic processes fuss was about. New graduate students studied social cognition as a no a normal part of their curriculum, and often integrated the approach into their own research programs. Over time, many principles of social cognition became so widely accepted that by, Ostrom (p. xii) concluded that social cognition had become "standard science." As a result, social psychology as a field has

changed. Theorists and researchers across the field routinely employ concepts, theories, and methods borrowed from cognitive psychology. Mediating processes are routinely examined using new methods, measures, and statistical techniques. And the subdisciplines of the field are achieving some integration, as domain-specific theories are reinterpreted or replaced by more universal ones. But this hardly means that social cognition now enjoys supremacy over the entire field— because social cognition did not simply change social psychology, it was also changed by it. To appreciate why this was necessary, we next consider one central aspect of the social cognition approach—the information processing model.

3.10 THE INFORMATION-PROCESSING MODEL

The information-processing model partitions "cognition" into component processes involving (1) attention and perception, (2) memory, and (3) judgment. Before the model existed, the mind appeared to be an inscrutable "black box," justifying behaviorists' assertions that it was not a proper topic for scientific study and that researchers ought to concentrate instead on more objectively observable data such as behavior. This view dominated American psychology for half of the twentieth century, marginalizing social psychologists who felt that human thought was central to understanding human behavior. However, toward the middle of that century scientists developed the first computer, which provided a useful simplifying metaphor for the inscrutable human mind. If the mind, like the computer, employed input operations (the human equivalent being attention and perception), storage operations (memory), and processing routines (evaluation and judgment).. This proved to be, contributing to the demise of behaviorism and the emergence of modern cognitive psychology.

Kelley's influential attribution theory explained how patterns of actors' behaviors contribute to causal judgments, without taking into account whether all such behaviors are equally attended, how they are interpreted, or whether some are better recalled than others. The social cognition view was that the different sub processes of cognition needed to be considered in such work. The research areas that arose to do this considering were termed person perception and person memory, terms sometimes still used to refer to the whole field of social cognition. It seems evident that attentional, perceptual, and mnemonic processes are important in attribution and other human cognitive processes. But the emphasis in social cognition on the information-processing model nonetheless provoked criticism.

Emotions and motivations are now represented in many social cognitive theories, although often using processes and principles similar to those designed for "colder" forms of cognitive content. Automatic processes and implicit cognitions are now studied alongside more deliberative and conscious phenomena. And behavior, rather than judgment, is often the ultimate focus of theory and research in the field. As a consequence of such changes, social cognition now looks more like other areas of social psychology, and less like cognitive psychology, than might have been expected in earlier years. This review focuses first on social cognition as a

research area that encompasses earlier core concerns with attribution and impression formation. The social cognition approach will be evident in the ways that research on these topics has evolved and changed.

3.11 THE CORE OF SOCIAL COGNITION ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Attribution theory is a bit of a misnomer, as the term actually encompasses multiple theories and studies focused on a common issue, namely, how people attribute the causes of events and behaviors. This theory and research derived principally from a single, influential book by Heider (1958) in which he attempted to describe ordinary people's theories about the causes of behavior. His characterization of people as "naive scientists" is a good example of the phenomenological emphasis characteristic of both early social psychology and modern social cognition.

Principal Theories

Two of the most important attribution theories were correspondent inference theory (Jones & Davis,) and covariation theory (Kelley,). Jones and Davis' theory derived principally from Heider's discounting principle, which states that confidence in any cause is diminished to the extent that other causes are plausible. One implication is that people will make fewer trait inferences about someone who's socially appropriate behavior can be explained by their personality and by social norms than about someone who's socially inappropriate behavior can be explained only by their personality. This prediction was supported by a classic experiment (Jones, Davis, & Gergen,) showing that inferences about a job applicant's traits were stronger when the candidate behaved in a manner contrary to assumed job-seeking norms.

Kelley's covariation theory derived principally from Heider's covariation principle, which states that people explain events in terms of things that are present when the event occurs but absent when it does not. The logic is nicely illustrated by the kind of stimuli that McArthur (1976) used in her test of the theory. Suppose that you learned that Englebert fell asleep in psychology class on Tuesday, but that he also fell asleep in most of his other classes on that day, and that, in fact, he falls asleep in psychology class and most other classes almost every day, though everyone else seems to stay awake. Most likely you would conclude that Englebert is one sleepy guy. Now suppose that instead, you learned that Englebert was just one of many students who fell asleep in psychology class on Tuesday, although he stayed awake in all other classes, as he usually does. In terms of the theory, the first example suggests that sleeping behavior covaries with the presence of Englebert, whereas the second suggests that such behavior covaries with the presence of the psychology class. Thus the proper cause becomes evident through a mental covariance analysis.

3.12 ERRORS AND BIASES

Attribution theories were very logical and sensible—and, it turned out, sometimes wrong. In McArthur's (1976) experiment on Kelley's theory, for example, subjects' inferences about a particular actor were predictably affected by the extent to which that person's behavior generalized across different settings (termed distinctiveness information) and across different times (consistency information), although not by the extent that it generalized across different actors (consensus information).

In other words, Englebert was viewed as one sleepy guy even if he was just one of many who fell asleep in psychology class. Thus, people sometimes did not appear to be as logical and sensible as the theory said they should be. Consequently, attribution research began to focus on attributional errors and biases—that is, on subject responses that were less logical than the theories predicted (e.gRoss,). The implicit message was that the theories provided good baseline descriptions, but that people deviate from these for a variety of reasons. Ultimately, however, some social cognitionists rejected the theories as simply descriptions of what people should do rather than what they actually do. Attribution theories were domain-specific micro theories that typically ignored the information-processing stages of attention, perception, and memory, even though these could alter the information on which people based their attributions.In other words, attribution theory exhibited many of the deficiencies characteristic of cognitively oriented work in the pre-social-cognition era.

Schema Theory

Although attribution theory was "pre-social-cognition" in some respects, the issues examined and the emphasis on people's phenomenology were quite basic processes congenial to the emerging field of social cognition. Moreover, the principles of attribution theory were easily recast in terms more compatible with this emerging field (Hamilton,). Kelley (1987) recognized that his covariance analysis appeared to require more time and work, and even more information, than people ordinarily have when evaluating the causes of events. He therefore suggested a version of attribution theory in which people simply matched an observed event with causal schemas they already possessed. Thus, when Englebert falls asleep in psychology class, we might guess from past experience that he has done this before, and that most students typically do not, so that the event fits a "sleepy student" scenario.

Application of causal schemas would be expected to require less time, effort, and information than the covariance analysis suggested by the original version of Kelley's theory. Schema theory was originally described by Bartlett (1932), based on experiments he undertook on people's memory for events. Such cognitively oriented work was out of favor in , and consequently it was largely ignored in the United States until social psychologists discovered Bartlett's legacy years later. His ideas were surprisingly modern in many ways, but his methods and language were not, so we focus here just on his ideas. Bartlett suggested that people have organized conceptions of people, places, events, and other things that they

bring to bear in processing new information—conceptions that he called schemas. He suggested further that these schemas provide a framework for remembering information, so that things that can be interpreted in terms of the framework are fit to it, and those that cannot are forgotten.

Heider and Simmel (1944) conducted one of the first schema studies in social psychology, showing subjects a short film in which three geometric shapes moved around the screen. Although there was nothing objectively meaningful about the movements of the shapes, subjects generally interpreted the film as a prototypical story about two males fighting over a female. In other words, subjects brought to bear their existing schemas and these affected how the film was remembered. These results are difficult for either correspondent inference theory or Kelley's original covariation theory to explain, although Kelley's later conception of attributional schemas could do so.

3.13 STATUS OF ATTRIBUTION THEORY

Attribution work involved more than these two theories. Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest, and Rosenbaum (1987) proposed a theory of performance attribution that was extensively researched and continues to have an impact in education, sports, and other applied areas. Attribution (or reattribution) therapy has been used in counseling and clinical psychology with some success for years (Brewin,). And many principles and ideas from attribution theory continue to attract interest and application (Maddux & Yuki, ; Sahar, ; White,). Within social cognition, there has always been some ambivalence toward attribution theory.In fact, dissatisfaction with attribution theories may have contributed to the rise of social cognition. But whether for positive or negative reasons, attribution theory provided a bridge between the social psychology of the 1960 s and the social cognition of the 1980s. It is not surprising, then, that the first social psychology book with social cognition in the title had attribution in it as well (Social Cognition, Inference, and Attribution by Wyer & Carlston,) and that the first text in social cognition (Fiske & Taylor,) devoted a chapter to attribution theory.

3.14 SUMMARY

We discuss Social Perception in this chapter. Then we studied Person Schema and Group stereotypes. White living in a society we form some opinions about a person which guide us while interacting with them. Then in Social Cognition we analyse Attribution Process and errors.

3.15 QUESTIONS

Write short Notes.

1. Errors Caused by Stereotypes.
2. Group Stereotypes
3. The Core of Social Cognition Attribution Theory
4. Errors and Biases

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4

BASIC PROCESSES II

Unit Structure:

4.0 Objectives
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Lasting False beliefs and their behavioral consequences
4.3 Nature of Attitude.
4.4 Attitudes Defined
4.5 Attitude Systems
4.6 Attitude Formation
4.7 Importance of Attitudes
4.8 Attitude Change
- 4.8.1 Implicit versus Explicit Attitudes .
- 4.8.2 Attitude Structure: The Meta-Cognitive Model
- 4.8.3 Classic Processes of Persuasion
- 4.8.4 Learning and Reception Theories
- 4.8.5 Meta-Cognition
- 4.8.6 Motivational Approaches
- 4.8.7 Fundamental Processes Underlying Attitude Change
- 4.8.8 Direction or Valence of Thinking
- 4.8.9 Ability Biases
- 4.8.10 Meta-Cognitive Processes

4.9 Self-Validation Theory
4.10 Flexible Correction Processes
- 4.10.1 Serving as Arguments
- 4.10.2 Attribution Theory
- 4.10.3 Use of Persuasion Heuristics
- 4.10.4 Conditioning
- 4.10.5 Implicit Change through Automatic Processes
- 4.10.6 The Influence of Communication Variables on Persuasion
- 4.9.7 Consequences of Different Persuasion Processes for Explicit Measures
- 4.9.8 Attitude Persistence and Resistance
- 4.9.9 Prediction of Behavior
- 4.9.10 Certainty: Strength without More Thinking

4.10 Attitude Change Today
4.11 Summary
4.12 Questions

4.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

- ➢ Describe Lasting False beliefs and their behavioral consequences
- ➢ Understand Nature of Attitude
- ➢ Explain Attitude change

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Social Judgement theory states that you have a statement or message and you accept it or reject it predicated on your cognitive map. You accept or reject a message based on one's own ego- involvement and if it falls within their latitude ofacceptance.So in this chapter we're going to discuss Lasting False beliefs and their behavioral consequences also we study the nature of attitude and how attitude changes over a time.

4.2 LASTING FALSE BELIEFS AND THEIR BEHAVIORAL CONSEQUENCES

Laboratory exploration has demonstrated that human memory can be remarkably fragile and indeed inventive. Studies on false memories and beliefs, for illustration, have compellingly shown that misleading information can lead to the creation of recollections of entire events that haven't occurred(Loftus, 2005). In one of the first studies on this issue, subjects were led to believe that when they were children, they had been lost in the shopping mall for an extended period of time before being reunited with their parents(Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). In posterior work, subjects falsely remembered even more unusual or disturbing events, similar as discovering a punch bowl at a wedding(Hyman, Husband, & Billings, 1995), having a ride in a hot- air balloon. Salient real- life examples of misremembering the history are cases in which people have falsely recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse, frequently instigated by suggestive therapeutic techniques(Geraerts etal., 2007; Loftus & Davis, 2006). People also claim to have recovered memories of further implausible experiences, including memories involving satanic ritual abuse(Scott, 2001), former lives(Peters, Horselenberg, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2007), and hijacking by space aliens(Clancy, 2005), and similar recollections are frequently recovered during suggestive therapy as well. Indeed though similar memories may not be real, they occasionally cause emotional pain similar to that of people who have endured a traumatic event(McNally etal., 2004). This can have behavioral consequences, similar as suing the alleged perpetrator after recovering memories of childhood abuse. StrikStrikingly, although a clear link between beliefs and behavior has been set up constantly(Ajzen, 2005), laboratory exploration,

until now, has not examined the possible effects of false memories on behavior.

Recently, Bernstein, Laney, Morris, and Loftus (2005a, 2005b) took the first steps toward answering this question by developing a procedure for examining the effects of false childhood memories and beliefs. Their subjects received the false suggestion that they had become ill after eating a certain food (e.g., hard-boiled eggs, strawberry ice cream) when they were children. The false suggestion increased subjects' confidence that the critical event had occurred. Moreover, the false belief resulted in decreased self-reported preference for the target food and increased anticipated behavioral avoidance of that food. These findings clearly demonstrate that false beliefs can influence attitudes. A remaining question, though, is whether false beliefs or memories produce real changes in behavior. The current study explored whether falsely suggesting to subjects that they had experienced a food-related event in their childhood would lead to a quantifiable change in their behavior. Moreover, we examined whether lasting false beliefs can have long-term consequences with respect to particular eating habits. We falsely suggested to subjects that, as children, they had become ill after eating egg salad. We then examined whether this suggestion increased their confidence that this event had occurred and whether they avoided the target food, in both the short and the long term (i.e., after 4 months).

Study shows that falsely suggesting that a person experienced a childhood event can change that person's behavior considerably, in both the short and the longer term. We falsely suggested to subjects that, as children, they had become ill after eating egg salad. After this manipulation, a significant minority of subjects came to believe they had experienced this event. More important, this newfound autobiographical belief was accompanied by significantly reduced consumption of egg-salad sandwiches, both immediately and 4 months after the false suggestion. findings show that, at least in the short term, simply having received the false feedback deterred both believers and nonbelievers from actually eating egg salad. Thus, they exhibited a contagion effect (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). That is, all subjects who received the false feedback must have been reminded of what it must feel like to become ill after eating egg salad. This finding also indicates that suggestions about the past may have more persistent effects on behavior than on self-reports, at least in the short term. Such a dissociation between behavior and self-reports is a well-known phenomenon in social psychology (Greenwald et al., 2002). However, in the third session, researchers found a significant difference between believers and nonbelievers in their consumption of egg-salad sandwiches. That is, the false feedback that was given 4 months earlier did not seem to have had a lasting effect on nonbelievers, who ate more egg-salad sandwiches than believers did at this session. It is possible that believers had been contemplating the egg-salad event and had consequently created memories about having gotten ill after eating egg salad as a child. Of course, we cannot prove the falseness of the reports subjects provided. One could definitely claim that the manipulation triggered true memories rather than creating false ones. findings demonstrate that it is possible, in at least a significant minority of adult

subjects, to induce lasting false beliefs that have consequences not only for attitudes, but also for behavior (see also Scoboria, Mazzoni, & Jarry, 2008). Scholars should consider this when conducting research on false beliefs, because some subjects might experience adverse outcomes from an experimentally induced false belief. These findings also have important implications for people's food and dieting choices. That is, possibly people could learn to avoid certain foods, and thus have healthier eating habits, by believing that they had negative childhood experiences with unhealthy foods. With overweight and obesity having reached epidemic levels around the world (Ogden et al., 2006), the influence of false beliefs on eating behavior seems an essential topic for future work, which should explore whether the consequences of actually having gotten sick after eating a food are similar to the consequences of having a false belief that one has experienced this event. Also, it would be interesting to investigate whether certain individual differences (e.g., suggestibility) may mediate or explain the effects on short- and long-term behavior that was found in this study. In any case, this study clearly demonstrates that false suggestions about childhood events can profoundly change people's attitudes and behavior.So False belief ascription is often considered a diagnostic of theory of mind capacity because an agent with a false belief holds an informational state incongruent with reality. And many times our false beliefs influence our behaviour patterns.

4.3 NATURE OF ATTITUDE

Research on attitudes has been popular in many disciplines. However, the construct is considered more central to social Psychology than to any other academic area. Allport (1935) claimed 60 years ago "the concept of attitude is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology.

4.4 ATTITUDES DEFINED

Attitudes and attitude change have been discussed at least since the beginning of this century (Thomas & Znaniecki, 1918). The study of attitudes has been an important area of interest to social psychologists, who often were also interested in related concepts such as propaganda. Educators have been interested in attitudes because of their possible impact on learning, and while attitudes have not been convincingly linked to achievement, they have been long considered an important component of the most important outcome of education: learning.

Attitude has been a difficult concept to define adequately, primarily because it has been defined by so many, but also because of the word's differing lay uses and connotations.One of the earliest definitions of attitude was proposed by Thomas and Znaniecki (1918). They defined attitude as:

A mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related.

More recently, Zimbardo, and Leippe (1991) defined attitude as:

An evaluative disposition toward some object based upon cognitions, affective reactions, behavioral intentions, and past behaviors ... that can influence cognitions, affective responses, and future intentions and behaviors.

Many refer to attitudes as "predispositions to respond" (Zimbardo & Leippe, 199 1). Attitudes are related to how people perceive the situations in which they find themselves. Also, attitudes vary in direction (either positive or negative), in degree (the amount of positiveness or negativeness), and in intensity (die amount of commitment with which a position is held; Smith, 1082).

4.5 ATTITUDE SYSTEMS

Attitude positions are the summary aggregation of four components: (a) affective responses, (b) cognitions, (c) behaviors, and (d) behavioral intentions (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). The affective component of attitude is said to consist of a person's evaluation of, liking of, or emotional response to some situation, object, or person. Affective responses reflect one's attitude with sensations of pleasure, sadness, or other levels of physical arousal- For example, for the attitude construct of computer anxiety, a topic of current interest, the affective component would be a person's liking of the computer and his feeling of excitement, or dread, when she or he used one.

The cognitive component of an attitude is conceptualized as a person's factual knowledge of the situation, object, or person, including oneself. In other words, the cognitive component refers to how much a person knows about a topic.These four components of attitude form an attitude system. The components are not isolated but are interrelated and produce an organizing framework or mental representation of the attitude construct. Cognitive schemata provide structure to interrelated attitudes and guide the information processes of attending, interpreting, and reconstructing (Smith, 1982). Behavioral research supports the idea that actions lead to the formation of cognitive schemata, which lead to the creation of attitudes. It would seem that the opposite is also true. Attitudes help form cognitive relationships, which in turn predispose behaviors.

4.6 ATTITUDE FORMATION

Situational stimuli or events in the environment directly influence behavior and the formation of attitudes. Strict behaviorists would argue that internal events that form attitudes are the result of observable actions. A change in attitude or beliefs occurs as a result of actions that have been influenced by reinforcers. Social-learning theory expands this principle. According to social-learning theorists, it is not essential to learn behaviors directly through action and reinforcement, as traditional behavioral psychologists

would propose. Indirect learning through observing a model and receiving verbal instruction has a powerful impact on behavior and attitude formation (Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991).

Situations that include a change in the behavioral component of attitude lead to changes in attitudes. But there is also a reciprocal action. Since the components of attitude systems are interrelated, a change in liking (affect) may result in a change in behaviors (Smith, 1982). For example, the currently popular concept of the cognitive apprenticeship is based on the idea of learners participating as apprentices in real-world activities with those who are more knowledgeable than they. If designed correctly, these situations are perceived by learners as important and realistic, and learners come to value them. The overt activities of cognitive apprenticeships produce in students favorable dispositions (i.e., affects), which in turn promote a sense of value and often a desire to learn more.

4.7 IMPORTANCE OF ATTITUDES

Traditionally when instruction is designed, there are two categories of outcomes in mind: those directed toward cognitive goals, and those related to the attitudes of the learner. There is little necessity to argue the importance of the acquisition of knowledge by a student as a result of instruction. Achievement is the paramount objective of most instructional activities, However, it may also be important to recognize the need for establishing attitudinal goals and for planning activities designed to facilitate affective outcomes in learners as a consequence of an instructional situation. As a matter of fact, it has become increasingly apparent to those involved in educational technology research that one of the major, and possibly unique, consequences of instructional situations involving media is the likelihood of the development of positive attitudinal positions in students (Simonson, 1985).

In summary, attitudes are complex phenomena. They have been studied for decades by social scientists and educators and are beginning to be understood as organizers related to learning processes and outcomes. Attitudes are learned "predispositions to respond" held by individuals that make them likely to act in certain ways. Attitudes are not observable, but they do serve to help produce observable actions in people.

Social psychologists, and others, have proposed a number of theories of attitude change. Many of the theories are related, so there has been considerable effort to categorize them. Because of the comprehensiveness of the attitude change literature, it is considered important to review the theories of attitude change as a foundation for proposing guidelines for persuasion.

4.8 ATTITUDE CHANGE

Persuasion plays an essential role in everyday social life. We use the term persuasion to refer to any procedure with the potential to change someone's mind. Although persuasion can be used to change many things such as a

person's specific beliefs (e.g., eating vegetables is good for your health), the most common target of persuasion is a person's attitudes. Attitudes refer to general evaluations individuals have regarding people (including yourself), places, objects, and issues. Attitudes can be assessed in many ways and are accorded special status because of their presumed influence on people's choices and actions (e.g., attitude change mediates the impact of belief change on behavior change). That is, all else being equal, when making choices people will decide to buy the product they like the most, attend the university they evaluate most favorably, and vote for the candidate they approve of most strongly. In the typical situation in which persuasion is possible, a person or a group of people (i.e., the recipient) receives a communication (i.e., the message) from another individual or group (i.e., the source) in a particular setting (i.e., the context). The success of a persuasive attempt depends in part on whether the attitudes of the recipients are modified in the desired direction. Designing appropriate strategies for attitude change depends on understanding the basic mechanisms underlying persuasion. Therefore, the primary goal of this chapter is to explain the psychological processes that are responsible for attitude change and provide an overview of the main theories and research findings from social psychology.

4.8.1 Implicit versus Explicit Attitudes

After a long tradition of assessing the impact of persuasion treatments on attitudes using people's responses to self-report measures (e.g., Is fast food good or bad?), more recent work has also assessed attitude change with measures that tap into people's more automatic or gut-level evaluations. Such techniques are often referred to as implicit measures, whereas assessments that tap a person's more deliberative and acknowledged evaluations are referred to as explicit measures. Using implicit measures can be important because these measures do not always reveal the same evaluations as explicit self-reports. For example, an explicit measure could reveal that a person claims to dislike cigarettes but an implicit measure might show a more favorable reaction (e.g., stronger associations between cigarettes and positive words than negative words). Implicit measures can be useful because they often bypass social desirability concerns and have been shown to predict spontaneous information processing, judgment, and behavior (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, ; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, b, for reviews). In contrast, deliberative attitude measures are especially important in predicting behaviors that also are undertaken with some degree of thought (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard,). Because implicit and explicit measures of attitudes are useful in predicting behavior separately (e.g., Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji,) and in combination (e.g., Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler,), it is useful to understand how each is modified by various persuasion techniques. Before turning to research on attitude change, we will provide a brief discussion of our assumptions regarding attitude structure because it is important for understanding some of the consequences of attitude change that will be described throughout this chapter (Fabrigar & Wegener, for an extended discussion of attitude structure)

4.8.2 Attitude Structure: The Meta-Cognitive Model

In addition to associating attitude objects with general evaluative summaries (e.g., good/bad), people sometimes develop an attitude structure in which attitude objects are separately linked to both positivity and negativity (see also Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson,). Furthermore, we assume that people can tag these evaluations as valid or invalid, or held with varying degrees of confidence. Our framework for understanding attitude structure is called the Meta-Cognitive Model (MCM; Petty & Briñol, a; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree,). For many attitude objects, one evaluation is dominant and is seen as valid. This evaluation would come to mind on encountering the attitude object, though the speed at which this occurs can vary (e.g., see Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, ; Fazio et al.,). However, sometimes a person considers both positive and negative evaluations to be valid; this person's attitude is best described as being explicitly ambivalent because both positive and negative associations come to mind and are endorsed (e.g., de Liver, van der Plight, & Wigboldus,).

At other times, however, people might have two opposite accessible evaluations come to mind, but one is seen as valid and the other is rejected. A denied evaluation can be a past attitude (e.g., I used to like smoking, but now I find it to be disgusting) or an association that was never endorsed but is nonetheless salient due to the person's culture (e.g., from the mass media). One example of the latter is when a person has automatic negative associations to a minority group but recognizes consciously that these associations are inaccurate (e.g., Devine,). When one evaluation that comes to mind is accepted but the other is rejected, the MCM refers to the attitude structure as one of implicit ambivalence (Petty & Briñol,). At the conscious level, people do not report any ambivalence because they accept one evaluation (e.g., cigarettes are bad) but not the other (e.g., cigarettes are good). However, in cases of implicit ambivalence, despite the fact that one evaluation is negated (i.e., the idea that "cigarettes are good" is tagged as "wrong"), both positive and negative evaluations might come to mind spontaneously in the presence of the attitude object. To the extent that the invalidity or "wrong" tag is not retrieved, the person might find him or herself reaching for a cigarette! This conflict at the level of automatic associations can produce some discomfort even though the person does not explicitly endorse opposite evaluations of the same attitude object (Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie,).even though the individuals who had changed their attitudes clearly rejected their old attitude at the explicit level, they still acted as if they were somewhat ambivalent by engaging in more processing of attitude-relevant information (Petty, Tormala, Briñol, & Jarvis,). The MCM holds that automatic evaluative associations only determine explicit self-reports of attitudes to the extent that people endorse these associations. On the other hand, automatic evaluative associations, whether endorsed or not, can affect implicit attitude measures (see also Gawronski & Bodenhausen,). That is, the perceived validity tags tend not to influence implicit measures until these tags become so well learned that they are automatically activated (see Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty,).

4.8.3 Classic Processes of Persuasion

The earliest studies were guided by relatively simple questions (e.g., is an appeal to emotions more effective than an appeal to reason?). When the science of persuasion began a century ago, researchers tended to focus on just one outcome for any variable (e.g., positive emotions should always increase persuasion) and only one process by which any variable had its effect (see Petty,). As data accumulated, however, researchers began to recognize that any one variable did not always have the same effect on persuasion (e.g., sometimes positive emotions could decrease persuasion), and each variable could affect attitudes by more than one process. Furthermore, the fact that some attitude changes tended to be relatively durable and impactful (e.g., guiding behavior), but other attitude changes were rather transitory and inconsequential, was puzzling. Contemporary theories of persuasion, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo,), the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly,), and the unimodel (Kruglanski & Thompson,) were generated to articulate multiple ways in which variables could affect attitudes in different situations (see Petty & Briñol, , for an historical overview). Before turning to contemporary theories, it is useful to briefly review some of the classic approaches that focused on single processes of persuasion.

4.8.4 Learning and Reception Theories

A prominent early approach to persuasion assumed that the same learning principles that applied to learning how to avoid touching a hot stove were also involved in learning whether to like or dislike something new. Thus, at the simplest level, it was proposed that merely associating some object, person, or issue with something else about which you already felt positively or negatively could make the previously neutral object take on the same evaluation (e.g., Staats & Staats,). The most influential learning approach stemmed from Carl Hovland's attempt to apply verbal learning principles to persuasion during World War II (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley,). The core assumption of this approach was that effective influence required a sequence of steps leading to absorption of the content of a message (e.g., exposure, attention, comprehension, learning, retention; see McGuire,). Once the relevant information was learned, people were assumed to yield to it. Thus, the core aspect of persuasion was providing incentives (e.g., an attractive source) to get people to learn the material in a communication so that they would be persuaded by it. In one important variation of this approach proposed by McGuire the reception phase (e.g., attention, learning) was separated from the yielding phase because several variables could have opposite effects on each step. The joint action of reception and yielding processes implies that people of moderate intelligence should be easier to persuade than people of low or high intelligence because moderate intelligence maximizes the impact of reception and yielding on persuasion (Rhodes & Wood, ,)for a review Self-Persuasion Approaches Despite how sensible the message learning approach seemed, the accumulated evidence

showed that message learning could occur in the absence of attitude change and that attitudes could change without learning the specific information in the communication (Petty & Cacioppo,). The cognitive response approach (Greenwald, ; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock,) was developed to account for this. In contrast to the message learning view, the cognitive response approach proposes that persuasion depends on the thoughts people generate to messages rather than learning the message per se. Thus, appeals that elicit primarily favorable thoughts toward a particular recommendation produce agreement (e.g., "if that new laundry detergent makes my clothes smell fresh, I'll be more popular"), whereas appeals that elicit mostly unfavorable thoughts toward the recommendation are ineffective in achieving attitude change—regardless of the amount of message learning. A person's thoughts in the absence of any explicit message can also produce attitude change. The persuasive effect of self-generated messages was shown in early research on role-playing. For example, in one study, individuals who generated arguments through playing a role (e.g., convincing a friend to quit smoking) were more turned off to cigarettes than those who received the same information passively (Elms, ; see also, Janis & King, ; Greenwald & Albert, ; Huesmann, Eron, Klein, Brice, & Fischer, ; Watts,).

In addition to generating messages, other work has shown that people can be persuaded when they try to remember past behaviors, imagine future behaviors, explain some behavior, or merely think about an event. Similarly, Tesser and his colleagues showed that merely thinking about an attitude object without being told what to think about it can lead to attitude change. In one study, thinking about a person who did something nice led that person to be evaluated more favorably than when distracted from thinking, whereas thinking about a person who was insulting led to more negative evaluations than when distracted (see Tesser, Martin, & Mendolia,). Similar effects have been observed in studies of self-presentation where people generate information about themselves (e.g., Baumeister, ; Tice, ; Wicklund & Gollwitzer,).

4.8.5 Meta-Cognition

The self-persuasion approaches just mentioned focus on the initial or primary thoughts individuals have about attitude objects. Recent research suggests that people not only have thoughts, but they can have thoughts about their thoughts, or meta-cognition (Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener,). One feature of thoughts that has proven to be useful is the confidence with which people hold their thoughts. That is, two people can have the same favorable thought about the message (e.g., "the proposed tax increase should help our schools' '), but one person can have considerably more confidence in the validity of that thought than another person. According to self-validation theory (Petty, Briñol, & Tormala,), people should rely on their thoughts more when they have confidence rather than doubt in those thoughts. In support of this idea, Petty et al. found that when the thoughts in response to a message were primarily favorable, increasing confidence in their validity increased persuasion, but increasing doubt in their validity decreased persuasion. When the thoughts to a message were mostly unfavorable, however, increasing confidence reduced persuasion,

but undermining confidence increased persuasion. An early demonstration of the importance of meta-cognition for persuasion came from research on what is called the ease of retrieval effect. In a classic study, Schwarz and colleagues asked participants to rate their own assertiveness after recalling versus examples of their own assertive behavior. They found that people viewed themselves as more assertive after retrieving just rather than examples. This result was initially surprising because a straightforward application of the self-persuasion approach would have suggested that people generating instances of assertiveness would have judged themselves to be more assertive than those generating instances. So, something other than the mere content of the thoughts generated must have played a role. Schwarz and colleagues reasoned that people also considered the ease with which the thoughts could be retrieved from memory. When people have an easy time generating thoughts they are more confident in them and use them more than when they have a difficult time generating them (Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, ; Tormala, Falces, Briñol, & Petty,). To date, numerous studies have appeared showing the importance of perceived ease across various issues, and measures, including implicit measures (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, ; see Schwarz, , , for reviews).

4.8.6 Motivational Approaches

The approaches just reviewed tend to have in common the idea that attitude change is based on the positive and negative beliefs and emotions that are associated with an attitude object and the perceived validity of these beliefs and emotions. That is, each attitude object is associated with salient information, and people either add up (Fishbein & Ajzen,) or average (Anderson,) this information, either deliberately or automatically (see Betsch, Plessner, & Schallies,), to arrive at their attitudes. People are sometimes rather impartial in their information-processing activity, carefully assessing whatever is presented for its merits or attempting to generate information on both sides of an issue. At other times, however, people are rather biased in their assessment. Persuasion theorists have examined a number of motives that lead people away from impartial information processing. Sometimes people want to achieve a particular answer rather than objectively weighing all possibilities (Kruglanski & Webster,). As we discuss in more detail later, perhaps the most studied biasing motive is based on the need for cognitive consistency as evident in Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance.

However, other motives can also bias information processing such as a desire to be free and independent or to belong to a group (see Briñol & Petty,, for a discussion). When motives bias thinking, people actively try to generate favorable or unfavorable thoughts. Biased thinking does not require a specific motive, however, as some variables can bias thinking outside of conscious intentions such as when a good mood makes positive thoughts spring to mind (Forgas, ; Petty et al.,).

4.8.7 Fundamental Processes Underlying Attitude Change

Attitudes are sometimes changed by relatively low thought mechanisms (e.g., conditioning), although at other times they are changed with a great deal of thinking (e.g., role playing). Sometimes the thinking is relatively objective and sometimes it is biased by various motives that are present. Notably, the research on persuasion shows that variables such as using an attractive source or putting people in a good mood sometimes have a positive effect on persuasion and sometimes the effect is negative. To understand these complexities, contemporary multi-process theories of persuasion were developed. We use one of these theories—the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo,)—to organize the literature. Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of Persuasion

The ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, ,) was developed in an attempt to integrate the literature on persuasion by proposing that there was a limited set of core processes by which variables could affect attitudes, and that these processes require different amounts of thought. Thoughtful persuasion was referred to as following the central route, whereas low-thought persuasion was said to follow the peripheral route. A common finding in ELM research is that the attitudes of people who are motivated and able to think about a message are influenced by their own thoughts following an assessment of the merits of the appeal, but when they are relatively unmotivated to think, attitudes are influenced by their reaction to simple cues in the persuasion setting (Petty & Wegener, , for a review). The ELM is an early example of what became an explosion of dual process (see Chaiken & Trope,) and dual system (see Deutsch & Strack,) theories that distinguished thoughtful (deliberative) from non thoughtful (gut, experiential, snap) judgments.

According to the ELM, the extent of thinking is important not only because it determines the route to persuasion and the process by which a variable affects attitudes, but also because more thoughtful persuasion tends to be more persistent over time, resistant to change, and predictive of behavior than is persuasion produced by low-thought processes (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith,).

One of the most fundamental things that a variable can do to influence attitudes is affect the amount of thinking about a communication (Petty, Ostrom, & Brock,). We will review some key variables that affect the extent of thinking. Motivation to Think Perhaps the most important determinant of a person's motivation to process a message is its perceived personal relevance. Whenever the message can be linked to some aspect of the message recipient's "self," it becomes more personally relevant and more likely to be processed. Linking the message to almost any aspect of the self, such as a person's values, goals, outcomes, and identities, can enhance self-relevance and processing (Blankenship & Wegener, ; Fleming & Petty, ; Petty & Cacioppo,).

In each case, motivating more thinking led attitudes to be more aff ected by the quality of the arguments in the message. Because evaluative conflict is typically experienced as uncomfortable (e.g., Abelson & Ronsenberg, ; Higgins, ; Newcomb, ; Osgood & Tannenbaum,), people attempt to reduce it. Perhaps the most common approach to dealing with feelings of

inconsistency is enhanced information processing (e.g., Abelson et al., ; Aronson, ; Festinger, ; Heider,

; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, ; Maio, Bell, & Esses, ;Nordgren, van Harreveld, & van der Pligt). By considering additional information, individuals presumably hope to gain enough information to resolve or minimize the inconsistency (e.g., Hänze, ; Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer,). Or, in a more biased way, they might seek out and think about information that supports their dominant reaction to an issue rather than their subordinate one (Clark, Wegener, & Fabrigar,). As mentioned earlier, the ambivalence that enhances information processing can be explicit or implicit (Briñol et al., ; Petty et al.,). Before closing, it is important to note that in addition to the situational factors described, there are also individual differences in people's motivation to think about persuasive communications. Some people like to engage in thoughtful cognitive activities, but others do not. The former are described as being high in need for cognition (NC) whereas the latter are low in this trait (Cacioppo & Petty,). Individuals high in NC tend to form attitudes on the basis of an effortful analysis of the quality of the relevant information in the persuasive proposal, whereas people low in NC tend to be more reliant on simple cues (although this pattern can be reversed in some circumstances;, Petty & Evans, Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, ; Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, , for reviews). Ability to Think Having the necessary motivation to process a message is not sufficient for the central route to occur. People must also be able to process it.

4.8.8 Direction or Valence of Thinking

When motivation and ability to think are high, people will engage in careful thought. In such situations, the quality of the information presented will be an important determinant of whether the thoughts generated are largely favorable or unfavorable. With cogent arguments, thoughts will be predominantly favorable, and with specious arguments, thoughts will be largely unfavorable.

However, as noted earlier, a person's thoughts can also be biased by factors outside of the message itself. Some factors in the persuasion setting, such as being in a positive mood or having the message presented by an expert source, can increase the likelihood that positive thoughts or favorable interpretations of information are generated (e.g., DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, ; Petty et al.,). Other factors, such as being the target of an explicit persuasion attempt, can increase the likelihood that counterarguing occurs (Petty & Cacioppo, b). This could be why "overheard" communications are often more influential than explicit persuasion attempts (e.g., Walster & Festinger,). In general, biasing influences tend to be more impactful when people are already thinking about the message and the message itself is somewhat ambiguous in its quality (Chaiken & Maheswaran,). Any time a message takes a position opposed to an existing attitude, people are likely to be biased against it—wanting to reject it. And when a message takes a position in favor of your attitudes, you likely will be biased in favor of it—wanting to accept it. Similarly, if a message is

perceived as counter to your outcomes, or values, or identities, you will be biased against it, but if it is perceived to be supportive, you will be biased in favor of it. As noted earlier, when a message is framed as simply relevant to the self (our outcomes, values, or identities), the amount of information processing is affected because the message is seen as more personally relevant. But when a message takes a particular position (pro or con) with respect to the self, the valence of the processing can be affected (Petty & Cacioppo,)

Motivational Biases

As noted earlier, perhaps the most studied motive in the persuasion literature is the need to maintain consistency among attitudes, beliefs, emotions, and behaviors (Festinger, ; Heider, ; Kiesler, ; Rosenberg,), and the most prominent consistency theory is the theory of cognitive dissonance. In Festinger's original formulation of dissonance theory, two elements in a cognitive system (e.g., a belief and an attitude; an attitude and a behavior) were said to be consonant if one followed from the other (e.g., I voted for Candidate X; She has the same positions that I do on the major issues) and dissonant if one belief implied the opposite of the other (e.g., I voted for Candidate X; His political party is opposed to mine). Festinger proposed that the psychological state of dissonance was aversive and that people would be motivated to reduce it.

One of the more interesting dissonance situations occurs when a person's behavior is brought into conflict with his or her attitudes or beliefs. For example, one common way of producing dissonance in the laboratory is by inducing a person to write an essay that is inconsistent with the person's attitude under high choice conditions and with little incentive (e.g., Zanna & Cooper,). Because behavior is usually difficult to undo, dissonance can be reduced by changing beliefs and attitudes to bring them into line with the behavior. Dissonance can result in a reanalysis of the reasons why a person engaged in a certain behavior or made a certain choice, and cause a person to rethink (rationalize) the merits of an attitude object. The end result of this effortful but biased cognitive activity can be a change in attitude toward the object.If people are provided with social support for their actions (Stroebe & Diehl,) or are given an opportunity to restore or bolster their self-esteem in some other manner (Tesser,), dissonance-reducing attitude change is less likely (for a review, see Sherman & Cohen,).

In fact, a strategy of bolstering the esteem of the persuasion target can serve as a general avenue to undermine resistance to persuasion (Knowles & Linn,). That is, one means that has been promulgated to decrease a person's resistance to change is to provide some self-affirmation prior to an attacking message. Self-affirmation theory (Steele,) holds that affirming an important aspect of the self prior to receipt of a counterattitudinal message can buff er the self against the threat imposed by the message and thereby increase the likelihood that participants will respond to the message favorably (e.g., Cohen, Aronson, & Steele,).

4.8.9 Ability Biases

Although most studies of bias in persuasion contexts fall in the motivational category, ability factors can also produce bias. For example, people who possess accessible attitudes bolstered by considerable attitude congruent knowledge are better able to defend their attitudes than those who have inaccessible attitudes or attitudes with a minimal underlying foundation (Fazio & Williams, ; Wood). For some variables, a combination of motivational and ability factors could be at work. For example, being in a positive mood might make it easier for positive thoughts to come to mind (an ability bias; Bower,), but might also motivate people to want to stay in that positive state by generating positive thoughts (e.g., Wegener & Petty,).

4.8.10 Meta-Cognitive Processes

In addition to affecting the amount of thinking and the direction of the thoughts, variables can also have an impact on attitudes by affecting what people think about their thoughts (Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener,). We describe some of these meta-cognitive factors next. Expectancy–Value Model Two key aspects of thoughts are the expectancy (i.e., likelihood) and value (i.e., desirability) of consequences considered in a thought.a persuasive message will be effective to the extent that it produces a change in either the likelihood or the desirability component of a consequence that is linked to the attitude object (e.g., Johnson, Smith-McLallen, Killeya, & Levin, ; Fabrigar & Wegener, this volume for further discussion).

4.9 SELF-VALIDATION THEORY

Whatever likelihood or desirability is provided for each consequence considered, the thoughts themselves can vary in the confidence with which they are held. For example, if a person thinks that getting his or her clothes clean is highly desirable and the likelihood of this occurring is quite high, but these judgments are not held with much certainty, they will not have as much impact on the person's evaluation of the product as if they were confidently held. In addition to thought certainty being affected by the likelihood and desirability certainties (Petty et al.,), as we describe next, it is also affected by numerous other situational and individual factors. Earlier in this chapter we explained how the ease of generation of thoughts could affect their perceived validity (Tormala et al., ,), but there are many others. Other variables that affect perceived validity of thoughts include simple bodily movements. Earlier research had indicated that nodding the head was associated with more favorable attitudes than shaking (Wells & Petty,). One possibility is that nodding imparts a sense of validity to what we are thinking and shaking imparts some doubt. According to this framework, whether nodding is good or bad for persuasion should depend on what people are thinking. Indeed, students who were exposed to a strong message and were generating favorable thoughts showed more persuasion when nodding than shaking. In contrast, students listening to a weak message who were generating mostly negative thoughts showed less persuasion when nodding than shaking. This is because the nodding validated whatever thoughts the students were having, increasing their impact on attitudes. Many other variables have been shown to affect perceptions of thought

validity and thereby attitudes. For example, research has shown that thought confidence is higher when after generating thoughts in response to a persuasive message people learn that the message was generated by an expert versus a non expert source. Thought confidence is also increased if people are made to feel happy, powerful, or they are self-affirmed after message processing (see Briñol & Petty, a). In each case, using a confidence manipulation after thought generation caused people to rely more on their thoughts such that when thoughts were primarily positive, increased confidence was associated with more persuasion, but when thoughts were primarily negative, increased confidence was associated with less persuasion. In the domain of explicit attitudes, confidence in thoughts has been found to be an especially potent determinant of judgment when the amount of thinking at the time of attitude formation or change is relatively high. It is also useful to consider the extent of thinking permitted during response to the attitude measure. In general, if attitudes are not well formed or practiced at the time of attitude measurement, an implicit measure is unlikely to reflect thought confidence effects (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,).

However, if the attitude is well formed and practiced at the time of attitude measurement (i.e., people have already considered the confidence in their thoughts in developing their attitudes), the implicit attitude measure is likely to reflect the same factors as the explicit measure (see Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin,).

4.10 FLEXIBLE CORRECTION PROCESSES

Just as enhanced confidence in thoughts leads to greater reliance on them, increased doubt leads people to discard their thoughts. Sometimes, people might be so doubtful of their thoughts that they think the opposite is true. In such cases, doubt can lead to reverse effects with positive thoughts leading to less positive attitudes than negative thoughts. If people have doubt in their thoughts because they fear that their thoughts might have stemmed from some biasing factor in the situation (e.g., an attractive source) or some prejudice they have, they could attempt to explicitly correct for their biased thoughts in accord with the mechanism specified by the Flexible Correction Model (FCM; see Wegener & Petty, , for a review). That is, people might estimate the magnitude and direction of the perceived biasing effect on their judgments and attempt to correct for it. To the extent that they correct too much, reverse effects of variables can be obtained (Petty & Wegener, ; Wegener & Petty, ; Wilson & Brekke,).

4.10.1 Serving as Arguments

According to the ELM, when the amount of thinking in a persuasion situation is high, people assess the relevance of all of the information available. That is, people examine source, message, recipient, and contextual and internally generated information as possible arguments for favoring or disfavoring the attitude object. Interestingly, variables that serve as simple cues when the likelihood of thinking is low can be processed as arguments when thinking is high.Under high thinking conditions, however, message recipients scrutinize the merits of the information presented so that

an attractive source would enhance attitude favorability if it was relevant to the advocacy (e.g., a beauty product), but not when it was irrelevant (e.g., a home loan; see Kruglanski et al., ; Miniard, Bhatla, Lord, Dickson, & Unnava). Of course, what information serves as a cogent argument can vary with individuals and with situations (Petty & Wegener,). Serving as Cues The final role for variables is the most basic—serving as a simple cue. According to the ELM, under low thinking conditions, attitudes are influenced by a variety of low effort processes such as mere association or reliance on simple heuristics and inferences. This is important because it suggests that attitude change does not always require effortful evaluation of the information presented. Next, we briefly describe some of the psychological processes that can produce attitude change with relatively little (if any) effortful thinking.

4.10.2 Attribution Theory

In an influential paper introducing self-perception theory, Bem suggested that when people have no special knowledge of their own internal states, they simply infer their attitudes in a manner similar to how they infer the attitudes of others [e.g., "if I (she) walked a mile to Target, I (she) must like that store"]. During much of the s, self-perception theory was thought to provide an alternative account of dissonance effects (Bem,). Subsequent research indicated, however, that both dissonance and self perception processes can operate, but in different domains. In particular, the underlying "discomfort from inconsistency leading to biased processing" mechanism of dissonance theory operates when a person engages in attitude discrepant action that is unacceptable to a person whereas self-perception processes are more likely when a person engages in attitude-discrepant but more agreeable behavior (Fazio, Zanna, & Cooper,).Self-perception theory also accounts for some unique attitudinal phenomena.

4.10.3 Use of Persuasion Heuristics

The term heuristics refers to simple rules or shortcuts that people can use to simplify decision making (Shah & Oppenheimer,). The Heuristic/Systematic model of persuasion (HSM represents an explicit attempt to use heuristics to explain why certain variables such as source expertise or message length have their impact (Chaiken, ; Chaiken et al.,). That is, the HSM proposes that in contrast to "systematic" (central route) processes, many source, message, and other cues are evaluated by means of simple schemas or cognitive heuristics that people have learned on the basis of past experience and observation. According to the HSM, the likelihood of careful processing increases whenever confidence in our attitude drops below the desired level (the "sufficiency threshold"). Whenever actual and desired confidence are equal, heuristic processing is more likely. For the most part, the HSM makes predictions that are similar to the ELM, though the language and specific mechanisms of each theory are a bit different (Eagly & Chaiken, ; Petty & Wegener, , for further discussion).

4.10.4 Conditioning

The attribution and heuristic models focus on simple cognitive inferences that can modify attitudes. Other approaches emphasize the role of relatively simple association processes. One of the most direct ways of associating affect with attitude objects is through classical conditioning. In brief, conditioning occurs when an initially neutral stimulus such as an unfamiliar shape (the conditioned stimulus; CS) is associated with another stimulus such as electric shock (the unconditioned stimulus; UCS) that is connected directly or through prior learning to some response such as feeling bad (the unconditioned response; UCR). By pairing the UCS with the CS many times, the CS becomes able to elicit a conditioned response (CR) that is similar to the UCR. Over the past several decades, a wide variety of conditioning stimuli have been used to create positive or negative attitudes including unpleasant odors and temperatures, harsh sounds, pleasant pictures, and elevating and depressing films (e.g., Gouaux, ; Staats, Staats, & Crawford, ; Stuart, Shimp, & Engle,). People have been found to be especially susceptible to conditioning effects when the likelihood of thinking is rather low (Cacioppo, MarshallGoodell, Tassinary, & Petty, ; see also, Shimp, Stuart, & Engle,). Theorists have suggested that classical conditioning applied to attitudes might actually be a somewhat different phenomenon more appropriately called evaluative conditioning (Martin & Levey,). This is because the conditioned attitudes do not follow the same properties as do the behaviors examined in typical classical conditioning paradigms (e.g., the conditioning of a salivary response in dogs).

In classical conditioning, the phenomenon works best when there is some awareness of the pairing of the CS and UCS so that the UCS comes to signal the appearance of the CS. In evaluative conditioning, this contingency awareness is not necessary. Perhaps because of this, the conditioned response in evaluative conditioning tends not to be extinguished when the UCS is no longer presented, unlike classical conditioning (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, , for a review). One possibility suggested recently by Jones, Fazio, and Olson is that evaluative conditioning occurs because of misattribution of the feelings elicited by the UCS to the CS. In a series of studies in which the UCS (pleasant or unpleasant pictures) and CS (Pokémon cartoon characters) were presented simultaneously over many trials, Jones et al. showed that the easier it was to confuse the source of the affect, the greater the conditioning effect.

Mere Exposure

The mere exposure effect occurs when attitudes toward stimuli become more favorable as a consequence of their mere repeated presentation without any need to pair the stimuli with other positive stimuli as in evaluative conditioning (Zajonc).

Perhaps the most accepted explanation of this effect today relies on the notion of perceptual fluency. Much research suggests that previous or repeated exposure to stimuli can make those stimuli easier to process, and that this fluency enhances subsequent liking. Specifically, the feeling of ease of processing is thought to be misattributed to a positive evaluation of the stimulus (Bornstein, ; Bornstein & D'Agostino, ; Jacoby, Kelley,

Brown, & Jasechko,), at least when people perceive fluency as something good (Briñol, Petty, & Tormala,). The fluency process is most likely to occur when the repeated stimuli are not thought about much (e.g., are presented very quickly or are meaningless; see Bornstein,). When the repeated stimuli already have some meaning, or elicit an initial dominant response in one direction or another, repeated exposure can accentuate that dominant response (Brickman, Redfi eld, Harrison, & Crandall,). Repeatedly presenting negative information, for instance, can make that information seem more negative (Cacioppo & Petty, ; Grush,). One possible reason for these polarization effects is that our positive assessments of positive information might seem more valid or plausible as exposure increases, as do our negative assessments of negative information (Kruglanski, Freund, & Bar-Tal,).

4.10.5 Implicit Change through Automatic Processes

Although the research just described on simple mechanisms of attitude change has assessed change using explicit attitude measures, these same mechanisms are capable of affecting implicit measures of attitudes. Although some studies likely involve invoking a different attitude object rather than attitude change (e.g., the manipulation makes the subtype of a black professional salient and this subtype is evaluated; see Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer), there are a sufficient number of studies in which it is clear that automatic evaluations of the same attitude object are being modified to conclude that automatic attitudes can be changed by simple associative processes requiring little elaborative thinking (for other illustrations, see Petty & Briñol, in press).

4.10.6 The Influence of Communication Variables on Persuasion

In addition to specifying the general mechanisms of persuasion just reviewed, the ELM postulates that any communication variable (i.e., whether source, message, recipient, or context) influences attitudes by affecting one of these key processes. Because of the very long list of persuasion variables that have been studied and the thousands of published studies, our review of variables is meant to illustrate how understanding the basic mechanisms of persuasion is useful in analyzing any possible variable of interest, even if it has never previously been studied.

Source Factors

Consider first the multiple processes by which source factors, such as expertise, attractiveness, race, or gender, can have an impact on persuasion. When the likelihood of thinking was low (e.g., low personal relevance topic), source factors have influenced attitudes by serving as a peripheral cue, affecting implicit (Forehand & Perkins, ; McConnell, Rydell, Strain, & Mackie) as well as explicit attitudes (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman; Chaiken) in the same direction as their valence. When the likelihood of thinking is set to be very high (e.g., high personal relevance of the message topic), source factors have taken on other roles. For example, if a source factor is relevant to the merits of a message, it can serve as a persuasive argument. Thus, an attractive endorser can provide persuasive visual

evidence for the effectiveness of a beauty product (Petty & Cacioppo, b). Another role that sources can play under high thinking conditions is biasing information processing. If the likelihood of thinking is not set to be very high or low by other variables then source factors such as expertise and attractiveness have affected how much thinking people did about the message (e.g., DeBono & Harnish, ; Moore, Hausknecht, & Th amodaran; Puckett, Petty, Cacioppo, & Fisher,).

Message Factors

Message variables can also serve in multiple roles. For example, think about the number of arguments that a persuasive message contains. This variable serves basic processes as a simple peripheral cue when people are either unmotivated or unable to think about the information (Petty & Cacioppo, a). That is, people can simply count the arguments in a message and agree more with the advocacy as more information is presented, regardless of the cogency of that information. When motivation and ability to think are high, however, the informational items in a message are not simply counted, but instead the information is processed for its quality. Thus, under low thinking conditions when the number of arguments in a message serves as a cue, adding weak reasons in support of a position enhances persuasion, but when the informational items in a message are processed as arguments, adding weak reasons reduces persuasion (Alba & Marmorstein, ; Friedrich, Fetherstonhaugh, Casey, & Gallagher, ; Petty & Cacioppo, a). The mere number of arguments is only one of the many message factors that can influence persuasion by serving in different roles in different situations. Other variables include whether the message emphasizes affect or cognition, is complex or not, matches the recipients' characteristics in some way, and argues in favor or against previous views (Petty & Wegener,). Finally, we note that as was the case with source factors, implicit measures are also affected by message factors (Petty & Briñol, 2010).

Recipient Factors

There are many recipient variables that are relevant for persuasion, ranging from motives such as the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty,), abilities such as intelligence (McGuire,), and individual differences in personality such as self-monitoring (Snyder & DeBono, ; Briñol & Petty, , for a review). Perhaps the recipient factor that has been studied most extensively, however, is a transitory one—the emotions the target of persuasion is experiencing at the time of persuasion. In accord with the ELM, prior research has shown that a person's emotions can serve in all of the roles for variables that we have summarized (Petty et al., , Briñol, Petty, & Rucker, , for reviews). Most simply, when thinking is constrained to be low (e.g., distractions present), emotions tend to serve as simple associative cues and produce evaluations consistent with their valence (e.g., Petty et al.,). When thinking is high, however, emotions serve in other roles. First, emotions can be evaluated as evidence (e.g., negative emotions such as sadness or fear can lead to positive evaluations of a movie if these are the intended states; e.g., Martin,). Also, when thinking is high, emotions can bias the ongoing thoughts (e.g., positive consequences seem more likely when people are in

a happy than sad state; e.g., DeSteno et al.,). The bias is emotion specific. For example, in one study (DeSteno et al.,), participants made to feel sad were more persuaded by a message pointing to sad consequences of a proposal rather than angry ones whereas those participants made to feel angry were more persuaded by a message pointing to angering consequences than sad ones. This is because the consequences seem more likely when the consequence matches rather than mismatches the emotional state. If an emotion is induced after people have finished thinking about the message, then emotions can affect confidence in our thoughts (Briñol, Petty, & Barden), because of the certainty appraisals associated with specific emotions. Because emotions such as happiness and anger are associated with certainty, these would validate thoughts, whereas emotions such as sadness would create doubt in thoughts and lead to less use of them (Tiedens & Linton).

Finally, when the likelihood of thinking is not constrained to be high or low, emotions can affect the extent of thinking. Either happiness or sadness could lead to more thinking depending on whether the emotion signals a problem to be solved (Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991), conveys a sense of uncertainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001), or invokes a motive to manage one's emotions by thinking (Wegener & Petty, 1994). As was the case with the other variables we have reviewed, recent research has revealed that the emotions experienced by a person can influence implicit measures of attitudes (e.g., Sassenberg & Wieber).

4.9.7 Consequences of Different Persuasion Processes for Explicit Measures

Now that we have articulated the various mechanisms by which variables can impact persuasion, we turn to the final issue of why we should care about process. Knowing something about the process can indicate whether the attitude change that is produced will be consequential or not. Sometimes a high and a low thought process can result in the same attitude, such as when being in a good mood produces a favorable attitude by serving as a simple associative cue under low thinking but biasing the thoughts generated under high thinking (Petty et al.,). According to the ELM, attitudes formed or changed through high thinking processes are more persistent, resistant to change, and predictive of behavior than attitudes changed via low thinking processes. There are both structural and meta-cognitive reasons for this. First, as thinking increases during attitude change, people should acquire more support for their attitudes (knowledge) and their attitudes should become more accessible. Furthermore, people should become more confident in their views. Each of these factors would increase the likelihood that attitudes would be consequential (Petty et al., , for a review).

4.9.8 Attitude Persistence and Resistance

When attitude changes are based on extensive issue-relevant thinking, they tend to persist (endure). For example, research has shown that encouraging self-generation of arguments (e.g., Elms, ; Watts,), using interesting or

involving communication topics (Ronis et al.,), leading recipients to believe that they might have to explain or justify their attitudes to other people (e.g., Boninger et al., ; Chaiken,), and having them evaluate a message during its receipt rather than afterward (Mackie,) are all associated with increased persistence of attitude change. Also, people who characteristically enjoy thinking (high need for cognition) show greater persistence of attitude change than people who do not (e.g., Haugtvedt & Petty; Wegener et al.; see, Petty et al., for a review).

Resistance refers to the extent to which an attitude change is capable of surviving an attack from contrary information. Although attitude persistence and resistance tend to co-occur, their potential independence is shown in McGuire's classic work on cultural truisms. Truisms such as "you should brush your teeth after every meal" tend to last forever if not challenged, but are surprisingly susceptible to influence when attacked because people have no practice in defending them. In his work on inoculation theory, McGuire demonstrated that two kinds of bolstering can be effective in facilitating resistance. One relies on providing individuals with a supportive defense of their attitudes (e.g., see Ross, McFarland, Conway, & Zanna,) and a second provides a mild attack and refutation of it (the inoculation). Just as people can be made more resistant to a disease by giving them a mild form of it, people can be made more resistant to discrepant messages by inoculating their initial attitudes (see Petty, Tormala, & Rucker,).

4.9.9 Prediction of Behavior

Once a person's attitude has changed, behavior change requires that the person's new attitudes rather than the old attitudes or previous habits guide action. If a new attitude is based on high thought, it is likely to be highly accessible and come to mind automatically in the presence of the attitude object. Therefore, it will be available to guide behavior even if people do not think much before acting (Fazio, ,). However, even if people do engage in some thought, attitudes based on high thinking are still more likely to guide behavior because these attitudes are held with more certainty and people are more willing to act on attitudes in which they have confidence (e.g., Barden & Petty, ; Brown, ; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, ; Leippe & Elkin,). Of course, behavior is determined by more than individuals' attitudes even if those attitudes are based on high thought. The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen,) highlights social norms (what others think you should do) as an important determinant of behavior, and the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen,) points to a person's sense of self-efficacy or competence to perform the behavior (see Ajzen & Fishbein). These theories make it clear that although attitude change can be an important first step, it might still be insufficient to produce the desired behavioral responses even if appropriate new attitudes were formed by the central route.

4.9.10 Certainty: Strength without More Thinking

We noted earlier that when attitudes change as a result of high thinking processes, they are likely to be held with greater certainty than when they are changed to the same extent by low thinking processes. Certainty generally refers to a sense of validity concerning our attitudes (Gross, Holtz, & Miller,) and is an important construct because it can cause attitude strength. That is, attitudes held with greater certainty are more resistant to change (e.g., Kiesler,), persistent in the absence of a persuasive attack (Bassili,), and more predictive of behavior (Fazio & Zanna,) than attitudes about which there is doubt. Initial conceptualizations of attitude certainty tended to assume that certainty sprang solely from structural features of attitudes such as having attitudes based on more issue-relevant knowledge, direct experience, or thought (e.g., Fazio & Zanna,). And, indeed, structural factors can play an important role in determining attitude certainty.

However, recent research has examined how people sometimes infer greater certainty in the absence of any structural differences. Notably, people can even come to infer greater certainty in their attitudes if they are merely led to believe that they have done much thinking about the attitude object even if they have not (Barden & Petty,). Of greatest importance is that the certainty that comes from simple inferences rather than structural differences can also cause the attitudes to be more consequential (Rucker, Petty, & Briñol, ; Tormala & Petty,). Consistent with the meta-cognitive model of attitude structure (Petty et al.,), it appears that attaching a sense of validity or certainty to our attitudes by whatever means can have long-term implications.

4.10 ATTITUDE CHANGE TODAY

In this review we have argued that persuasion can be understood by breaking the processes responsible for attitude change into a finite set. These processes relate to some of the classic topics of persuasion (e.g., credibility, emotion), and explain how any one variable can produce opposite outcomes, and how the same outcome can be produced by different processes. We emphasized that understanding the underlying mechanisms of persuasion is important because different processes are associated with different consequences. Contemporary research has begun to examine the consequences of deliberative and automatic persuasion processes not only for explicit but also for implicit attitude measures. For example, attitude change processes that require thinking deeply about the attitude object are likely to result in attitude representations that are well integrated and connected with other relevant material in memory (see, e.g., McGuire, ; Tesser,). High thought attitude change can also spill over and influence related attitudes such as when attempting to change attitudes on abortion leads to changes on the issue of contraception (e.g., Crano & Chen,). Such effects on related attitudes have been especially prevalent in the literature on minority influence whereby the minority does not produce change on the focal issue but does on a related topic (see Moscovici, Mucchi-Faina, & Maass, ; Mugny & Perez,). Research on changing automatic attitudes and understanding their relationship to more deliberative attitudes is likely to increase. One other area that is likely to see an exponential increase in

interest concerns how persuasion processes can be mapped with new brain imaging techniques (e.g., see Cunningham, Packer, Kesek, & Van Bavel,). Such measures are likely to add to our knowledge of persuasion just as prior measurement techniques have each led to substantial progress in the field.

4.11 SUMMARY

In this chapter we studied Social Judgement.We discussed how a person's false beliefs influence their behaviour patterns .Then we discussed Attitude,the nature of attitude and we also analyzed the process of attitude change. In the study of Social Psychology Social judgment and attitude have a vast research . On the basis of that research students studied the different aspect of Social Psychology.

4.12 QUESTIONS

Write Short Notes.

1. Motivational Biases
2. Fundamental Processes Underlying Attitude Change
3. Implicit versus Explicit Attitudes
4. Attitude Formation

4.13 REFERENCE

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5

THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL RELATIONS-I

Unit Structure:

5.0 Objectives

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Self Interest and Beyond

5.2.1 Basic Principles of Interpersonal Orientation

5.3 Interpersonal Attraction

5.3.1 Theoretical Perspectives

5.3.2 Target Factors

5.3.3 Perceiver Factors

5.3.4 Relationship Factors

5.3.5 Environmental Factors

5.4 Intimate Relationships

5.4.1 Interdependence Theory

5.4.2 The Intimate Relationship Mind

5.4.3 On-Line Processing

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5.6 Breaking Up

5.6.1 Therapeutic Approaches to Negative Emotion in Relationships

5.7 Summary

5.8 Questions

5.9 Reference

5.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

- ➢ Describe Self Interest and Beyond
- ➢ Understand Interpersonal Attraction
- ➢ Explain Intimate Relationships
- ➢ Understand the Breaking Up

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The self is not part of the brain, and it is not an illusion, and the "real self" is not hidden away in some magical world. Rather, the self is an integral

part of the interface between the animal's body and the social system. The human self must have the skills and qualities to deal with it. Social needs are also reflected in a person's behavior, and if anything, the self is more important in satisfying them than in satisfying physical needs. So the first task of the self is to achieve social acceptance. In addition, I try to secure and improve my position in the social group. It tracks data about itself and works to improve how others perceive it (mostly social). In this chapter we discussed orientations which are beyond self interest. Then we analyze interpersonal attractions , the reason behind it . Afterwards we studied Intimate Relationships and the nature of breaking up .

5.2 SELF INTEREST AND BEYOND

Adam Smith assumes that most of the time groups and societies work well because individuals perceive their own interests. Pursuing self-interest often has unintended consequences that enhance the common good. First, by systematically analyzing situations, researchers inform each other about different situations that may (or may not) occur in everyday life. Thus, there are many different conflicts in everyday life - conflicts between self-interest and the common good, conflicts between self-interest and equality, conflicts between equality and the common good, etc.

Second, by actively studying various situations in the laboratory or in the field, it became increasingly clear that many situations present a conflict between self-interest and the common good. Such situations are everywhere in our close relationships (e.g. washing dishes proactively), in our relationships with colleagues (e.g. whether or not we prepare well for a meeting, if it takes a lot of time), and in our relationships with organizations or society as a whole (e.g. whether we participate in volunteer activities or not). Clearly, a relationship is unlikely to be healthy or even last unless people engage in costly activities that benefit the partner.

In fact, conflicts between self-interest and the common good are so common in everyday life that it can be argued that the most difficult task for governments, groups and organizations, and friends and close associates is to successfully manage conflicts between self-interest and the common good. This may explain why many different disciplines have such a longstanding interest in issues directly related to understanding conflicts or social dilemmas between self-interest and the common good (eg, Dawes, 1980; Komorita and Parks, 1995). In addition to the empirical study of social dilemmas, social psychology has been strongly interested in cooperation and competition, prosocial behavior, altruism, aggression, trust, reciprocity, and many others. These topics are primarily studied from an interpersonal or group perspective, but it should be clear that they have also been studied from an intergroup or broad social perspective. Thus, the broad scientific and societal importance of social dilemmas is undeniable.

To understand social interaction we must consider the person (the *Self*), the interaction partner (the Partner), and the Situation. Likewise, social interaction experiences can be shaped by any of these three components, independently or in combination. For example, a person may be likely to

yield noncooperative, selfish interactions because of person influences (e.g., the person does not tend to trust others' cooperativeness), partner influences. (e.g., the partner holds in fact a competitive orientation), or situation influences (e.g., the two people often are faced with zero-sum-like situations, with very little opportunity for fruitful exchange through cooperation).

Several theories tend to assume such influences, although often focusing on one of these influences. Models or theories that focus on self-fulfilling prophecies tend to focus more strongly on influences of the Self. For example, individuals with competitive orientations are likely to elicit noncooperative behavior from others, because they expect noncooperation from others, they behave noncooperatively toward others, through which they elicit noncooperative behavior from others—thereby supporting their initial belief that "everybody is selfish" (cf. Kelley & Stahelski, 1970).

Cooperation and competition would not be called for, and one cannot communicate or develop trust if there are no conflicts between self-interest and collective interest. This would be a world in which "good and bad" do not seem to matter. In this chapter, interpersonal orientation is broadly defined as the set of cognitions, affect, and motivation that underlie interpersonal behavior and social interaction. We deliberately use a broad definition to reveal its relevance to many interpersonal topics, from affiliation to attachment, and from altruism to aggression.

5.2.1 Basic Principles of Interpersonal Orientation

Most people pursue good outcomes for self, either in the short term, the long term, or both (Individualism), but this is often not the sole orientation that people adopt to Interaction situations.

Interpersonal orientations reflect not only individualism (enhancement of own outcomes) but also cooperation (enhancement of joint outcomes), equality (enhancement of equality in outcomes), altruism (enhancement of other's outcomes), competition (enhancement of relative advantage over others), and aggression (minimization of other's outcomes). The prosocial orientations of cooperation and equality frequently operate in a concerted or interactive manner. That is, these orientations tend to go hand in hand, and it is the interplay of both "prosocial orientations" that best accounts for behavior and interaction in settings of interdependence. Interpersonal orientations are partially shaped by social interactions-therefore, shaped by the self, the interaction partner, and/or the situation. It represent different probabilities with which one or more decision rules (e.g., outcome transformations such as MaxJoint, MinDift) are activated and used. There are three important prosocial orientations: Cooperation,Equality, Altruism . Two prosocial orientations :Individualism, Competition and one antisocial Orientation : Aggression

Cooperation : To the extent that a person feels more strongly part of the group and valued by the group, or the extent to which a person derives self-definition and esteem from the group, individuals are more likely to behave cooperatively. It has been suggested that under conditions of strong identity,

there may be a blurring of the distinction between personal outcomes and collective outcomes- that is, me and mine becomes we and ours, just as we and ours becomes me and mine (e.g., De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).

Equality : Equality has great potential to promote quality and effectiveness of interpersonal relationships and therefore it can be considered a decision rule that is deeply rooted in peoples orientation towards others. It will often serve as the norm and heuristics for one's own actions and expectations regarding other's actions.

Altruism : Altruism is the unselfish concern for other people—doing things simply out of a desire to help, not because you feel obligated to out of duty, loyalty, or religious reasons. It involves acting out of concern for the well-being of other people.

Indualism: Individualism involves giving one's own interests precedence over the interests of the state or social group (i.e., egoism or selfishness). It is based on the belief in the primary importance of the individual and in the virtues of self-reliance and personal independence.

Competition: A "competition," by its very nature, is what psychologists call an "extrinsic incentive." Extrinsic simply means that the motivation to adopt a behavior or decision is sourced externally rather than internally (e.g., when you do something because you get a reward for it). A fundamental characteristic (and downside) of nearly all extrinsic incentives is that they only tend to work for as long as the incentive is maintained! The opposite of extrinsic is what we call "intrinsic" motivation. When we are intrinsically motivated to do something (e.g., helping others, saving energy) we do it not because of an external reward, but simply because we are personally convinced that it is the right thing to do. "Right" doesn't refer to vague cultural conceptions of good and evil, but rather to morality as an evolved capacity. It's Enhancement of relative outcomes in favour of self.

Aggression : Aggression is reduction of outcomes for others.Social psychologists define aggression as behavior that is intended to harm another individual who does not wish to be harmed (Baron & Richardson, 1994). Because it involves the perception of intent, what looks like aggression from one point of view may not look that way from another, and the same harmful behavior may or may not be considered aggressive depending on its intent. Intentional harm is, however, perceived as worse than unintentional harm, even when the harms are identical (Ames & Fiske, 2013).

5.3 INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION

Most of us can readily remember attraction experiences that dominated our life for a while.attraction involves an individual's positive evaluation of others and the desire to approach them scholars have not arrived at a consensual definition of attraction. Perhaps the most influential definition over the past several decades is that interpersonal attraction is "an individual's tendency or predisposition to evaluate another person . . . in a positive (or negative) way" (Berscheid & Walster, , p.). Scholars adopting

this definition primarily conceptualize attraction as an attitude, with affective, behavioral, and cognitive components. Over time, scholars have increasingly complemented this attitudinal conceptualization by emphasizing the motivational aspects of attraction, observing that attraction characterizes not only perceivers' evaluations of targets, but also their desire to initiate contact or to establish intimacy with them (e.g., Simpson & Harris, ; see Graziano & Bruce,). Attraction scholars focus on relationships that are not (yet) close, although they also examine attraction-relevant processes conducted in close relationship contexts (e.g., research distinguishing strangers who become close friends from strangers who do not). We refer to the person who inspires attraction in somebody else as the "target" and the person who experiences attraction as the "perceiver." In reality, of course, both interactants are frequently in both of these roles simultaneously; we adopt this terminology for clarity of exposition.

5.3.1 Theoretical Perspectives

In the 1960s and 1970s, a large proportion of attraction research fell into one (or both) of two broad theoretical traditions. The first encompassed reinforcement theories, which were guided by the idea that perceivers are attracted to targets who are rewarding them. Attraction scholars working in this tradition borrowed ideas from general theories—such as social exchange theory (Blau, ; Homans,), equity theory (Adams, ; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid,), and interdependence theory (Kelley & Th ibaut, ; Thibaut & Kelley,)—and also developed more specific variants targeted toward attraction. According to one such theory, "liking for a person will result under those conditions in which an individual experiences reward in the presence of that person, regardless of the relationship between the other person and the rewarding event or state of affairs" (Lott & Lott, , p. ; emphasis in original; see also Byrne & Clore,).

The second broad theoretical tradition encompassed cognitive consistency theories, which were guided by the idea that perceivers are motivated to seek congruence among their thoughts, feelings, and interpersonal relationships. As with the reinforcement approach, scholars working in this tradition borrowed ideas from general theories—particularly cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger,) and balance theory (Heider,)—and also developed more specific variants targeted toward attraction. For example, not only do perceivers tend to like targets who like them, they also tend to like targets who share their own sentiments toward third parties (e.g., they like targets who dislike somebody they also dislike) (Aronson & Cope,). Scholars have derived a panoply of new attraction hypotheses from this evolutionary approach (e.g., Buss & Schmitt, ; Eastwick, ; Gangestad & Simpson,), and many of these hypotheses have been empirically supported.

Predictors of Attraction

We now explore the predictors of attraction: We divide this exploration into sections on (1) target factors, (2) perceiver factors, (3) relationship factors, and (4) environmental factors.

5.3.2 Target Factors:

Scholars have identified a broad range of factors that make some targets more attractive than others. Some of these target effects are stable individual differences, whereas others are situationally induced or time varying. In terms of stable individual differences, one of the most important and well-studied target factors is physical attractiveness. men tend to be attracted to women with sexually mature features such as prominent cheekbones, whereas women tend to be attracted to men with sexually mature features such as a broad jaw (Cunningham, Barbee, & Philhower, ; Rhodes,). One clever line of research using computer morphing procedures to produce composite versions of human faces ,demonstrated that such faces become more attractive when they consist of a larger number of human faces. One explanation for this effect is that such composites seem most familiar to the perceivers because they approximate an average of the targets perceivers have encountered in their everyday lives, which make the composites easy to process (Langlois, Roggman, & Musselman, ; Langlois, Roggman, & RieserDanner, ; Rhodes, Harwood, Yoshikawa, Nishitani, & MacLean, ; Rubenstein, Langlois, & Roggman,). A second explanation is that such composites are symmetrical, a feature that perceivers find attractive in its own right (Fink, Neave, Manning, & Grammer, ; Mealey, Bridgstock, & Townsend, ; Rhodes, Sumich, & Byatt,).

Moving from faces to bodies, men tend to be most attracted to women with waist-to-hip ratios of approximately 0.7, whereas women tend to be most attracted to men with waist-to-hip ratios of approximately 0.9 (Furnham, Petrides, & Constantinides, ; Singh,). Shocking recent evidence demonstrates that men also tend to prefer women with relatively large breasts, especially when they are accompanied by a relatively trim waist (Furnham, Swami, & Shah, ; Voracek & Fisher,), and women seem to prefer men with broad shoulders, especially when they are accompanied by a relatively trim waist (Hughes & Gallup,). Women also tend to prefer tall men over short men (Hitsch et al., in press; Salska et al.,). In addition to their physical attractiveness, targets are more attractive to the extent that they possess certain psychological dispositions. Scholars have identified a broad range of target characteristics that are appealing to perceivers; three of the most important are warmth/trustworthiness, attractiveness/vitality, and status/resources (Fletcher, Simpson, Thomas, & Giles, ; Simpson, Fletcher, & Campbell,).

A third stable factor influencing how attractive targets are is the degree to which they anticipate that perceivers will like them or reject them (Curtis & Miller,). Targets who anticipate that perceivers will like them behave more warmly during their interactions, which in turn predicts perceivers' liking for them (Stinson, Cameron, Wood, Gaucher, & Holmes,). Shifting from dispositional to situational factors, targets who are familiar are more attractive than targets who are not (but see Norton, Frost, & Ariely,).

Perceivers also tend to be more attracted to targets who ingratiate than to targets who do not, particularly when the ingratiation attempt is directed toward the perceiver rather than toward a third party observer (Gordon,).

This perceiver–observer discrepancy appears to result from perceivers' self enhancement motives and is not moderated by perceivers' self-esteem (Vonk,).

Finally, male perceivers tend to find female targets more attractive—in terms of both physical appearance (Roberts et al.,) and scent (Havlíček, Dvořáková, Bartoš, & Flegr, ; Singh & Bronstad,)—when these targets are ovulating than when they are not. This effect could emerge in part because women dress better when they are ovulating than when they are not (Haselton & Gangestad, ; Haselton, Mortezaie, Pillsworth, Bleske-Rechek, & Frederick, ; Schwarz & Hassebrauck,). However, the effect remains robust when clothing is held constant.

5.3.3 Perceiver Factors:

In addition to targets differing in how attractive they are, perceivers differ in their tendency to become attracted to targets. As with target effects, some of these perceiver effects are stable individual differences, whereas others are situationally induced or time varying. In terms of stable individual differences, physically unattractive perceivers tend to view targets as more attractive (Montoya,) and tend to have lower standards for a potential partner (Buss & Shackelford,) than physically attractive perceivers do, although some research suggests that physically unattractive perceivers merely lower their standards for whom they would date while still accurately assessing targets' attractiveness (Lee, Loewenstein, Ariely, Hong, & Young,)

Similarly, perceivers with low comparison standards (low expectations regarding what they deserve or can get from a relationship) tend to view targets as more attractive than do perceivers with high comparison standards. Although individuals vary in the degree to which their comparison standards are stably high or low, a given individual's comparison standards can also fluctuate over time. Another individual difference variable influencing perceivers' tendencies to become attracted to targets is perceiver sex. At least in the romantic domain, men tend to experience greater attraction than women, especially when considering short-term involvements. Several speed-dating studies have yielded compatible results, with men "yessing" a larger proportion of their partners than women (Fisman et al., ; Kurzban & Weeden, ; Todd, Penke, Fasolo, & Lenton, ; but see Finkel & Eastwick,)

5.3.4 Relationship Factors:

Attraction is determined by more than just the characteristics of the target, on the one hand, and the characteristics of the perceiver, on the other. Many important predictors of attraction are dyadic, or relational, involving the interplay between the target's and the perceiver's characteristics.

perceiver × target attributes

Newcomb (1961) randomly assigned University of Michigan transfer students to be roommates and discovered that the more similar the students

were before moving in together, the more they liked each other by the end of the academic year. Furthermore, similarity effects are not limited to positive characteristics; antisocial individuals tend to be attracted to other antisocial individuals (Krueger, Moffitt, Caspi, Bleske, & Silva,), and depressive individuals tend to be attracted to other depressive individuals (Locke & Horowitz,). Some scholars have argued that perceivers experience the strongest attraction to targets who are similar to the perceivers' "ideal self " (the person they aspire to become) rather than to the perceivers' actual self (LaPrelle, Hoyle, Insko, & Bernthal,). Some evidence, however, suggests a boundary condition on perceivers' attraction to a target who is similar to their ideal self: Cognitive attraction increases as the target approaches and even exceeds the perceiver's ideal self, but affective attraction declines as the target exceeds perceiver's ideal self, most likely because such a target is threatening to perceivers (Herbst, Gaertner, & Insko,). Although the link between similarity and attraction is robust (for a meta analytic review, see Montoya, Horton, & Kirchner,), it is not universal.

perceiver × target interaction dynamics

The most extensively researched topic in this domain is reciprocity of attraction. Scholars have long demonstrated that perceivers tend to like targets who like them more than targets who do not (Backman & Secord, ; Curtis & Miller,). Kenny and his colleagues have distinguished between two distinct forms of reciprocity: generalized and dyadic (Kenny, ; Kenny & Nasby, ; Kenny & La Voie,). Whereas the generalized reciprocity correlation indexes the degree to which likers tend to be liked (i.e., whether perceivers who tend to like targets on average tend to be liked by those targets on average), the dyadic reciprocity correlation indexes the degree to which uniquely liking a given target more than other targets predicts being uniquely liked by that target in return (i.e., whether perceivers who selectively like certain targets more than others tend to be liked by those certain targets more than those targets like other people). One interesting feature of this work is that dyadic reciprocity effects tend to be positive in both platonic and romantic contexts (with perceivers who uniquely like or desire a target also being uniquely liked or desired by that target), whereas generalized reciprocity effects are positive in platonic contexts (with perceivers who generally like targets being liked by those targets) but negative in romantic contexts (with perceivers who generally desire targets not being desired by those targets) (Kenny, ; Eastwick, Finkel, Mochon, & Ariely, ; see Finkel & Eastwick,).

A second line of research on the attraction-relevant effects of perceiver × target interaction dynamics involves nonconscious mimicry, which refers to unintentional behavioral synchrony between a perceiver and a target. Perceivers like targets who mimic them more than targets who do not (Chartrand & Bargh,). People seem to have an unconscious intuition of this effect, as they tend to mimic others when they want to be liked (Cheng & Chartrand, ; Lakin & Chartrand, ; Lakin, Jeff eris, Cheng, & Chartrand,). A third line of research involves transference, which refers to a cognitive process through which aspects of a perceiver's relationship with one target

are automatically applied to the perceiver's relationship with another (Andersen, Reznik, & Manzella, ; see Freud, /). In one study, perceivers became more attracted to targets who resembled positive than negative significant others in their life, an effect that was not due to the simple positivity or negativity of the targets' characteristics (Andersen et al.,)

A fourth line of research involves instrumentality, which refers to the degree to which perceivers find a given target useful in helping them progress in their current goal pursuits. Perceivers are more attracted to a target who is instrumental for a specific goal (but not to a target who is not) when that goal is currently active than when it is not (Fitzsimons & Shah,). This preference for instrumental targets when a particular goal is relevant appears to be especially strong for perceivers with high power (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strack, ; Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky,). A fifth line of research involves exchange and communal norms, which refer to expectations that dyadic partners should give benefits contingently or non contingently, respectively (see Clark, Lemay, Graham, Pataki, & Finkel,). Perceivers are more attracted to a target who behaves in a manner consistent with the norm they prefer for that relationship.

5.3.5 Environmental Factors:

The social environment

One aspect of the social environment that influences the degree to which perceivers are attracted to a given target is the degree to which the members of the perceivers' social network like or dislike that target. Indeed, female perceivers appear to be more influenced than male perceivers by the opinions of others, even when these others are strangers (Graziano, JensenCampbell, Schebilske, & Lundgren,).

A second aspect pertains to cultural norms, which refer to widespread beliefs within certain cultural or historical contexts about who is attractive. For example, although women are more attracted than men to potential romantic partners who have good earning prospects and are older than themselves, and men are more attracted than women to potential romantic partners who are physically attractive and are younger than themselves (Buss,), these sex differences are substantially weaker to the extent that the power imbalance between men and women within the culture is smaller (Eagly & Wood,). Another line of research also examines cross-cultural differences, although it does not examine cultural norms, per se. Males prefer heavier women to lighter women when food is in short supply, and they prefer lighter women to heavier women during times of plenty (Tovée, Swami, Furnham, & Mangalparsad,). Evidence that such effects are due to hunger, rather than to some other factor confounded with food supplies, comes from recent studies demonstrating that men rated heavier women as more attractive when the men were entering the campus dining hall for dinner (when they were hungry) than when they were leaving after eating dinner (when they were satiated) (Nelson & Morrison, ; Swami & Tovée,).

A third aspect of the social environment that influences attraction is perceived scarcity, which refers to perceivers' subjective experience that access to potential targets is dwindling.

The physical environment

One of the most extensively researched aspects of the physical environment that predicts attraction is proximity, which refers to the degree to which the perceiver and target are close to rather than far from each other in physical space. For example, people were about twice as likely to become close friends with somebody who lived next door to them than to somebody who lived two doors down. Although the proximity effect has been replicated many times (e.g., Ebbeson, Kjos, & Konečni, ; Latané, Liu, Nowak, Bonevento, & Zheng, ; Nahemow & Lawton, ; Segal,), even in initial encounters (Back, Schmulke, & Egloff ,), proximity does not always lead to liking; indeed, people are also much more likely to be enemies with somebody who lives near them than with somebody who lives farther away (Ebbeson et al.,). In addition to these robust effects of physical proximity, a broad range of environmental variables influences attraction by making the context of the social interaction pleasant as opposed to unpleasant. As mentioned previously, perceivers experience greater attraction to targets when interacting with them in a comfortable room than in a hot or crowded room (Griffitt, ; Griffi tt & Veitch,). The same goes for a number of additional environmental factors, including listening to pleasant or unpleasant music (May & Hamilton,)

5.4 INTIMATE RELATIONSHIP

The study of intimate relationships has become one of the most important domains in social psychology over the past three decades or so. One key concept developed by Kelley and colleagues (Kelley & Th ibaut, ; Kelley et al.,) describes relationships in terms of interdependence. In close, intimate relationships the well-being and psychological processes of one individual are intertwined with the same processes in another person. Not surprisingly, therefore, successful intimate relationships are characterized by relatively high levels of trust, knowledge, commitment, and intimacy. However, intimate relationships themselves can be divided into two categories: platonic friendships and romantic relationships (this chapter focuses on nonfamilial intimate relationships). Romantic relationships differ from intimate platonic friendships in two major ways. First, romantic relationships contain elements of sexual attraction and passion, and second, individuals are typically involved in just one romantic attachment at a time. Friendships can be intense and are of great psychological importance in people's lives, but most research in social psychology has been devoted to understanding romantic relationships.

5.4.1 Interdependence Theory

The genesis of interdependence theory can be traced to the books produced by Kelley and Thibaut, (Kelley, ; Kelley & Th ibaut, ; Thibaut & Kelley,). This approach has various interlocking components. Overall, the theory is

framed in terms of costs versus rewards. However, the subsequent relationship evaluations and decisions (e.g., "should I go or should I stay") are not based on the objective nature of such benefits, but rather on the perceived consistency between perceptions of the benefits and two different kinds of standards—expectations about what benefits are deserved (comparison level or CL) and the available alternatives (comparison level alternatives or CLalt). If the perceived benefits are higher than CL and CLalt, then this should produce higher levels of relationship satisfaction and commitment, respectively. Keeping the benefits constant, however, but moving CL or CLalt higher than the perceived benefits should reduce relationship satisfaction or relationship commitment

A second key feature of this theory concerns the way in which two partners coordinate their interaction to sustain cooperation and concern for the other, rather than selfishly pursuing benefits for the self. Using concepts drawn from game theory, this aspect of the theory deals with the type of power and influence individuals have over each other and how couples respond to each other when their interests conflict or overlap. The two most basic mutual forms of control are termed fate control and behavior control. Fate control is a function of what each partner decides to do for the other (regardless of what the recipient says or does). An example of this category is arranging a surprise party for our partner—the partner does not exert any control over this event. Relationships in which such forms of control are pervasive are problematic because the recipient will be deprived of control and is likely to feel dissatisfied.

The third feature of the theory concerns the central role played by interpersonal attributions, such as trust, commitment, and attitudes to the other. These facilitate and render automatic the shift from a selfish frame of mind (termed the given matrix in the theory) to a relationship or partner-serving orientation (termed the effective matrix) and are thought to be important in maintaining successful relationships (Rusbult &Van Lange,). It is hard to exaggerate the importance that this general theory has had in the study of intimate relationships in social psychology. This is not because the specific details of the theory have all been accepted as they were originally formulated, but rather because the three main planks of the approach— interdependence, mutual responsiveness, and interpersonal attributions—have continued to guide the questions, theories, and research generated to study intimate relationships.

5.4.2 The Intimate Relationship Mind

Relationship Goals

The five general goals (explanation, evaluation, prediction, regulation, and achieving relationship satisfaction) are activated the moment a potential partner is met, and they remain potent throughout the course of the relationship. As already noted, one of the main goals in life is to have a satisfying sexual relationship. The five goals listed will often interact with one another instead of acting independently.

Lay Relationship Theories

We move next to the stored knowledge structures that exist in the service of the goals. Regardless of the way in which such knowledge structures are conceptualized, scientists agree that people do not store and retrieve exact replicas of every interpersonal experience. Instead, experiences are organized into generalized representations that summarize regularities encountered over time, including beliefs, expectations, interpersonal goals, and behavioral strategies. Whenever a relationship-relevant event occurs (from simply thinking of a close other to receiving a compliment from your partner), such lay theories are activated automatically, guiding how the event is mentally processed and influencing both accompanying emotions and resultant behavior. We distinguish between two levels of lay intimate theories: general relationship theories that summarize knowledge specifically relevant to close relationships and local theories that represent models of specific intimate relationships such as our husband or ex-girlfriend.

We briefly describe each in turn, and analyze how they help drive the ABCs (Aff ect, Behavior, and Cognition) of psychological phenomena in intimate relationships. General relationship theories contain beliefs, expectations, and concepts that are concerned with intimate, sexual relationships. These theories can be idiosyncratic, to some extent, depending on individual experiences. Nevertheless,relationship theories are derived from both culturally shared sources of information (e.g., media) and from hard-wired evolutionary adaptations (see Maner & Kenrick, Chapter , this volume). Thus, many core features of general relationship theories are similar across individuals. A key point here is that people bring these expectations and beliefs with them from the beginning of specific relationships. Other types of general lay relationship theories have the same structure across individuals, although the actual content may differ. We have already noted that there are stable individual differences in relationship goals. In addition, there is good evidence that the same is true for attachment models, ideal standards, and what Knee, Patrick, and Lonsbary terms ``growth and destiny beliefs.'' That is, individuals differ in the extent to which they believe and trust others will be available and responsive in times of need (Mikulincer & Shaver,), the importance they place on such standards as physical attractiveness in evaluating a potential or existent mate (Fletcher et al.,), and the extent to which they believe relationship success is determined by destiny or through overcoming challenges (Knee et al.,). Individual differences in the content of these lay theories (partly) determine how the same relationship events are perceived and responded to. For example, individuals who ascribe to destiny beliefs are less satisfied with their relationships in the face of negative partner behavior or relationship experiences. In contrast, individuals who view relationship problems as challenges to be overcome remain relatively satisfied and committed when their partners do not live up to their ideals or when they experience conflict within their relationships (Knee et al.,). Regardless of their particular content, lay relationship theories pervasively influence affect, behavior, and cognition within relationships.

People enter social situations with preexistent mental dispositions (theories about relationships) that help to produce interpretations and explanations of behavior, evaluations of the partner and the relationship, and finally decisions about the course of the relationship. Another type of general theory that predates, but influences, local relationship theories concerns the self. Indeed, as local relationship theories develop over time they steadily become entwined with representations and evaluations of the self (Aron, Aron, & Norman,). That is, people start thinking in terms of "we" rather than "I" and "you." Another way in which the self is linked to relationship outcomes is via self-esteem. Self-esteem can be thought of as an attitude toward the self (a local theory of the self) and is sensitive to how other people view and react to the self. In an influential theory, Leary and colleagues (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, ; Leary,) posited that self-esteem is essentially like a gauge (or sociometer) that monitors the extent to which the individual is well regarded by others. Evidence has steadily accumulated supporting this theory in intimate relationship contexts. For example, self-esteem is positively correlated with self-perceived mate value, such as attractiveness (Anthony, Holmes, & Wood,), and with secure attachment representations (Bylsma, Cozzarelli, & Sumer,).

Murray and her colleagues have shown that lower self-esteem is associated with underplaying the amounts of love and satisfaction actually reported by the partner (Murray, Holmes, & Griffin,). Recent diary studies by Murray and others also document the subtle and dynamic nature of associated processes over short periods of time (typically weeks) in romantic relationships (Murray, Holmes, Bellavia, Griffin, & Dolderman, ; Murray, Bellavia, Rose, & Griffin, ; ; Murray, Griffin, Rose, & Bellavia,). These studies suggest that when the partner is perceived to be insensitive in some way, low self-esteem motivates withdrawal from the relationship, the production of uncharitable attributions, and a decline in relationship satisfaction. The take-home message is that local relationship theories are generated according to the way in which they overlap with preexistent general relationship theories. Thus, relationship evaluations are produced (in part) as a function of the extent to which perceptions and experiences match prior expectations and beliefs. This insight is taken directly from interdependence theory. However, recent research and theorizing has extended this idea and showed that greater discrepancies between ideal standards and perceptions of the partner in existing relationships on specific dimensions (such as warmth, attractiveness, and status) are linked with lower relationship satisfaction (Fletcher et al.,), higher rates of relationship dissolution (Fletcher, Simpson, & Thomas,), and more strenuous attempts to change the partner (Overall, Fletcher, & Simpson,).

At the center of lay local relationship theories is a set of relationship evaluative judgments that are continuously updated on the basis of relevant information. The most studied evaluative categories include overall satisfaction, passion, commitment, trust, closeness or intimacy, and love. Social psychologists and others have carried out huge amounts of research on such constructs, and there are many self-report scales designed to measure relationship quality judgments. Just one of the most popular scales developed by Spanier (the Dyadic Adjustment Scale) has been cited several

times in research articles (at present). These kinds of judgments play a critical role in generating relationship behavior, cognition, and emotion. As romantic relationships develop, intimacy and closeness change. The associated types of attributions (what you think your partner thinks and feels about you), sometimes termed "reflected appraisals," are important in intimate relationships, consistent with Reis' ideas (Reis, Clark, & Holmes)

5.4.3 On-Line Processing

The relationship mind not only stores knowledge and theories but also thinks, daydreams, perceives, and feels in episodic bursts. We have labeled this component "on-line processing" .Although the examples used may leave the impression that people always consciously draw on their theories, relationship theories are also routinely accessed unconsciously (Fletcher, Rosanowski, & Fitness,). In addition, the on-line cognitive processing itself may be unconscious and automatic. This level of efficiency is necessary. A single interpersonal interaction requires many streams of cognitive processing to occur simultaneously. Partners must encode the verbal and nonverbal behavior (including facial expressions, eye contact, and gestures), while controlling their own behavior, making rapid judgments, and blending their thoughts, emotions, and behavior into a smoothly coordinated interaction. This is achievable only if considerable processing is conducted automatically and unconsciously. There is considerable direct evidence for this thesis based on studies that use techniques that require individuals to carry out two tasks at the same time, thus loading their cognitive resources (e.g., Fletcher et al.,), or studies that assess the power of subliminal perception (Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver,). Murray and Holmes review research showing that people automatically respond to the goal of enhancing intimacy. In long-term, stable relationships a great deal of communication becomes routine, resulting in over learned and stereotypical sequences of behavior. Two types of events have been shown to cause people to return to conscious, controlled cognition (often accompanied by emotion)—negative events and unexpected events (Berscheid,; Fletcher & Thomas,).

Emotions

The functions of emotions in relationships are no different from their role generally (Fitness, Fletcher, & Overall,). First, emotions (such as fear, anger, or love) both attract attention and provide the motivation to attain a goal. Second, they provide information that helps people decide how to attain goals. Thus, in relationship settings feelings of love are associated with the desire to be physically close to the partner and to express such urges, and feelings of anger are associated with the desire to confront the partner and seek redress (Fitness & Fletcher,). However, negative emotions provide a problem in relationships, given that their expression is likely to accelerate the demise of relationships. Thus, individuals actively control and manage the expression of emotions such as jealousy or anger (Fletcher, Thomas, & Durrant,). Indeed, the expression of emotions serves a range of communication goals that are important in intimate relationships. Clark and her colleagues have argued, for example, that the expression of emotions

such as anxiety and sadness signals the need for comfort and support from the partner, whereas the expression of anger sets the scene for the partner to seek forgiveness (Clark, Fitness, & Brissette,). Emotions are, thus, tied to both social cognition and the way that couples interact and negotiate issues within their relationships.

At the general level individuals hold theories about the nature of emotions as they play out in intimate relationships, such as anger and love. These are often referred to as scripts, because they involve interactional sequences that unfold predictably over time (Fitness,). For example, the prototypical script for anger (as revealed in participants' reports of anger episodes in their relationships) involves the partner triggering the emotion by treating the target unfairly, the target feeling muscle tension and a strong urge to express the emotion, the partner responding in kind (angrily), the target feeling tense or depressed afterward, the target perceiving reasonable control over the self, and the target believing it was mainly the partner's fault. Finally, the partner should eventually respond by asking for forgiveness (Fitness & Fletcher,). Use of these scripts allows individuals to read and interpret the emotions not only of their partners but also of themselves. We draw two main conclusions. First, emotions and cognitions are thoroughly intertwined, and work together in normal social cognition. Second, studies of rare forms of brain damage that incapacitate emotions, but leave other abilities and functions intact, have shown that people develop crippling deficits in social intelligence and managing interpersonal relationships (Damasio,). Damasio's explanation is that without emotions individuals are deprived of critical information.

Damasio's explanation has the ring of truth when applied to intimate relationships. Imagine, for example, making decisions and judgments in relationship contexts while experiencing no emotions or feelings Without emotions or affective tone, individuals would become rudderless ships, similar to the patients described by Damasio who suffered from specific damage to regions of the brain centrally involved in emotions and affect.

Self-Regulation

So we come to the final step in the model—behavior and the self-regulation of behavior .If everyone openly expressed every passing cognition and emotion honestly, many relationships would implode. Consider revelations such as "I wish your penis was bigger," "I always liked your sister more than you," "I stole some money from you years ago," or even "Actually, you do look fat in those trousers". Fortunately, the expression of thoughts and feelings are routinely controlled and censored in relationships.

We noted previously that intimate relationships pose an approach–avoidance problem. There is increasing evidence that the way in which people regulate the self emphasizes goals of approaching positive outcomes and of avoiding negative outcomes in relationship contexts (see Finkel, Molden, Johnson, & Eastwick, , for a review). These authors review research suggesting, for example, that promotion-focused individuals (who are oriented toward approaching gains and avoiding non gains) are more

likely than prevention-focused individuals (who are oriented toward approaching non losses and avoiding losses) to perceive more romantic alternatives and to pursue them more vigorously. We have more to say about self-regulation in intimate relationships in the later section dealing with communication. However, with this brief sketch of the intimate relationship mind as background, we move to discussing the work on attachment, love, and communication.

5.4.4 Attachment

Human infants and their caretakers are born to bond. The first psychologist to grasp and exploit this point—John Bowlby—produced a detailed version of what has come to be known as "attachment theory," . Based on observations of both human infants and other mammalian species, Bowlby discovered a standard sequence of responses produced by infants when separated from their caregiver—protest, despair, and detachment. The most important elaboration of attachment theory, especially for later work dealing with adult intimate relationships, was provided by Ainsworth who developed the "strange situation" laboratory procedure (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,). This procedure stressed infants by separating them from their mother, leaving them in the presence of a stranger. Ainsworth found a pattern that has since been generally replicated many times; the most common response of the infants tested (categorized as secure) was to cry when the mother left , seek comfort when she returned, and then settle down and continue playing with the toys. However, approximately 20 % of the infants tested (who were categorized as avoidant) did not pay much attention to their mothers, were not particularly distressed when the mother left , and more or less ignored the mother on return. The remaining 10% to 15% of the infants tested (who were categorized as anxious or ambivalent) tended to behave in a contradictory fashion when the mother returned, whining, crying, and seeking physical contact, yet resisting and hanging back at the same time. Bowlby's theory did not just deal with infant–adult attachment, but is also a theory of personality development over the lifespan. Bowlby was convinced that based on early pivotal experiences with mothers or caretakers, infants develop working cognitive models of attachment (expectations, attitudes, emotional reactions, and so forth) that are carried into adulthood. These working models, he postulated, should exert profound psychological influences throughout adult life on the nature of intimate relationships forged with both adults and children. However, it was not until Hazan and Shaver published the first systematic research applying attachment theory to adult intimate relationships. This article proved to be the big bang of adult attachment research.

Hazan and Shaver argued that romantic love represents a reprise of the intense intimacy bonds generated in infant–caregiver attachments, and thus should resemble the patterns found in the developmental research. Hazan and Shaver initially developed self-report measures of the three attachment working models, which they derived from the work of Bowlby and Ainsworth. From the following paragraphs participants were instructed to choose the one that best described themselves in terms of the feelings they typically experienced in romantic adult relationships:

Secure: I find it relatively easy to get close to others and I am comfortable depending on them and having them depend on me. I don't often worry about being abandoned or about someone getting too close to me.

Avoidant: I am somewhat uncomfortable being close to others. I find it difficult to trust them completely, difficult to allow myself to depend on them. I am nervous when anyone gets too close, and love partners often want me to be more intimate than I feel comfortable being.

Anxious: I find that others are reluctant to get as close to me as I would like. I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me or won't want to stay with me. I want to merge completely with another person, and this desire sometimes scares people away.

They found that the proportions of participants who endorsed each working model were similar to the figures obtained with infants from the Ainsworth strange situation, and that secure people reported more positive relationships with their parents than did avoidant or anxious participants (Hazan & Shaver,)The Hazan and Shaver measurement method assumed that people fit into either one attachment working model or the other. This may seem like a reasonable assumption, but it has turned out to be wrong. Other researchers have developed multi-item scales that do not assume the categories are mutually exclusive.

One important question studied has been the extent to which attachment working models are stable over time. The evidence indicates that across the life span attachment working models are relatively stable, but are also exquisitely attuned to external influences, especially intimate relationship experiences. For Bowlby, working models were internal cognitive representations that summarized the child's previous attachment experiences, both emotional and behavioral. Working models comprise beliefs about others and the self, and produce expectations and attitudes that can be used to predict consequences for future relationships. Working models, thus, provide the mechanism and the link between childhood and adult relationships. Specifically, consistent with Bowlby's prediction, when individuals or relationships are put under stress, higher levels of avoidance in working models increase the fear of rejection, which leads to withdrawal and a reluctance to seek or offer support (Collins & Feeney, ; Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan;). However, there is also evidence that working models differentiate among different categories of relationship partners in adulthood.

Finally, there is evidence that attachment working models are used to regulate behavior. In a pioneering piece of research, Simpson, Rholes, and Nelligan revisited Bowlby's hypothesis that the attachment systems should be initiated when individuals are placed under stress (indeed, this is the basis for the strange situation procedure developed by Ainsworth). Thus, Simpson and colleagues surreptitiously observed the behavior of couples sitting in a waiting room, after the woman in each couple had been stressed by information about an upcoming experiment, which never actually took place, but which supposedly involved painful experiences. The more

stressed the women became, the more their attachment working models (assessed prior to the experiment) seemed to influence their behavior; for example, more secure women sought more support whereas more avoidant women avoided seeking support from their partner, to the extent of expressing irritation if their partners asked what was wrong or offered support. To summarize, attachment working models operate like highly accessible general or local relationship lay theories. When triggered, they automatically influence relationship judgments or decisions.

Love

Romantic love is not simply an invention of Western cultures. Jankowiak and Fischer found good evidence (based on folk tales, ethnographies, evidence of elopement, and so forth) that romantic love exists in cultures studied. This is a conservative figure, given that in the loveabsent cultures the ethnographic accounts were uninformative rather than definitive, and in only one culture did an ethnographer claim that romantic love did not actually exist. Moreover, romantic love is not simply a product of modern cultures—the power and addictive nature of love have been noted in poetry and literature going back years (Fowler,). Romantic love has other features that mark it out as basic and universal. It has a specific neuropsychological signature, including the release of hormones such as oxytocin and dopamine (Fisher,). Like all hormones these substances have multiple functions in the brain and in the body; when they are released in the brain, they operate as neurotransmitters with oxytocin being associated with bonding and affiliation behavior and dopamine associated with rewards and pleasure. Moreover, both these neurotransmitters tend to be focused on the same part of the brain (the nucleus accumbens), and thus are implicated in the development of mate attraction and bonding (Insel, ; Aragona et al.,). In humans, there is evidence that both males and females have extensive receptors for oxytocin (or a closely related neuropeptide called vasopressin). In contrast, in species in which the males are promiscuous, only the females possess such extensive receptors in the brain for this neuropeptide (which is thought to be associated with the need for females to bond with immature, defenseless offspring) (Insel,).Shaver, Hazan, and Bradshaw conceptualized adult romantic love in terms of Bowlby's (evolutionary) treatment of attachment systems in humans. Bowlby argued for the existence of three basic behavioral systems that bond dyads together: attachment, caregiving, and sex. Thus, Shaver et al. wrote that saying "I love you" can mean any or all of the following (note the role of emotions in the descriptions).

Love as attachment: "I am emotionally dependent on you for happiness, safety, and security; I feel anxious and lonely when you're gone, relieved and stronger when you're near. I want to be comforted, supported emotionally, and taken care of by you. Part of my identity is based on my attachment to you."

Love as caregiving: "I get great pleasure from supporting, caring for, and taking care of you; from facilitating your progress, health, growth, and

happiness. Part of my identity is based on caring for you, and if you were to disappear I would feel sad, empty, less worthwhile, and perhaps guilty."

Love as sexual attraction: "I am sexually attracted to you and can't get you out of my mind. You excite me, 'turn me on,' make me feel alive, complete my sense of wholeness. I want to see you, devour you, touch you, merge with you, lose myself in you, 'get off on you.'"

Berscheid and Walster provided an influential attempt to conceptualize (sexual) love in terms of two basic factors: companionate love and passionate love. Companionate love captures the former two categories (attachment and caregiving), whereas passionate love is akin to sexual attraction. Research using a prototype approach (Fehr,), or the use of factor analysis to identify latent factors (Aron & Westbay,), suggests that lay people think about love based on the same kinds of distinctions, namely, in terms of intimacy (or attachment), commitment (or caregiving), and passion (or sexual attraction) (Sternberg,). If love is a commitment device, as an evolutionary approach suggests, then it should function to end the search for alternative mates.

However, there are also strong arguments and evidence suggesting that love may not be so blind. The fact that many long-term romantic relationships dissolve suggests that the motivating power of love to promote positive bias has its limitations. Moreover, a broad array of empirical evidence suggests that lay judgments of partners and relationships are firmly tied to reality. One way of resolving this apparent contradiction is that there may be two independent ways of measuring the accuracy of judgments in intimate relationships: mean-level bias and tracking accuracy. Thus, it is possible for people to have the best of both worlds in romantic relationships and to be both positively biased and accurate at the same time. To illustrate, consider some recent research on the so-called "affective forecasting error" in relationship contexts (Eastwick, Finkel, Krishnamurti, & Loewenstein,). Prior evidence has indicated a robust tendency in non relationship contexts for people to predict greater levels of negative or positive affect, following negative or positive events, than actually happen (an example of mean-level bias). The research by Eastwick et al. found the same effect when individuals first predicted and then experienced the affective outcomes associated with a dating relationship break up; people experienced significantly less distress than they predicted . However, they also evinced significant tracking accuracy of their emotional reactions. And the forecasting (mean-level) error disappeared for those who were not in love with their partners when making the forecasts, or indicated a week prior to the break up that it was likely they would start a new romantic relationship, or who initiated the break up. In short, only those who were significantly invested in the relationship predicted more distress than they experienced when the relationship actually dissolved. It is hard to resist the conclusion that this bias has a functional basis, given that it should motivate individuals who have much at stake to maintain and improve their romantic relationship, and perhaps retain their mates. There is also evidence that bias in people's judgments will depend on their goals.

Communication

As noted previously, the defining feature of intimate relationships is interdependence; one partner's desires, goals, and happiness depend on the desires, goals and behavior of the other partner (Kelley & Thibaut,). Inevitably, however, situations will arise in which partners' goals clash (e.g., negotiating household chores or amount of time spent together) and one partner behaves negatively (e.g., is critical or withdraws from affection) or disregards the others' needs (e.g., fails to provide necessary support or refuses to accept an apology). Motivated by the assumption that marital distress is caused by destructive reactions to conflict, researchers studied the communication behaviors partners exchange when discussing relationship problems. This approach has yielded hundreds of studies that employ arguably the most time-consuming and sophisticated methodological and analytic techniques within the field. The standard paradigm involves recording couples discussing an unresolved relationship issue and then measuring communication behavior using extensive coding systems (see Heyman,). This initial work was expanded by employing longitudinal designs to test whether destructive communication predicted important relationship outcomes, such as declines in relationship satisfaction or divorce.

Two interaction patterns seem to play a central role in this process. First, Gottman reported that a particularly unhealthy dyadic exchange is negative reciprocity—when negative behavior by one partner is met with intensified negative behavior by the other (Gottman,). Second, Christensen and his colleagues found that critical, blaming, and demanding communication from the person who wants change (more often the woman) often elicits defensive withdrawal from the targeted partner (more often the man) and this demand-withdraw pattern predicts poorer problem resolution and reduced relationship satisfaction (Christensen & Heavey, ; Heavey, Layne, & Christensen, ; Klinetob & Smith,). In short, hostile and blaming communications, as a response to conflict or relationship problems, tend to drive negative interactions that can all too readily spiral downward over time. This pattern highlights a key point: The consequences for the relationship of a given communication attempt will be partly determined by how the other partner responds (a point we return to later).

In the 1990s there were two shifts from the (clinical) focus on overt behaviors. First, as previously noted, there was increasing emphasis on the role that beliefs and perceptions play in understanding communication and relationship maintenance (Fletcher & Fincham,)Happy partners, in contrast, attribute negative behaviors to external attributions (having a hard day at work) but attribute positive behaviors to stable, internal traits (caring and unselfish). Moreover, the former, uncharitable attributional pattern is associated with destructive communication during problem-solving discussions, such as less support and agreement and more criticism, withdrawal, and negative reciprocity (Bradbury & Fincham, ; Bradbury, Beach, Fincham, & Nelson, ; Miller & Bradbury,). Exploring the links between cognition and behavior also provides a window into how personal traits influence communication within intimate relationships. Furthermore,

this attribution bias leads anxious Intimate Relationships individuals to react with greater hostility and anger during problem-solving discussions (Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips,) and these destructive reactions tend to escalate conflict during daily life (Campbell, Simpson, Boldry, & Kashy). Finally, consistent with the above communication patterns, hostile and defensive behavior arising from expectations of rejection evoke anger and dissatisfaction in the partner (Downey, Frietas, Michaelis, & Khouri,).

The second shift , referred to previously, involved recognizing that communication is important in maintaining relationships when faced with any kind of relationship threat, not just in situations of overt conflict. For example, Caryl Rusbult and colleagues (Rusbult, Zembrodt, & Gunn,) detailed four typical responses (EVLN) people described when feeling dissatisfied in their relationship.

Exit: Active behaviors that are destructive for the relationship, such as ending or threatening to terminate the relationship, and abusing, criticizing, or derogating the partner.

Voice: Constructive active behaviors such as attempting to improve conditions by discussing problems, suggesting solutions, and altering problematic behavior.

Loyalty: Passively waiting and hoping for improvement, forgiving and forgetting partner offenses, and maintaining faith in the partner even when faced with hurtful actions.

Neglect: Passive destructive responses such as allowing the relationship to deteriorate by ignoring or spending less time with the partner and avoiding discussions of problems.

This typology captures many of the overt communication behaviors examined in dyadic conflict discussions previously described. For example, exit incorporates behaviors such as hostility, anger, and criticism, and neglect encapsulates withdrawal. In addition, research using this typology to examine peoples' responses to negative partner behavior reveals that communication within everyday interactions (not just laboratory-based ones) produces similar effects. Couples who tend to engage in exit and neglect report lower problem resolution and reduced satisfaction and commitment (Drigotas, Whitney, & Rusbult, ; Rusbult, Johnson, & Morrow, a, b; Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus,). Furthermore, a pattern of responding that represents the opposite of the negative reciprocity and demand-withdraw patterns identified in the laboratory plays an important role in the maintenance of relationship well-being. Accommodation—the tendency to inhibit destructive exit and neglect responses when faced with negative partner behavior and instead react constructively with voice and loyalty—is associated with increases in relationship satisfaction (Rusbult, Bissonnette, Arriaga, & Cox,). This is because accommodation builds trust and commitment (Weiselquist, Rusbult, Foster, & Agnew,) and eases problematic interactions by maintaining feelings of acceptance and intimacy (Overall & Sibley,). Thus far, it is beginning to look as if sweetness and accommodation are the

recipes for relationship success. However, more recent work has suggested that things are not this simple. Some studies have reported that negative communication predicts relative increases in relationship satisfaction across time (e.g., Cohan & Bradbury, ; Heavey et al., , ; Karney & Bradbury,), which suggests the exact opposite of the standard finding. Such findings (often called reversal effects), at face value, seem odd if not bizarre. However, it turns out that the distinction between active and passive communication embodied in the EVLN typology may provide the solution to this puzzle.

Recall that voice and exit involve individuals actively addressing and attempting to solve the problem (voice) or directly expressing their anger and discontent (exit). In contrast, loyalty and neglect are passive responses because individuals avoid the problem by withdrawing from the relationship (neglect) or passively waiting for the problem to solve itself (loyalty). First, these reversal effects are restricted to negative behaviors that are active and direct, such as criticism and blame. Similarly, some research has shown that constructive but passive behavior, such as using humor to minimize conflict or being loyal and waiting for things to improve, is associated with lower relationship satisfaction (Cohan & Bradbury,) and has a weaker effect on solving the problem compared to active voice-type responses (Drigotas et al., ; Overall, Sibley & Travaglia, ; Rusbult et al., a, b). Second, expressing anger and hostility clearly communicates the nature and severity of the problem, thus perhaps motivating partners to bring about change and therefore leading to successful problem resolution. Positive loyal responses, in contrast, may reduce conflict in the short term, but leave the problem unaddressed (Holmes & Murray,). In support of this explanation, recent research has found that using active exit-type communication behavior, such as being demanding and derogating the partner, generates significant partner change over time (Overall, Fletcher, Simpson, & Sibley,). This research also found that active constructive behavior, such as directly discussing causes and solutions, is associated with a greater change in targeted problems over time, whereas loyalty-type responses, such as using positive affect to soften conflict, fail to produce the desired change. However, this does not mean that being obnoxious is good for relationships. Although a critical, blaming approach might prompt greater change in the partner, the well-established patterns of negative reciprocity and demand withdrawal suggest that this approach will nevertheless elicit hostility and defensive reactions in the partner. These destructive effects are unlikely to be fleeting, and the positive changes that are produced by active communication may counterbalance—but not reverse—the negative impact of these behaviors. Thus, improving problem resolution might best be accomplished by using active strategies that also communicate care and regard, such as directly discussing problems and suggesting solutions, as long as the message is not gift -wrapped to the point that it appears as if the communicator does not really care whether the situation changes or not (Overall et al.,).

5.6 BREAKING UP

Several investigators have examined hypotheses derived from ERM concerning the degree of emotional disruption an individual is likely to experience upon separation from the partner or dissolution of the relationship. In accord with ERM, Attridge predicted that the closer the relationship, the greater the frequency and intensity of emotional experience upon separation. Neither the length of the relationship nor (perhaps surprisingly to some people) the individual's satisfaction with the relationship were associated with the experience of emotion, whether the partners were separated or not. Attridge's study confirms another ERM prediction: It will be recalled that ERM predicts that an increase in the experience of "hot" emotion, rather than mild feelings or other valence states, should result from disruption of a close relationship. Attridge found that only emotions characterized by high arousal – that is, the more intense emotions – were significantly associated with increases in closeness for separated partners. Separated couples who were close experienced increases in fear, jealousy, passion, and joy. However, the milder feeling states characterized by less arousal (e.g., happy, needed, content, sad, and lonely) showed no increases for anyone, not even close couples who were separated.

Emotional events whose origins are outside the relationship have great potential to create emotional storms within a close relationship, as the phrase "emotion spillover" suggests. Emotion spillover refers to an individual's experience of emotion caused by a non-relationship event (e.g., being fired from the job; falling ill) that interferes with the individual's customary interaction performance within the relationship. This, then, disrupts the partner and precipitates the partner's experience of emotion "in" the relationship (since it has been caused by the individual), which, in turn, is likely to disrupt the partner's usual interaction performance – a disruption whose effects are likely to reverberate back to the individual, further heightening that person's emotional experience. ironically – when an outside event produces negative emotion for an individual in a close relationship, the individual's partner may be less likely to remain tranquil and supportive than a superficial partner might be because the partner is likely to be experiencing emotion him- or herself; the partner's emotional state, in turn, may interfere with the partner's ability to perform as the individual expects, thus adding internal fuel to the individual's externally-generated emotional fire. The tendency of emotion-precipitating events occurring outside the relationship to wreak disruption within a close relationship provides one more reason why close relationships, as opposed to superficial relationships, are the most frequent context for the experience of intense emotion. And there is yet another reason why close relationship partners, as contrasted to the less close, are more likely to experience intense emotion: they are more vulnerable than superficial partners are to the experience of jealousy – a highly negative emotion that has been the subject of much theory and research (see Berscheid, 1994).

Jealousy

Jealousy has been defined as ".the emotion that people experience when control over valued resources that flow through an attachment to another person is perceived to be in jeopardy because their partner might want or might actually give and/or receive some of these resources from a third party" (Ellis & Weinstein, 1986, p. 341). Not all individuals in such situations experience the emotion of jealousy, however, and, if they do, not all experience it with the same intensity. ERM predicts that it is individuals within close, as opposed to less close, relationships who are most likely to experience this emotion and, moreover, given high interdependence, it is those individuals who have available to them few substitute partners should the relationship dissolve who will most intensely experience jealousy when they perceive that a third party threatens the relationship. Another study that underscores the importance of the individual's ability to find a replacement partner should the third party succeed in breaking up the relationship is provided by Bringle (1995). Homosexual men, who had less exclusive relationships than the heterosexual men in this study, experienced less jealousy in their intimate relationships than did the heterosexual men. Heterosexual men may have been more dependent on their partners than the homosexual men were and they may have had fewer readily available partner substitutes. This interpretation of Bringle's finding is supported by his report that the incidence of jealousy increased in both groups between 1980 and 1992 and the increase was accompanied by an increase in the exclusiveness of both homosexuals' and heterosexuals' intimate relationships. In sum, ERM predicts that the likelihood of an individual experiencing jealousy within a relationship is a function of three factors: the closeness of the relationship, the availability of substitute partners, and the degree to which the third party represents a threat to the continuance of the relationship

5.6.1 Therapeutic Approaches to Negative Emotion in Relationships

Relationship therapists have long recognized the association between negative emotion and the disconfirmation of an expectancy about the partner or the relationship. Unrealistic expectations are doomed to be disconfirmed. Moreover, if the expectation is rigidly held even in the face of repeated disconfirmations, the individual is likely to chronically experience negative emotion in the relationship. Eidelson and Epstein (1982) developed the Relationship Belief Inventory to assess the degree to which relationship partners hold unrealistic beliefs and expectations about close relationships (e.g., the expectation that partners who care about each other should be able to sense each other's needs and preferences without overt communication). ERM suggests that if violated expectations are the most usual precipitating cause of intense emotion in close relationships, then the reduction of negative emotion in the relationship may be achieved primarily by two means. The first is to persuade the violating partner to bring his or her behavior in line with the individual's expectations. This is the "change the partner" approach that most people try first – with more or less success (usually less), depending on their communication, negotiation, and conflict resolution skills and the motivation and ability of the partner to

change his or her behavior. This is one reason, of course, why improving communication and conflict resolution skills is a frequent objective of relationship therapy. The second means by which the individual may reduce his or her experience of negative emotion in the relationship, however, is to change his or her own expectations to bring them in line with the partner's actual behavior. This is the "change myself (and accept the partner)" approach. Needless to say, most people find this second approach less desirable than the first because it not only requires them to change their own behavior but it not infrequently requires them to relinquish plans and goals they not only expected the partner would facilitate but believe the partner should facilitate. Moreover, the relinquishment of valued goals whose achievement is believed to enhance well-being should itself be accompanied by negative emotion (e.g., sadness). Thus, the task of revising our discrepant expectations to be congruent with the way the world is – rather than how we thought the world was or how we wish it to be – can be difficult and painful. But it may be less painful in the long run than retaining unrealistic relationship expectations that are doomed to be violated again and again and yet again, generating on each successive occasion the fresh experience of negative emotion. It should be noted that at least one individual therapy technique, Ellis's Rational-Emotive Therapy (e.g., Ellis & Dryden, 1997), directly seeks to ameliorate the negative emotions distressed individuals experience (whether in association with their interpersonal relationships or otherwise) by uncovering the individual's unrealistic expectations and directly attacking those that give rise to chronically experienced negative emotion. With respect to distressed relationships (as opposed to distressed individuals), the traditional technique followed by many relationship therapists has been to teach partners compromise and accommodation strategies and skills to help them change those behaviors that are causing their partner to experience negative emotion and to manage their own negative emotions. For example, relationship therapists Notarius, Lashley, and Sullivan state that, "Anger is the fuel that fires relationship conflict, and its heat can either forge adaptive relationship change or melt down the foundation of the relationship" (1997, p. 219). These theorists advise their clients to "practice, practice, and practice alternative responses to anger" (1997, p. 245). Such alternative responses include replacing the "hot thoughts" that generate anger with "cool thoughts" that promote conversation and problem solving, quieting physiological arousal with relaxation techniques, and avoiding critical remarks that make the partner defensive (1997, p. 245).

Unfortunately, outcome studies of relationship therapy often have been less favorable than for other kinds of therapy (see Berscheid & Reis, 1998). As a consequence, alternative approaches to traditional relationship therapy have been sought. One promising new approach – Integrative Behavioral Couple Therapy (IBCT) – has been developed by Jacobson and Christensen (e.g., 1996), who have observed that many couples experience incompatibilities that cannot be resolved by compromise or accommodation. To ameliorate negative emotion in close relationships, IBCT integrates the traditional technique intended to change both partners' behaviors with strategies that simply promote the partners' acceptance and

tolerance of each other's unpleasant behaviors through coming to see those behaviors in the "larger context of the other and of their relationship together" (Christensen & Walczynski, 1997, p. 266). Jacobson and Christensen assume that a combination of change and acceptance will be more powerful than either alone (e.g., if partners receive acceptance from each other, they may be more willing to change their behavior if they possess the ability to do so). Although Jacobson and Christensen arrived at IBCT through their clinical experience and wisdom, it can be seen that their approach simultaneously utilizes both means implied by ERM for reducing negative emotion in close relationships; that is, both partners are encouraged to change their behavior to meet the other's expectations but they also are encouraged to change their own expectancies. So far, outcome studies of IBCT are showing good results in increasing relationship satisfaction (see Christensen & Walczynski, 1997).

5.7 SUMMARY

Orientation beyond self-interest states many important facts. All orientations play an important role in the study of social psychology. Then we studied attraction, how it occurs and different factors which influence the process. The future of contemporary intimate relationships, given the way in which individuals are bombarded with information about relationships, along with images of beautiful people and their beautiful partners. Social psychologists build process models that combine individual differences in what people bring with them into local intimate relationships (traits, attitudes, beliefs, and resources) with subsequent cognitive and affective processes and behavioral interactions.

We have discussed the concept of relationship itself, the construct of closeness, the antecedents and consequences of emotional experience, and some emotional phenomena within relationships from the perspective of ERM. Given the important role that expectations about the partner and the relationship play in providing the conditions for the experience of emotion in close relationships, more research on the nature of such expectations held by different types of individuals for different types of relationships might prove fruitful for relationship scholars who seek to understand emotional phenomena within close relationships. After that we studied breaking up . There are many reasons behind it. Therapeutic approach gives a clear idea about the whole process.

5.8 QUESTIONS

Write Short Notes.

1. Attachment
2. Target Factors
3. Love
4. Relationship Factors
5. Jealousy

5.9 REFERENCE

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6

THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL RELATIONS-II

Unit Structure:

6.0 Objectives

6.1 Introduction

6.2 Helping and altruism defined

6.3 When Do People Help?

6.4 A decision model of intervention

6.5 A cost–reward framework

6.6 Why Do People Help?

6.7 Learned helpfulness

6.8 Arousal and affect

6.9 Empathy and emotion.

6.10 Negative state relief model.

6.11 Arousal: cost–reward model.

6.12 Empathy-altruism hypothesis.

6.13 Social norms and personal standards

6.14 Social responsibility.

6.15 Personal norms, goals, and self-concept.

6.16 Fairness.

6.17 Biological "motives" for helping and altruism.

6.18 Who Helps? Dispositional Variables

6.19 Summary

6.20 Questions

6.21 Reference

6.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

- ➢ Describe Helping and altruism
- ➢ Understand Who Helps? Dispositional Variables
- ➢ Explain Personal norms, goals, and self-concept.

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Prosocial behavior represents a broad category of activities that "are generally defined by society as beneficial to other people and to the dominant political system" (Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981, p. 4). This category includes a variety of behaviors designed to benefit others, such as helping, sharing, cooperating, comforting, and donating to charity. This chapter focuses on two subcategories of prosocial behavior: helping and altruism. We consider three questions: When do people help? Why do people help? Who will help? (see also Batson, 1998; Piliavin & Charng, 1990; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995).

6.2 HELPING AND ALTRUISM DEFINED

Helping and altruism are two main types of prosocial behavior. Helping is an intentional act that benefits another. Attempts to identify important characteristics of helping have suggested several key dimensions, including, for example, the type of help needed and the possible consequences of helping and not helping (McGuire, 1994; Pearce and Amato, 1980; Shotland and Huston, 1979).

While the concept of helping concerns the results of an action, the concept of altruism concerns the motivation behind the behavior. Classic definitions in psychology (Sober, 1988, 1992) added intrinsic motivation as a feature of altruistic helping. For example, altruism has been defined as a special type of helping in which a benefactor helps another without expecting to receive a reward from external sources for giving help (Macaulay and Berkowitz, 1970), while incurring some personal costs to do so (Krebs, 1982; Wispé, 1978). More recent perspectives have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between the various intrinsic motivations involved in helping. According to Batson (1991, 1998), altruism does not refer to the prosocial act in itself, but to the purpose behind the act: "Altruism is a motivational state whose ultimate goal is to increase the well-being of another" (Batson, 1991, p. 6). In contrast, selfish helping is the ultimate goal of improving one's own well-being.

6.3 WHEN DO PEOPLE HELP?

Many of the earlier studies of when people help focused on non emergency situations and thus considered helping to be guided by many of the same external factors (e.g., norms of reciprocity) and internal influences (e.g., need for social approval) as other forms of socially valued behaviors. By the mid-1960s, stimulated by dramatic incidents in the news about failures of bystanders to intervene to save the lives of others, empirical attention turned to emergency situations and to the relatively unique nature of helping behavior. Much of this research was shaped by the pioneering ideas reflected in Latané and Darley's (1970) decision model of bystander intervention .

6.4 A DECISION MODEL OF INTERVENTION

The Latané and Darley (1970) decision model of bystander intervention proposes that whether or not a person helps depends upon the outcomes of a series of prior decisions. Although the model was initially developed to understand how people respond in emergencies that require immediate assistance, aspects of the model have been successfully applied to many other situations, ranging from preventing someone from driving drunk to making a decision about whether to donate a kidney to a relative (Borgida, Conner, & Manteufel, 1992; Rabow, Newcomb, Monto, & Hernandez, 1990).

According to Latané and Darley, before a person initiates a helping response, that person goes through five decision-making steps. The person must: (1) notice that something is wrong, (2) define it as a situation that requires some sort of intervention, (3) decide whether to take personal responsibility, (4) decide what kind of help to give, and (5) decide to implement the chosen course of action. The decision made at any one step has important implications for the bystander's ultimate response – a "no" response at any step means the victim will not be helped.

With respect to the first step of the model, noticing the event, bystanders are more likely to notice events that are inherently more vivid and attention-getting. As a consequence, they are more likely to intervene. Beyond the characteristics of the potential helping situations themselves, aspects of the physical environment (e.g., noise; Mathews & Canon, 1975) and the social environment (e.g., population density; Levine, Martinez, Brase, & Sorenson, 1994) may influence whether people notice an event and respond in helpful ways.One explanation of this rural–urban difference is that in order to cope with stimulus overload (Milgram, 1970) urban residents restrict their attention mainly to personally relevant events. Strangers, and thus their situations of need, may therefore go unnoticed.

Another factor that may influence whether or not people notice that something is wrong is their mood or other transitory feelings or states. There is considerable evidence that when individuals are in a good mood, they are more likely to help (Salovey, Mayer, & Rosenhan, 1991) due, at least in part, to increased attentiveness to others (McMillen, Sanders, & Solomon, 1977). Pleasant environments, such as those with appealing aromas, also facilitate helping (Baron, 1997), mediated in part by positive mood. Conversely, environmental stressors usually have a negative impact on people's moods (Bell, Fisher, Baum, & Greene, 1996).

In terms of the second step of the model, one basic factor that can influence whether a situation, once noticed, is interpreted as a situation requiring assistance is the nature of the event itself. Across a range of studies, bystanders are more inclined to help victims who make their need clear with overt distress cues (e.g., screams) than victims in similar situations who do not scream (Piliavin et al., 1981). The social environment can also influence whether an event is interpreted as requiring help. When bystanders notice an event but the nature of the event is unclear, the reactions of other

witnesses may shape their assessment of the situation. Thus, although the presence of others typically inhibits intervention (Latané, Nida, & Wilson, 1981), others' expressions of concern or alarm can facilitate helping (Wilson, 1976).

In the third step of Latané and Darley's model,once the need for assistance is determined, bystanders must decide who is responsible for helping. When a person is the only potential helper, the decision is obvious. In contrast, when a bystander believes that other people are also witnessing the event and that these other people can help, diffusion of responsibility may occur. That is, the belief that others will take action can relieve a bystander from assuming personal responsibility for intervention, because it can be reasoned that assistance is no longer necessary (Darley & Latané, 1968; Otten, Penner, & Waugh, 1988). Diffusion of responsibility thus does not occur when the other bystanders are believed to be incapable of intervening (Korte, 1969). It is more likely to occur when personal danger is involved in helping, when other witnesses are perceived as better able to help, and when norms permit or support it (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991; Piliavin et al., 1981).

Whereas the first three steps of the Latané and Darley model have received careful empirical support, the fourth and fifth steps, deciding what to do and implementing the chosen course of action have not been the focus of substantial research. Nevertheless, the work that does exist is generally supportive. People with first aid training, for instance, offer more medically effective help than do people without relevant training (Shotland & Heinold, 1985).

Overall, the Latané and Darley decision model of intervention provides a valuable broad framework for understanding when bystanders will or will not help others in need. The next model to be considered allows a more detailed analysis of how the nature of the situation and characteristics of the victim influence helping.

6.5 A COST–REWARD FRAMEWORK

A cost–reward analysis of helping assumes an economic view of human behavior – people are motivated to maximize their rewards and to minimize their costs (Piliavin et al., 1981). From this perspective, people are relatively rational and mainly concerned about their self interest. In a potential helping situation, a person analyzes the circumstances, weighs the probable costs and rewards of alternative courses of action and then arrives at a decision that will result in the best personal outcome.

There are two categories of costs and rewards: those for helping, and those for not helping. Costs for helping can involve effort and time, danger, embarrassment, and disruption of ongoing activities. Costs for not helping include feelings of guilt or shame and public censure. Rewards for helping may include money, fame, self-praise, avoidance of guilt, thanks from the victim, and the intrinsic pleasure derived from having helped.

The cost–reward perspective also assumes that both the negative values attached to costs and the positive values associated with rewards are subjective ones. They are influenced by factors such as characteristics of the person in need, the nature of the relationship between that person and a potential benefactor, and the personal attributes of a potential benefactor. For example, costs for not helping are perceived as lower when the person is seen as responsible for his or her plight (e.g., due to immoral actions) than when the cause is beyond the person's control (e.g., illness; Otten et al., 1988). Physical attractiveness and interpersonal attraction may promote helping because they increase potential rewards associated with opportunities to initiate a relationship. More positive attitudes towards and feelings for a person in need also may increase costs for not helping (e.g., stronger feelings of guilt), decrease costs for helping (e.g., less anxiety about how the person will respond to help), or increase rewards for helping (e.g., more value associated with the recipient's gratitude) – and thereby increase helping. For instance, people who desire a communal relationship with another person experience an elevated positive affect when they choose or even are required to help that person. In contrast, those who do not desire a relationship react with negative affect when they are required to help (Williamson & Clark, 1992).

Finally, studies of individuals dispositionally inclined to act prosocially provide indirect and direct evidence that these people estimate the costs of such interventions as lower than do individuals not so inclined (Colby & Damon, 1992; Oliner & Oliner, 1992; Penner & Fritzsche, 1993; also see the later section of this chapter, Who Helps? Dispositional Variables).

Similarity, in terms of dress style, nationality, personality, attitudes, and shared group membership or social identity is also positively associated with helping (Dovidio, 1984; Dovidio et al., 1997). Although the general tendency to help members of one's own group more than members of other groups occurs cross-culturally, the effect is stronger in collectivist societies (e.g., Japan and China) than in individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States; see Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993). One reason that similarity promotes helping in general is that it leads to interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971), which can increase costs for not helping and rewards for helping (Williamson & Clark, 1992). In addition, people who are seen as dissimilar are typically perceived as unpredictable, holding different beliefs and values, and threatening. From a cost-reward perspective, therefore, the benefits for helping a similar other are higher and the costs are Lower.

Whereas positive attitudes promote helping, negative attitudes can decrease it. Stigmatized persons are typically less likely to receive help than non-stigmatized persons (Edelmann, Evans, Pegg, & Tremain, 1983; Walton et al., 1988). However, because negative social attitudes, such as racial prejudice, are themselves sanctioned and stigmatized, the effects of race on helping can be complex (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Indeed, whereas some studies show that Whites are less likely to help African Americans than Whites, other studies demonstrate that Whites are as likely or are even more likely to help African Americans than Whites.

Gaertner and Dovidio offered a framework to account for these seemingly contradictory results. Because discrimination violates current social norms and may violate most people's self-image of being fair, there are special costs associated with Whites discriminating against African Americans. As a consequence of these costs, Whites may help African Americans as often, and sometimes more often (Dutton & Lennox, 1974), than they help Whites in situations in which a failure to help could be interpreted as bias.

However, when Whites can rationalize not helping on the basis of some factor other than race (as in the belief that someone else will help), their self-image is no longer threatened, these costs do not apply, and they are then less likely to help African Americans than Whites (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977).

In general, then, helping is more likely to occur when the rewards for helping outweigh the costs. Nevertheless, because costs and rewards are subjectively determined, there is considerable individual variation in response to similar situations. In addition, costs and rewards are not necessarily weighed equivalently: costs are normally weighed more heavily (Dovidio et al., 1991). Under highly arousing conditions, because of a more narrow focus of attention, not all costs and rewards may be considered (Piliavin et al., 1981).

6.6 WHY DO PEOPLE HELP?

Approaches to the question of why people help have focused on three types of mechanisms: (1) learning, (2) arousal and affect, and (3) social and personal standards. The learning explanation applies general principles from learning theories to the acquisition of helping skills and of beliefs about why these skills should be used to benefit others.

Arousal and affect theories focus on emotionally based motivations but generally share a guiding principle with learning theory that people are motivated to behave in ways that bring them some kind of reward – in this case, feeling better. However, there are some theorists who argue that under some very special circumstances people may be motivated by the primary goal of making another person feel better, by true altruism. Finally, there is the social and personal standards approach that considers how people's personal values can motivate helping by affecting both cognitive and affective processes.

6.7 LEARNED HELPFULNESS

Two basic processes have been implicated in the application of learning theory to helping behavior: operant conditioning and social learning. Consistent with the principles of operant learning, people are more likely to help others when their previous helping responses have been positively reinforced (see Staub, 1979). Conversely, people may learn not to help others because helping has led to negative consequences (see Grusec, 1991; Staub, 1978). Social learning, either through modeling or direct instruction, can also be an effective way to facilitate helping. Consistent with more

general research on attitudes and behavior, the effectiveness of persuasion is related to the nature of the message and characteristics of the audience and the persuader.

Social learning through observing models has both immediate and long-term effects on helping (Grusec, 1981). Again consistent with general principles, the consequences to the model (e.g., positive, neutral, negative), characteristics of the model (e.g., status, attractiveness, similarity), and relationship between the observer and the model (e.g., attachment between a child and parent) mediate the influence of prosocial models. Furthermore, temporary states or moods, such as positive affect, that may increase the salience of positive, previously learned behaviors can increase the likelihood of helping (Isen, 1993; Salovey et al., 1991).

Parental models can have a strong and prolonged impact on helping. Fabes, Eisenberg, and Miller (1990) found that primary school girls who were sympathetic to children in distress had mothers who also were sympathetic in such situations, suggesting that the children were in part modeling their mothers' reactions. There is also an association between prosocial parental models and the behavior of their children in adulthood (Clary & Miller, 1986; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Piliavin & Callero, 1991; Rosenhan, 1969).

The relationship between the nature of rewards and helpfulness, however, varies developmentally. According to Bar-Tal and Raviv's (1982) cognitive learning model, very young children are usually motivated by specific material rewards and punishments, older children are motivated by social approval, and adolescents are motivated by self-satisfaction and personal conviction. Similarly, the work of Eisenberg and her colleagues (Eisenberg et al., 1987; Eisenberg, Miller, Shell, McNalley, & Shea, 1991) suggests that prosocial moral reasoning proceeds developmentally. Preschool children engage mainly in self-centered moral reasoning, whereas older children demonstrate more sophisticated and other-oriented kinds of reasoning – and generally more helpfulness.

Furthermore, Grusec (1991) suggests that reliance on direct or material rewards may undermine the internalization of helping tendencies for older children. Children who help in order to receive material rewards may be less likely to assist others when these rewards are unlikely (e.g., for anonymous help) and may be less likely to develop intrinsic motivations for helping (Fabes, Fultz, Eisenberg, May-Plumlee, & Christopher, 1989).

6.8 AROUSAL AND AFFECT

In addition to the cognitive processes involved in direct and vicarious learning, arousal and affect play important roles in helping and altruism. People are aroused by the distress of others (see Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991). This reaction appears even among very young children and occurs across cultures. In fact, this phenomenon is so strong and universal some researchers have proposed that empathic arousal, arousal generated vicariously by another person's distress, has a biological and evolutionary basis (Cunningham, 1985/6; Hoffman, 1990).

6.9 EMPATHY AND EMOTION

Although most researchers agree that empathic arousal is important and fundamental in helping (Dovidio, 1984), there is much less agreement about the nature of this emotion and how it actually motivates people to help. Empathic arousal may produce different emotions. In severe emergency situations, bystanders may become upset and distressed; in less critical, less intense problem situations, observers may feel sad (Cialdini, Schaller, et al., 1987), tense (Hornstein, 1982), or concerned and compassionate (Batson, 1991). How arousal is interpreted can shape the nature of prosocial motivation.

Weiner (1980, 1986) suggests that another's need for help stimulates a search for causes by the observer. People seek to understand why the person needs assistance. The perceived causes are then analyzed . These attributions, in turn, create an affective experience that motivates action. Weiner suggests, for example, that attribution to uncontrollable causes produces sympathy that motivates helping. Attribution to controllable causes may generate anger, which may inhibit helping. Thus, "attributions guide our feelings, but emotional reactions provide the motor and direction for behavior" (Weiner, 1980, p. 186).

The roles of empathy and emotional experience in prosocial motivation are the focus of several models of helping that rely on arousal and affect as primary motivational constructs underlying helping and altruism. Negative emotions, such as guilt, can be powerful motivators of helping. People are more likely to help others when they feel they have harmed these individuals in some way (Salovey et al., 1991). One explanation is that when people feel that they have unfairly harmed others, their self-esteem suffers. Therefore, they try to make amends. This image-reparation hypothesis suggests that by making a positive social response, people's self-esteem is restored and their self-image is repaired. It is also possible that simply anticipating guilt can motivate helping. That is, within relationships where help is normative – such as parent–child, romantic, or other types of communal relationships – people may offer assistance because they believe, probably through past experience, that they will feel guilty if they do not help. Such guilt is most strongly and commonly experienced in communal relationships (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).

They cannot explain why people who simply witness a transgression against someone else also become more helpful. Cialdini and his colleagues have proposed a broader model, the negative state relief model (Cialdini, Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982; Cialdini et al., 1987) to explain such reactions.

6.10 NEGATIVE STATE RELIEF MODEL

According to the negative state relief model, harming another person or witnessing another person being harmed can produce negative feelings such as guilt or sadness. People who experience these negative states are then motivated to reduce them. Through socialization and experience, people

learn that helping can serve as a secondary reinforcer (Williamson & Clark, 1989; Yinon & Landau, 1987); the good feelings derived from helping may therefore relieve their negative mood. Thus, negative moods such as guilt and sadness may motivate people to help because helping produces the reward of making them feel better. In contrast to the image-reparation hypothesis, the negative state relief model proposes that people are motivated primarily to feel good rather than to look good. In both theories, however, the motivation for helping is essentially egoistic. That is, the primary motive for helping another person is that helping improves the helper's own situation.

Three fundamental assumptions of the negative state relief model have received some support. The first assumption is that the negative state that motivates a person to help can originate from a variety of sources. Guilt from having personally harmed a person and sadness from simply observing another person's unfortunate situation, because they are negative experiences, can both motivate helping (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973). Moreover, these effects seem to motivate helping in response to requests in particular; negative moods do not increase compliance in general (Forgas, 1998). The second assumption is that other events besides helping may just as effectively make the person feel better, and exposure to these events can relieve the motivation to help caused by negative states. Consistent with this aspect of the model, if some other event that improves the potential helper's mood precedes the opportunity to help (e.g., receiving praise; Cialdini et al., 1973) or if the person anticipates a less costly way of improving their mood (e.g., listening to a comedy tape; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988), the potential helper is no longer particularly motivated to provide assistance.

A third assumption of this model is that negative moods motivate helping only if people believe that their moods can be improved by helping. Negative feelings will not promote helping if people are led to believe that these feelings cannot be relieved (Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984)) or if, as with younger children, the self-rewarding properties have not yet developed (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976; Cialdini et al., 1982).

6.11 AROUSAL: COST–REWARD MODEL

Whereas the negative state relief model is based directly on principles of operant conditioning and on virtually the sole concern with one's own wellbeing, other affective models focus more on the assessment of and reaction to another person's problem, plight, or distress. Arousal is a central motivational concept in the Piliavin et al. (1981) arousal: cost–reward model (see also Dovidio et al., 1991). Arousal motivates a bystander to take action, and the cost–reward analysis shapes the direction that this action will take. Specifically, this model proposes that empathic arousal is generated by witnessing the distress of another person.

There is substantial evidence for the fundamental proposition of this model that people are emotionally responsive to the distress of others (Fabes, Eisenberg, & Eisenbud, 1993). Adults and children not only report feeling empathy, but they also become physiologically aroused by the pain and

suffering of others. Moreover, observers may not just feel bad about the pain or distress of another person, but they may also begin to experience what the other person is feeling (Vaughan & Lanzetta, 1980). Preschool children also spontaneously show signs of facial concern and physiological arousal at the distress of others (Fabes et al., 1993), and there is evidence that even one- and two-day-old infants will respond with crying to the distress of another infant (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976).

Also supportive of the arousal: cost–reward model, empathic arousal attributed to the other person's situation motivates helping. Facial, gestural, and vocal indications of empathically induced arousal, as well as self-reports of empathically induced anxiety, are consistently positively related to helping (see Dovidio et al., 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Marks, Penner, & Stone, 1982). Consistent with the hypothesized importance of attributing this arousal to the other's situation, people are more likely to help when arousal from extraneous sources such as exercise (Sterling & Gaertner, 1984), erotic films (Mueller & Donnerstein, 1981), and aggressive films (Mueller, Donnerstein, & Hallam, 1983) are attributed to the immediate need of another person. People are less likely to help when arousal generated by witnessing another person's distress is associated with a different cause (e.g., misattributed to a pill; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977).

Although the arousal: cost–reward model and the negative state relief model both posit egoistic motivations for helping, there are at least two important differences between them. First, attribution of arousal plays a central role in the arousal: cost–reward model; only arousal attributed to the plight of the other person will motivate helping. In contrast, the negative state relief model posits that, regardless of their attributed source, negative states (particularly guilt and sadness; Cialdini et al., 1987) can motivate helping. The second major distinction between the two models concerns the goal of the help that is given. The arousal: cost–reward model is a tension-reduction model that assumes that the victim's need produces an arousal state in the potential benefactor and that the goal of the benefactor's intervention is to alleviate his or her own aversive state by eliminating the distress of the victim. According to the negative state relief model, however, people in negative moods are looking for ways to eliminate or neutralize their negative mood. Thus, any event that might improve the emotional state of the observer, including events that have nothing whatsoever to do with benefiting the person in distress, may serve this purpose equally well.

6.12 EMPATHY-ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS

In contrast to egoistic models of helping, Batson and his colleagues (see Batson, 1991) present an empathy-altruism hypothesis. Although they acknowledge that egoistically motivated helping occurs, Batson and his colleagues argue that true altruism also exists. Altruism is defined as helping with the primary goal of improving the other person's welfare. Specifically, according to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, witnessing another person in need can produce a range of emotional experiences, such as sadness, personal distress (e.g., upset, worry), and empathic concern

(e.g., sympathy, compassion). Whereas sadness and personal distress produce egoistic motivations to help, empathic concern creates altruistic motivation.

The primary mechanism in Batson's empathy-model is the emotional reaction to another person's problem. Batson suggests that under some circumstances, for example if there is a special bond between the potential helper and the person in need, it can elicit empathy or empathic concern, which he defines as "an other-oriented emotional response (e.g., sympathy, compassion) congruent with the . . . welfare of another person" (Batson & Oleson, 1991, p. 63). In contrast to sadness and personal distress which, as noted above, generate an egoistic desire to reduce one's own distress, Batson (1987, 1991) proposes that empathic concern produces an altruistic motivation to reduce the other person's distress. The altruistically motivated person will then help if (a) helping is possible, (b) helping is perceived to be ultimately beneficial to the person in need, and (c) helping personally will provide greater benefit to the person in need than would assistance from another person also able to offer it. Thus, empathic concern is hypothesized to produce greater concern for the welfare of the other person.

The empathy-specific punishment explanation suggests that feeling empathic concern may generate additional costs for not helping that make these people likely to help even when helping requires moderate effort. From this perspective, the motivation that Batson and his colleagues described as altruistic may represent a subtle form of egoism based on the social costs associated with what other people's negative evaluations might be (Archer, 1984; Archer, Diaz-Loving, Gollwitzer, Davis, & Foushee, 1981) or self-imposed costs for violating one's personal standards (Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). However, inconsistent with these egoistic interpretations, evidence of altruistic motivation has been obtained even when social evaluation is not possible (Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986); and when information is provided that gives them a reason for not helping that preserves their personal standards of behavior. For example, people who experience empathic concern still help after being told about the inaction of previous potential helpers or about people's general preference for a less helpful option (Batson, Dyck, et al., 1988, Study 2 & 3). The empathy-specific reward interpretation, another alternative explanation for evidence of altruistic motivation, is closely related to the punishment explanations. It proposes that people help others because they expect a reward from the recipient, from others who observe the act, or from themselves. One involves the desire to share in the other's joy – "empathic joy." Another concerns the helper's reactions to the relief of the other person's need.The evidence with respect to empathic joy is mixed. In support of the egoistic perspective, Smith, Keating, and Stotland (1989) found that participants who were high in empathy helped more when they believed that they would learn of the consequences for helping than when they believed they would not. But in a subsequent study, Batson and his colleagues also varied the likelihood of learning about the consequences of helping and produced support for the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, Batson, Slingsby, et al., 1991). Participants who experienced low levels of empathic concern and were presumably egoistically motivated were more

likely to help when they believed they would learn of the benefits of their intervention, particularly when there was a high likelihood it would improve the other person's situation (and thus produce "empathic joy"). In contrast, those who reported high levels of empathic concern and were presumably altruistically motivated exhibited high levels of helping regardless of whether they would have the opportunity to experience "empathic joy." The desire to share in the other's joy, therefore, does not account for helping by these empathically-aroused participants.

Overall, this version of the empathy-specific reward explanation, although still possible, does not definitely disprove the existence of altruism. The other explanation concerns how people respond to the person in need being helped. If empathically concerned people are primarily motivated by a personal desire for reward, they should feel better if they help the person in need (and earn the reward) than if someone else does it. In contrast, if people are altruistically motivated, they should feel better just knowing that the person in need is helped, regardless of who the helper is. Empathically concerned people seem to care for others in this latter way. Their moods improve when they learn that the other person's need has been relieved, regardless of the source of relief (Batson, Dyck, et al., 1988).

Sibicky, Schroeder, and Dovidio (1995), for example, found that participants experiencing higher levels of empathic concern gave fewer hints to help a partner with a problem-solving task when they were led to believe that providing hints would impair the person's performance on a subsequent task with aversive consequences (greater likelihood of being shocked). When they were not informed of these subsequent negative consequences of providing hints, participants experiencing higher levels of empathic concern offered more hints. In general, then, the weight of the evidence is on the side of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. The behavior that Batson and his colleagues identify as altruistic cannot fully be explained by a desire to obtain personal rewards. Another egoistic interpretation for findings that support the empathy-altruism hypothesis was proposed by Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini et al., 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). They have argued that empathic people may have a greater motivation to help because empathy has aroused sadness as well as empathic concern, and it is the egoistic need to relieve this sadness that is really motivating helping. The data relevant to this argument are inconsistent and controversial. Indicative of egoistic motivation, Cialdini and his colleagues found that empathy produced high levels of sadness as well as empathic concern (Cialdini et al., 1987, Study 1) and that empathically concerned people showed high levels of helpfulness only when they believed that their sad mood could be improved by helping (Cialdini et al., 1987, Study 2). In contrast, in two subsequent studies, Batson et al. (1989) demonstrated, consistent with altruistic motivation, that anticipating a mood enhancing event did not lead people high in empathic concern to be less helpful. Other studies have revealed that empathically aroused participants exhibit a high level of helping even when they are led to believe that helping could not improve their mood (Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988) and that their motivation is directed at helping the particular person for whom they feel empathy, not helping just

anyone (Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990). Apparently, these individuals' primary goal was not to make themselves feel better; regardless of whether their own moods would soon be improved, they were highly motivated to help the other person.

The most recent egoistic challenge of results that apparently show an altruistic motivation for helping also comes from Cialdini and his associates. Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg (1997) have argued that the manipulation typically used to induce empathic concern for another person may also create a greater sense of self–other overlap, or "oneness" between the potential helper and the recipient of the help. This raises the possibility that empathy-related helping may not be selfless, because helping would also indirectly improve at least the psychological well-being of the helper. In support of this contention, Cialdini et al. carried out path analyses of participants' responses to helping requests from different individuals and found that empathic concern did not directly lead to helping; rather, it was correlated with "oneness" between the helper and the victim, which did directly affect helping. In response to this challenge, Batson et al. (1997) conducted a series of studies in which they directly manipulated empathy and shared group membership (which presumably affects self–other overlap). Contrary to Cialdini's argument, Batson et al. reported that the empathy helping relationship was "unqualified by group membership" .

The extremely large number of conflicting experimental results regarding the question of altruism versus egoism as the motivational basis for prosocial actions makes it quite difficult to draw any firm conclusions about any specific motive responsible for any particular set of results. Certainly, some behaviors labeled as "altruistic" by one researcher may, in fact, be motivated by egoistic concerns and vice versa.

6.13 SOCIAL NORMS AND PERSONAL STANDARDS

Both cognitive (learning) and affective factors are likely involved in the third motivational perspective, social norms and personal standards. Normative theories of helping emphasize that people help others because they have expectations based on previous social learning or the current behavior of others that it is the socially appropriate response. That is, helping is viewed as "a function of the pressure to comply with shared group expectations about appropriate behavior that are backed by social sanctions and rewards" (Schwartz & Howard, 1982, p. 346).

6.14 SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

According to the norm of social responsibility, people are expected to help others who are dependent on them, even when there is no tangible gain for the benefactor (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1963). In general, the greater the need, the more likely people are to help (Piliavin et al., 1981), and, as the research on physical attraction suggests (Dovidio, 1984), this effect may be particularly pronounced when helping increases the likelihood of a desired long-term interdependent relationship, such as a romantic one. There are,

however, exceptions and limits to this rule. People are less obligated to adhere to the social responsibility norm if the interdependent relationship is unwanted or threatens feelings of personal freedom and choice (Berkowitz, 1973)

6.15 PERSONAL NORMS, GOALS, AND SELF-CONCEPT

Whereas general norms of social responsibility may provide only a vague guide for behavior in concrete situations, the use of personal norms and standards is valuable for accounting how a particular person will behave in a specific situation. Internalized moral values and personal norms can motivate helping both cognitively and affectively. The cognitive component involves expectations of behavior that are based on personal standards; the affective component concerns the emotional reaction (e.g., pride, guilt) associated with meeting or not meeting one's standards. Personal norms typically predict helping better than general social norms (Schwartz & Howard, 1982), particularly when attention is focused inward on these personal standards (Hoover, Wood, & Knowles, 1983).

Perhaps because of similar cognitive and affective mechanisms, people who are led to make dispositional self-attributions for their helpfulness and to develop the self-concept that they are helpful people subsequently show relatively high levels of helpful behavior (Grusec, 1991; Swinyard & Ray, 1979). In contrast, those who are offered money to help or are pressured externally to help perceive themselves to have helped less altruistically than if they helped without such inducements (Batson, Fultz, Schoenrade, & Paduano, 1987; Thomas & Batson, 1981; Thomas, Batson, & Coke, 1981), which may make them less helpful in the future.

Also like spontaneous helping, self-interest can be directly involved in volunteer activities. People may donate money to achieve personal recognition, to get ahead in their careers, to gain the respect of others, or even because they may expect some financial reward for their "charity" (e.g., tax benefits). Two in-depth studies of volunteerism conducted over 30 years apart (Daniels, 1988; Sills, 1957) both found that concern for others co occurred with personal interest, a feeling of power, feelings of obligation, identification with the goals of the organization, the desire for social contact, and other self-centered motives (Chambre, 1987; Pearce, 1983). Thus, although people often report "altruistic" reasons for helping, personal needs and goals also appear to be very important.

The consequences of action or inaction for one's self-concept, values, and needs may be directly related to cost–reward considerations and affective reactions to opportunities to help. Thus, the issues of when people help and why they help may be closely interrelated. Regular and public commitments to helping, such as donating blood or volunteering for charities, can lead to the development of a role-identity consistent with those behaviors (Grube & Piliavin, 2000; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Stryker, 1980).

6.16 FAIRNESS

The second class of norms for helping relates to issues of perceived fairness. One facet is the norm of reciprocity. According to this norm, people should help those who have helped them, and they should not help those who have denied them help for no legitimate reason (Gouldner, 1960). Consistent with this proposition, people normally reciprocate assistance to others who have helped them. This is particularly true when the person expects to see the helper again (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Carrington, 1982), although it can also occur when there is no expectation of future interaction (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966). Also, the more assistance a person receives, the more help he or she subsequently gives (Kahn & Tice, 1973). Reciprocity involving the repayment of specific benefits is particularly strong for most casual relationships, but may be weaker in more intimate communal relationships (Clark & Mills, 1993). In communal relationships, however, a broader type of reciprocity may be involved in which people are generally mutually responsive to the needs of the other person, if needs arise. People involved in such relationships are primarily concerned about the welfare of their partner and anticipate that kindnesses will be reciprocated if such actions are ever needed (Webley & Lea, 1993). Consequently, they monitor the needs of their partner more closely than the immediate exchange of assistance, and thus helping is tied more directly to responsiveness to these needs than to a desire to repay specific assistance previously received. However, these circumstances notwithstanding, the norm of reciprocity appears to be a basic and fundamental aspect of human social exchanges. However, the work of Miller and her colleagues (e.g., Miller & Bersoff, 1994) does suggest that in different cultures there may be different reasons why people feel obligated to return favors.

The concern for fairness and balance that underlies the reciprocity norm also relates to the principle of equity. Equity exists when people in a relationship believe that their input and output – what they contribute to and what they get out of the relationship – are balanced (Walster et al., 1978). When people perceive an imbalance, they are motivated to restore equity. There is considerable evidence of equity motives in helping. People who have unfairly received benefits – for example, those who receive too much reward based on their contribution to the group activity – often freely choose to give up some of their reward (Schmitt & Marwell, 1972). Conversely, if people feel that they have been undercompensated, they will be less helpful to coworkers or the company for which they work (Organ & Ryan, 1995). In addition, when people have transgressed they are less likely to help others if equity has been restored by retribution, and they are more likely to help others if they are simply forgiven, which increases feelings of indebtedness (Kelln & Ellard, 1999). Helping or withholding assistance is therefore instrumental in restoring balance and achieving equity.

6.17 BIOLOGICAL "MOTIVES" FOR HELPING AND ALTRUISM

Although biologists and ethologists have long argued for a biological basis of helping and altruism, the extension of these arguments to prosocial actions among humans is a relatively recent development. Three things seem responsible for the greater acceptance of a biological view of helping and altruism. First, in general, explanations of human social behaviors that rely on evolutionary theory have become more socially and scientifically acceptable in recent years (see Buss & Kenrick, 1998). Second, it is generally agreed that empathy plays a critical role in helping and altruism and it appears that there is a specific part of the human brain – the limbic system – that gives humans the capacity to empathize with other people (Carlson, 1998). Moreover, this brain structure was present very early in human evolutionary history (MacLean, 1985). Indeed, it may have been present in the earliest mammals, over 180 million years ago. Further, studies of identical twins have consistently suggested the heritability of empathy (Davis, Luce, & Kraus, 1994; Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, & Eysenck, 1986; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 1992). Thus, although there may be individual differences, people appear to be generally inherently empathic.

Trivers (1971), for example, used the term reciprocal altruism to refer to a genetic tendency for mutual helping that increases inclusive fitness, the likelihood that one's genes will be transmitted to future generations. One important component of inclusive fitness is a form of helping known as kin selection. A well-documented phenomenon among animals, kin selection refers to the strong positive association between biological (i.e., genetic) relatedness and the incidence of mutual helping (Alcock, 1989). Kin selection makes evolutionary sense because saving the lives of relatives (sometimes even at the sacrifice of one's own life) can increase the incidence of one's own genes in subsequent generations (Buss & Kenrick, 1998). Cunningham (1985/6) reviewed the research on kin selection and reciprocal altruism in humans and found, supportive of the biological perspective, that the closer the kinship relationship the greater the expectations that help would be given to them, the greater the resentment if help were withheld, the greater the willingness to provide aid to the other person, and the more they expected that help would be reciprocated.

On the other side of this issue, Batson (1998) has provided perhaps the most cogent criticism of the evolutionary approach to helping and altruism. It is the absence of any hard or direct information on the mechanisms that mediate the relationship between genes and behavior. That is, it is unlikely that humans are genetically "hardwired" to help others, as is almost certainly the case with insects and other "lower" animals. Thus, in humans certain genes (or gene combinations) must make certain affective and cognitive processes more likely, and these processes are the proximal and direct causes of helping and altruism.

In summary, the reasons why people help involve both cognitive and affective influences. Cognitively, people learn that helping is a positively valued social behavior and learn when it is appropriate to help. Affectively, the distress of another person can elicit empathic arousal. Depending on how this arousal is interpreted, it can inhibit intervention, facilitate egoistic helping, or produce altruistic motivation. As many models emphasize (e.g., Piliavin et al., 1981), the affective and cognitive processes are not independent. Moreover, individual, developmental, and cultural differences can occur for both the cognitive and affective processes (Fiske, 1991).

6.18 WHO HELPS? DISPOSITIONAL VARIABLES

Dispositions, situations, and helping

Over 70 years ago, Hartshorne and May (1928) concluded that prosocial actions are largely situationally determined rather than the result of enduring personal characteristics. This led to the conventional wisdom that dispositional variables are weak and unreliable predictors of helping and altruism. Further, when interest in helping was rekindled in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Dovidio, 1984), the research findings were consistent with the situationist perspective – the notion that social actions such as helping are primarily determined by the characteristics of the situation in which the action occurred (Mischel, 1973).

One likely reason for the absence of strong or consistent relationships between personality measures and measures of prosocial actions was the context in which the dispositional correlates of helping were studied. A substantial portion of the research on helping in the 1960s and 1970s used some variant of the bystander intervention paradigm, measuring a single decision to help or not help in a situation in which strong situational variables had been effectively manipulated (e.g., the severity or clarity of the emergency). However, the impact of traits (or any other dispositional variable) on behavior is most likely to be observed in behavioral consistencies across time and situations rather than in one specific situation. Also, the greater the strength of situational cues or demands, the less likely it is that dispositional variables will influence a person's behavior in that situation. Thus, the failure of dispositional variables to account for meaningful amounts of variance in the bystander intervention experiments is not surprising, and may say as much about the characteristics of the research paradigms employed as about the relationship between dispositional variables and helping (Penner, Escarrez, & Ellis, 1983).

In recent years there has been somewhat of a resurgence of interest in dispositional correlates of helping and altruism. The more recent research generally supports the interactionist perspective on social behavior – situational and dispositional variables jointly explain more of the variance in a measure of interest than either class of variable does individually. However, within this context empirical findings indicate a much more important role for dispositional variables than was suggested by the earlier studies.

Demographic characteristics

Demographic variables are background characteristics related to a person's physical or social status. Among the demographic characteristics that have been studied in relation to prosocial actions are age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religion, and gender. Most studies of the demographic correlates of helping have been surveys of the incidence of financial donations to and volunteering for service organizations, including religious, educational, and health organizations. While strong with regard to external validity, surveys, of course, are limited in their capacity to identify causal relationships. Another limitation of these data is that they come almost exclusively from the United States; some of the relationships reported might vary across different countries and cultures. Nonetheless, the results of these studies are informative and useful.

Education relates to charitable actions in ways that cannot be simply explained by greater resources. For example, in the United States blood donors are most likely to be people with at least some college education and who hold professional jobs (Piliavin & Callero, 1991). Bellah and his colleagues (1985) concluded that among wealthy, well-educated people, prosocial actions may also serve personal growth needs. That is, having attained many of their material goals, these people may turn to goals that give more meaning to their lives. There is also a strong association between religiosity and both donations and volunteerism. People who report a religious affiliation contribute a greater percentage of their household income than people with no religious affiliation (Independent Sector, 1997).Turning to gender, although national surveys consistently show that a larger percentage of women than men serve as volunteers (Independent Sector, 1997), early laboratory research on gender differences in helping indicated that men were more likely to help than women. Reconciling these apparently conflicting findings, Eagly and Crowley (1986) concluded from their review of the literature that men and women do not differ in how much they help but rather in the kinds of help they offer. Moreover, the kinds of help men and women will provide is largely determined by whether the helping action is consistent or inconsistent with the actor's gender role, a set of norms about how people should behave based on their biological sex. Gender-role expectations relate to both cognitive and affective factors in helping. The female gender role is often associated with the trait of "communion" – being caring, emotionally expressive, and responsive to others (Ashmore, Del Boca, & Wohlers, 1986), and being supportive and nurturant, especially to their friends and family (Eagly & Crowley, 1986).

In addition, although both men and women experience physiological arousal when they observe distress in others, women are more likely to interpret this arousal as a positive empathic response to the other person's needs (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983).Perhaps because of this, there is a greater expectation that men will engage in heroic helping, in which they risk their own well-being in order to help others, even strangers; and chivalrous helping, in which they protect individuals who are less able and powerful than them.

Systematic reviews of the literature (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Piliavin & Unger, 1985) strongly support this gender-role explanation of male– female differences in helping. That is, people tend to offer the kinds of help that are most consistent with and appropriate for their gender roles. And the more salient the person's gender role, the stronger is this relationship (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). It is also likely that gender roles affect perceptions of the costs and rewards associated with various kinds of helping. In particular, women, because of how they have been socialized, may find the rewards associated with nurturant forms of helping and the costs for not helping to be greater, and the costs for helping to be lower, than do men.

Motives and helping

People may also systematically differ in their personal goals that underlie helping. Snyder, Clary, and their associates (e.g., Clary & Snyder, 1991; Clary et al., 1998; Omoto & Snyder, 1990) have made this idea the cornerstone of their approach to helping and altruism. More specifically, they have employed a "functional analysis" to explain long-term, sustained prosocial actions, such as volunteering. This approach attempts to identify the "personal and social needs, plans, goals, and functions that are being served by . . . [these] actions" (Clary & Snyder, 1991, p. 123). According to these researchers, there are six primary needs or motives that may be served by volunteering (Clary et al., 1998; Clary & Snyder, 1991). They are: (1) value-expressive – expressing values related to altruistic and humanitarian concerns; (2) understanding – gaining knowledge or exercising existing knowledge, skills, and abilities; (3) social – being among friends and engaging in activities that might win their approval; (4) career – pursuing activities that might directly or indirectly benefit one's career; (5) protective – protecting one's ego from negative features of the self and helping to address personal problems; and (6) enhancement – enhancing positive feelings about oneself and furthering personal growth and development.

Consistent with this functional analysis, surveys of volunteers (e.g., Allen & Rushton, 1983; Anderson & Moore, 1978; Independent Sector, 1997) suggest that different people have different reasons for engaging in this activity.

Omoto and Snyder (1995) found that three self-serving motives – understanding, personal development, and esteem enhancement – were all positively associated with tenure as a volunteer, but the value-expressive motive was not. These findings were consistent with earlier findings by Snyder and Omoto (1992), and led Omoto and Snyder (1995) to conclude: "it appears that the opportunity to have personal, self-serving, and perhaps even selfish functions served by volunteering was what kept volunteers actively involved" (p. 683). Other studies have also found that personal motives play a significant role in volunteerism, but sometimes these are not the same motives identified by Omoto and Snyder.

Deaux and Stark (1996) found a positive correlation between the value-expressive motive and intention to donate time to a conflict resolution program for prisoners, as well as a positive correlation with an egoistic

motive. More recent research suggests that motives, including value-expressive ones, may also play a role in sustained prosocial activities ("Organizational Citizenship Behavior") within private, for-profit organizations (Rioux & Penner, 1999; Tillman, 1998). Overall, although the primary motives for helping appear to vary across situations and studies, there is consistent evidence that helping serves many important functions and that different people have different motives for helping.

Personality correlates of helping and altruism

Graziano and Eisenberg (1997) have identified three kinds of evidence supporting the conclusion that personality traits can account for significant amounts of variance in prosocial actions. The first is that, as noted earlier, differences in empathy, a characteristic that is strongly linked with helping and altruism, may be at least in part inherited (Davis et al., 1994). The second kind of evidence is consistency of prosocial actions across situations and across time. For instance, Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that 40 years after World War II ended, people who had risked their lives to save Jews from the Nazis were still more helpful than people with comparable demographic characteristics (e.g., age, nationality) who had not rescued Jews (see also Colby & Damon, 1992; Marwell, Aiken, & Demerath, 1987; Reddy, 1980; Savin-Williams, Small & Zeldin, 1981).

The third kind of evidence relates to replicable associations between "prosocial behavior and those personality characteristics conceptually linked to (helping and) altruism" (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997, p. 813).

Personality characteristics associated primarily with cognitive processes may relate to individual differences in how people perceive and weigh the various costs and rewards for helping and to the steps involved in making a decision to help. For instance, individual differences in the propensity to accept responsibility for helping have been identified as an important personality characteristic (Schwartz & Howard, 1982). In their work with the rescuers, the Oliners also found that this trait also distinguished rescuers from non rescuers. Studies of other kinds of helping, including medical donations and short term interventions on behalf of a person in trouble, also find a positive association between ascription of responsibility and helping (Schwartz & Howard, 1982; Staub, 1986, 1996). A sense of self-efficacy and feelings of confidence, which also relate to the subjective assessment of costs and rewards and perceptions of the ability to help successfully, are also consistent personality correlates of helpful and altruistic actions (see Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997).

More direct evidence for the impact of personality traits on cost assessments comes from Penner and his associates (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995). They developed a measure of prosocial personality characteristics, the Prosocial Personality Battery. One of the two factors on this measure is called Helpfulness (a self-reported history of being helpful and an absence of egocentric responses to distress in others). Helpfulness is correlated with a broad range of helpful actions, including emergency intervention, helping peers and friends in non emergency situations,

sustained volunteering, and informal prosocial activities among employees within a large organization (Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Penner et al., 1995; Penner, Midili, & Kegelmeyer, 1997). And it also is negatively correlated with estimates of the costs of helping distressed others (Penner et al., 1995).

Other personality characteristics that are consistently associated with helping relate directly or indirectly to arousal. Dispositional empathy is one of the most important of these characteristics. Affective empathy involves the tendency to experience affect or emotion in response to others' emotional experiences. Cognitive empathy relates to the tendency or ability to see things from another person's perspective (Davis, 1994). There is substantial consistency in the literature regarding the positive association between dispositional empathy and a broad range of prosocial actions. Penner and his associates (Penner & Craiger, 1991; Penner et al., 1995) have found that empathy, social responsibility, and concern for the welfare of others are all strongly related to one another. Indeed, they form the other factor of their prosocial personality measure, which is called Other-Oriented Empathy – the tendency to experience empathy for, and to feel responsibility and concern about, the well-being of others; in other words, prosocial thoughts and feelings.

Personality and helping:

First, a comprehensive understanding of helping involves an appreciation not only of personality (and situational) factors separately but how they interact to produce helping. Second, although personality is now recognized as an important factor in helping, personality traits typically play a less substantial role in helping than do situational factors (e.g., Oliner & Oliner, 1988; see also Piliavin & Charng, 1990). Third, in many of the studies on personality and helping causal inference is difficult. For instance, sustained volunteering may shape one's self-concept as an empathic, responsible, and efficacious person rather than these characteristics be the causes of helping. Finally, personality studies need to speak even more directly to the mechanisms that mediate the relationship between a particular personality trait and a helpful or altruistic act.

6.19 SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have reviewed a range of causes, moderating influences, and mediating mechanisms involved in helping and altruism. At the model's base are the most distal causes of a prosocial action; the causes become progressively more proximal as we move toward the top. Thus, the model begins with the evolutionary processes associated with natural selection and inclusive fitness. Among humans' ancestors, helping was a behavior that, under many circumstances, served to increase inclusiveness fitness, and thus it is a characteristic that is likely to be reflected in prosocial genetic predispositions among contemporary humans. This should be especially likely for helping biological relatives because this action directly increases the likelihood that one's own genes will be transmitted to future generations. But, in addition, even helping others who are unrelated may ultimately be beneficial to one's own survival or the survival of relatives

through processes of reciprocity. Humans are both feeling and thinking organisms. Thus, the model suggests that affective and cognitive processes provide mechanisms for translating genetic predispositions into prosocial actions. Moreover, consistent with an evolutionary perspective, empathy is a highly heritable characteristic and empathic arousal increases with closeness to the person in need. From a cognitive perspective, people learn about helping and how to be helpful in the same ways that they learn other social behaviors, through direct or vicarious rewards and punishments.Affect and cognitive processes are, of course, reciprocally intertwined. People have higher levels of cognitive and affective empathy with others who are similar to them, with whom they share group membership, and with whom they are closer. Personal dispositions may also affect affective and cognitive factors and thus produce individual differences in helpfulness.

Helping can be egoistically motivated. In such instances, the primary objective with respect to affect might be to improve one's mood or relieve one's own empathic distress. With regard to cognition, egoistically-motivated helping may reaffirm one's positive self-image or satisfy a wide range of personal goals (e.g., job advancement, distraction from personal problems). Batson (1991) has argued, demonstration of truly altruistic motivation provides a broader and different perspective on behavior for a discipline that has been traditionally considered virtually exclusively the effect of personal consequences for behavior (e.g., the Law of Effect or drive reduction models). Finally, we note that the behavioral outcome of these processes can come in various forms. Helping may be direct or indirect (e.g., calling the police). It may be short-term or involve long-term commitments. Helping may also be reflected in inaction when helping has negative social consequences (e.g., stigmatization for providing academic assistance; Major & Crocker, 1993) or personal consequences (e.g., the failure to develop important skills; Sibicky et al., 1995) that outweigh the immediate benefits of intervention or in the refusal to acquiesce to a request for assistance that might ultimately cause another harm (e.g., an alcoholic's request for a drink). Thus, an understanding of the processes underlying helping can illuminate a wide range of other behaviors while offering genuinely unique insights to human motivation.

6.20 QUESTIONS

Write Down Short Notes

1. Empathy and emotion.

2. Fairness

3. Social responsibility.

4. Dispositional Variables

5. Arousal and affect

6.21 REFERENCE

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7

CONNECTIONS TO RELATED FIELDS-I

Unit Structure:

7.0 Objectives

7.1 Introduction

7.2.1 Social Cognitive Neuroscience Past, Present ,Future

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7.2.3 The Intellectual Backdrop

7.2.4 The Rise of Social Neuroscience

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7.2.6 Electroencephalography (EEG) and Event-Related Potential (ERP)

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7.2.14 STS/TPJ

7.2.15 Detection of Threat

7.2.16 Self-Regulation

7.3 Forensic Psychology : Physical Attractiveness Bias

7.4 Summary

7.5 Questions

7.6 Reference

7.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

- ➢ Describe Methods of Social Neuroscience
- ➢ Understand Components of the Social Brain
- ➢ Explain Self-Regulation
- ➢ Elaborate Physical Attractiveness Bias

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In arguably the first major textbook on social psychology, Floyd Allport (1924) chose to begin with an examination of the physiological basis of human behavior. It is not surprising, therefore, that the topic of social neuroscience should stand with other research areas in any comprehensive coverage of social psychology. Yet, for most of the past century, relatively few social psychologists have emphasized its biological nature (with notable exceptions to be discussed shortly).In this chapter we are going to study Social Cognitive Neuroscience. Its past , present and future. Then we will discuss Forensic Psychology and will explain physical attractiveness bias in detail.

7.2.1 Social Cognitive Neuroscience : Past, Present and Future Promise

Within the past decade or so, however, a biological revolution has taken place within many areas of psychological science, including social psychology, with an increasing emphasis on the use of neuroscience methods to understand human behavior. The field of neuroscience reflects the interdisciplinary effort to understand the structure, function, physiology, biology, biochemistry, and pathology of the nervous system.

From a psychological perspective, however, the term neuroscience typically is used to refer primarily to the study of the brain. Social neuroscience, a term first used by John Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g. Cacioppo & Berntson), is an emerging field that uses the methods of neuroscience to understand how the brain processes social information. It involves scholars from widely diverse areas (e.g., social and personality psychology, neuroscience, psychiatry, philosophy, anthropology, economics, and sociology) working together and across levels of analysis to understand fundamental questions about human social nature. The core challenge of social neuroscience is to elucidate the neural mechanisms that support social thought and behavior. From this perspective, just as there are dedicated brain mechanisms for breathing, seeing, and hearing, the brain has evolved specialized mechanisms for processing information about the social world, including the ability to know ourselves, to know how others respond to us, and to regulate our actions in order to coexist with other members of society. The problems that are studied by social neuroscience have been of central interest to social psychologists for decades, but the methods and theories that are used reflect recent discoveries in neuroscience.

7.2.2 History of Social Neuroscience

Although a rise in the use of neuroscience methods has accelerated over the past decade or so, it is important to understand how it has permeated psychological thinking as we look at how those methods can be useful for studying social cognition and behavior.

7.2.3 The Intellectual Backdrop

By the beginning of the twentieth century, anatomists had a reasonably good understanding of the basic structures of the brain. What was less clear,

however, is how these structures worked to produce thought and behavior—much less how the brain created complex mental activities such as those associated with attitudes, prejudice, or love. A key question was whether different parts of the brain did different things or whether the entire brain acted in unison to perform its vital functions. This issue remains at the heart of social neuroscience, in that ascribing particular functions to specific brain regions might make intuitive sense, but it also might be quite misleading if activity in that brain area reflects general mechanisms that might be true for many different functions (Cacioppo, Berntson, & Nusbaum, ; Ochsner,).

The major question that remains is how specific brain regions contribute to social cognition (Mitchell,) as well as how activity across distributed brain areas produces social thoughts and actions. Some of the earliest proponents of functional localization were the phrenologists, such as Franz Gall and Johann Spurzheim, who identified social constructs such as self-esteem as being reflected by enlargements on the skull (the area to feel for bumps in the skull indicating high self-esteem is just at the crown at the back of your head). Although the theory that brain functions are associated with specific patterns of bumps on the skull is now discredited, the idea that discrete regions of the brain are specialized for different tasks was quite insightful. Early case histories of individuals with brain damage also provided considerable evidence for localized functions.

Psychologists such as Karl Lashley in the early twentieth century continued to argue that all parts of the cortex contributed equally to mental abilities through mass action, an idea known as equipotentiality. In a series of learning studies, Lashley removed cortical tissue from rats to see if he could disrupt their ability to remember how to navigate through mazes. He found that it was the amount of tissue removed rather than where it was located that impaired learning. However, had Lashley removed subcortical tissue he would have come to a much different conclusion. It is now well established that subcortical structures such as the hippocampus and the amygdala are critical to learning and memory. One reason the debate about whether psychological processes are located in specific parts of the brain or distributed throughout the brain continued so long was because researchers did not have methods for studying ongoing mental activity in the working brain. The invention of brain-imaging methods in the 1970s and1980 s changed that swiftly and decidedly. Functional brain imaging, the use of imaging techniques to observe ongoing mental activity, was pioneered by Marcus Raichle and his colleagues (i.e., Peter Fox, Michael Posner, and Steven Petersen) in the mid-1980s. Although early imaging work used positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was developed in the early 1990s and now serves as the dominant brain imaging method. In the past decade there has been an explosion of research linking specific brain areas with particular behaviors and mental processes (for reviews see the various chapters in Gazzaniga,). We now know that there is some localization of function, but that many different brain regions participate to produce behavior and mental activity (Adolphs, ; Lieberman,). That is, although there is considerable support for the general idea of specialization, almost every behavior involves the joint activity of many brain regions. As we discuss later, identifying specific

functions for discrete brain structures remains an ongoing challenge for functional neuroimaging approaches to studying social behavior.

7.2.4 The Rise of Social Neuroscience

Within social psychology, efforts to understand bodily involvement in social phenomena also has a long history, such as the use of skin conductance measures to indicate whether experimental conditions produced arousal (e.g., Lanzetta & Kleck,), the assessment of changes in various facial muscles for understanding emotionality (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty,), and the measurement of heart rate and other cardiac activity to understand specific psychological states (e.g., Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley), such as whether people feel threatened or challenged by environmental events (Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey, & Leitten, ; Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost,). Indeed, early descriptions of social neuroscience emphasized psychophysiological arousal and response (Cacioppo, Berntson, & Crites,).

In the mid-1990s Stan Klein and John Kihlstrom (1998) argued that the study of various neurological conditions could provide novel assessments of social functions by examining what happens to relevant social behaviors when particular systems are impaired.What has dramatically increased interest in social neuroscience is the new generation of brain imaging techniques that allows researchers to watch the working mind in action (Heatherton et al., ; Lieberman, ; Macrae, Heatherton, & Kelley, ; Ochsner,; Ochsner & Lieberman,), which has led some to prefer the term social cognitive neuroscience to social neuroscience (see Lieberman, ; Ochsner); however, most researchers use the terms interchangeably. The advent of imaging led to an explosion of research on social cognition, with a resulting boom in special issues of various journals devoted to the topic, specialized conferences both large and small, grant initiatives from several institutes of the National Institutes of Health and from the National Science Foundation, and the launching of two new journals in focusing on social neuroscience (Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience and Social Neuroscience).

7.2.5 Methods of Social Neuroscience

Researchers have only recently been able to study the working brain as it performs its vital mental functions, including social cognition. Although a multitude of different methods have been developed, they tend to group into two categories. The first group relies on measuring the electrical activity (and its associated magnetic consequences) in the brain. These methods are optimized for assessing the timing of brain activity (i.e., they are high in temporal resolution) but are limited in their ability to localize the origins of the brain activity (i.e., they are low in spatial resolution). The second category is based on tracking the blood flow (and its correlates) that accompanies neuronal activity. Methods in this group, such as PET and fMRI, are relatively high in spatial resolution, but because of the rather sluggish nature of blood flow, they are low in temporal resolution. Here we describe some of the major techniques that are used in social neuroscience.

7.2.6 Electroencephalography (EEG) and Event-Related Potential (ERP)

EEG was the first noninvasive method of brain mapping developed for humans.It is based on the principle that neural activity produces electrical potentials that can be measured and that the sum of these potentials indicates the relative activity of the brain. EEG records these electrical signals in real time through electrodes that are strategically placed on the scalp. Because EEGs register all brain activity the signal is noisy and it cannot provide information about specific changes in brain activity in response to a stimulus or cognitive task. This problem is remedied by using event-related potentials (ERP), an offshoot of EEG. During ERP experiments, the trials are repeated numerous times and the EEG signals following those trials are averaged together to create an average waveform of the brain's response to the experimental event. Perhaps the most important feature of ERP is that it provides a relatively precise record of brain activity. The use of ERP methods has provided psychologists with insights into a number of important social behaviors, including identifying unique patterns that are associated with perceiving members of an outgroup, at least for those who score high on measures of racial prejudice (Ito, Thompson, & Cacioppo,). An excellent review of findings in social neuroscience using ERP describes the method as being useful for understanding person perception, stereotyping, attitudes and evaluative processes, and self-regulation (Bartholow & Amodio,2009).

A technique related to ERP that also provides better spatial resolution is magnetoencephalography (MEG), which measures magnetic fields that are produced by the electrical activity of the brain. Unlike EEG, MEG does not require electrodes but rather uses special sensors that detect magnetic fields. MEG has the same temporal resolution as ERP, but because magnetic signals are not distorted by the skull, as are EEG signals, its signal localization is considerably better. In a study of the effects of social exclusion on self-control failure using MEG, Campbell and colleagues (2006) found that social exclusion affects frontal lobe regions typically involved in executive control of attention. Unfortunately, MEG is not widely available and is considerably more expensive than EEG.

7.2.7 Functional Neuroimaging

The brain imaging methods that have produced the greatest scientific enthusiasm in recent times measure metabolic processes rather than electrical activity. Brain activity is associated with changes in the flow of blood as it carries oxygen and nutrients to activated brain regions. Brain imaging methods track this flow of blood to understand which areas of the brain are most active for a given task. PET, the first imaging method developed, involves tracking the brain's metabolic activity by using a relatively harmless radioactive substance that is injected into the bloodstream. A PET scanner detects this radiation as blood travels through the brain and therefore can be used to map out brain activity in real time in three-dimensional space. The resulting image identifies the neural structures engaged in specific cognitive tasks. PET has at least one major

disadvantage. The use of radioactive substances places an inherent limitation on the number of trials that can be used, and accordingly tends to have low power. Moreover, it can take a long time to image the entire brain and so trials themselves need to last for an extended period. For reasons of safety as well as the ability to use many more trials, most current brain imaging is conducted using fMRI, to which we now turn. Similar to PET, fMRI measures brain activity by tracking metabolism associated with blood flow, but it does so noninvasively (that is, nothing is injected into the bloodstream). Thus, a single fMRI study can contain hundreds of trials, thereby greatly enhancing the power of the study. fMRI does not measure blood flow directly. Rather, it employs a strong magnetic field to assess changes in the blood–oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) response at particular cortical sites after they have become active, which is an indirect measure of blood flow. Specifically, the BOLD signal is derived from the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood at cortical locations throughout the brain.

7.2.8 Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)

It is commonly known that functional neuroimaging data only "suggest" brain regions that may be engaged during a given behavior; correlations between behavior and localized brain activity cannot establish a causal brain–behavior linkage. One way to address such a hypothesis would be to conduct a lesion study in which specific brain regions were damaged while leaving other areas relatively intact. Ethics committees, however, tend not to encourage lesioning our undergraduate research participants. Fortunately, TMS allows reversible experimental disruption of neural activity in relatively circumscribed cortical regions while individuals engage in a cognitive task (Jahanshahi & Rothwell, ; Walsh & Cowey, ; Wig, Graft on, Demos, & Kelley,).

During TMS, a powerful electrical current flows through a wire coil that is placed on the scalp over the area to be stimulated. As electrical current flows through the coil, a powerful magnetic field is produced that interferes with neural functions in specific regions of the brain. If multiple pulses of TMS are given over an extended time (known as repeated TMS), the disruption can carry over beyond the period of direct stimulation. Recent studies using TMS to create a virtual lesion in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) have demonstrated interference in the perception of eye gaze direction (Pourtois et al.,2004), reduced accuracy in detecting biological motion from point light displays (Grossman, Battelli, & Pascual-Leone,2005), and interference with processing facial expressions indicating anger (Harmer, Th ilo, Rothwell, & Goodwin,2001).

7.2.9 Conceptual Concerns for Using Imaging Methods

In spite of the enthusiastic adoption of the methods of neuroscience to study social psychological constructs, there remain important conceptual issues regarding this approach (see Vul et al.,). Space limits preclude a full discussion of such concerns, but we provide a few examples. Perhaps the most central issue is that scientists do not yet fully understand the specific

neural basis of brain imaging signals. Although several explanations have been proposed for the BOLD response, the precise mechanism remains unspecified at the neuronal level. Another problem we discussed earlier is that most imaging methods are necessarily correlational and therefore prone to all the inherent limitations of correlational methods. The advent of tools such as TMS may make it possible to examine causality, but TMS is limited to cortical areas near the skull and therefore will not be useful for many mental processes that involve deeper structures.

Assessing patients who have brain injury can provide complementary evidence for the causal involvement of a brain region for a given psychological function. The final conceptual issue we note is the difficulty in localizing specific psychological functions to discrete brain regions. There have now been several thousand imaging studies of a variety of psychological functions. What is clear is that there is no one-to-one mapping between brain region and psychological function. Indeed, some brain regions are activated across numerous cognitive and social tasks (Mitchell, ; Ochsner, 2007). Thus, when a researcher finds a particular activation in an imaging study it is not always obvious what that activation indicates. Although the literature contains sufficient evidence that there is specialization of brain function, it can be challenging to determine the specific function associated with a particular activation (Lieberman,). An area may be activated across a broad array of disparate cognitive tasks because those different tasks share some common psychological process (i.e., semantic processing, memory, selecting among competing stimuli).

In these cases, the activation may have little to do with the research question of greatest interest to the investigator. As in all areas of science, the value of any imaging study depends on the care with which the experimental tasks are designed. In the ideal world appropriate comparisons conditions are used that differ from the experimental conditions in as few dimensions as possible. Moreover, researchers have to be vigilant to the possibility that their manipulations may be confounded with other psychological processes

Building a Social Brain

The overarching assumption is that the brain evolved over millions of years as an organ that solves adaptive problems, which for humans are frequently social in nature. Early human ancestors needed to recognize faces of friends and foe, identify potential mates and evaluate them in terms of desirability, understand the nature of group relations, and so on. Importantly, humans have evolved a fundamental need to belong which encourages behavior that helps people be good group members (Bowlby, ; Baumeister & Leary,). Effective groups shared food, provided mates, and helped care for offspring. As such, human survival has long depended on living within groups; banishment from the group was effectively a death sentence.

Baumeister and Leary (1995) argued that the need to belong is a basic motive that activates behavior and influences cognition and emotion, and that it leads to ill effects when not satisfied. Indeed, even today not belonging to a group increases a person's risk for a number of adverse

consequences, such as illnesses and premature death (Cacioppo et al.,2006). Initial findings using neuroimaging have shown that unique neural regions are associated with processing social information as compared to general semantic knowledge. For instance, Mitchell, Heatherton, and Macrae (2002) showed that when participants make semantic judgments about words that could either describe a person (e.g., assertive, fickle) or an object such as fruit (e.g., sundried, seedless), various brain regions, particularly the medial prefrontal cortex, were uniquely associated with person judgments. Similarly, Mason, Banfi eld, and Macrae (2004) found that when participants made judgments about whether an action (e.g., running, sitting, or biting) could be performed by a person or a dog, the medial prefrontal cortex was once again associated with judgments only about people. Thus, the brain seems to treat other humans as a special class of stimuli (Norris et al.,2004). Here we examine the implications of that notion.

The Building Blocks of the Social Brain

Converging evidence suggests that the human brain comes hard-wired to find other humans interesting. Within hours of life, newborns attend more to faces than any other objects, listen longer to human voices than other sounds, and gaze longer at upright versus upside down displays of biological motion (Goren, Sarty, & Wu,1975 ; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; Simion, Regolin, & Bulf,2008 ; Vouloumanos & Werker,2007). Because babies lack knowledge about the world, this initial interest in other beings is likely driven by simple, perceptual cues. Indeed, two dots and a line are enough to grab an infant's attention, but only if those shapes are presented in the configuration of a face: two dots for eyes and a line for the nose (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975). However primitive, having an innate set of "life detectors" affords two important benefits. First, it increases the chance of survival by ensuring that infants detect those who are likely to feed, protect, or eat them. The second, perhaps less obvious, benefit is that cleaving the world into animate and inanimate halves establishes the foundation on which social thought is built (Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin,2007).

The layering of social understanding on a framework of animacy is demonstrated across child development. By months of age, infants infer goal directedness in a moving human hand but not a moving rod (Woodward, 1998) and by months they attribute intentions to human actors but not machines (Meltzoff , 1995). Thus, early thoughts, feelings, and actions are imputed only to the subset of the world that can think, feel, and act in return. In this way, the initial step of detecting life conserves precious cognitive energy—a finite resource that people are loath to expend (Fiske & Taylor,1991). Detecting animacy avoids such effort-wasting missteps as greeting doors or wondering why the lamp is such a poor conversationalist. Evidence from neuroscience suggests that these "life detectors" are housed in two regions of the temporal lobe: the ventral temporal cortex for the detection of human form (faces, bodies) and the lateral temporal cortex for the detection of human dynamics (sound, motion).

Detecting Faces

Faces pack a wealth of information into a relatively small space: they identify people and can be evaluated along many dimensions including attractiveness, maturity, and trustworthiness. Consistent with its usefulness, expertise in facial recognition develops early and appears to hold a privileged status in the human brain. Indeed, one of the most robust findings in social neuroscience is that viewing faces activates a particular section of cortex more than any other kind of stimuli including nonface objects, scrambled faces, and inverted faces (Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Maisog, & Haxby, 1997; Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun,1997 ; McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997). This region is located bilaterally (one per hemisphere) on the underside of the human brain and is dubbed the fusiform face area (FFA) given its heightened response to faces. Lesions to the FFA can create prosopagnosia: the selective inability to recognize the identity of faces (Duchaine & Nakayama, ; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1998).

However, despite difficulties in recognizing even highly familiar faces consciously, prosopagnosic patients can identify people by voice and show a heightened emotional response (skin conductance) to familiar others indicating an unconscious level of recognition (von Kriegstein, Kleinschmidt, & Giraud, 2006). Thus, even when conscious facial recognition fails, other brain regions aid the all-important task of identifying people in the environment. The structural properties of a face provide not only the identity of a person but also the raw material for attraction. Regardless of whether a book should be judged by its cover, research suggests that people cannot help but do just that. In one study, subjects were asked to report the identity of various faces while lying in an fMRI scanner. Although subjects were not judging attractiveness at the time, hemodynamic activity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) correlated with subjects' later ratings of the attractiveness of those faces. OFC, a region associated with the evaluation of reward, was activated more by faces later deemed attractive relative to faces deemed unattractive (O'Doherty et al., 2003).

As might be predicted, sexual preference modulates this activity: male faces evoked a greater response in this region for homosexual men and heterosexual women while female faces evoked a greater response for heterosexual men and homosexual women (Kranz & Ishai,2006). However, the magnitude of OFC activity to attractive faces may not be equivalent across genders. In a recent study, the OFC of male viewers was activated more by attractive females than vice versa, supporting the hypothesis that heterosexual males find attractive, opposite-sex faces more rewarding than do their female counterparts. However, other reward regions such as the nucleus accumbens were activated in response to attractive faces similarly across genders (Cloutier et al.,2008).

Recently, other face-sensitive regions of the cortex have been identified that may work in tandem with the FFA to support other percepts and inferences based on the invariant features of a face (e.g., gender—Kriegeskorte, Formisano, Sorger & Goebel, ; trustworthiness—Oosterhof

& Todorov,). However, the face is more than a collection of features; it also provides a canvas for facial expressions that convey transitory emotional and mental states.

Decoding Expressions

Faces A person's facial expressions telegraph intentions and emotions. These expressions can last several seconds (imagine winning the lottery or finding out that your new roommate keeps ferrets), but the majority are subtle and fleeting. Indeed, the most telling expressions are often very brief: a sneer, a glimmer of recognition, or a flicker of raised eyebrows can announce our true feelings in an instant (Ekman, 1992). Social intelligence requires a sensitive and rapid system to decode these social cues. Neuroimaging studies using high temporal resolution ERP have found that some neural responses to emotional facial expressions are so rapid (< ms) that they may be processed even before achieving conscious awareness. Consistent with evolutionary pressures, this rapid system appears to be especially geared to detect expressions of threat (e.g., the large eye-whites of fearful faces—Whalen et al.,2004).

At a slower timescale, decoding expressions may also rely on the ability to simulate another's emotional state (Damasio, 1994). Somatosensory cortices associated with having cutaneous, kinesthetic, and visceral sensations appear to be active during emotion recognition. Damage to this region has been associated with impaired touch sensation and impaired recognition for multiple emotions (Adolphs et al.,2000). Furthermore, the insular cortex associated with the perception of taste is recruited during the recognition of facial expressions of disgust (Phillips et al.,1997). Patients with reduced activity in somatosensory regions have difficulty accessing their own bodily state and exhibit flat affect. This overlap is consistent with the idea that emotion recognition may depend in part on activating circuits involved in learning our own emotional states.

Decoding Expressions: Bodies and Voices

Faces are not the only way to determine what someone is thinking or feeling. Body language and tone of voice are also important social cues. In the past decade, many studies have converged on one region in the brain as the hub for understanding human movement: the STS (Allison et al.,2000 , Beauchamp et al.,2005 ; Grossman et al., 2002; Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini,2000). Consistent with a layering of social understanding on the detection of biological properties, the STS in adult subjects seems to be particularly tuned to human movement that expresses social meaning (Castelli, Happé, & Frith, ; Haxby et al., ; Martin & Weisberg,). Those with compromised functioning in this region (e.g., autism) are less accurate at decoding emotions compared to neutral movements (Dakin & Frith,). The same region implicated in detecting human movement is adjacent to the region supporting the detection of human voice. Several studies have shown that a region near the STS is activated by the sound of other human beings relative to similarly complex nonspeech sounds and supports the ability to understand emotional intonation (Beaucousin et al., ; von Kriegstein &

Giraud). In normal daily life, the ability to hear emotion in a person's voice is taken for granted, but losing that ability (aprosodia) can have devastating social consequences. The human brain appears to have specialized regions of cortex for the detection and understanding of human faces, movement, and voice. These regions are highly interconnected not only with each other, but as nodes within larger, interacting circuits that support the full breadth of social understanding including self-identity, ability to empathize, and regulation of our behavior in accordance with social norms.

7.2.10 Components of the Social Brain

Given the fundamental need to belong, there needs to be a social brain system that monitors for signs of social inclusion/exclusion and alters behavior to forestall rejection or resolve other social problems (see Krendl & Heatherton,). Such a system requires four components, each of which is likely to have a discrete neural signature. First, people need self-awareness—to be aware of their behavior so as to gauge it against societal or group norms. Second, people need to understand how others are reacting to their behavior so as to predict how others will respond to them. In other words they need "theory of mind" or the capacity to attribute mental states to others. This implies the need for a third mechanism, which detects threats, especially in complex situations. Finally, there needs to be a self-regulatory mechanism for resolving discrepancies between what we know about that self and what is expected of ourselves, which motivates behavior to resolve any conflict that exists. This does not mean that other psychological processes are unimportant for social functioning. Indeed, capacities such as language, memory, and vision, along with motivational and basic emotional states, are generally important for functioning within the social group.

However, they are not necessary for a person to be a good group member; the blind and deaf can contribute substantially to their groups. By contrast, people with disturbances in the primary components of self, theory of mind, threat detection, or self-regulation have fundamental and often specific impairments in social function.

7.2.11 Awareness and Knowledge about the Self

The concept of self forms the foundation for the social brain. Survival in human social groups requires people to monitor their behavior and thoughts to assess whether those thoughts and behaviors are in keeping with prevailing group (social) norms. According to Baumeister (1998), "the capacity of the human organism to be conscious of itself is a distinguishing feature and is vital to selfhood" . The topic of self may be among the most near and dear to social and personality psychologists. In social neuroscience, the study of self-reflection has provided one of the best examples of how neuroimaging might be especially useful as a tool to resolve theoretical debates when traditional behavioral methods are unable to do so. Because this is an important demonstration of the value of imaging, we present this material in considerable detail before summarizing what social neuroscience has learned about the brain mechanisms that support self-reflection.The first line of evidence in favor of the view that self is

special emerged from the pioneering work of Tim Rogers and his colleagues (1977), who showed that when trait adjectives (e.g., happy) were processed with reference to the self (e.g., "does happy describe you?"), subsequent memory performance was better than when the items were processed only for their general meaning (e.g., "does happiness mean the same as optimistic?"). This self-referential effect in memory has been demonstrated many times (Symons & Johnson,) and shows that information processed about the self is special. Indeed, even people who can remember very little can often remember information that is self-relevant.

Rogers proposed that the self is a unique cognitive structure that possesses special mnemonic abilities, leading to the enhanced memorability of material processed in relation to self. Other researchers argued that self plays no special or unique role in cognition, but that the memory enhancement that accompanies self-referential processing can be interpreted as a standard depth-of-processing effect (Greenwald & Banaji, ; Klein & Kihlstrom,). The wealth of personal information that resides in memory encourages the elaborative encoding of material that is processed in relation to self. In turn, this elaborative encoding enhances the memorability of self-relevant information. From this perspective, the self is quite ordinary; it just elicits greater elaboration during encoding.

Neuroimaging techniques are ideally suited for resolving debates for which competing theories make identical behavior predictions. An initial attempt to examine the neural substrates of the self-reference effect used PET. Unfortunately, as discussed, there is a limit to the number of trials that can be presented using PET, and the researchers did not obtain a statistically significant self-reference effect (Craik et al., 1999). Nonetheless, their results were intriguing in that during self-reference processing trials, they did find distinct activations in frontal regions, notably the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and areas of the right prefrontal cortex. Observing the power limitation of PET, Kelley and colleagues used event-related fMRI in an attempt to identify the neural signature of self-referential mental activity (Kelley et al.,2002). In a standard self-reference paradigm, participants judged trait adjectives in one of three ways: self ("does the trait describe you?), other ("does the trait describe George Bush?"), and case ("is the trait presented in uppercase letters"?). These judgments produced the expected significant differences in subsequent memory performance (i.e., self > other > case). More importantly, however, they enabled the researchers to test the competing explanations that have been offered for the self-reference effect in memory. Previous functional imaging studies have identified multiple regions within the left frontal cortex that are responsive to elaborate semantic encoding .Thus, if the self reference effect simply reflects the operation of such a process, one would expect to observe elevated levels of activation in these left frontal areas when traits are judged in relation to self. If, however, the effect results from the properties of a unique cognitive self, we might expect self-referential mental activity to engage brain regions that are distinct from those involved in general semantic processing. The left inferior frontal region, notable for its involvement in semantic processing tasks, did not discriminate between self and other trials.

Instead, Kelley et al. (2002) observed selective activity in areas of the prefrontal cortex, notably the MPFC, suggesting that this region might be involved in the self-referential memory effect. In a later study, Macrae and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that activity in MPFC could predict whether a person would subsequently remember terms encoded with reference to self, providing more compelling evidence of a link between the activity in MPFC and self-memory processes.

Since these early studies, social neuroscience has made excellent strides in identifying brain regions that are involved in processing information about the self (Krendl & Heatherton,2009 ; Lieberman,2009). Both neuroimaging and neurological patients have implicated ventral regions of the MPFC as contributing importantly to conceptual aspects of selfhood (along with a consistent collection of other brain structures along the cortical midline; see Northoff et al.,2006). Although the cognitive aspects of selfrefl reflection involve MPFC, the emotional consequences of those responses (i.e., whether the response indicates positive or negative things about the rater) appear to be coded in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex, which is just adjacent to MPFC (Moran et al.,). The issue of whether the self is somehow "special" remains somewhat contentious (Gillihan & Farah,), but the imaging literature is quite clear regarding tasks that involve self-awareness: they activate MPFC in imaging studies (Gusnard,).

The extent to which we include others in our self-concept has been a topic of particular interest for social psychologists. Theories of intimacy and personal relationships might suggest that the self-reference effect is affected by the closeness of a relationship with the other used as a target. Indeed, Aron and colleagues define closeness as the extension of self into other and suggest that our cognitive processes about a close other develop to include that person as part of the self (Aron & Aron,1996 ; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson,1991 ; Aron & Fraley,1999). Neuroimaging provides an interesting context for examining this question. The available studies provide mixed evidence regarding overlap in making trait judgments for self and others, with some studies finding overlapping patterns of activation in MPFC and others finding MPFC activity only for self and not for a highly familiar other (Heatherton et al.,2006). It is possible that methodological issues may account for this discrepancy, as the studies used different targets and different types of imaging designs.

Fellows and Farah (2007) reported that when asked to indicate their attitudes toward various stimuli, patients with MPFC lesions show unusually large discrepancies between testing sessions, suggesting that damage to this region leads either to failures to retrieve knowledge of our attitudes or instability in otherwise stable aspects of selfhood. It is important to be clear that there is no specific "self " spot of the brain, no single brain region that is responsible for all psychological processes related to self. Rather, psychological processes are distributed throughout the brain, with contributions from multiple subcomponents determining discrete mental activities that come together to give rise to the human sense of self (Turk, Heatherton, Macrae, Kelley, & Gazzaniga, 2003).

Various cognitive, sensory, motor, somatosensory, and affective processes are essential to self, and these processes likely reflect the contribution of several cortical and subcortical regions. Indeed, some have argued that the most important psychological processes that produce activation of MPFC involve inferential processing, whether about the self or anything else (Legrand & Ruby,2009). More recently, Jason Mitchell (2009) proposed that any type of social cognition that involves internally generated "fuzzy" representations that are inexact and subject to revision, such as judging attitudes about self or others, or even objects in general, activates MPFC.

7.2.12 Mentalizing and Theory of the Mind

One of the most important attributes of the social brain is the ability to infer the mental states of others to predict their actions (Amodio & Frith,2006 ; Gallagher & Frith,2003 ; Mitchell, 2006). The underlying assumption—that behavior is caused by mental states—has been called taking an "intentional stance," "theory of mind," and "mind perception" (Epley & Waytz, 2009) and is an important developmental milestone. Testing whether young children possess theory of mind usually involves telling them stories in which false beliefs must be inferred. In one well-known example, a child is shown two dolls: Sally and Ann. Sally has a basket and Ann has a box. The child watches as Sally puts a marble in the basket and leaves. While Sally is gone, "naughty" Ann takes the marble out of the basket and puts it in the box. Then Sally returns. The child is asked: "Where will Sally look for the marble?" The correct response requires understanding that Ann moved the marble unbeknownst to Sally and that Sally thus holds a false belief that the marble is still in the basket. Healthy and IQ-matched Downs syndrome children succeed at this task around the age of years (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).

Before that time, children have difficulty grasping the idea that a person can believe something decoupled from reality. It is perhaps not surprising that patients with impoverished social relationships do poorly on theory of mind tasks. Four-year-old autistic children have a failure rate of % on the Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith,). If the task involves the added difficulty of understanding what a person thinks about another person's beliefs or thoughts (i.e., second-order mental state attribution), the failure rate in autistic individuals is very high (Baron-Cohen,). Although autistic individuals may develop strategies using non mentalistic representations to pass some of these tests, difficulty inferring another's thoughts is an enduring and debilitating indicator of autism. Research with patients and healthy adults has converged on three brain areas that are consistently modulated by tasks requiring the inference of mental states: the temporal poles, the temporal parietal junction (TPJ), and the MPFC.

Healthy adult volunteers recruit these areas when inferring mental states from facial expressions in photographs, attributing mental states to animations of geometric shapes, and imputing mental states to characters in stories (Frith & Frith, 1999).

7.2.13 Temporal Poles

The temporal poles are the farthest forward ends of the temporal lobes. Lesions of this region in monkeys yield grossly abnormal social behavior and result in the loss of normal emotional attachments to the monkeys' infants and peers. Damage to this region in humans also leads to severe socio emotional deficits including depression, socially inappropriate behavior, and a lack of empathy (Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat,2007)

In the intact adult brain, the temporal poles are especially active when people imagine or read about social situations. Given the connections of this area to the medial temporal lobe memory system, it has been suggested that this region evaluates incoming social information based on our past experience. In this way, the temporal poles allow people to construct and evaluate social norms. Consistent with this view, patients with TP lesions have particular difficulty predicting how people will behave in social and emotional circumstances even if they know them quite well (Frith, ; Olson, Plotzker, & Ezzyat,2007).

7.2.14 STS/TPJ

As discussed previously, numerous studies have linked the superior temporal sulcus with the perception of human movement, particularly socially meaningful human movement. The tendency to impute social meaning to motion cues was demonstrated in an early social psychological study by Fritz Heider and Mary-Ann Simmel (1944). In this seminal study, subjects spontaneously inferred intent, emotion, gender, and even personality in simple animations of interacting geometric shapes. Some researchers have speculated that there are adjacent but distinct areas within this region of cortex that support three related but dissociable functions: recognition of human movement, recognition of mental states from motion cues, and the ability to understand another's mind regardless of whether motion cues are present. The latter ability appears to be associated primarily with the most posterior region of the superior temporal sulcus, also known as the temporal parietal junction, or TPJ. This region has been implicated in mental perspective taking (Saxe & Powell, 2006) as well as physical perspective taking.

Disruption to this region produces impairments in the ability to imagine how one's body looks from another's perspective (Blanke et al.,). Thus, this region supports the ability to contemplate spatial and mental perspectives different from our own (Saxe & Kanwisher, ; Mitchell,). Medial Prefrontal Cortex The area consistently activated by mentalizing is the MPFC, although typically an area slightly higher than observed for self referential processing.

Across these seemingly disparate studies, however, a common denominator has emerged: MPFC appears to support the ability to attend to the mental states that give rise to experience, that is, to create an explicit representation of what we think or feel about X. Recent research suggests that this area is also important for taking the perspective of another person (i.e., "how would you feel if you were person X"). This suggests that being able to represent

our own subjective experience plays a central role in the ability to understand the subjective experience of others (Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, ; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae,2003 ; Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae,2008)

7.2.15.Detection of Threat

One value of having theory of mind is that it supports a third mechanism, which is threat detection, a process particularly useful in complex situations such as may be encountered in dealing with ingroup or outgroup members.

Ingroup Threats

If humans have a fundamental need to belong, then there ought to be mechanisms for detecting inclusionary status (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, ; Macdonald & Leary, 2005). Put another way, given the importance of group inclusion, humans need to be sensitive to signs that the group might exclude them. Indeed, there is evidence that people feel anxious when they face exclusion from their social groups (Baumeister & Tice, 1988). Lonely people show a pattern of activation in theory of mind regions that indicates they spontaneously reflect more when viewing distressed people than happy people (Cacioppo et al.,2008).

Social psychologists have documented the pernicious effects of interpersonal rejection threat on mood, behavior, and cognition (Smart & Leary, 2009). There have recently been a series of neuroimaging studies that have examined social rejection. Most prominent is the study by Naomi Eisenberger and her colleagues (2003) who found that the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) was responsive during a video game designed to elicit feelings of social rejection when virtual interaction partners suddenly and surprisingly stopped cooperating with the research participant.

Since this initial study, other studies have also implicated the anterior cingulate cortex, although some of them find a more ventral (lower) rather than dorsal (higher) region. Another recent study (Burklund, Eisenberger, & Lieberman,2007) found a relationship between both dACC and vACC activity and rejection sensitivity during emotional processing, albeit the vACC activity was in a region different from that reported by Somerville et al. (2006). The somewhat disparate findings of these studies indicate the need for further research to more clearly identify the neural correlates of states of social distress, especially in terms of the functional roles of dACC and vACC in processing and responding to threat cues. Similarly, Krendl, Richeson, Kelley, and Heatherton (2008) found vACC activation during a stereotype threat task. They conducted an fMRI study in which women were reminded of gender stereotypes about math ability while they were completing difficult math problems. Women showed an increase in vACC activity while performing difficult math problems after a social threat was induced (reminding them of gender stereotypes), whereas in the absence of a social threat, women instead showed heightened activation over time in regions associated with math learning, and no change in vACC activation. Not surprisingly, women who were threatened exhibited a decrease in math performance over time whereas women who were not threatened improved

in performance over time. Given the above findings, it is reasonable to conclude that the vACC is engaged in social and emotional processing.

Outgroup Threats

Not all threats, however, are related to social exclusion. Just as people naturally fear dangerous animals (i.e., poisonous snakes and spiders, tigers and wolves), they also face harm from other humans. Indeed, other group members can transmit disease, act carelessly and place bystanders at risk, waste or steal vital group resources, or poach one's mate. Similarly, people from other groups can also be dangerous when competition for scarce resources leads to intergroup violence. Hence, there is also a need for mechanisms that detect threats from people from outgroups. The most common area identified as relevant to threat from outgroup members is the amygdala (for a review, see Eberhardt,). In perhaps the first social neuroscience study that used functional neuroimaging, cognitive neuroscientist Elizabeth Phelps, social psychologist Mahzarin Banaji, and their colleagues used fMRI to study racial attitudes. They showed white college students pictures of unfamiliar black and white faces while they scanned brain activity (Phelps et al.,2000). For those subjects who score high on an implicit measure of racial bias, the unfamiliar black faces activated the amygdala, a brain structure that is involved in fear responses. Many other studies have associated amygdala activity with negative response to African-Americans (Cunningham et al.,2004 ; Phelps et al.,2000 ; Richeson et al., 2003). Wheeler and Fiske (2005) found that the types of judgments that participants make about faces affect amygdala activity. For instance, when white participants were asked to evaluate black faces, amygdala activity was observed only when the target was socially categorized (e.g., "Is this individual over years old?"), and not when participants were asked to individuate the target ("Would this individual like this vegetable?").

It is important to note that the amygdala is only one of several neural areas engaged during the evaluation of an outgroup member. Emerging research from neuroimaging has revealed that areas of the prefrontal cortex involved in cognitive control are also engaged in these tasks. affective processing in the amygdala is a hard-wired circuit that has developed over the course of evolution to protect animals from danger. However, many recent imaging studies have observed amygdala activity to stimuli of both negative and positive valence, indicating that the amygdala is not solely concerned with fear. Indeed, some have argued that the amygdala is important for drawing attention to novel stimuli that have biological relevance. Whalen (1998,2007) has argued that the amygdala is especially concerned with ambiguous stimuli that provide insufficient information to discern the nature of the threat. This may be why faces expressing fear activate the amygdala to a greater extent than do angry faces (Whalen et al., 2001).

7.2.16.Self-Regulation

A unique aspect of human behavior is the ability to regulate and control thoughts and actions, an ability commonly referred to as self-regulation.

Self Regulation allows people to make plans, choose from alternatives, focus attention on the pursuit of goals, inhibit competing thoughts, and regulate social behavior .Extensive evidence from neuroimaging and patient research demonstrates that the prefrontal cortex is imperative in successfully engaging self-regulatory processes, as befitting its label as "chief executive" of the brain (Goldberg,2001). Abundant patient and neuroimaging research has identified discrete brain regions within the prefrontal cortex that are critical for self-regulation (for review, see Banfi eld, Wyland, Macrae, Münte, & Heatherton,2004), primarily the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; involved in modulating cognitive control), the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; involved in integrating cognitive and affective information), and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; involved in conflict resolution).

The DLPFC has been associated with planning, novelty processing, choice, the control of memory and working memory, and language function . Damage to this area often results in patients' inability to inhibit certain behaviors (Pandya & Barnes,1987). Damage to the OFC, which controls our behavioral and emotional output and how we interact with others (Dolan,1999), often results in striking, and sometimes aggressive, behavioral changes (e.g., Rolls, Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). Damage to the OFC usually results in personality changes such as indifference, impaired social judgment and responsiveness, poor self-regulation, lack of impulse control, and poor judgment and insight .The ACC is essential for initiating actions, evaluating conflicts, and inhibiting prepotent responses, processes heavily involved in self-regulation (Kerns et al., 2004). The ACC is functionally dissociated into the dorsal (higher) ACC that evaluates cognitive conflict and the ventral (lower) ACC that evaluates emotional conflict (Bush, Luu, & Posner,2000). Recall that the ventral ACC is active during social evaluation and rejection. The ACC is often engaged whenever any kind of "supervisory input" is required (Badgaiyan & Posner,1998). In fact, it is widely accepted that the ACC is somehow involved in evaluating the degree and nature of conflict, whereas other parts of the brain (particularly the PFC) may be involved in resolving the conflict itself (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, ; Cohen, Botvinick, & Carter, ; Kerns et al., 2004).

Emerging neuroimaging research has sought to identify more clearly the neural structures in self-regulation by examining the structures engaged in emotion and cognitive regulation. More specifically, the ACC plays an important role in suppressing unwanted thoughts (Mitchell et al., 2007), such that it is transiently engaged following the occurrence of unwanted thoughts, whereas the dorsolateral PFC is most active during efforts to suppress those thoughts. This finding is in keeping with the important role of prefrontal regions in executive functions more generally, all of which are necessary for successful self regulation (Miller & Cohen,2001), and it also supports Wegner's (1994) model of ironic mental control. Since the case of Phineas Gage, we have known that damage to certain prefrontal regions is associated with a lack of impulse control and self-regulatory difficulties more generally. The role of lateral PFC regions in regulating social

emotions appears to be among the most robust findings in social neuroscience.

7.3 FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY : PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS BIAS

The term 'attractiveness bias' refers to the influence of attractiveness on individuals' evaluations of others. Specifically, physically attractive people are perceived as having more socially desirable personality traits compared to physically unattractive individuals (Dion, Berscheid & Walster, 1972). Many studies have examined the role that attractiveness plays in social judgment and found in almost every context, that attractive people are perceived more favorably than unattractive people (Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo, 1991; Langlois, Kalakanis, Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam, & Smoot, 2000). For instance, attractive individuals are typically regarded as more humorous, amiable, intelligent, helpful, and socially skilled than less attractive individuals (Feingold, 1992; Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976).

Dion et alia (1972) termed this phenomenon the 'what is beautiful is good stereotype'. As such, attractiveness bias may have many implications for social and political decisions. Of concern is whether attractiveness-bias might influence decisions with serious implications, such as in the legal system. One of the most widely studied extralegal variables is the defendant's physical attractiveness (Willis & Todorov, 2006), and research literature suggests that physically unattractive defendants are generally at a disadvantage, in both the likelihood of being convicted guilty, and the severity of the recommended sentence. It is suggested that this is due to 'dangerous decisions theory' (DDT). That is, a defendant's untrustworthiness or dangerousness is assessed almost immediately upon first seeing a defendant's face (Willis & Todorov, 2006; Porter, ten Brinke, & Gustaw, 2010). Those perceived as untrustworthy or dangerous in initial judgments are more likely to be found guilty by a judge or jury, and to be given longer sentences (Porter et alia, 2010).

Related to these issues, "baby-faced" individuals, or those with small noses, large eyes, a small chin, and a round face are perceived to be weaker and more affectionate than mature-faced individuals (Zebrowitz & Montepare, 2008). These positive social characteristics associated with having a baby-face reduce a defendant's likelihood of being found guilty, and reduce sentence length compared to those with more "mature" faces (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988). There is even research suggesting that benefits accruing to the physically attractive (i.e., advantages in the employment arena) may be somewhat protective against criminal engagement. An association between unattractiveness and increased criminality was found for men and women, although this effect was more pronounced for women (Cavior, Hayes, & Cavior, 1974; Cavior & Howard, 1973). This could in turn supplement the stereotype 'what is beautiful is good'.

It is important to note however, that there have been a small number of conflicting findings in which contextual factors appear to produce contrary results. Termed the 'beauty is beastly' effect (Heilman & Stopeck, 1985), attractiveness was conversely found to disadvantage women in particular employment contexts (e.g., with same-sex evaluations for competitive positions). In courtroom situations, although attractive defendants generally seem to have an advantage, research suggests that this might only be the case for certain crimes, such as rape and robbery (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). For other crimes, including swindle (Sigall & Ostrove, 1975; Smith & Hed, 1979) and negligent homicide (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), physically attractive defendants tend to be treated more harshly, as they are perceived to have used their appearance to their advantage; they are also perceived as being capable of better judgment and thus more responsible ('reverse halo effect'; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Stereotypes related to the reverse halo effect are particularly prevalent in the portrayal of crime in the media. Historically, attractive TV criminals were portrayed either as psychopaths that prey on weak and vulnerable victims or as professionals that are shrewd, ruthless, and violent (Surrette, 1989); both types of crimes outlined in the research above. However, the rising popularity of True Crime documentaries and the expanding portrayal of criminals have come under ethical and moral debate (Bonn, 2014). To date, there is little scientific research quantifying the effects of attractive actors portraying criminals and the effects this may have on public perception retrospectively. However, the presence of an attractiveness-bias could provide psychological insight into the effects of these portrayals on public opinion. Questionnaires are an efficient means of collecting data, but have well-documented vulnerabilities related to introspection and presentation bias (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Fazio, Jackson,

Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007). This is particularly relevant in research that examines bias in socially sensitive topics (e.g., prejudice toward minority social groups) compared to research on topics such as consumer preferences and clinical phenomena (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Furthermore, extant data in attractiveness bias typically did not disaggregate data for male and female participants or examine potential gender effects. A more nuanced approach in such investigations may help to provide a more comprehensive and informative account of factors involved in attractiveness bias. Only a small number of studies have attempted to use more objective measures of participant behaviour to demonstrate implicit positive bias toward attractive versus unattractive individuals. These include studies recording reactions times on computer generated tasks such as the modified Stroop (Van Leeuwen & Macrae, 2004), the Go/No Go Association task (e.g. Buhlmann, Teachmann, & Kathmann, 2011) and the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Murphy, McCarthaigh, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014; Murphy, Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, & Kelly, 2015). The IRAP (Barnes-Holmes et alia, 2006) was developed from a modern behaviour-analytic account of language and cognition called relational frame theory (RFT; see Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), and has been used to examine attractiveness bias in other domains (Murphy et alia, 2015) as well as in

areas such as implicit self-esteem (Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009; Ritzert et alia, 2016) and sexual beliefs (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009). Support has been provided for the IRAP in terms of reliability (Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009) and validity (Barnes-Holmes, Waldron, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). The IRAP, in common with other implicit measures, has also been shown to have predictive validity toward behaviour (Dawson et alia, 2009; Vahey, Nicholson, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015).

The current study aimed to determine if participants responding on the IRAP would show pro-attractive bias, anti-unattractive bias, or both, or no bias, in the context of evaluations of guilt or innocence toward attractive versus unattractive facial photo images. Participants were required to respond under time pressure to relations presented via a computer programme, alternately affirming or denying across trial-blocks relations that were consistent or inconsistent with beauty-positive stereotyping. The study focused on facial attractiveness (photographic facial images of attractive v. unattractive individuals) because facial attractiveness is deemed of primary importance in an individual's overall attractiveness (Heilman & Stopeck, 1985; Willis & Todorov, 2006; Porter et alia, 2009). An explicit attractiveness rating scale was used to determine whether participants deemed the images as attractive or unattractive as intended.

Participant's beliefs about their own appearance were measured through the Beliefs about Appearances Scale (BAAS; Spangler, 2001) and data were examined for correlations.

Previous research has suggested that the bi-directionality of the 'beauty is good' stereotype was specific to the domain of sociability. That is, attractiveness is good and unattractiveness is bad was found in the context of sociable attributes, but not in relation to attributes such as intelligence (Griffin & Langlois, 2006). Murphy et alia (2015) found a pro-attractive bias but not an anti-unattractive bias in the context of successfulness evaluations. These differences in directionality may suggest the importance of context in stereotypes. In terms of gender influencing attractiveness bias, no significant difference was observed between data for male and female participants for the implicit (IRAP) measure. This finding is inconsistent with previous research, which found male participants showed a stronger implicit attractiveness-bias compared to females (Murphy et alia, 2014).

However, the study by Murphy et alia (2014) had a higher ratio of female to male facial images compared to the even number of male and female facial images in the current study. Previous research measuring explicit attractiveness-innocence bias has reported a stronger attractive leniency effect for participants judging the other gender (Wuensch, Castellow & Moore, 1991). Furthermore, this effect was stronger for male participants judging female defendants than female participants judging male defendants (Efran, 1974). In the current study, attractiveness bias shown for male participants in IRAP trial-type D-scores was marginally stronger, but the difference was not statistically significant.

It may be worth further investigation to determine if a larger sample of participants might show more pronounced gender differences. Although small sample size may limit the generalisability of the current results, Vahey et alia (2015) found that a sample size of 29 participants is sufficient to provide a study with a statistical power of .80 when examining the statistical significance of first-order Pearson's r correlations between clinically-focused IRAP effects and corresponding criterion variables. A limitation was that the current research did not examine the effects of gender of stimuli (i.e., facial images) for any potential interaction with gender of participants, thus the differences between same-sex and different-sex pairings could not be analyzed. Ongoing development of the IRAP program, however, suggests it may be readily adapted to assess influence of gender of target individuals This shows that females in our sample had stronger beliefs that positive feelings, self-worth, and interpersonal and work success are dependent upon their appearance (BAAS) compared to males; and also had stronger opinions about the attractiveness of those depicted in the photographs. Gender differences are relatively common in studies examining explicit opinions about body image or satisfaction (Frost & McKelvie, 2004; Grossbard, Lee, Neighbors & Larimer, 2009) or importance of physical appearance (Gentile, Grabe, Dolan-Pascoe, Wells & Matino, 2004) but our results, and those of Murphy et alia (2015) did not find similar group differences when implicit attractiveness bias was measured. Gender differences in opinions about one's own image or attractiveness might therefore be more likely than implicit opinions about others' character/behaviour based on their attractiveness.

This is supported by the fact that we found no correlations between the BAAS and the IRAP; the constructs may be too divergent to be comparable. Although the analysis of the data on the photographic stimuli confirmed that participants discriminated between pictures of "attractive" and "unattractive" facial images in accordance with the predesignated attractive and unattractive categories, it was unclear if the images functioned as expected for each participant. Future studies might consider the feasibility of selecting stimuli for the IRAP individually, based on each participant's ratings, as this may improve the extent to which the function of the stimuli could be predicted. The issue of correlations between explicit and implicit data is at times complicated, particularly with research in socially sensitive domains when presentation or introspection effects may confound explicit findings. In such cases, no stereotype may be evident in explicit data in contrast with implicit results, and no correlations may be evident between explicit and implicit data (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). If explicit data fails to show a stereotype bias but implicit measures do show such bias, presentation effects may be suspected related to the former. At times, it might be intuitively expected that results would show correlations but researchers should consider whether their implicit and explicit variables should logically be associated. As yet, it is arguable whether such correlations are necessary; this should be determined on a case-by-case-basis, as opposed to 'by default'. The results are consistent with previous research findings in the area of judgments of guilt or innocence, which have shown bias favoring attractive individuals.

7.4 SUMMARY

Over the past two decades, the integration of cognitive neuroscience and social psychology has led to new insights into the neural basis of human social cognition. In beginning to examine the neural support of social behavior, researchers have sought to identify the neural bases of cognitive processes that allow humans to tap into the minds of others. It seems likely that the methods of cognitive neuroscience will contribute to our understanding of the social brain. Here we discussed all the facets of Neuroscience. Then we studied how physical attractiveness bias influences forensic psychology. The studies related to topics also show consistency with previous research.

7.5 QUESTIONS

Write down short notes.

1. Methods of Social Neuroscience
2. Components of the Social Brain
3. Self-Regulation
4. Temporal Pole

7.6 REFERENCE

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8

CONNECTIONS TO RELATED FIELDS-II

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8.0 Objectives

8.1 Evolutionary Theory for Social Psychology : Introduction

8.1.1 A Bit of History

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8.1.5 Adaptations Are Designed to Solve Recurrent Social Problems

8.1.6 Adaptations Are Functionally Specialized and Domain Specific

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8.1.8 Coalition Formation

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8.2.1 The Self-Concept

8.2.2 Independent versus Interdependent Self-Concepts

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8.2.6 Motivation

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8.2.18 Emotions and Facial Expressions
8.2.19 Intensity of Emotional Experience
8.3 Summary
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8.0 OBJECTIVES

After reading this unit, you will be able to:

- ➢ Describe Mating
- ➢ Understand Parental Care
- ➢ Explain Self-Concept
- ➢ Elaborate Emotions and Facial Expressions

8.1 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTRODUCTION

An evolutionary perspective implies that many thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of people are caused, in part, by biological mechanisms that have been shaped by thousands of generations of evolution. From romantic relationships, friendship, and prosocial behavior to fear, aggression, and intergroup prejudice, the principles of evolutionary psychology can provide a deeper understanding of most important topics in social psychology.

8.1.1 A Bit of History

Since the time of Charles Darwin, scientists have recognized that the human body is a product of biological evolution, but not until the 1970s did scientists begin to seriously explore the possibility that biological evolution also influences human psychology and behavior. E. O. Wilson's book

Sociobiology (1975) ushered in the perspective of evolutionary psychology—an approach in which psychologists use what they know about human biological evolution to inform their understanding of the contemporary human mind. A relative newcomer on the social psychology scene, evolutionary psychology has become a major explanatory force that unites into one conceptual framework many diverse findings within the field. The initial advent of evolutionary psychology was colored by controversy. Many thought that although evolution might underlie human physical characteristics (such as opposable thumbs and upright posture), it was less obvious how evolution might provide a foundation for cognition and behavior. At the time, most traditional approaches to psychological science relied heavily on explanations involving unconstrained learning—a process that could be directly observed and manipulated. The evolutionary approach has generated many new findings and ideas, and the field's top journals have since published hundreds of social psychological studies testing evolutionarily informed hypotheses about the whole range of social psychological phenomena, from altruism to xenophobia (e.g., Griskevicius et al., ; Navarette et al., ; Schaller & Murray,).

8.1.2 What Is Evolutionary Social Psychology?

Evolutionary psychology is not limited to any particular domain of scientific inquiry. It is not a single theory or hypothesis. Rather, evolutionary psychology is an overarching meta-theoretical perspective. It comprises a set of assumptions that governs how scientists approach questions about psychological phenomena (Buss,1995 ; Ketelaar & Ellis,2000). These assumptions (e.g., that cognition is produced in part by underlying biological processes and that human biology has been shaped by a long history of evolutionary forces) are scientifically noncontroversial, and are based on a vast storehouse of knowledge within the biological sciences. The broad perspective of evolutionary psychology provides a set of conceptual tools that can be used to deduce specific mid-level theories, models, and hypotheses about social psychological phenomena. It is these theories, models, and hypotheses (not the overarching perspective of evolution) that offer specific predictions pertaining to social psychological phenomena. Rarely do evolutionary psychologists frame their specific research questions in terms of very broad considerations such as survival and reproduction. Rather, research questions tend to be framed so that they test mid-level theories that provide a more specific portrait of the influences of evolution on psychology and behavior. Tinbergen (1963) made an important distinction between historical evolutionary hypotheses (concerned with questions such as when mammalian females shifted from laying eggs to bearing live young) and functional evolutionary hypotheses (concerned with questions such as the functional implications of how males versus females invest in their offspring). Evolutionary psychology is generally concerned with the latter level of analysis (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010, in press).

Evolutionary social psychology, for example, incorporates the power of the situation, assuming that proximate triggers for action typically lie in the immediate social context. Evolutionary social psychology is also an

interactionist perspective, in recognizing that thoughts, feelings, and behavior emerge as an interactive function of variables inside the person (e.g., individual differences, specific motives) and the situation (e.g., salient contextual variables). Thus, an evolutionary perspective is not meant to replace traditional social psychological perspectives. Far from it. The perspective of evolutionary psychology supplements traditional approaches by providing a deeper explanatory framework that helps explain psychological phenomena in terms of their root causes. an evolutionary perspective rejects any simplistic "nature versus nurture" approach to the causes of social behavior. Rather, it acknowledges, and seeks to unpack, the fascinating and dynamic interactions among evolved psychological mechanisms, developmental processes, learning, and culture.

Thus, an evolutionary approach replaces both a blank slate view and a genetic determinist view with a view of the mind as a coloring book: some of the basic foundations of the human mind are predetermined, just as the lines in a coloring book are already written in. But the richness of human experience, learning, and culture is needed to color in those lines to make an actual human being (Kenrick, Nieuweboer, & Buunk,2010). People can and often do exercise control over powerful and fundamental emotional and motivational inclinations, including anger, fear, and sexual arousal. Furthermore, most psychological mechanisms reflect the operation of flexible trade-offs, determined in interaction with current environmental conditions and past learning experiences (Gangestad & Simpson, ; Kenrick, Li, & Butner,2003).

An evolutionary perspective does not discount the role of social learning. Indeed, the capacity for learning is itself based on a set of evolutionary adaptations (Moore,2004), and many specific psychological processes that are rooted in evolved mechanisms are still responsive to cultural context and social learning histories (Kurzban, Cosmides, & Tooby, ; Maner et al.,2005). Rather than being "hardwired" to respond to social situations in certain ways, the human mind evolved to be especially adept at learning those elements of the social environment that are relevant to solving evolutionarily fundamental challenges, and to respond flexibly when those elements come into play.

8.1.3 Important Assumptions and Conceptual Tools

These organisms tend to be more successful at reproducing and thus transmitting their genes to future generations. Over many generations of differential reproductive success, this process—natural selection—produces organisms possessing those characteristics that previously conferred relatively high reproductive fitness. The mind has also been shaped by the process of sexual selection, which refers to the idea that some individuals are better able to compete with members of their own sex over access to potential mating partners. In some cases, traits that are selected for because they enhance reproductive success may be neutral with respect to survival or they may even hinder survival.

8.1.4 Reproductive Fitness Is the Engine That Drives Evolution

The ultimate function of evolved psychological processes is to promote reproduction—the perpetuation of genes into subsequent generations. Although reproduction is the ultimate function of evolved psychological and behavioral processes, this does not mean that each episode of thought or behavior directly promotes reproductive success. First, not all psychological and behavioral processes reflect evolved mechanisms. Many processes, for example, can be reflected by products of evolved mechanisms. What television shows people choose to watch, the languages they speak, and whether they prefer chocolate or vanilla ice cream have not been specifically designed by evolution, although they may reflect byproducts of underlying evolved mechanisms.

Second, even processes that have been designed through evolution to serve some adaptive function do not necessarily enhance reproduction in an immediate sense. To assert that psychological mechanisms were designed by evolution to promote reproductive fitness is sometimes misunderstood to imply that all behavior is ultimately about sex. Although successful reproduction requires mating, successful reproduction involves a diverse array of other challenges including protecting yourself from predators and other forms of physical harm, avoiding contagious diseases, avoiding rejection and social exclusion, navigating status hierarchies, caring for offspring, and so on (Bugental,2000 ; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990; Kenrick, Li, & Butner,2003 ; Kenrick, Maner, Butner, Li, Becker, & Schaller,2002). Indeed, even individuals who never reproduce directly may still increase their reproductive fitness through a variety of indirect means. Reproductive fitness is not defined by the production of offspring but by the successful reproduction of genes. Actions that have implications for the survival and reproduction of close genetic relatives, therefore, have indirect implications for our own reproductive fitness (this illustrates the concept of inclusive fitness; Hamilton,). Consequently, evolutionary analyses apply not only to the small set of behaviors bearing directly on sex and mating, but to a much greater proportion of human social cognition and behavior.

8.1.5 Adaptations Are Designed to Solve Recurrent Social Problems

The physical and psychological characteristics produced through natural and sexual selection are known as adaptations. Adaptations, which are features of an organism that were selected because they enhanced the reproductive fitness of the organism's ancestors, are designed to solve specific adaptive challenges that arose consistently in ancestral environments. Like many other social species, humans must often avoid sources of harm, including harm from predators, intrasexual rivals, and members of hostile outgroups. Humans must also avoid contact with sources of disease including pathogens potentially carried by other people. To reproduce, humans must solve challenges pertaining to the formation of new romantic and sexual relationships.Like other highly social species, humans must solve problems associated with forming and maintaining lasting coalitions of allies. Because many human social structures are organized hierarchically, humans must also solve problems associated with

the attainment of social status and dominance. Each of these broad classes of problems can be divided into hierarchically linked subproblems.Most adaptations are designed to solve these types of specific subproblems.

8.1.6 Adaptations Are Functionally Specialized and Domain Specific

Traditional psychological theories presume that the mind reflects an information processor designed to encode and integrate many different forms of information according to the same basic rules, similar to a computer with a single operating system. In contrast, most evolutionary approaches presume that natural selection produces numerous relatively specialized, domain-specific psychological mechanisms, similar to the range of different software applications that can be run on a computer (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; Kenrick, Sadalla, & Keefe,1998). In fact, both viewpoints may be right. Some mental processes appear to be domain general, in the sense that they work the same way across many different domains. Humans do not have a single all-purpose "survival system" that addresses the problems of extracting nutrients from food and moving those nutrients throughout the body. Instead, humans possess functionally distinct (albeit linked) digestive, circulatory, and respiratory systems. These domain-specific systems are themselves composed of functionally distinct sub-systems designed to perform specific tasks (e.g., the digestive system's salivary glands, stomach, and intestines). Similarly, rather than having a single "social survival system" that addresses all fitness-relevant problems presented by social ecologies (problems of status attainment, coalition formation, child-rearing, and the like), an evolutionary perspective presumes that the human psyche is made up of functionally distinct (albeit linked) cognitive, emotional, and behavioral mechanisms—each designed to serve a specific set of fitness-relevant functions. Functionally specific psychological mechanisms may perform more effectively than a single all-purpose information-processing system (Cosmides & Tooby,).

Mechanisms that serve specific functions would be better equipped to deal with the huge influx of information from the environment, because they would be designed to process only a very narrow and specific portion of that information. a view of the mind as domain specific implies that psychological mechanisms that govern cognition and behavior in one social domain may be very different from those that govern cognition and behavior in other social domains (e.g., Ackerman & Kenrick, ; Kenrick, Sundie, & Kurzban, ; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2006).

8.1.7 Evolutionary Social Psychology by Domains

The bottom line of evolution by natural selection is differential reproductive success. Successful reproduction involves a diverse array of tasks—making friends, negotiating status hierarchies, forming and maintaining long-term relationships, and taking care of your children (Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, In press). Adaptationist reasoning—bolstered by cognitive, behavioral, and neurophysiological evidence (Panksepp, ; Plutchik,)—suggests that much of human behavior may be organized around a fairly limited set of fundamental motives, each linked to a

particular adaptive challenge posed by ancestral environments. Based on several recent reviews (Bugental, ; Buss, ; Fiske, ; Kenrick et al., , ; Kenrick, Neuberg, & Cialdini,), we will organize the remainder of our discussion around five key domains of social life—coalition formation, status, self-protection, mating, and parental care.

8.1.8 Coalition Formation

Humans have a fundamental need for social belonging that is rooted deeply within human evolutionary history (Baumeister & Leary,). The evolutionary literature on social affiliation has important implications for understanding cooperation, prosocial behavior, exchange, reciprocity, and the psychology of kinship. Alliances with Kin Social psychologists tend not to focus much on differences between interactions among kin versus nonkin (Daly, Salmon, & Wilson,). However, there are important differences between these kinds of relationships. Research with humans and other species, for example, suggests substantially lower thresholds for engaging in various types of cooperative behavior among individuals who are genetically related (e.g., Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, ; Burnstein et al., ; Essock-Vitale & McGuire, ; Neyer & Lang,). From the perspective of inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton,), it is easy to see why people tend to align themselves with their kin—a benefit shared with a kin member implies indirect genetic benefits to oneself, and costs exacted on the self by kin are also indirect costs to the kin member.

Kinship provides one foundation for understanding the evolution of prosocial behavior as well as variability in prosocial behavior across different circumstances. The logic of inclusive fitness provides an explanation for one form of altruism—nepotism. Evidence of nepotistic altruism is found widely across the animal kingdom (Greenberg, ; Holmes & Sherman, ; Suomi,). Compared to dizygotic twins, monozygotic (identical) twins are more cooperative in economic decision-making games (Segal & Hershberger,). In other contexts, too, people are more inclined to help genetically related kin, and this tendency is bolstered under conditions that have direct implications for the kin member's survival and reproductive fitness (Burnstein et al., ; Neyer & Lang, ; Stewart-Williams,).

Emotions may also serve as heuristic cues to kinship. Empathy likely evolved as part of a system for aiding kin in distress (Preston & de Waal, ; Maner & Gailliot,), and thus kinship may be implicitly connoted by the emotional experience of empathy— even when the empathy is elicited by nonkin (Hoffman,1981 ; Krebs,1987 ; Park et al.,2008).

8.1.9 Alliances with Nonkin

According to these theories, our ancestors would have benefited from cooperating with others to the extent that those people were likely to reciprocate. In this way, each member of a reciprocal exchange relationship reaps benefits in the long term. Indeed, whereas close kin cooperate with relatively less regard for past reciprocation, sharing between progressively less related individuals becomes more linked to a history of reciprocal sharing (e.g., Fiske, 1981; Trivers, 1971). recent evolutionary analyses of

what attributes people value most in group members highlight the universal value placed on trustworthiness (Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li,).

8.1.10 Social Exclusion and Social Anxiety

This makes sense from the standpoint that throughout much of evolutionary history, being excluded from your group led to disastrous consequences, even death. The threat of social exclusion can promote a variety of psychological changes aimed at restoring a person's level of social belonging (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, ; Maner, Miller, Schmidt, & Eckel, in press). When threatened with the possibility of social exclusion, people become highly attuned to other people in ways that might help facilitate social connections (DeWall, Maner, & Rouby, 2009; Gardner et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2000), although negative and antisocial responses to exclusion have also been observed (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2005; DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009; Leary et al., 2006).

8.1.11 Status

Like the social structures of other species, the social structures of many human societies are organized hierarchically, with some individuals enjoying higher status than others (Barkow, ; Eibl-Eibesfeldt,). Social status, a basic aspect of most social groups, refers to a person's position in a social hierarchy, such that people high in status have greater influence over others and greater access to group resources.

8.1.12 Links among Status, Dominance, and Prestige

Having high social status is associated with an array of adaptive rewards such as access to group assets, friends, mates, respect, praise, admiration, happiness, and health (Archer,1988 ; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Keltner et al.2003,). Evolutionary theories suggest that status brings reproductive success across many species: high-status individuals are better able to obtain mating partners and to provide care to offspring than low-status individuals (e.g., Ellis,1995 ; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987). Unlike people with dominance, people with prestige have influence because they are listened to and respected, not because they force others to do what they want. Deference to prestigious people is freely conferred. Notably, it is possible to have prestige without dominance (e.g., a well-respected emeritus faculty member), just as it is possible to have dominance without prestige (e.g., a nefarious and disliked dictator). Both dominance and prestige serve as routes through which people can climb to the top of a social hierarchy.

The evolutionary literature on status has also been applied to the study of leadership (Boehm, ; van Vugt,). It sometimes can be difficult to get group members to work together. Group leaders, by virtue of their leadership position, possess status and influence, can help solve this social coordination problem, and enable groups to manage fundamental challenges such as protecting themselves from rival outgroups, acquiring resources, and defusing conflicts within the group. The prevalence of leadership throughout history and across species suggests that leadership and followership can provide stable strategies for an effective group.

However, recent evolutionarily inspired work has noted that there may also be a fundamental motivational conflict between leaders and their followers (Maner & Mead, in press; van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser,2008).

8.1.13 Gender Differences in Fitness Payoffs for Status Striving

From an evolutionary perspective, males gain an additional set of benefits from striving for status. Due to their high level of parental investment, women tend to be highly selective in choosing their long-term mates, and tend to place a premium on the social status of potential long-term romantic partners (Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsenmeier ; Sadalla et al.,). High status men are able to offer their mates relatively greater protection and access to resources, both of which were useful in caring for offspring. Consequently, compared to females, males are more motivated to seek high levels of social dominance (Hill & Hurtado,) and are more likely to worry about possible loss of status relative to other group members (Daly & Wilson, ; Gutierres, Kenrick, & Partch, ; Maner, Miller, Schmidt, & Eckel,).

Eagly and Wood (1999) argued that differences in status striving may stem from the male gender role's emphasis on power and status versus the female gender role's emphasis on nurturance. They suggest that men's and women's gender roles differ across societies because of two fundamental evolved differences: men are physically larger and women carry and nurse offspring (Wood & Eagly,). Thus, they posit an interaction between an evolved mechanism and connections to related fields the development of cultural norms, which is in some ways consistent with evolutionary models of gender role norms (Kenrick, ; Kenrick, Trost, & Sundie, 2004). In positing a causal link between social roles and various gender differences in social behavior, Eagly and Wood's biosocial model provides a proximate account of gender differences (Kenrick & Li,2000).

An evolutionary perspective, however, provides a deeper level of explanation that specifies the root causes of underlying biological processes that can account for gender differences, for example, by linking men's higher levels of testosterone to their greater focus on dominance and intrasexual competition, characteristics found in males across many species (Mazur & Booth,1998). Nevertheless, the work by Eagly and Wood and others indicates an increasing tendency for social psychologists to develop theories that consider the links between evolution and the development of culture (see also Schaller et al., 2010).

8.1.14 Self-Protection

The need to protect yourself from harm is perhaps the most fundamental of human motivations. Ancestral humans frequently encountered threats from members of hostile outgroups (Baer & McEachron, 1982) and intragroup competition over status and material resources led to recurrent threats from ingroup members (Daly & Wilson,).

8.1.15 The Evolved Fear Module

Psychological processes are very sensitively tuned to evolutionarily relevant cues in the environment that can signal the presence of possible threats (Haselton & Nettle,2006). An angry facial expression, for example, often signals that a person is inclined toward aggressive behavior and may take violent physical action (Parkinson,2005). Indeed, expressions of anger are cross-culturally universal—they are recognized the world over as a sign of impending threat (Ekman & Friesen,1976 ; Ekman, 1982). Consequently, people selectively attend to angry faces and quickly and accurately detect angry-looking faces among distractor faces in a variety of visual search tasks .The effects of natural selection can be seen in the process by which people learn to associate perceptions of threat with particular types of stimuli. To the extent that particular threats have posed recurrent dangers to humans throughout evolutionary history, people may be particularly adept at learning to fear those threats.

8.1.16 Intergroup Processes

Consequently, a variety of self-protective processes are directed selectively at avoiding outgroup members. For example, self-protective goals can lead people to see anger in the faces of outgroup members, even when those faces are perceived as neutral in other contexts (Maner et al.,2005). Although people tend to remember the faces of outgroup members less well than the faces of ingroup members, that pattern is reversed when the outgroup members display an angry facial expression—angry outgroup faces are remembered particularly well, presumably because they are perceived as posing a particularly dire threat (Ackerman et al., 2006). Moreover, the presentation of one angry-looking outgroup member leads people to see subsequent outgroup members as more threatening; the same does not hold true for perceptions of ingroup members (Shapiro et al.,2009).

Some groups are perceived as posing threats to physical safety; other groups are thought to pose threats to the security of our economic resources; still other groups are presumed to threaten a group's ability to socialize its young. In each case, the specific type of perceived threat evokes a highly specific pattern of emotion (fear, anger, disgust, pity) and behavior (avoidance, ostracism, aggression). And in each case, the pattern of psychological responses maps onto forms of recurrent intergroup threats faced by humans throughout history. Vigilance toward sources of outgroup threat is exacerbated by contextual cues that, throughout history, have signaled increased vulnerability to forms of harm.

Research on racial prejudice provides another excellent illustration that evolution works via the constraints it places on learning (i.e., "nature via nurture"; Ridley,). Humans, like other primates, tend to be xenophobic (Holloway,). From an evolutionary perspective, ethnic and racial distinctions provide only one of many possible characteristics that people may use to define the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup.

8.1.17 Disease Avoidance

Although modern medical advances have dramatically reduced the likelihood that infection with pathogens will lead to death, throughout most of evolutionary history infection spelled disaster for the infected individual. As a result, humans possess a number of emotional and cognitive mechanisms designed to help avoid contact with potential sources of contagion .The emotion of disgust plays a key role in promoting adaptive avoidance of potential contagion (e.g., Rozin & Fallon,). Disgust serves as a rich source of information (cf. Schwarz & Clore,), signaling that a substance, food, or person is potentially hazardous. Disgust responses are deeply rooted in human biology and in the capacity for learning. An intriguing set of evolutionary hypotheses pertains to disease avoidance mechanisms that emerge at particular points in a woman's menstrual cycle. Fessler and colleagues have argued that although avoidance of contagion is important for both men and women, infection presents a particularly pernicious problem for women (e.g., Fessler, , ; also Fessler & Navarrete,). So that their body does not reject an unborn offspring, women's immune systems are suppressed when the likelihood of pregnancy is high. Fessler tested this hypothesis by examining disgust and avoidance of potential sources of pathogens in women across their menstrual cycle.

8.1.18 Mating

Evolutionary research on mating can be organized into two primary domains: relationship selection and relationship maintenance. Relationship selection refers to a person's choice of potential partners and the priority they place on long-term, committed relationships and short-term, casual sexual relationships. Relationship maintenance refers to processes involved in helping people protect their long-term relationships; this includes avoiding the temptation of attractive relationship alternatives and warding off intrasexual competitors.

8.1.19 Relationship Selection

Almost all human societies have some form of institutionalized long-term bonding such as marriage (Daly & Wilson,). At the same time, people often engage in short-term casual sexual relationships, with little or no intention of staying together for the long term (e.g., Marshall & Suggs,). Decisions about whether to pursue a long-term or short-term relationship depend in part on an individual's sociosexual orientation (Gangestad & Simpson, ; Simpson & Gangestad, ; Jackson & Kirkpatrick,), which refers to a person's general inclination to pursue committed long-term relationships and/or short-term sexual relationships. An orientation toward short-term mating is referred to as being sociosexually unrestricted, whereas an orientation toward long-term mating is referred to as being sociosexually restricted. There is variability in sociosexuality both among individuals (with some people being more unrestricted than others) and between the sexes. On average, men tend to be somewhat more unrestricted than women; they are relatively more inclined to pursue short-term sexual relationships and to desire sex without commitment. Women, in contrast, are relatively more

inclined to seek long-term commitment (Clark & Hatfield, ; Simpson & Gangestad,).

Evolutionary analyses also provide a basis for predicting sex differences in the types of characteristics valued in short-term and long-term partners (Li & Kenrick, ; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, & Linsenmeier,). With regard to short-term relationships, both men and women are highly attentive to the physical attractiveness of a potential partner (e.g., Maner et al., ; Maner, Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller,). Physical attractiveness can signal a number of characteristics relevant to reproductive fitness. Highly symmetrical people, for example, typically are judged to be attractive, and symmetry can signal the presence of a strong immune system and a person's overall level of genetic fitness (Gangestad & Simpson,). Mating with an attractive man should increase the likelihood that a woman will have more genetically fit offspring (Fisher; Scheib et al.,). Moreover, a man's physical attractiveness often signals his level of social dominance (e.g., via markers of testosterone; Cunningham, Barbee, & Pike,), and women tend to prioritize dominance in their male partners (Buss, a).

Characteristics such as health and youth, which are related to perceptions of female attractiveness, may signal a woman's level of fertility (Buss & Schmitt, ; Kenrick et al., ; Li et al.,). From an evolutionary perspective, men have an evolved preference for healthy, young mates because such a preference would have increased the likelihood that a male ancestor would have fathered healthy offspring and, in turn, successfully passed his genes on to subsequent generations (Kenrick & Keefe, ; Singh,). The characteristics people value in long-term mates are somewhat different than what they seek in short-term mates. When considering marriage partners, for example, there is some evidence that women tend to prefer status and access to resources somewhat more than men and men tend to prefer physical attractiveness somewhat more than women (e.g., Buss, b; Buss & Barnes, ; McGinnis, ; Sprecher, Sullivan, & Hatfield,).

One thing is clear: the debate over the existence and origin of sex differences in mating is ongoing, as researchers continue to use a variety of methods to investigate mating preferences and choices.

8.1.20 Relationship Maintenance

Although human mating arrangements vary from culture to culture, all include long-term relationships in which both the male and female contribute to the offspring's welfare (Daly & Wilson, 1983). From an evolutionary perspective, the maintenance of long-term relationships serves key social affiliation and child-rearing functions that enhance reproductive success (Buss,1999 ; Hazan & Diamond,2000). Humans, like many other sexually reproducing species, sometimes display a tendency toward polygamy and may be disinclined to maintain romantic relationships that are completely monogamous (Baresh & Lipton,2007 ; Betzig,1985). The emotion of romantic love has been conceptualized as an adaptation designed to help people maintain commitment to a long-term relationship (Frank,1988 ,2001). Feelings of romantic love reduce people's interest in alternative partners and help ensure their satisfaction and commitment to a

current partner (Gonzaga et al.2001,). Another challenge people face in maintaining a long-term relationship involves preventing their partner from being unfaithful. From an evolutionary perspective, warding off romantic rivals and preventing a partner from engaging in extra-pair relationships is a key part of ensuring your own reproductive success .Moreover, an evolutionary perspective is useful for identifying the specific types of relationship rivals that might be most appealing to your mate. As mentioned previously, people tend to seek out extra pair mates who are physically attractive. Consequently, when primed with the threat of infidelity, members of both sexes attend vigilantly to same-sex interlopers who are physically attractive (Maner, Miller, Rouby, & Gailliot,2009).

In contrast to men, women can be certain of their maternity; thus, sexual infidelity should be somewhat less disconcerting for women than for men. Women, however, have faced a different threat—having their long-term mate direct resources toward other women. As a consequence, a man's emotional infidelity may be particularly distressing because it can signal a high likelihood of diverting resources to other women and their offspring. The evolutionary approach to sex differences in jealousy has been controversial and has been criticized on both methodological and theoretical grounds.

8.1.21 Parental Care

Parental care is critical to the survival of human offspring (Geary,2000 ; Hrdy, 1999). The desire to nurture offspring, however, is not constant across all parents. Decisions about caring for any particular offspring are contingent on a variety of factors that affect the costs and benefits of parental investment (Alexander,1979 ; Daly & Wilson,1980). An evolutionary logic suggests that decisions pertaining to child nurturance depend on various factors including the perceived genetic relatedness to the parent, the ability of parental investment to be converted to reproductive success, and the opportunity costs of investing. It makes sense that mothers invest more than fathers, and that relatives on the maternal side invest more than relatives on the paternal side. In addition, because investing in other men's offspring is unwise from a reproductive standpoint, it makes sense from an evolutionary perspective that the behavior of stepparents toward stepchildren is not equal to that of biological parents toward their own children. Parental investment in male offspring may have a higher rate of both return and risk than investment in female offspring (Daly & Wilson,1988 ; Trivers & Willard, 1973). Although there is rarely a shortage of males willing to mate with a female, a male typically needs to compete against other males to gain access to mates. In addition, whereas females are physically limited to having children at a relatively slow rate across a shorter reproductive lifespan, males are not constrained by internal gestation and menopause. Rather, male reproductive success varies greatly across men, ranging from those at the bottom of a status hierarchy who have no mates to those at the top, who have been known to sire up to several hundred children (e.g., Betzig,1992 ; Daly & Wilson,1988). Because of this differential in risk and return, it may be advantageous for a family with abundant resources to invest in sons, but for resource-poor families to allocate what they have to their daughters (Trivers & Willard, 1973).

8.1.22 Evolutionary Social Psychology Today

Relative to many other approaches in psychology, evolutionary approaches are the new kid on the block. Each year, the field of evolutionary social psychology sees significant new advances in theory and method. Evolutionary psychologists are quick to point out that evolved psychological mechanisms work in conjunction with learning, and that learning occurs within a rich context of cultural information. Researchers have begun to deliver on the promise of an integrative evolutionary psychology by directly examining the interaction of evolution and culture (Tooby & Cosmides,1992). Similarly, using an evolutionary analysis, Schaller and Murray (2008) showed that basic units of personality such as sociosexual orientation, extraversion, and openness to experience vary predictably with the prevalence of pathogens in local cultural environments. New cross-cultural research is providing unique opportunities to examine the environmental and cultural contingencies that influence the here-and-now manifestation of evolved mental processes (Henrich et al.,2006 ; Marlowe et al.,2008). One source of debate in this area involves the distinction between "evoked" culture and "transmitted" culture. Evoked culture refers to the process through which ecological variables directly activate genetic mechanisms, as in the previous mating-related examples. Transmitted culture instead refers to the process through which cultural norms travel from individual to individual via learning processes (e.g., imitation, mimicry, and story-telling; e.g., Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). During ovulation (their peak period of fertility) women dress more attractively, act in flirtatious ways, and seek out men displaying cues to high genetic fitness (Haselton & Gangestad, ; Penton-Voak et al.,1999). Women at the peak of their reproductive fertility are even more likely to cheat on their current partner, as long as the man they are cheating with is more sexually attractive than their current partner (Pillsworth & Haselton, 2006). Conversely, men prefer the scent of women who are ovulating, and men who smell the scent of an ovulating woman display high levels of testosterone, a hormone that promotes sexual courtship (Miller & Maner,2010).

Other recent research is integrating social psychological theories of priming with evolutionary theories of adaptive psychological processes. Findings from these priming studies suggest that the temporary activation of important goal states promotes the engagement of adaptive psychological connections to related fields processes ultimately designed to enhance reproductive success (Ackerman et al., 2009; Griskevicius et al.2006, a,b; Maner et al.,2005,2007,).

8.2 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY FOR CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

One important set of questions that social psychologists address concerns how people make sense of their social worlds. Some psychological phenomena are manifest in more culturally variable ways than others, and it is typically not clear a priori which phenomena should be the most similar across cultures. Hence, if we are interested in assessing the universality of a particular phenomenon it is necessary to examine data from a wide array

of samples. Social psychologists do not always hypothesize about or assess the degree of universality in psychological processes, but when they do a major obstacle is the limited nature of the database. However, what is even more problematic for identifying the universality of psychological processes is that the psychological database does not just represent a narrow sample of the world's population, it often represents an unusual sample.

There have always been and continue to be many good reasons for American researchers to study the most convenient samples for them as this allows researchers to test hypotheses about the nature of psychological phenomena, understand how these phenomena relate to each other, identify underlying mechanisms, and reveal the situations in which these phenomena occur—that is, studying WEIRD samples is not a problem for most of what social psychologists have always been interested in doing. However, psychologists are often interested in generalizing far beyond their samples and in constructing universal theories.

8.2.1 The Self-Concept

Much cultural psychological research extends from research on the self-concept. This research has largely focused on distinctions between independent and interdependent self-concepts and how these different self-views manifest with respect to self-consistency and flexibility, insider and outsider phenomenological experiences, and incremental and entity theories of self.

8.2.2 Independent versus Interdependent Self-Concepts

People are not born with a particular self-concept; rather, the process of becoming a self is contingent on people interacting with and seizing meanings from their cultural environments. Because people are exposed to very different cultural experiences around the world, it follows that they will come to develop different kinds of self-concepts. Evidence for the cultural foundation of the self-concept comes from a number of sources. For example, many studies have assessed the structure of people's self-concepts by having people freely describe aspects of themselves using the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland,1954). Such cultural differences are already evident among kindergarten-aged children (Wang,2004), revealing how early cultural experiences come to shape the self-concept.

These different patterns of responses in self-descriptions suggest that there are at least two different ways in which people might conceive themselves. One way, as evident in the most common responses of Westerners, is that the self can largely derive its identity from its inner attributes– a self-contained model of self that Markus and Kitayama (1991) labeled an independent self-concept. These attributes are assumed to reflect the essence of an individual in that they are viewed as stable across situations and across the lifespan, they are perceived to be unique (in that no one else is expected to have the same configuration of attributes), they are viewed as significant for regulating behavior, and individuals feel obligated to publicly advertise themselves in ways consistent with these attributes.

A second way that people can conceptualize themselves, as was more common among the responses of those from non-Western cultures, is to view the self as largely deriving its identity from its relations with significant others; this model is termed an interdependent self concept (Markus & Kitayama,1991). With this view of self, people recognize that their behavior is contingent on their perceptions of other's thoughts, feelings, and actions, they attend to how their behaviors affect others, and they consider their relevant roles within each social context. The interdependent self is not a separate and distinct entity, but is embedded in a larger social group. Because the self-concept is central to the ways that people process and interpret much information (Markus, 1977), it is perhaps not surprising that this distinction in self-concepts (which relates to individualism–collectivism; Triandis,) has been related to a wide variety of different psychological processes. It is possible that other cultural dimensions will be found that have comparable degrees of explanatory power for making sense of cultural differences in various ways of thinking, but thus far independence and interdependence have attracted the most research interest.

8.2.3 Self-Consistency versus Flexibility

The idea that people strive to maintain a consistent self-concept has been central to many seminal theories regarding the self (e.g., Festinger,1957 ; Heider,1958 ; Swann, Wenzlaff , Krull, & Pelham, 1992); however, much of this research has targeted cultural samples in which independent self-concepts predominate. This fact matters because the independent self is viewed as a relatively bounded and autonomous entity, complete in and of itself, that is perceived to exist separately from others and the surrounding social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Because independent selves are viewed as similar connections to related fields to objects in that they are viewed as whole, unified, integrated, stable, and inviolate entities (Shweder et al.1998,), core representations of the self tend to remain largely uninfluenced by the presence of others (although situations may activate different aspects of the working self-concept; Markus & Kunda,). The independent self is experienced as relatively unchanging and constant across situations, and people are often willing to make rather costly sacrifices to preserve a semblance of self-consistency.

In contrast, for people with interdependent views of self, an individual's relationships and roles take precedence over abstracted and internalized attributes, such as attitudes, traits, and abilities. Hence, a person with an interdependent self who changes situations finds himself or herself in new roles bearing different obligations, and these should lead to different experiences of the self. Indeed, much research with participants from cultures in which interdependent selves are common reveals less evidence for a self-concept that is consistent across contexts compared with cultures in which independent selves predominate.

Self-knowledge is more readily available, and is simultaneously accessible, among East Asian participants than among Americans (Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng,2009). Whereas psychological consistency

has been linked with well-being among Westerners, the benefits of being consistent across situations are less apparent for East Asians. Suh (2002) found that whereas consistency across situations was associated with greater degrees of well-being, social skills, and being liked by others for Americans, these relations were far weaker for Koreans. Wellbeing and positive feelings about the self do not seem to be as tethered to a consistent identity for East Asians as they do for North Americans. The above studies converge in demonstrating that people from cultures characterized by interdependent views of self have weaker tendencies for self consistency than do those from cultures characterized by independent views of self.

8.2.4 Insider versus Outsider Phenomenological Experiences

Self-concepts also vary in terms of the perspective that people habitually adopt. On the one hand, people may prioritize their own perspective, thereby making sense of the world in terms of how it unfolds for them. Alternatively, people may prioritize the perspective of an audience, and attend to the world and themselves in terms of how they imagine it appears to others. Cohen, Hoshino-Browne, and Leung (2007) refer to these two perspectives as insider and outsider phenomenological experiences. In interdependent cultural contexts, in which individuals need to adjust themselves to better fit in with the ingroup, it becomes crucial to know how they are being evaluated by others. In independent cultural connections to related fields contexts, in contrast, in which people's identity rests largely on the inner attributes that they possess, there is a cultural imperative to "know oneself" and to elaborate on their unique perspective. There is much recent evidence for this cultural difference in phenomenological experiences.

8.2.5 Multicultural Selves

There are two complementary perspectives on this. One is that multicultural people have multiple self concepts that are simultaneously accessible, and their typical thoughts and responses reflect a blending of these.

The relations between interdependence and prevention motivations exist across cultural groups, so that anyone, multicultural or not, who thinks interdependent thoughts should also become more prevention oriented. Frame Switching thus is not limited to multiculturalism. Nonetheless, multiculturalism does show more extreme degrees of frame-switching than do monocultures (Gardner, Gabriel & Dean, 2004), suggesting that the knowledge networks of multicultural regarding ideas such as independence and interdependence are more clearly demarcated than they are for monoculturals. Multicultural people appear to differ from monocultural people in another way—they tend to be more creative. When people adapt to different cultural environments they need to adopt a flexible style in how they approach problems, and this has been shown to be associated with enhanced creativity on a connections to related fields number of different creative tasks (Leung, Maddux, Galinsky, & Chiu,2008 ; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). This is particularly true among those with higher levels of

identity integration (i.e., those who perceive compatibility between their two cultural identities; Cheng, Sanchez-Burks, & Lee,2008).

8.2.6 Motivation

People's motivations are influenced by their cultural experiences. A number of key motivations have been found to appear differently across cultures, including motivations for self-enhancement, approach-avoidance motivations, agency and control, motivations to fit in or to stick out, achievement motivations, and motivations for honor.

8.2.7 Motivations for Self-Enhancement and Self-Esteem

Much research has focused on people's motivation for self-enhancement, that is, a desire to view yourself positively. This research reveals that most Westerners desire to view themselves in positive terms. In contrast, however, evidence for self-enhancement motivations is less pronounced in many interdependent cultural contexts.

There are a number of alternative explanations that have been offered to account for this cultural difference. A second possibility is that East Asians will self-enhance in domains that are especially important to them. Some evidence in support of this alternative account has been found using the "Better-than-Average Effect" paradigm (e.g., Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea,2007 ,); however, studies using other methods reveal that East Asians are more self-critical for important traits than they are for less important ones. The "Better-than-Average Effect" yields different results from other self-enhancement methodologies apparently because of the difficulties that people have in considering distributed targets (such as the average person) in contrast to specific targets (such as the self or your best friend; Hamamura, Heine, & Takemoto,2007 ; Klar & Giladi,1997 ; Krizan & Suls, 2008).

A third alternative account is that East Asians are presenting themselves self-critically, but are privately evaluating themselves in a self-enhancing manner (e.g., Kurman,2003). Evidence with the IAT measure of self-esteem is largely consistent with this account (see Falk et al., 2009, for a review), although studies that employ hidden behavioral measures in anonymous situations reveal cultural differences similar to those that employ questionnaires (e.g., Heine et al.,2001 ; Heine, Takata, & Lehman,2000). Th at the IAT measure of self-esteem has thus far failed to show reliable correlations with other implicit or explicit measures of self-esteem or external criteria (Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker,2000 ; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt2005,) makes it difficult to evaluate the conflicting results from these studies.Variation in self-esteem has also been identified across historical periods. Given that independence correlates with self-esteem within cultures (e.g., Heine et al.,1999), it is possible that self-esteem has been increasing in the United States because people are living more independent lifestyles.

8.2.8 Approach and Avoidance Motivations

There are also cultural differences in approach and avoidance motivations between East Asians and Westerners. Given that both self-enhancement and approach motivations reflect concerns about obtaining positive benefits for the self, and that both self-improvement and avoidance motivations entail attending to potential costs to the self, it is possible that these motivations might share a common basis (Heine, 2005; Higgins 2008,). One account for these cultural differences is that "face" is a critical resource in East Asian cultural contexts, and because face is more easily lost than it is gained, people come to habitually attend to avoidance information (Heine,2005).

8.2.9 Agency and Control

The ways that people attend to their needs and desires are shaped by the theories that they embrace regarding where they can exert control. As previously discussed, Dweck and colleagues (e.gDweck & Leggett, 1988) discuss implicit theories that people have regarding the malleability of their selves: namely, incremental and entity theories of self. In addition, people also have implicit theories about the malleability of the world.To the extent that people have implicit theories that the world is malleable but that selves are stable, they should have experiences of control different from people who view themselves as malleable but the world as largely impervious to change (Su et al.,1999). Those who tend to see the world as malleable and their selves as stable will be more likely to maintain a sense of primary control, in which they strive to shape existing realities to fit their perceptions, goals, or wishes.

In contrast, those who are more likely to see the world as stable and their selves as malleable will be more likely to engage in secondary control strategies. When the self is perceived to be more mutable than the social world, it follows that people would be quite willing to adjust themselves to better fit in with the demands of their social worlds.

People look to explain events in the world in which they perceive the most agency to lie, and in collectivist societies this tends to be in groups. Cultural differences in agency are also evident in the ways that people make choices. People in interdependent contexts should be more concerned with the goals of their groups, and thus be more willing to adjust their behaviors (and reduce their choices) to coordinate the actions of the group toward those goals. connections to related fields One stark example of this cultural difference is that in many interdependent cultures today (and perhaps in a majority of cultures several centuries ago), critical life decisions, such as who to marry or what job to pursue, have been made by families rather than by the individuals themselves (e.g., Lee & Stone, 1980).In sum, the ways that people make choices, and express agency more generally, differ in a number of important ways across cultures.

8.2.10 Motivations to Fit in or to Stick Out

People have competing motivations to fit in with others or to stick out from a crowd. Asch (1956) famously documented a motivation to conform with

a unanimous majority in his line-comparison studies. This conformity paradigm has been replicated well over time in different countries. Motivations to fit in appear to be stronger in cultural contexts that encourage people to maintain strong relationships with others. In contrast to a motivation to conform, we can also consider people's motivations to stick out and to be unique. In general, it appears that people from independent cultural contexts have a stronger motivation for uniqueness; a desire to be viewed as distinct from others should be facilitated by evidence that you are unique.

8.2.11 Motivations for Honor

Nisbett and Cohen (1996) proposed that the southern United States has a culture of honor, that is, a culture in which people (especially men) strive to protect their reputation through aggression. In the case of the southern United States, a culture of honor emerged because herding was a key component of the South's early economy, and herders have vulnerable wealth (livestock can easily be stolen, and the sparse population of herding lands made it difficult to police). The establishment of a personal reputation for aggressive revenge for insults therefore emerged to prevent herd-rustling. Although herding is no longer the primary economic activity of most Southerners, Nisbett and Cohen argue that these cultural norms have persisted as a culture of honor represents a stable equilibrium point (Cohen, 2001).

There are a variety of different kinds of data that converge in support of this thesis. Similarly, survey data reveal that Southerners are more likely than Northerners to offer violent solutions to problems, but only if those involve a threat to an individual's or family's honor (Cohen & Nisbett,1994). Experimental evidence further reveals that when Southerners are insulted they are more likely than Northerners to be angry, show heightened cortisol and testosterone responses (these hormone levels tend to increase with aggression), and act more physically aggressive (Cohen et al., 1996). Likewise, field studies reveal that Southerners, compared with Northerners, are warmer toward someone who committed violence in connections to related fields in defense of their honor (but not for other kinds of violent acts; Cohen & Nisbett,1997).

8.2.12 Relationships

Central to the distinction between independent and interdependent self concepts is the notion that culture shapes the ways that people relate to others. This section reviews how the self-concept is related to the way that people distinguish between ingroups and outgroups, how people with more independent self-concepts tend to have more opportunities for forming new relationships and dissolving older relationships than do those with more interdependent self-concepts, and how this difference in relational mobility is associated with various aspects of people's relationships. The interdependent self, as discussed, is importantly sustained and defined by its significant relationships within the ingroup (Markus & Kitayama,1991). This suggests that an interdependent individual's ingroup relationships

represent a unique class within the universe of potential relationships that the individual might have. An interdependent self cannot be interdependent with everyone, and the self-defining nature of ingroup relationships suggests that these relationships should hold a particularly privileged position.

In contrast, the independent self is a self-contained entity that remains quite similar regardless of its interaction partners, and there are fewer consequences associated with distinguishing between ingroup and outgroup members in many situations. As such, the demarcation of ingroups from outgroups should be more salient and stable in interdependent cultural contexts. Much evidence supports this reasoning.

Relationships also vary across cultures in terms of the ease with which people can form them. Relationships among those in independent cultures are entered into, and are maintained, on a somewhat mutually voluntary basis. In such contexts, people have relatively high relational mobility (Falk et al., 2009; Yuki et al.,2008 ; also see Oishi, Lun, & Sherman,2007) and individuals can seek new relationships or dissolve unsatisfying older relationships. Importantly, a relationship must in some way benefit the independent individual or they would not devote the efforts necessary to cultivating it. Hence, people in independent contexts actively seek positive and rewarding relationships and will often not devote much effort or resources to any relationship that does not appear to be beneficial, or may allow those relationships to wither (Adams, 2005; Anderson, Adams, & Plaut,2008 ; Baumeister,2005 ; Heine, Foster, & Spina, 2009; Schug, Yuki, Horikawa, & Takemura,2009). The Western social psychological literature on relationships tends to be focused largely on the formation and dissolution of relationships, suggesting that conditional relationships have thus far been the primary focus of inquiry—indeed, there are relatively few references to less contingent relationships, such as those with kin (cf. Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides,2007).

In contrast, relationships among those from interdependent cultures are often viewed in less conditional terms. We are born into a relatively fixed interpersonal network and over the course of a lifetime an individual subsequently joins a select few interpersonal networks that remain somewhat stable over the years. There are relatively few opportunities to form new relationships or to dissolve existing ones at any given point in time, and this holds true regardless of whether the relationships are rewarding.

8.2.13 Cognition and Perception

Many psychologists assume that research from the area of cognition and perception targets the most basic and fundamental psychological processes. Given this perspective, it is interesting that cross-cultural research on cognition and perception reveals some of the clearest evidence for cultural variation. Research contrasting analytic and holistic ways of thinking reveals much cultural variation in how people attend to objects and fields, how they reason, and how they explain the behavior of others.

8.2.14 Analytic versus Holistic Thinking

Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett, 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) explored whether a variety of cognitive and perceptual tasks glossed under the labels of analytic and holistic thinking varied across cultural contexts, particularly between North American and East Asian cultures. By analytic thinking they mean a focus on objects, which are perceived as existing independently from their contexts, and are understood in terms of their underlying attributes. These attributes are further used as a basis to categorize objects, and a set of fixed abstract rules are used for predicting and explaining their movements and actions. In contrast, by holistic thinking Nisbett and colleagues are referring to an orientation to the context. This is an associative way of thinking in which people attend to the relations among objects and among the objects and the surrounding context. These relations are used to explain and predict the behavior of objects. Furthermore, in holistic thinking there is an emphasis on knowledge that is gained through experience rather than through the application of fixed abstract rules

Further evidence for a greater attention to objects can be seen in studies in which people are asked whether they have seen a focal object before in scenes in which the background has been switched. In sum, these findings converge to show that Westerners perceive the world in some importantly different ways than people from other cultural contexts.

8.2.15 Reasoning Styles

Westerners are more likely to group objects on the basis of categories and rules, whereas people from many other cultural groups are more likely to group objects based on similarity or functional relationships . In a similar vein, Norenzayan and colleagues found that the Chinese were more likely to group objects if they shared a strong family resemblance, whereas Americans were more likely to group the same objects if they could be assigned to that group on the basis of a deterministic rule (Norenzayan et al., 2002 b). These cultural differences in reasoning appear to be a product of social interdependence; even within the same linguistic and geographic regions of Turkey, farmers and fishermen, who have more socially connected lifestyles, showed more evidence for holistic reasoning on this same task (and on other related tasks) than did herders, who are more isolated (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008).

Furthermore, as previously discussed, cultures diff er with respect to how people reason about contradiction. A holistic orientation suggests that everything appears fundamentally connected and in flux, which suggests that real contradiction might not be possible. The Aristotelian law of contradiction, in which “A” cannot equal “not A” is not as compelling if “A” is connected with “not A” and if “A” and “not A” are always changing. This “naive dialecticism,” which is more common among East Asians, is associated with a greater tolerance for contradiction compared with Westerners across a variety of tasks (see Peng & Nisbett,1999).

8.2.16 Explaining the Behavior of Others

Given these cultural differences in attention and reasoning, we might expect that Westerners would be inclined to explain events by reference to properties of the person, whereas non-Westerners would be inclined to explain the same events with reference to interactions between the person and the field. A number of classic studies, which were initially conducted exclusively with Western participants, found that when asked to explain the behavior of others, people largely attend to the person's disposition to explain the behavior, even when there are compelling situational constraints available (e.g., Jones & Harris,1967). However, research in non-Western cultures often reveals a somewhat different pattern. In sum, whereas considering dispositional information over situational information tends to be found cross-culturally, this correspondence bias is attenuated in non-Western cultures (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan,1999).

8.2.17 Emotion

The relation between culture and emotional experience has attracted much research interest. Two aspects of emotions have received the most amount of study across cultures: facial expressions of emotion and people's subjective reports of their emotions, including people's reports of the intensity of their emotional experiences, emotion terms, and kinds of emotional experiences. Furthermore, the nature of positive emotional experiences, such as subjective well-being and happiness, has been extensively studied across cultures.

8.2.18 Emotions and Facial Expressions

Darwin was one of the first scientists to consider whether emotional facial expressions were universal features of the human species or were the products of cultural learning (Darwin,1872 /1865). He noted a number of similarities in the facial expressions of various primates and humans and proposed that these expressions should be shared by all humans. Ekman and colleagues, who extensively followed up on Darwin's hypothesis, conducted several studies to investigate connections to related fields whether emotional expressions are universally shared.Some other emotions, in particular, contempt, shame, embarrassment, pride, and interest, have also believed to be universally recognized (e.g., Keltner, 1995).

Although this research reveals that people are able to recognize the facial expressions of many emotions across cultures, people are more accurate in recognizing emotional expressions made by people from their own cultural background. Yuki, Maddux, and Masuda (2007) proposed that in cultures in which there were stronger cultural norms to regulate emotional expressions, such as in Japan, people would be more likely to attend to those aspects of the face that were more difficult to regulate (i.e., the eyes). In contrast, in cultures in which there are weaker norms for emotional regulation, such as in the United States, people would attend to the largest visual cues (i.e., the mouth). Indeed, studies found that independent manipulations of the mouth and eyes in facial expressions affected Japanese and Americans differently—Japanese attended more to the eyes than Americans whereas Americans attended more to the mouth than Japanese

(Yuki et al.2007,). Whereas Ekman and colleagues argued that the capacity to produce and recognize particular facial expressions is identical across cultures, cultural variation is anticipated in the form of “display rules" (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Display rules are the culturally specific rules that govern what facial expressions are appropriate in a given situation and how intensely they should be displayed. There is much evidence that cultures diff er in the degree to which emotions are expressed.

It is not always obvious whether we are presenting a universal facial expression or enacting a cultural display rule. Furthermore, as people’s facial expressions can affect their emotional experience , it is possible that cultures differ not only in their display rules, but also in their emotional experiences.

8.2.19 Intensity of Emotional Experience

Much cross-cultural research in emotions has targeted similarities and differences in the facial expressions of people. However, in East Asian cultural contexts, in which inhibition of emotional expressions is more common, people’s heart rate recovers more quickly following an angering event. This appears to be due to the fact that East Asian participants are more likely to reappraise events in a less anger-provoking way (Anderson & Linden,2006 ; Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007).

Kinds of Emotional Experiences

Independent and interdependent self-concepts provide a useful framework to make sense of cultural variation in emotional experiences. The self-concept should shape how an emotionally relevant situation is appraised. Those with interdependent selves are more concerned with maintaining a sense of interpersonal harmony, and thus should consider how events in the world impact close others as well as themselves

Cultural Variation in Subjective Well-Being and Happiness

Many factors influence the overall satisfaction that people have with their lives. Wealth as assessed by GDP positively correlates with the overall well being of a country. However, this relation is not linear; money and happiness are most closely connected at very low levels of wealth, where a little extra money can make the difference between surviving or not. People in collectivist cultures showed a higher correlation between their life satisfaction scores and being respected by others for living up to cultural norms, compared with people from individualistic cultures. Furthermore, the kinds of positive emotions that people desire also vary across cultures. In sum, cultures vary in their happiness, in part, because they appear to have quite different ideas about what happiness is and from what it is derived (Falk, Dunn, & Norenzayan,2010).

To summarize the cross-cultural research on emotions, there is much similarity across cultures with respect to facial expressions of emotions (although there is some important variability here too). In the domain of

emotional experience, in contrast, the evidence for cultural variation is more pronounced.

8.3 SUMMARY

In this chapter we have been studying Evolutionary theory for Social psychology and Cultural Psychology. Humans are a cultural species and a rich understanding of how human minds operate would be facilitated by a psychological science that is attentive to people's cultural experiences. Research in cultural psychology has grown substantially, particularly in the past two decades. Furthermore, although some psychological phenomena appear in more invariant forms across cultures than others, it is often not clear which phenomena should be expected to vary the most. psychological processes can be seen as entangled with "meaning"—and because particular meanings can vary substantially across cultural contexts, so must the psychological process (Bruner, 1990; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs,2006). A serious shortcoming of the cultural psychological database thus far is that a large portion of it is constituted by comparisons of North American and East Asian college students. Although there have been good theoretical and methodological reasons to build on the differences that have been identified between these groups, much of the world remains largely unexplored territory. In sum, studying the psychology of people from different cultures does not provide only information relevant to those other cultures. Such research also serves to identify psychological phenomena that researchers might miss if they limited their research to Western samples, and it serves as an important tool to identify mechanisms that underlie psychological processes.

8.4 QUESTIONS

Write down following Short Notes

1. Mating
2. Parental Care
3. Self-Concept
4. Emotions and Facial Expressions

8.5 REFERENCE

Baumeister, R. F. & Finkel , E. J.(2010) Advanced Social Psychology : Interpersonal Process. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

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