Positive-Psychology-English-Version-munotes

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INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY
Unit Structure
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Need for a Science of Human Strengths and Virtues
1.3 Deconstruction of Illness Ideology and Inclusion of Human Strengths
1.4 Positive Psychology: Assumptions, Goals, and Definitions
1.5 Three Pillars of Positive Psychology
1.6 References
1.1 INTRODUCTION Positive psychology has been described in many ways and with many
words, but the commonly accepted definition of the field is this:
―Positive psychology is the scientific study of wh at makes life most worth
living‖ (Peterson, 2008).
To push this brief description a bit further, positive psychology is a
scientific approach to studying human thoughts, feelings, and behavior,
with a focus on strengths instead of weaknesses, building the good in life
instead of repairing the bad, and taking the lives of average people up to
―great‖ instead of focusing solely on moving those who are struggling up
to ―normal‖
1.2 NEED FOR A SCIENCE OF HUMAN STRENGTHS AND VIRTUES While the formal discipline o f positive psychology has only existed since
2000,[1] the concepts that form the basis of it have been the subject of
empirical study since at least the 1980s,[29][30] and present in religious and
philosophical discourse for thousands of years. It has been influenced by
humanistic as well as psychodynamic approaches to treatment. Predating
the use of the term ―positive psychology‖, researchers within the field of
psychology had been focusing on topics that would now be included under
this new denomination
The term positive psychology dates back at least to 1954, when Maslow’s
first edition of Motivation and Personality was published with a final
chapter titled ―Toward a Positive Psychology.‖ In the second edition
published in 1970, he removed that chapter, saying in the preface that
―a positive psychology is at least available today though not very widely.‖ munotes.in

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2 Introduction To Positive Psychology There have been indications that psychologists since the 1950s have been
increasingly focused on the promotion of mental health rather than merely
treating mental illness. From the beginning of psychology, the field has
addressed the human experience using the ― Disease Model ,‖ specifically
studying and identifying the dysfunction of an individual.
Positive psychology grew as an important field of study wi thin psychology
in 1998 when Martin Seligman chose it as the theme for his term as
president of the American Psychological Association . In the first sentence
of his book Authentic Happiness , Seligman claimed: ―for the last half
century psychology has been consumed with a single topic only – mental
illness,‖ expanding on Maslow’s comments. He urged psychologists to
continue the earlier missions of psychology of nurturing talent and
improving normal life.
Several humanistic psychologists , most notably Abraham Maslow , Carl
Rogers , and Erich Fromm , developed theories and practices pertaining to
human happiness and flourishing. More recently, positive psychologists
have found empirical support for the humanistic theories of flourishing. In
addition, positive psyc hology has moved ahead in a variety of new
directions.
In 1984, Diener published his tripartite model of subjective well -being ,
positing ―three distinct but often related components of wellbeing:
frequent positive affect, infrequent negative affect, and co gnitive
evaluations such as life satisfaction .‖
In this model, cognitive , affective and contextual factors contribute to
subjective well -being. According to Diener and Suh, subjective well -being
is ―based on the idea that how each person thinks and feels about his or
her life is important.‖
Carol Ryff’s Six-factor Model of Psychological Well -being was initially
published in 1989, and additional testing of its factors was published in
1995. It postulates six factors which are key for well -being, namely self-
acceptance , personal growth , purpose in life , environmental
mastery, autonomy , and positive relations with others.
According to Corey Keyes , who collaborated with Carol Ryff and uses the
term flourishing as a central concept, mental well -being has three
components, namely hedonic (c.q. subjective or emotional), psychological,
and social well -being. Hedonic well -being concerns emotional aspects of
well-being, whereas psychological and social well -being, c.q. eudaimonic
well-being, concerns skills, abiliti es, and optimal functioning. This
tripartite model of mental well -being has received extensive empirical
support across cultures
1.3 DECONSTRUCTION OF ILLNESS IDEOLOGY AND INCLUSION OF HUMAN STRENGTHS munotes.in

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3 Positive Psychology The short history of clinical psychology suggests that change will not
come easily. With the founding of the first ―psychological clinic‖ in 1896
at the University of Pennsylvania, Lightner Witmer started the field of
clinical psychology (Reisman, 1991). Witmer and other early clinical
psychologists worked p rimarily with children who had learning or school
problems —not with ―patients‖ with ―mental disorders‖ (Reisman, 1991;
Routh, 2000). Thus, they were influenced more by psychometric
theory and its emphasis on careful measurement than by psyc hoanalytic
theory and its emphasis on psychopathology. Following Freud’s 1909
visit to Clark University, however, psychoanalysis and its derivatives
soon came to dominate both psychiatry and clinical psychology (Korchin,
1976).
Other develo pments encouraged clinical psychologists to devote their
attention to psychopathology and to view people through the lens of the
disease model. First, although clinical psychologists’ academic
training took place in universities, their practi tioner training primarily
occurred in psychiatric hospitals and clinics (Morrow, 1946, cited in
Routh, 2000) where they worked mostly as psycho -diagnosticians
under the direction of psychiatrists. Second, after World War II (1946), the
Veterans
Administration joined the American Psychological Association in
developing training centers and standards for clinical psychologists.
Because these early training centers The short history of clinical
psychology suggests that change will not co me easily. With the founding
of the first ―psychological clinic‖ in 1896 at the University of
Pennsylvania, Lightner Witmer started the field of clinical psychology
(Reisman, 1991). Witmer and other early clinical psychologists worked
primarily with childr en who had learning or school problems —not with
―patients‖ with ―mental disorders‖ (Reisman, 1991; Routh, 2000).
Thus, they were influenced more by psychometric theory and its
emphasis on careful measurement than by psychoanalytic theory a nd its
emphasis on psychopathology. Following Freud’s 1909 visit to
Clark University, however, psychoanalysis and its derivatives soon came
to dominate both psychiatry and clinical psychology (Korchin, 1976).
Other developments encouraged clinical psychologists to devote their
attention to psychopathology and to view people through the lens of the
disease model. First, although clinical psychologists’ academic
training took place in universities, theirpractitioner training pr imarily
occurred in psychiatric hospitals and clinics (Morrow, 1946, cited in
Routh, 2000) where they worked mostly as psycho -diagnosticians
under the direction of psychiatrists. Second, after World War II (1946), the
Veterans Administr ation joined the American Psychological Association
in developing training centers and standards for clinical psychologists.
Because these early training centers. The ancient roots of the term clinical
psychology continue to influence our thinking about th e discipline long
after these roots have been forgotten. Clinic derives from the Greek
klinike, or ―medical practice at the sickbed,‖ and psychology derives from
the Greek psyche, meaning ―soul‖ or ―mind‖ (Webster’s Seventh New munotes.in

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4 Introduction To Positive Psychology Collegiate Dictionary, 1976) . How little things have changed since the
time of Hippocrates. Although few clinical psychologists today literally
practice at the bedsides of their patients, too many of its practitioners
(―clinicians‖) and most of the public still view clinical psycholo gy as a
kind of ―medical practice‖ for people with ―sick souls‖ or ―sick minds.‖ It
is time to change clinical psychology’s view of itself and the way it is
viewed by the public. Positive psychology provides a long -overdue
opportunity for making this chang e.
How Clinical Psychology Became “Pathological”:
The short history of clinical psychology suggests, however, that any such
change will not come easily. The field began with the founding of the first
―psychological clinic‖ in 1896 at the University of Penn sylvania by
Lightner Witmer (Reisman, 1991). Witmer and the other early clinical
psychologists worked primarily with children who had learning or school
problems — not with ―patients‖ with ―mental disorders‖ (Reisman, 1991;
Routh, 2000). Thus, they were inf luenced more by psychometric theory
and its attendant emphasis on careful measurement than by psychoanalytic
theory and its emphasis on psychopathology. Following Freud’s visit to
Clark University in 1909, however, psychoanalysis and its derivatives
soon c ame to dominate not only psychiatry but also clinical psychology
(Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997; Korchin, 1976).
Several other factors encouraged clinical psychologists to devote their
attention to psychopathology and to view people through the lens of th e
disease model. First, although clinical psychologists’ academic training
took place in universities, their practitioner training occurred primarily in
psychiatric hospitals and clinics (Morrow, 1946, cited in Routh, 2000). In
these settings, clinical psy chologists worked primarily as
psychodiagnosticians under the direction of psychiatrists trained in
medicine and psychoanalysis.
Second, after World War II (1946), the Veterans Administration (VA) was
founded andsoon joined the American Psychological Assoc iation in
developing training centers and standards for clinical psychologists.
Because these early centers were located in VA hospitals, the training of
clinical psychologists continued to occur primarily in psychiatric settings.
Third, the National Insti tute of Mental Health was founded in 1947, and
―thousands of psychologists found out that they could make a living
treating mental illness‖ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi,2000, p. 6).By the
1950s, therefore, clinical psychologists had come ―to see themselves as
part of a mere subfield of the health professions‖ (Seligman &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 6). By this time, the practice of clinical
psychology was characterized by four basic assumptions about its scope
andabout the nature of psychological adjustment and maladjustment
(Barone, Maddux, & Snyder,1997). First, clinical psychology is concerned
with psychopathology —deviant, abnormal, and maladaptive behavioral
and emotional conditions. Second, psychopathology, clinical problems,
and clinical populations dif fer in kind, not just in degree, from normal
problems in living, nonclinical problems and nonclinical populations. munotes.in

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5 Positive Psychology Third, psychological disorders are analogous to biological or medical
diseases andreside somewhere inside the individual. Fourth, the clinic ian’s
task is to identify (diagnose) the disorder (disease) inside the person
(patient) and to prescribe an intervention (treatment) tha twill eliminate
(cure) the internal disorder (disease).Clinical Psychology Today: The
Illness Ideology and the DSM Once clinical psychology became
―pathologized,‖ there was no turning back. Albee (2000) suggests that ―the
uncritical acceptance of the medical model, the organic explanation of
mental disorders, with psychiatric hegemony, medical concepts, and
language‖ (p. 2 47), was the ―fatal flaw‖ of the standards for clinical
psychology training that were established at the 1950 Boulder Conference.
He argues that this fatal flaw ―has distorted and damaged the development
of clinical psychology ever since‖ (p. 247). Indeed, things have changed
little since 1950. These basic assumptions about clinical psychology and
psychological health described previously continue to serve as implicit
guides to clinical psychologists’ activities. In addition, the language of
clinical psycho logy remains the language of medicine and pathology —
what may be called the language of the illness ideology. Terms such as
symptom, disorder, pathology, illness, diagnosis, treatment, doctor,
patient, clinic, clinical, and clinician are all consistent with the four
assumptions noted previously.
These terms emphasize abnormality over normality, maladjustment over
adjustment, and sickness over health. They promote the dichotomy
between normal and abnormal behaviors, clinical and nonclinical
problems, and cli nical and nonclinical populations. They situate the locus
of human adjustment and maladjustment inside the person rather than in
the person’s interactions with the environment or in sociocultural values
and sociocultural forces such as prejudice and oppres sion. Finally, these
terms portray the people who are seeking help as passive victims of
intrapsychic and biological forces beyond their direct control who
therefore should be the passive recipients of an expert’s ―care and cure.‖
This illness ideology and its medicalizing and pathologizing language are
inconsistent with positive psychology’s view that ―psychology is not just a
branch of medicine concerned with illness or health; it is much larger. It is
about work, education, insight, love, growth, and pla y‖
This pathology -oriented and medically oriented clinical psychology has
outlived its usefulness. Decades ago the field of medicine began to shift its
emphasis from the treatment of illness to the prevention of illness and later
from the prevention of ill ness to the enhancement of health (Snyder,
Feldman, Taylor, Schroeder, & Adams, 2000). Health psychologists
acknowledged this shift over two decades ago (e.g., Stone, Cohen, &
Adler, 1979) and have been influential ever since in facilitating it. Clinical
psychology needs to make a similar shift, or it will soon find itself
struggling for identity and purpose, much as psychiatry has for the last two
or three decades (Wilson, 1993). The way to modernize is not to move
even closer to pathology -focused psychiat ry but to move closer to
mainstream psychology, with its focus on understanding human behavior
in the broader sense, and to join the positive psychology movement to
build a more positive clinical psychology. Clinical psychologists always munotes.in

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6 Introduction To Positive Psychology have been ―more he avily invested in intricate theories of failure than in
theories of success‖ (Bandura, 1998, p. 3).
They need to acknowledge that ―much of the best work that they already
do in the counseling room is to amplify strengths rather than repair the
weaknesses of their clients‖ (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).
Building a more positive clinical psychology will be impossible without
abandoning the language of the illness ideology and adopting a language
from positive psychology that offers a new way of thinkin g about human
behavior. In this new language, ineffective patterns of behaviors,
cognitions, and emotions are problems in living, not disorders or diseases.
These problems in living are located not inside individuals but in the
interactions between the ind ividual and other people, including the culture
at large.
People seeking assistance in enhancing the quality of their lives are clients
or students, not patients. Professionals who specialize in facilitating
psychological health are teachers, counselors, consultants, coaches, or
even social activists, not clinicians or doctors. Strategies and techniques
for enhancing the quality of lives are educational, relational, social, and
political interventions, not medical treatments. Finally, the facilities to
which people will go for assistance with problems in living are centers,
schools, or resorts, not clinics or hospitals. Such assistance might even
take place in community centers, public and private schools, churches, and
people’s homes rather than in special ized facilities.
The Social Deconstruction of the DSM:
As with all icons, powerful sociocultural, political, professional, and
economic forces built the illness ideology and the DSM and continue to
sustain them. Thus, to begin this iconoclasm, we must real ize that our
conceptions of psychological normality and abnormality, along with our
specific diagnostic labels and categories, are not facts about people but
social constructions — abstract concepts that were developed
collaboratively by the members of soci ety (individuals and institutions)
over time and that represent a shared view of the world. As Widiger and
Trull (1991) have said, the DSM ―is not a scientific document. . . . It is a
social document‖
The illness ideology and the conception of mental diso rder that have
guided the evolution of the DSM were constructed through the implicit
and explicit collaborations of theorists, researchers, professionals, their
clients, and the culture in which all are embedded. For this reason, ―mental
disorder‖ and the numerous diagnostic categories of the DSM were not
―discovered‖ in the same manner that an archaeologist discovers a buried
artifact or a medical researcher discovers a virus. Instead, they were
invented. By describing mental disorders as inventions, howev er, I do not
mean that they are ―myths‖ (Szasz, 1974) or that the distress of people
who are labeled as mentally disordered is not real. Instead, I mean that
these disorders do not ―exist‖ and ―have properties‖ in the same manner
that artifacts and viruses do. For these reasons, a taxonomy of mental munotes.in

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7 Positive Psychology disorders such as the DSM ―does not simply describe and classify
characteristics of groups of individuals, but . . . actively constructs a
version of both normal and abnormal . . . which is then applied to
indiv iduals who end up being classified as normal or abnormal‖ (Parker,
Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin, & Stowell -Smith, 1995, p. 93).
The illness ideology’s conception of ―mental disorder‖ and the various
specific DSM categories of mental disorders are not refl ections and
mappings of psychological facts about people. Instead, they are social
artifacts that serve the same sociocultural goals as our constructions of
race, gender, social class, and sexual orientation — that of maintaining and
expanding the power of certain individuals and institutions and
maintaining social order, as defined by those in power (Beall, 1993;
Parker et al., 1995; Rosenblum & Travis, 1996). Like these other social
constructions, our concepts of psychological normality and abnormality
are tied ultimately to social values —in particular, the values of society’s
most powerful individuals, groups, and institutions —and the contextual
rules for behavior derived from these values (Becker, 1963; Parker et al.,
1995; Rosenblum & Travis, 1996). As M cNamee and Gergen (1992) state:
―The mental health profession is not politically, morally, or valuationally
neutral. Their practices typically operate to sustain certain values, political
arrangements, and hierarchies or privilege‖ (p. 2).
Thus, the debat e over the definition of ―mental disorder,‖ the struggle over
who gets to define it, and the continual revisions of the DSM are not
searches for truth. Rather, they are debates over the definition of a set of
abstractions and struggles for the personal, po litical, and economic power
that derives from the authority to define these abstractions and thus to
determine what and whom society views as normal and abnormal. Medical
philosopher Lawrie Resnek (1987) has demonstrated that even our
definition of physica l disease ―is a normative or evaluative concept‖ (p.
211) because to call a condition a disease ―is to judge that the person with
that condition is less able to lead a good or worthwhile life‖ (p. 211). If
this is true of physical disease, it is certainly also true of psychological
―disease.‖ Because they are social constructions that serve sociocultural
goals and values, our notions of psychological normality -abnormality and
health -illness are linked to our assumptions about how people should live
their li ves and about what makes life worth living. This truth is illustrated
clearly in the American Psychiatric Association’s 1952 decision to include
homosexuality in the first edition of the DSM and its 1973 decision to
revoke homosexuality’s disease status (K utchins & Kirk, 1997; Shorter,
1997).
As stated by psychiatrist Mitchell Wilson (1993), ―The homosexuality
controversy seemed to show that psychiatric diagnoses were clearly
wrapped up in social constructions of deviance‖ (p. 404). This issue also
was in the forefront of the controversies over post -traumatic stress
disorder, paraphilic rapism, and masochistic personality disorder
(Kutchins & Kirk, 1997), as well as caffeine dependence, sexual
compulsivity, low -intensity orgasm, sibling rivalry, self -defeat ing
personality, jet lag, pathological spending, and impaired sleep -related munotes.in

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8 Introduction To Positive Psychology painful erections, all of which were proposed for inclusion in DSM -IV
(Widiger & Trull, 1991). Others have argued convincingly that
―schizophrenia‖ (Gilman, 1988), ―addiction‖ (Pee le, 1995), and
―personality disorder‖ (Alarcon, Foulks, & Vakkur, 1998) also are socially
constructed categories rather than disease entities.
1.4 POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: ASSUMPTIONS, GOALS, AND DEFINITIONS Martin Seligman & Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi define pos itive psychology
as ―the scientific study of positive human functioning and flourishing on
multiple levels that include the biological, personal, relational,
institutional, cultural, and global dimensions of life.
Sheldon and King (2001) define positive ps ychology as ―nothing more
than the scientific study of ordinary human strengths and virtues‖
Gable and Haidt (2005) defined positive psychology is ―the study of the
conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal
functioning of peopl e, groups and institutions.‖
―Positive psychology is the scientific study of what makes life most worth
living‖ (Peterson, 2008)
According to American Psychological Association (APA), Positive
Psychology is a field of psychological theory and research that focuses on
the psychological states (e.g., contentment, joy), individual traits or
character strengths (e.g., intimacy, integrity, altruism, wisdom), and social
institutions that enhance subjective well -being and make life most worth
living.
Seligman’s (2 003) three pillars of positive psychology
1. Positive subjective experiences (such as joy, happiness, contentment,
optimism, and hope)
2. Positive individual characteristics (such as personal strengths and
human virtues that promote mental health);
3. Positive social institutions and communities that contribute to
individual health and happiness.
Assumptions of Positive Psychology:
A major assumption of positive psychology is that the field of psychology
has become unbalanced. (Simonton & Baumeister, 2005).
Human goodness and excellence are as authentic as disorders and distress
and therefore deserve equal attention from mental health practitioners. Its
time to challenge the disease model (Maddux,2002)
Human beings have the potential for good and that we are motivated to
pursue a good life (Linley & Joseph,2006) munotes.in

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9 Positive Psychology he most basic assumption of positive psychology is that human goodness
and excellence are as authentic as disorders and distress and therefore
deserve equal attention from mental health practitioners. The discipline of
positive psychology is primarily focused on the promotion of the good
life. The good life refers to those factors that contribute most
predominately to a well lived life. Qualities that define the good life are
those that enrich our live s, make life worth living and foster strong
character (Compton, 2005).
Seligman (2002) defines good life as a combination of three elements:
Positive connection to others or positive subjective experience; Positive
individual traits and; Life regulation qu alities.
Positive connection refers to aspects of our behaviour that contribute to
positive connectedness to others. It is the positive subjective experiences
that includes the ability to love, forgive, and the presence of spiritual
connections, happiness and life satisfaction that combine to help and
create a sense of deeper meaning and purpose in life. Positive individual
traits may include such things as a sense of integrity, the ability to be
creative, and the presence of virtues such as courage and hum ility.
Life regulation qualities are those qualities that allow us to regulate our
day to day behaviour in such a way that we can accomplish our goals.
Some of these qualities include a sense of individuality or autonomy, a
high degree of a healthy self -control and wisdom to guide behaviour.
According to positive psychology, the good life must also include the
relationship with other people and the society as a whole (Park &
Peterson, 2008; Duckworth, Steen & Seligman, 2005).
A primary goal of what could be termed as the positive psychology
movement is to be a catalyst for change in the focus of psychology from a
preoccupation with repairing the worst things in life to also building
positive qualities (Joseph & Linley, 2006). This is especially relevant to
the therapeutic context, since positive psychologists would argue that the
role of the therapist is not to simply alleviate distress and leave the person
free from symptomatology, but also to facilitate wellbeing and fulfilment
which is not only a worthwhil e goal in its own right, it also serves as a
preventive function that buffers against future psychopathology and even
recovery from illness (Joseph & Linley, 2006).
Contributions to Happiness:
The concept of happiness is the corner stone of the assumptions of positive
psychology. Happiness is characterised by the experience of more frequent
positive affective states than negative ones as well as a perception that one
is progressing toward important life goals (Tkach & Lyubomirsky, 2006).
Identifying factors that contribute to happiness has proven to be
challenging. Interestingly though, one thing that does stand out in the
research to date is that the attainment and pursuit of pleasure may not
always lead to happiness. munotes.in

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10 Introduction To Positive Psychology Certain kinds of environmental factors or conditions have been found to
be associated with happiness and include such things as; individual
income, labour market status, health, family, social relationships, moral
values and many others (Carr, 2004; Selim, 2008; Diener, Oishi & Lucas,
2003). Ul timately, in the pursuit of understanding happiness, there are two
main theoretical perspectives which focus on addressing the question of
what makes people feel good and happy. These are the hedonic and
eudaimonic approaches to happiness (Keyes, Shmotkin, & Ryff, 2002).
Positive Psychology views happiness from both the hedonistic and
eudaimonic view in which they define happiness in terms of the pleasant
life, the good life and the meaningful life (Norrish & Vella -Brodrick,
2008). Peterson et al. identifie d three pathways to happiness from the
positive psychological view:
Pleasure is the process of maximising positive emotion and minimising
negative emotion and is referred to as the pleasant life which involves
enjoyable and positive experiences. Engagement is the process of being
immersed and absorbed in the task at hand and is referred to as the good
life which involves being actively involved in life and all that it requires
and demands. Thus the good life is considered to result from the
individual culti vating and investing their signature strengths and virtues
into their relationships, work and leisure (Seligman, 2002) thus applying
the best of self during challenging activities that results in growth and a
feeling of competence and satisfaction that bri ngs about happiness.
Meaning is the process of having a higher purpose in life than ourselves
and is referred to as the meaningful life which involves using our strengths
and personal qualities to serve this higher purpose. The meaningful life,
like the go od life, involves the individual applying their signature
strengths in activities, but the difference is that these activities are
perceived to contribute to the greater good in the meaningful life.
Ultimately, it is a combination of each of these three el ements described
above that positive psychology suggests would constitute authentic and
stable happiness
Goals of Positive Psychology:
According to Martin Seligman’s goal of positive psychology was
 To refocusing the entire field of psychology.
 To find elem ents of positive psychology represented in so many
different areas of psychology, from physiological to clinical
psychology.
 To restore balance within the discipline of Psychology which was too
much focused on negative aspects. munotes.in

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11 Positive Psychology  To catalyze a change in psyc hology from a preoccupation only with
repairing the worst things in life to also building the best qualities in
life.
 To improve understanding of positive human behaviors to balance the
negative focus of much mainstream research & theory (Sheldon &
King, 2 001).
 To develop an empirically -based conceptual understanding and
language for describing healthy human functioning that parallels our
classification and understanding of mental illness (Keyes, 2003)
 To boost present well being.
 To prevent future problems .
 To make life worthwhile.
Positive psychology is concerned with eudaimonia , a Greek word meaning
―good spirit‖. It is considered an essential element for the pursuit of
happiness and a good life. It emphasizes cherishing that which holds the
greatest valu e in life and other such factors that contribute the most to
having a good life. While not attempting a strict definition of what makes
up a good life, positive psychologists agree that one must be happy ,
engaged, and meaningful with their experiences. Martin Seligman referred
to ―the good life‖ as using your signature strengths every day to produce
authentic happiness and abundant gratification .
Positive psychology complements, without intending to replace the
traditional fields of psychology . Emphasizing the study of positive human
development, could enhance our application and understanding in other
fields. More specifically, those which are more clinical and scientific -
based. Since they may produce a limited perspective and understanding.
Positive psyc hology has also placed a significant emphasis on fostering
positive self-esteem and self-image . Although positive psychologists, with
a less humanist direction, focus less on such topics.
The basic premise of positive psychology is that human beings are o ften
driven by the future more than the past. It also suggests that any
combination of positive experiences/emotions, past or present, lead to a
pleasant, happy life. Another aspect of this may come from our views
outside of our own lives. Author of Grit, Angela Duckworth, might view
this as having a prosocial purpose, which could have a positive
psychological effect on our lives. Seligman identified other possible goals:
families and schools that allow children to grow, workplaces that aim for
satisfaction and high productivity, and teaching others about positive
psychology. Psychologist Daniel Gilbert has also written extensively on
the effects of time perception and happiness.
Those who practice positive psychology attempt psychological
interventions that foster positive attitudes toward one’s subjective
experiences, individual traits, and life events. The goal is to munotes.in

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12 Introduction To Positive Psychology minimize pathological thoughts that may arise in a hopeless mindset and
to develop a sense of optimism toward life. Positive psychologists s eek to
encourage acceptance of one’s past, excitement and optimism about one’s
future experiences, and a sense of contentment and well -being in the
present.
Related concepts are happiness , well-being , quality of life , contentment ,
and meaningful life .
 Happiness: Has been sought after and discussed throughout time.
Research has concluded that happiness can be thought of in the way
we act and how we think in relative terms to it.
 Well -Being: Has often been referred to what is inherently good for an
individu al both physically and mentally, though other aspects could
be added in to define well -being.
 Quality of life: Quality of life encompasses more than just physical
and mental well -being; it can also include socioeconomic factors.
However, there is a cultur al difference with this term, as it can be
perceived differently in different cultures and regions around the
world. In the simplest of terms, this is how well you are living and
functioning in life.[
Positive psychology has also been a subject of criticis m and accused of
advancing misleading ideas about positivity. As a result, the principles of
positive psychology are sometimes dismissed as bearing more in common
with self -help tactics than scientifically -proven theories.
However, positive psychology tech niques are now being utilized in other
traditional aspects of therapy, with confirmed results supporting its
effectiveness. The practice of well -being therapy, developed by
psychologist Giovanni Fava from the University of Bologna, focuses on
the self -observed well -being of the patient, rather than solely on their self -
reported distress.
Carol Kauffman, director of the Coaching and Positive Psychology
Initiative At Harvard University’s McLean Hospital, outlined four
techniques for integrating positive psych ology into traditional therapy
methods in the Harvard Mental Health Letter. These techniques mainly
involve reversing the focus of therapy from negative events and emotions
to more positive ones, developing a language of strength, balancing the
negative an d positive aspects of certain actions or situations, and building
strategies that foster hope, such as identifying skills to tackle a particular
problem and shifting focus to those skills.
Though the principles of positive psychology suggest that success c an be
built on personal strengths, it’s also important to work on your weaknesses
and achieve a healthy balance, so that you can attain a more fulfilled life.
1.5 THREE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY munotes.in

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13 Positive Psychology Positive Psychology has three central concerns:
1. positive experiences,
2. positive individual traits, and
3. positive institutions.
Understanding positive emotions entails the study of contentment with the
past, happiness in the present, and hope for the future. Understanding
positive individual traits i nvolves the study of strengths, such as the
capacity for love and work, courage, compassion, resilience, creativity,
curiosity, integrity, self -knowledge, moderation, self -control, and wisdom.
Understanding positive institutions entails the study of the st rengths that
foster better communities, such as justice, responsibility, civility,
parenting, nurturance, work ethic, leadership, teamwork, purpose, and
tolerance.
Positive psychology is an emerging approach developed by leading
psychologists, most notably Martin Seligman and Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi. The focus of positive psychology is on encouraging
positive and effective behaviors [1] that help to bring out desired
behaviors and applies well to many business and technical situations. Dr.
Seligman noted in his writings that there are essentially three pillars that
make up the scientific endeavor of positive psychology. The first two
relate to individual behavior and the third is the study of positive
institutions , which Seligman suggested was ―beyond the gu ild of
psychology.‖ [2]This article will focus on that third pillar, which is within
the realm of organizational psychology and of great interest to anyone
who wants to be part of an effective organization.
The first two pillars of positive psychology focu s on positive emotion and
positive character, each of which contribute to the development of a sense
of self -efficacy and personal effectiveness; these are both very important
to individual success. Organizations, not unlike the people who comprise
them, o ften have unique and complex personalities. Individuals who join
the army or the police force certainly experience the culture of the
organization in a very real way.
When people fail in their jobs, it is sometimes due to factors beyond their
direct contro l; perhaps they could not fit into the culture and the
expectations of the organization itself or the organization’s culture made
success very difficult to attain. What are the traits that we might want to
highlight when looking at an organization from a p ositive psychology
perspective?
Organizations that encourage curiosity, interest in the world, and a general
love of learning provide an environment that is consistent with what Dr.
Seligman had in mind with his first cluster, which he termed wisdom .
Techn ology professionals could understand these traits in terms of
organizations that encourage learning new technologies and frameworks
and provide opportunities for professionals to constantly improve their munotes.in

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14 Introduction To Positive Psychology skills. Judiciousness, critical thinking, and open -mindedness along with
ingenuity, originality, and practical street smarts are also attributes found
among employees in effective organizations. Social, personal, and
emotional intelligence describes organizations that encourage their
members to respectfully understand both individual and group differences,
including cultural diversity.
Organizations that encourage employees to feel safe when speaking up or
taking the initiative can be understood to exhibit valor and courage, which
is the cluster that Seligma n termed bravery. Integrity and honesty, along
with perseverance and diligence, are also grouped with these positive
traits. The degree to which these characteristics and their active expression
are valued in an organization will significantly impact that firm’s
functioning and results.
Positive organizations encourage their employees to take initiative and
ensure that employees feel safe, even when reporting a potential problem
or issue. Dysfunctional organizations punish the whistleblower, while
effectiv e organizations recognize the importance of being able to evaluate
the risks or problems that have been brought to their attention and actively
solicit such self -monitoring efforts.
The cluster of humanity and love consists of kindness, generosity, and an
intrinsic sense of justice. Organizations that encourage a genuine sense of
delivering value to customers and also the idea of giving back to their
community model these behaviors and are more likely to see employees
living these values on a daily basis. O f paramount importance is good
citizenship and teamwork as well as a strong culture of leadership. While
many organizations may have individuals who exhibit these strengths,
highly effective organizations make these values a cultural norm, which,
in turn, becomes the personality of the organization itself.
The cluster of temperance includes self -control, humility, and modesty, all
of which can be understood in terms of delivering quality to all
stakeholders, including ensuring real value to stock -holders i nstead of
simply advertising and marketing hype. Gratitude is a fundamental trait of
many successful organizations; this involves modeling positive behaviors
and actively participating in helping the communities that support them.
These are often the same organizations that have a strong sense of hope
and optimism and are mindful of the future; again all traits found in
Seligman’s view of positive psychology. Some organizations have a
culture that exhibits spirituality, faith, and even religiousness, which aligns
with their personality. Most importantly, playfulness and humor, along
with passion and enthusiasm, all make for a corporate environment that
breeds successful and loyal employees.
Over the years, many organizations have unfortunately become associa ted
with greed and dysfunctional behavior. However, the study of positive
psychology provides an effective, comprehensive, and attainable model to
understand those companies that exhibit cultures that encourage and munotes.in

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15 Positive Psychology nurture the positive behaviors that resea rch indicates leads to success and
profitability.
1.6 REFERENCES  Snyder, C. R.; & Lopez, S. J. (2002). Handbook of Positive
Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
 Snyder, C. R.; Lopez, S. J.; & Pedrotti, J. T. (2011). Positive
Psychology: The Scie ntific and Practical Explorations of Human
Strengths. New Delhi: Sage South Asia Edition.

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16
2
POSITIVE SUBJECTIVE STATES
Unit Structure
2.1 Introduction and Historical Development
2.2 Subjective Well -Being {Swb}
2.2.1 Theoretical Approaches To Swb
2.2.2 Correlates of Subjective Well -Being
2.2.3 Culture and Swb
2.3 Positive Emotions
2.3.1 Histo rical Development Of Positive Emotions
2.3.2 The Broaden -And-Build Theory Of Positive Emotions
2.4 The Flow Experience
2.5 Optimism and Hope
2.6 References
2.1 INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Subjective well -being (SWB) is defined as ‘a person’ s cognitive and
affective evaluations of his or her life’ (Diener, Lucas, & Oshi, 2002).
There are two factors of SWB – cognitive and affective. The cognitive
factor refers to one’s evaluations about his or her life satisfaction in the
specific areas of li fe such as family or work and life satisfaction as a
whole. The affective factor refers to the emotional responses to the various
life-events.
SWB comprises of three components – positive affect, negative affect and
life satisfaction. A person experiences high SWB when he experiences
positive affect, low level of negative affect and high life satisfaction.
Positive affect refers to experience of pleasant emotions, moods and
feelings (joy, pride, gratitude) Negative affect refers to experience of
unpleasant emotions (anger, disgust, fear).
Various philosophers and researchers have contributed to the
understanding and development of the concept of SWB. To begin with,
the Utilitarian focused on understanding the physical, mental and
emotional aspects of pleasu re and pain, experienced by individuals.
According to Jeremy Bentham, the essence of a good life is presence of
pleasure and absence of pain.
Flugel (1925) recorded and studied the emotional reactions of the people
to various events and categorized them. G eorge Gallup, Gerald Gurin and
Hadley Cantril initiated the use of surveys as assessment method on a munotes.in

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17 Research Methodology For Psychology large scale. After the World War II, various researchers started using
surveys with general public regarding their happiness and life satisfaction.
Norman Bradburn (1969) showed that the positive and negative affect
have different correlates, are independent and merely not just opposites of
each other; thus, implying that these two affects must be studied separately
to gain broader understanding of its impl ication on the SWB. Thus, just as
elimination of pain does not guarantee experience of pleasure similarly
reducing the experience of negative affect will not necessarily increase the
experience of positive affect.
Since the mid -1980’s, the study of SWB ha s grown rapidly and emerged
as a scientific discipline. SWB emphasizes on the individuals and their
evaluations about their life events. With the shift in trend from
collectivism to individualism, the significance of SWB has increased.
People all over the world have become concerned about their quality of
life and not merely about the ‘material’ possessions. Development of
various scientific methods has helped in development of an applied
discipline.
2.2 MEASURING SUBJECTIVE WELL -BEING {SWB} The earlier s urvey questionnaires were simplistic concerning single
question about happiness and life satisfaction of the people. The scores
obtained from these questions about the overall evaluation of people’s life
were found to be well converged (Andrew & Withey, 19 76).
Over the time, the multi -item scales were developed. These multi -item
scales had greater validity and reliability as compared to the single -item
scales. Factors like life satisfaction, pleasant affect, unpleasant affect and
self-esteem were found to b e distinct from each other by Lucas, Diener &
Suh (1996).
One important issue with the use of self -report instruments is the validity.
The use of other methods of assessment like the expert ratings based on
the interviews with participants, reporting fe elings at random moments in
day-to-day life, memories for positive and negative events of the
participants’ lives, reports obtained from family and friends and smiling
were found to converge with the self -report measures by Sandvik, Diener
& Seidlitz (1993 ).
Use of multi -method battery to assess the SWB will be more beneficial
rather than merely relying on multi -item questionnaires. Combination of
various assessment methods like that of participants’ reports and
experience sampling can supplement the inform ation obtained through the
questionnaires and can also aid in understanding how people construct
their judgments about SWB.
Schwarz & Strack (1999) concluded that people’s judgments about life
satisfaction are not fixed and that they use the latest informa tion to
construct their judgments about life satisfaction. Certain information could
be more important for some people and not so much for others. Thus, munotes.in

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18 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research different people will base their judgments depending on what information
seems important to them at tha t specific point in time. People from
individualistic cultures, are more likely to base their judgments on the
level of their self -esteem; whereas people from collectivistic cultures are
more likely to base their judgments on the opinions of the other peop le
(Diener& Diener, 1995).
People’s judgments about their life satisfaction may differ depending upon
the type of information they seek to base their judgments. Some people
may focus more on the positive/ pleasant aspects of their lives whereas
others may focus more on the negative/problematic aspects. People also
differ in terms of how much importance they assign to their emotions in
basing their life satisfaction judgments (Suh & Diener, 1999). Thus,
people’s judgments about life satisfaction depend on di fferent information
that they consider important and this information may change over the
time.
Thomas & Diener (1990) found that the judgments of life satisfaction and
happiness are influenced by their current mood, their beliefs about
happiness and how e asily they can retrieve the positive or the negative
information. Researchers have also differentiated between people
constricting the judgements about life satisfaction on the basis of
momentary thoughts and feelings or global assessment of the same.
Acco rding to Kahneman (1999), the momentary evaluations offer more
accurate judgments of SWB as they are less likely to be distorted by
biases. On the other hand, the global evaluations are also important as they
offer an insight into how an individual summari zes his or her life
experiences as a whole. Thus, these two types of evaluations - specific and
global – offer two distinct sets of information, pertaining to specific
aspects of people’s life and global judgments about their life satisfaction.
2.2.1 The oretical Approaches to SWB:
The various theories of happiness can be categorized into three groups:
i. Need and goal satisfaction theories
ii. Process or activity theories
iii. Genetic or personality theories
Need and Goal Satisfaction Theories:
The centr al idea of the need and goal satisfaction theories is that happiness
is experienced when there is elimination of pain and gratification of the
biological and psychological needs. These theories believe that the
individuals attain higher life satisfaction a s they attain their goals or needs
and move towards their ideal state. Omodei & Wearing (1990) found that
there was a positive correlation between the satisfaction of needs in
individuals and their degree of life satisfaction. munotes.in

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19 Research Methodology For Psychology The concept of pleasure prin ciple put forth by Sigmund Freud and
Maslow’s theory of hierarchy of motives represent this category of
theories. These theoretical approaches posit that reduction in the amount
of tension and satisfaction of the various biological and psychological
needs and goals of an individual, causes happiness. Thus, according to
these theories happiness is an end state that is achieved when the needs are
met and goals are fulfilled.
Process or Activity Theories:
These theories posit that engagement in an activity can be a source or
cause of happiness. Csikszentmihalyi (1975) suggested that people are
happy when they are involved in activities that interest them and match
their level of skill sets. This match between the activities and that of the
skills lead to a stat e of mind ‘flow’ and further said that people who
experience this flow are the ones who experience high degree of
happiness.
Having significant life goals and being able to pursue them can lead to
SWB (Emmons, 1986 & Little, 1989). It was found that peopl e experience
more happiness when they are involved in activities for intrinsic reasons
(Sheldon, Ryan & Reis, 1996). Individuals who have significant goals in
life are more likely to experience positive emotions, are more likely to be
energy -driven and fee l that their life is more meaningful (McGregor &
Little, 1998).
Genetic or Personality Theories:
These approaches believe that there is a component of stability in the
levels of well -being and happiness experienced by people and that SWB is
strongly influ enced by the genetic or personality factors. An individuals’
judgments about SWB reflect the cognitive and emotional reactions of his
life circumstances, these life situations can be relatively stable or short -
lived. Hence, the researchers have to study bo th the aspects of SWB; long -
term and momentary.
Diener & Larsen (1984) found that people’s reactions change according to
the change in circumstances and those changes in reactions are reflected in
their momentary SWB. The stable patterns of an individuals ’ SWB can be
predicted through the average of the momentary reports across various
situations. They further found that people have specific emotional
responses to various life circumstances and that these emotional responses
are moderately to strongly stab le over the period of time.
The stability and the consistency of the SWB can be attributed to the
genetic factors; certain people are prone to be happy or unhappy. Certain
personality traits have been lined to SWB. Lucas & Fujita (2000) found
that Extraver sion is correlated strongly with pleasant affect and
Neuroticism is associated with negative affect. Tellegen et al. (1988)
studied the genetic influences on SWB. They studied and compared
monozygotic twins who were reared apart to dizygotic twins who were munotes.in

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20 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research reared apart and also with the monozygotic and dizygotic twins who were
reared together.
They found that 40% of the variability in the positive affect and 55% of
variability in the negative affect could be predicted by genetic variation.
The results could be attributed to the environmental influences as well but
genetic factors play an important role in influencing the characteristic
emotional responses to the various life circumstances (Tellegen et al.,
1988)
Besides theses theoretical explanations, the d ifferences in the SWB can be
attributed to various other factors as well. The stable individual
differences in how people think about the world can lead to differences in
SWB. Some people recall and process the pleasant aspects of the life
better than the unpleasant aspects. Some other factors like the cognitive
dispositions, optimism, the expectancy for control seem to influence the
judgments of SWB.
2.2.2 Correlates of Subjective Well -Being:
Demographic Correlates of SWB:
Although genetic factors and tem peramental predisposition have an impact
on the SWB; the other factors related to an individual also play an
important role. This section explores the demographic correlates of SWB.
Wilson (1967) found that the personality factors and the demographic
facto rs both have an influence on the SWB. Campbell, Converse &
Rodgers (1976) found that the demographic factors like that of the age,
income and education do not account for much variance in the judgments
of SWB.
Diener & Diener (1996) and Diener et al. (199 9) analysed the
demographic correlates of SWB and came to following conclusions –
Demographic factors like age, sex and income are related to SWB, the
influence of these demographic factors is usually small, and most of the
people are moderately happy. Thu s, it can be concluded the demographic
factors can distinguish between people who are extremely happy and
people who are moderately happy.
An individual’s goals and needs must be taken into consideration when
understanding the relation between income and SWB. If the person’s
material needs keep increasing rapidly than the income then the benefits of
the rising income will be diminished or negligible. Age and Gender are
also related to SWB even if the effects are small; depending on what
component of the SW B is being measured.
Other demographic factors like subjective perception of one’s physical
health, marital status and religious faith are also positively correlated to
SWB. However, the way people perceive their health is more important
than the objectiv e reality, the effect of marital status varies for men and
women, similarly the effect of religious activities will depend on the
specific religious inclinations. Hence, it is important to study the munotes.in

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21 Research Methodology For Psychology individual components of SWB to understand its correlates (Diener et al.,
1999).
2.2.3 Culture and SWB:
Not just the demographic factors, the cultural factors also play an
important role in SWB. In collectivistic cultures, self -esteem is not
strongly associated with SWB (Diener & Diener, 1995) also extraversion
seems to be less strongly associated with pleasant affect (Lucas et al.,
2000). Cultural differences in the significance of personality congruence
plays an important role in SWB.
Personality Congruence is the extent to which the behaviour of a person is
consistent with his feelings, across various situations. The collectivistic
cultures are less congruent than the individualistic cultures, thus the
personality congruence is less strongly associated with SWB in
collectivistic cultures than the individualisti c cultures (Suh, 1999). In the
collectivistic cultures the opinions and the wishes of a person’s significant
others; rather than his own emotions plays an important role in
determining the level of life satisfaction (Suh et al., 1998).
The cultural norms a lso exert an influence on the demographic correlates
of SWB. Wealth can lead to greater SWB in poorer countries, when the
basic needs are not met. People in the richer countries are more likely to
be happier, but this could either be because they have more luxuries and
also high levels of equality, longevity and human rights.
Marriage is also an important correlate of SWB that is influenced by the
cultural factor. Unmarried couples are happier than the married couples in
the individualistic countries, where as married couples are happier than the
unmarried couples in the collectivistic cultures because of the social
approval that comes with marriage (Diener et al., 2000).
Since, SWB is crucial for the being happy hence, several interventions are
designed to b oost the SWB and eventually the happiness of an individual.
Fordyce (1977, 1983) evaluated a program based on the idea that the SWB
can be increased if the people learn to imitate the characteristics of people
who are happy and have high SWB. Characteristi cs of happy people
include being organized, occupied, more socialization, having positive
outlook and healthy personality. The study found lasting effects of this
intervention. The programs for enhancing SWB can be effective, given
that more efforts have t o be directed for development, implementation and
evaluation of such interventions.
2.3 POSITIVE EMOTIONS 2.3.1 Historical Development of Positive Emotions :
Positive Emotions refer to the pleasant or desirable responses to the
situations ranging from emoti ons like joy, contentment, interest, gratitude,
love etc. Positive emotions also indicate absence of negative emotions like
hate, anger, disgust, fear etc. Positive emotions are capable of producing munotes.in

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22 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research optimal functioning in an individual not just momentarily but for longer
period of time.
Positive emotions essentially play a very significant role in our lives.
Hence, we must work towards cultivating positive emotions in us and also
promoting in those among other people around us. Experiencing positive
emotio ns is not an end state rather it is a means to achieve and improve
physical and psychological health and thereby greater life satisfaction.
Given the significant role the positive emotions play in our life and
happiness; we need to focus on conducting rese arch in this area. Before
that we also need to look into the historical development of the research
conducted in the area of positive emotions.
Neglected Relative to Negative Emotions:
Traditionally, the focus of research in psychology has been to understa nd
the problem behaviours (disorders) and to understand the causes and
remedies for theses problem behaviours. As a result of this, the focus has
always been on understanding the negative emotions rather than the
positive emotions. When negative emotions a re experienced extremely,
inappropriately and over longer periods of time may cause development of
behaviours characterized by anxiety, phobias, aggression, depression etc.
Another reason why positive emotions were given secondary importance
is because mos t of the models assume that the emotions are associated
with or followed by specific action tendencies. These specific action
tendencies were assumed to be adaptive in nature and evolved over
generations as they helped for survival.
Most of the specific a ction tendencies that were researched were the ones
associated with the negative emotions. For example, fear is associated
with escape and anger is associated with physical aggression. The action
tendencies that are associated with the positive emotions ar e not specific
in nature rather they are non -specific and vague in nature. For example,
joy is associated with activation and contentment is associated with
inactivity; theses action tendencies are too general than specific
(Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998).
Confused with related Affective States:
The distinction between positive emotions and the other affective states
like the sensory pleasure and positive mood has always been quite fuzzy.
Various forms of sensory pleasure are confused with that of the positi ve
emotions because both involve physiological changes and pleasant
subjective feel; moreover, sensory pleasure and positive emotions often
co-occur.
However, emotions are different from that of the physical sensations.
Emotions require some form of cogni tive appraisal – assigning meaning to
the event. As against that, pleasure can be caused merely by a change in
the physical environment. Another distinction is that, pleasure relies on the munotes.in

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23 Research Methodology For Psychology body stimulation whereas, emotions can occur even in the absence of the
external physical stimulation.
Emotions and mood are conceptually quite different from each other.
Emotions occupy the foreground of the consciousness, are short -lived, and
have an object. Mood on the other hand occupy the background of the
conscious ness, are long -lasting and objectless or free -floating in nature
(Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Rosenberg, 1998).
Functions identified as Approach Behavior or Continued Action:
The previous experiences of positive emotions, causes an individual to
interact wit h their environment and engage in activities that are adaptive in
nature from an evolutionary aspect. The connection between the positive
emotions and activity engagement lead people to experience positive
affect (Diener & Diener, 1996). Without this exper ience of positive affect,
people would be disengaged or unmotivated to interact with their
environment.
Thus, the most common function of the positive emotions is to facilitate
approach behaviour or continued action. The other positive affective states
like that of the sensory pleasure and the positive mood also play a role in
approach behaviour or continues action. The sensory pleasure motivates
people to approach or continue engaging in activities that are biologically
useful to them, similarly the posit ive moods motivate the people to
approach or continue to engage in the thoughts and action that was
initiated (Cabanac, 1971; Clore, 1994).
2.3.2 The Broaden -And-Build Theory of Positive Emotions:
Fredrickson (1998) put forth the Broaden -and-Build theory o f Positive
Emotions stating that the positive emotions broaden the people’s thoughts
and actions and help them build their personal resources. The traditional
approaches of positive emotions largely confused them with the other
affective states, trying to fit them into the general models of emotions and
focusing on approach or continuation as their basic function.
This new model is based on the specific action tendencies, which can best
describe the function of the negative emotions. A specific action tende ncy
can be described as the consequence of a psychological process that helps
narrow down the thought -action sequence by urging the person to act in a
particular way. In a life -threatening situation, such narrowed thought -
action sequence helps the person t o make quick decisions and facilitates
immediate actions. Such specific action tendencies triggered by the
negative emotions, have helped our ancestors for their survival.
Positive emotions do not or very rarely occur during the life -threatening
situations , hence a specific action tendency to narrow the thought -action
sequence in order to facilitate quick decision and action may not be
required. On the contrary, the positive emotions have a completely
opposite effect; they broaden the people’s thought -actio n sequence, thus
opening up a wide array of thoughts and actions. For instance, joy munotes.in

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24 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research stimulates creativity, interest stimulates exploration and contentment
stimulates integration. Each of these sequences, explains the ways in
which positive emotions broaden the thought -action sequences.
The specific action tendencies triggered by the negative emotions have
direct and immediate benefits, that are adaptive for us in life -threatening
situations. The specific action tendencies triggered by the positive
emotions are indirect and long -term in nature, as the broadening helps us
to build enduring resources. The positive emotions facilitate the building
up of personal resources that ranges from physical, social, cognitive,
emotional and psychological resources (Fredri ckson, 1998 & 2000).
This theory explains that, through the experience of positive emotions
people can evolve. As the following figure 1 explains; the experiences of
positive emotions broaden the thought -action repertoires, which helps
people build endurin g personal resources, that transforms people into
becoming more knowledgeable, creative, resilient, socially adaptable and
physically and psychologically healthy individuals. The theory further
explains that the initial experiences of positiveemotions crea te upward
spirals towards further experiences of positive emotions.
The Broadening Hypothesis:
The broaden -and-build theory explains that the experiences of positive
emotions, broaden the person’s momentary thought -action tendencies. To
put it in simple w ords, the positive emotions widen the array of our
thoughts and actions. Isen et.al. (1985) found that positive emotions can
impact the thoughts to become more inclusive, flexible, creative and
receptive; and can produce more creative and variable actions.
The broadening hypothesis posits the win hypotheses, that the positive
emotions broaden the people’s thought -action repertoire and the negative
emotions narrow the people’s thought -action repertoires. The positive
emotions widen the array of thoughts and actions whereas, the negative
emotions narrow down the array of thoughts and actions. Fredrickson &
Branigan (2001) conducted an experiment to test the twin hypotheses.
They induced the specific emotions of joy, contentment, fear and anger by
showing the p articipants emotionally evocative short film clips.
Participants were also shown non -emotional film clip for the neutral
condition for comparison. Immediately following each of the film clip, the
breadth of the participants’ thought -action repertoires was measured. They
were asked to imagine themselves in situation where similar feelings
(emotions) would arise, and then to list what things they would do in such
situations.
The results showed that, the participants in the two positive emotions
condition (jo y and contentment) identified significantly more things that
they would do compared to the participants in the two negative emotions
condition (fear and anger) and the participants in the neutral condition.
The participants in the negative emotions conditi on named significantly munotes.in

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25 Research Methodology For Psychology fewer things than those in the neutral condition (Fredrickson & Branigan,
2001).
The Building Hypothesis:
The broaden -and-build theory explains further that the experiences of
positive emotions broaden the person’s momentary thought -action
tendencies which helps the person to build enduring personal resources.
Positive emotions build enduring personal resources in terms of physical,
intellectual and social resources.
The evidence suggestive of link between positive emotions and
intellectual resources comes from the individual differences in attachment
styles. The children who receive secure attachment from their caregivers
tend to be more flexible, persistent and resourceful problem -solvers
compared to their peers (Arend et. Al. 1978; 1979). They are more likely
to seek exploration of novel places and thus develop better cognitive maps
of the places (Hazen & Durrett, 1982). These intellectual resources
acquired in the childhood extend into their adulthood as well.
The experience of po sitive emotions, broaden the thought -action
repertoires, build enduring personal resources which together results in
improved well -being of an individual. With improved personal resources
people learn better coping strategies and resilience that will be he lpful in
the face of adversities and stressful situations. This theory proposes that
the positive emotions and the broadened thinking influence each other in a
reciprocal manner, thus creating upward spiral towards enhanced
resilience and coping.
Fredricks on and Joiner conducted a study to understand the building
hypothesis and concluded that over the time, positive emotions and broad -
minded coping build on each other mutually. The broaden -and-build
theory explains that experiences of positive emotions can build enduring
psychological resilience and trigger the upward spirals towards
psychological and emotional well -being. Thus positive emotions not only
make people feel good at the present moment but also increases the
likelihood of people being happy in th e future.
The Undoing Hypothesis:
The broaden -and-build theory states that the experiences of positive
emotions broaden the person’s momentary thought -action repertoires
whereas the negative emotions narrow down the thought -action
repertoires; and hence, t he positive emotions can also function in ways to
‘undo’ the effects of the negative emotions. This is called the undoing
hypothesis (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998).
The key components of the positive and the negative emotions cannot
coexist simultaneously because a person’s momentary thought -action
repertoire cannot be simultaneously narrow and broad. The mechanism
responsible for this incompatibility could be the ‘broadening’. The
positive emotions broaden the person’s thought -action repertoire which munotes.in

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26 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research will loosen the hold gained by the negative emotions on the person’s mind
and body, by undoing the preparation for specific action.
Fredrickson et al., (2000) conducted an experiment to test the undoing
hypothesis. The participants were first induced a high aro usal negative
emotion and then by random assignment; immediately induced mild joy,
contentment, neutrality or sadness by showing short, emotionally
evocative film clips. The results showed that the participants in the mild
joy and contentment (two positive emotion conditions) exhibited faster
cardio -vascular recovery than those in the neutral control condition and
faster than those in the sadness condition.
The positive and the neutral films do not differ in what they do to the
cardio -vascular system, they differ in what they can undo within the
cardio -vascular system. The two distinct types of positive emotions (mild
joy and contentment) were capable of undoing the cardio -vascular effects
of the negative emotions because the positive emotions broaden the
people’s thought -action repertoire.
There are individual differences in the ability to make use of the undoing
effect of the positive emotions. Block & Kremen (1996) found that people
who score high on the self -report measures of psychological resilience
show faster cardio -vascular recovery after the negative emotional arousal
as compared to the people who score low of psychological resilience.
Highly resilient people experience more positive emotions than the less
resilient people. The experience of the posi tive emotions helps them
bounce back from the negative emotional arousal. Thus, the resilient
people are experts in harnessing the undoing effect of the positive
emotions.
Intervention Programs:
There are no techniques or interventions directly based on th e broaden -
and-build theory for increasing the prevalence of positive emotions.
However, the broaden -and-build theory can explain the effectiveness of
the existing techniques that can be reframed to increase the prevalence of
the positive emotions.
There a re no direct methods for inducing emotions among people. All the
emotion inducing techniques are indirect in nature; they often focus on
one component of the multi -component system. Emotions typically arise
from the appraisals of the personal meaning of th e of a specific event thus,
the most useful emotion inducing technique is to shape the person’s
appraisals of a situation. The most effective technique is to recalling
situations that elicit certain emotions. The other emotion -inducing
techniques include a facial or a muscle configuration, a physiological state
or a mode of thinking.
The interventions that have been discussed in this section are practicing
relaxation and increasing pleasant activities. munotes.in

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27 Research Methodology For Psychology Practicing Relaxation:
The various relaxation technique s range from meditation and yoga to
imagery exercises and progressive muscle relaxation. These techniques
have shown to produce relaxation and help treat problems caused or
exacerbated by the negative emotions. The relaxation techniques are
highly effectiv e as they initiate the positive emotion of contentment
(Fredrickson, 2000).
Contentment is a positive emotion that elicits cognitive changes rather
than the physical changes. It integrates the present moment with the
experiences into an enriched appreciati on of one’s place in the world
(Fredrickson, 1998 & 2000). The relaxation techniques create conditions
for experiencing the positive emotions by inducing the key components of
contentment.
The Mediation exercises induce a state of mindfulness (full awarene ss of
the present moment) that resemble the characteristic of contentment. The
use of Imagery exercises, focus on specific situations (nature, previous
experiences) known to be frequent precursors of contentment. Use of
Progressive Muscle Relaxation create s tension -release sequence which
gives way for relaxed contentment. The various relaxation techniques
induce the components of contentment which further increases the
probability of multi -component experience of contentment. The relaxation
techniques are e ffective in treating problems caused by negative emotions
because of the undoing effect of the positive emotions (Fredrickson,
2000). In the long term, the use of relaxation techniques can be useful for
psychological growth and well -being.
Increasing Pleas ant Activities:
The behavioural theories suggest that depression is caused due to deficit in
response -dependent positive reinforcement. The interventions focusing on
increasing the pleasant activities are based on the behavioural theories.
The various inte rventions include; increasing the engagement of pleasant
activities like being physically active (exercising), being creative, being
close to the nature and socializing.
These interventions place emphasis on pleasant activities and not on
pleasant subject ive experiences (positive emotions). Although pleasant
activities are capable of producing positive emotions, to what extent it
happens depends on the subjective meanings attached by the individuals to
those activities. The effectiveness of these intervent ions can be accelerated
by increasing the pleasant activities and connecting it to the broadening
and building effects of the positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2000).
Folkman (1997) suggested that positive emotions result from finding
positive meaning. Peopl e find positive meaning in the activities and events
of day -to-day life by reattaching those events and activities with positive
values. In this context, engaging in physical activity can be viewed as
personal achievement, attending a social event can be v iewed as an
opportunity to connect with other people and being close to the nature can munotes.in

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28 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research be seen as a shift from the monotonous activities. Finding positive
meaning in such ways can produce experiences of contentment, joy, love
and other positive emotions.
Finding positive meaning can produce significant therapeutic effects and
can cause improvement in physical as well as psychological health and
well-being. Fredrickson (2000) argued that finding positive meaning
produces positive emotions that broaden the mo des of thinking and build
enduring personal resources. The intervention strategies focusing on
increasing the pleasant activities can be used to focus more directly on
finding positive meaning and experiencing positive emotions.
The broaden -and-build theor y emphasizes on the ways in which positive
emotions are significant elements of optimal functioning and hence
essential aspect of positive psychology. The important contribution that
this theory makes is that it is important to cultivate positive emotions un
our lives and those around us, which can transform us into better persons,
leading better lives.
2.4 THE FLOW OF EXPERIENCE Studying the creative process in the 1960s (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi,
1976), Csikszentmihalyi was struck by the fact that when work on a
painting was going well, the artist persisted single -mindedly, disregarding
hunger, fatigue, and discomfort —yet rapidly lost interest in the artistic
creation once it had been completed. Flow research and theory had their
origin in a desire to un derstand this phenomenon of intrinsically
motivated, or autotelic, activity: activity rewarding in and of itself (auto
self, telos goal), quite apart from its end product or any extrinsic good that
might result from the activity. Significant research had been conducted on
the intrinsic motivation concept by this period (summarized in Deci &
Ryan, 1985).
Nevertheless, no systematic empirical research had been undertaken to
clarify the subjective phenomenology of intrinsically motivated activity.
Csikszent mihalyi (1975/2000) investigated the nature and conditions of
enjoyment by interviewing chess players, rock climbers, dancers, and
others who emphasized enjoyment as the main reason for pursuing an
activity. The researchers focused on play and games, where intrinsic
rewards are salient.
Additionally, they studied work —specifically, surgery —where the
extrinsic rewards of money and prestige could by themselves justify
participation. They formed a picture of the general characteristics of
optimal experience a nd its proximal conditions, finding that the reported
phenomenology was remarkably similar across play and work settings.
The conditions of flow include:
 Perceived challenges, or opportunities for action, that stretch (neither
overmatching nor underutiliz ing) existing skills; a sense that one is
engaging challenges at a level appropriate to one’s capacities munotes.in

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29 Research Methodology For Psychology  Clear proximal goals and immediate feedback about the progress that
is being made. Being “in flow” is the way that some interviewees
described the sub jective experience of engaging just -manageable
challenges by tackling a series of goals, continuously processing
feedback about progress, and adjusting action based on this feedback.
Under these conditions, experience seamlessly unfolds from moment to
mome nt, and one enters a subjective state with the following
characteristics:
 Intense and focused concentration on what one is doing in the present
moment • Merging of action and awareness
 Loss of reflective self -consciousness (i.e., loss of awareness of one self
as a social actor)
 A sense that one can control one’s actions; that is, a sense that one can
in principle deal with the situation because one knows how to respond
to whatever happens next
 Distortion of temporal experience (typically, a sense that ti me has
passed faster than normal)
 Experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding, such that often
the end goal is just an excuse for the process. When in flow, the
individual operates at full capacity (cf. de Charms, 1968; Deci, 1975;
White, 1959). The state is one of dynamic equilibrium. Entering flow
depends on establishing a balance between perceived action capacities
and perceived action opportunities (cf. optimal arousal, Berlyne,
1960; Hunt, 1965).
The balance is intrinsically fragile. If chal lenges begin to exceed skills,
one first becomes vigilant and then anxious; if skills begin to exceed
challenges, one first relaxes and then becomes bored. Shifts in subjective
state provide feedback about the changing relationship to the environment.
Expe riencing anxiety or boredom presses a person to adjust his or her
level of skill and/ or challenge in order to escape the aversive state and
reenter flow.
The original account of the flow state has proven remarkably robust,
confirmed through studies of ar t and science (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996),
aesthetic experience (Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson, 1990), sport
(Jackson, 1995, 1996), literary writing (Perry, 1999), and other activities.
The experience is the same across lines of culture, class, gender, and age,
as well as across kinds of activity. Flow research was pursued throughout
the 1980s and 1990s in the laboratories of Csikszentmihalyi and
colleagues in Italy (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988;
Inghilleri, 1999; Massimini & Carli, 1988; Mass imini & Delle Fave,
2000). The research in Italy employed the Experience Sampling Method
(ESM), using pagers to randomly sample everyday experience. It yielded
several refinements of the model of experiential states and dynamics in
which the flow concept i s embedded. The ESM and the theoretical munotes.in

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30 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research advances that it made possible are discussed in the section on measuring
flow. During the 1980s and 1990s, the flow concept also was embraced by
researchers studying optimal experience (e.g., leisure, play, sports, a rt,
intrinsic motivation) and by researchers and practitioners working in
contexts where fostering positive experience is especially important (in
particular, formal schooling at all levels).
In addition, the concept of flow had growing impact outside acad emia, in
the spheres of popular culture, professional sport, business, and politics. In
the 1980s, work on flow was assimilated by psychology primarily within
the humanistic tradition of Maslow and Rogers (McAdams, 1990) or as
part of the empirical literat ure on intrinsic motivation and interest (e.g.,
Deci & Ryan, 1985; Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992). In recent years, a
model of the individual as a proactive, self -regulating organism interacting
with the environment has become increasingly central in psyc hology (for
reviews, see Brandsta ¨dter, 1998; Magnusson & Stattin, 1998). This is
highly compatible with the model of psychological functioning and
development formed in concert with the flow concept (Csikszentmihalyi
& Rathunde, 1998; Inghilleri, 1999).
A key characteristic that the flow model shares with these other
contemporary theories is interactionism (Magnusson & Stattin, 1998).
Rather than focusing on the person, abstracted from context (i.e., traits,
personality types, stable dispositions), flow research has emphasized the
dynamic system composed of person and environment, as well as the
phenomenology of person -environment interactions. Rock climbers,
surgeons, and others who routinely find deep enjoyment in an activity
illustrate how an organized set of challenges and a corresponding set of
skills result in optimal experience.
The activities afford rich opportunities for action. Complementarily,
effectively engaging these challenges depends on the possession of
relevant capacities for action. The effortless absorption experienced by the
practiced artist at work on a difficult project always is premised upon
earlier mastery of a complex body of skills. Because the direction of the
unfolding flow experience is shaped by both person and environment, we
speak of emergent motivation in an open system (Csikszentmihalyi, 1985):
what happens at any moment is responsive to what happened immediately
before within the interaction, rather than being dictated by a preexisting
intentional structure located withi n either the person (e.g., a drive) or the
environment (e.g., a tradition or script).
Here, motivation is emergent in the sense that proximal goals arise out of
the interaction; later we will consider the companion notion of emergent
long-term goals, such as new interests. In one sense, an asymmetry
characterizes the person -environment equation. It is the subjectively
perceived opportunities and capacities for action that determine
experience. That is, there is no objectively defined body of information
and set of challenges within the stream of the person’s experience, but
rather the information that is selectively attended to and the opportunities
for action that are perceived. Likewise, it is not meaningful to speak about munotes.in

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31 Research Methodology For Psychology a person’s skills and attentiona l capacities in objective terms; what enters
into lived experience are those capacities for action and those attentional
resources and biases (e.g., trait interest) that are engaged by this presently
encountered environment.
Sports, games, and other flow activities provide goal and feedback
structures that make flow more likely. A given individual can find flow in
almost any activity, however —working a cash register, ironing clothes,
driving a car. Similarly, under certain conditions and depending on an
individual’s history with the activity, almost any pursuit —a museum visit,
a round of golf, a game of chess —can bore or create anxiety. It is the
subjective challenges and subjective skills, not objective ones, that
influence the quality of a person’s experi ence. Flow, Attention, and the
Self To understand what happens in flow experiences, we need to invoke
the more general model of experience, consciousness, and the self that was
developed in conjunction with the flow concept (Csikszentmihalyi &
Csikszentmih alyi, 1988).
According to this model, people are confronted with an overwhelming
amount of information. Consciousness is the complex system that has
evolved in humans for selecting information from this profusion,
processing it, and storing it. Informatio n appears in consciousness through
the selective investment of attention. Once attended to, information enters
awareness, the system encompassing all of the processes that take place in
consciousness, such as thinking, willing, and feeling about this
infor mation (i.e., cognition, motivation, and emotion). The memory
system then stores and retrieves the information. We can think of
subjective experience as the content of consciousness. The self emerges
when consciousness comes into existence and becomes awar e of itself as
information about the body, subjective states, past memories, and the
personal future. Mead (1934; cf. James, 1890/1981) distinguished between
two aspects of the self, the knower (the “I”) and the known (the “me”).
In our terms, these two a spects of the self reflect (a) the sum of one’s
conscious processes and (b) the information about oneself that enters
awareness when one becomes the object of one’s own attention. The self
becomes organized around goals (see Locke, this volume; Snyder, Ran d,
& Sigmon, this volume). Consciousness gives us a measure of control,
freeing us from complete subservience to the dictates of genes and culture
by representing them in awareness, thereby introducing the alternative of
rejecting rather than enacting them . Consciousness thus serves as “a clutch
between programmed instructions and adaptive behaviors”
(Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988, p. 21). Alongside the
genetic and cultural guides to action, it establishes a teleonomy of the self,
a set of goals that have been freely chosen by the individual (cf.
Brandsta¨dter, 1998; Deci & Ryan, 1985). It might, of course, prove
dangerous to disengage our behavior from direct control by the genetic
and cultural instructions that have ev olved over millennia of ad apting to
the environment. On the other hand, doing so may increase the chances for
adaptive fit with the present environment, particularly under conditions of
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32 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research 2.5 OPTIMISM AND HOPE Learned optimism -seligman and colleagues:
The Hi storical Basis of Learned Optimism:
Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) reformulated their model of
helplessness (see also Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993) to incorporate
the attributions (explanations) that people make for the bad and good
things th at happen to them. University of Pennsylvania psychologist
Martin
Seligman (Seligman, 1991, 1998b; see also Seligman, Reivich, Jaycox, &
Gillham, 1995) later used this attributional or explanatory process as the
basis for his theory of learned optimism. A Definition of Learned
Optimism In the Seligman theory of learned optimism, the optimist uses
adaptive causal attributions to explain negative experiences or events.
Thus, the person answers the question, “Why did that bad thing happen to
me?” In technical terms, the optimist makes external, variable, and
specific attributions for failure -like events rather than the internal, stable,
and global attributions of the pessimist. Stated more simply, the optimist
explains bad things in such a manner as (1) to acco unt for the role of other
people and environments in producing bad outcomes (i.e., an external
attribution), (2) to interpret the bad event as not likely to happen again
(i.e., a variable attribution), and (3) to constrain the bad outcome to just
one perfo rmance area and not others (Le., a specific attribution).
Thus, the optimistic student who has received a poor grade in a high
school class would say, (1) “It was a poorly worded exam” (external
attribution), (2) “I have done better on previous exams” (var iable
attribution), and (3) “I am doing better in other areas of my life such as my
relationships and sports achievements” (specific attribution). Conversely,
the pessimistic student who has received a poor grade would say, (1) “I
screwed up” (internal att ribution), (2) “I have done lousy on previous
exams” (stable attribution), and (3) “I also am not doing well in other
areas of my life” (global attribution).
Seligman’s theory implicitly places great emphasis upon negative
outcomes in determining one’s att ributional explanations. Therefore, as
shown Distance Oneself Link Oneself Seligman’s theory uses an excuse -
like process of “distancing” from bad things that have happened in the
past, rather than the more usual notion of optimism involving the
connection to positive outcomes desired in the future (as reflected in the
typical dictionary definition, as well as Scheier and Carver’s definition,
which we explore shortly in this chapter).
Within the learned optimism perspective, therefore, the optimistic
goaldir ected cognitions are aimed at distancing the person from negative
outcomes of high importance.
Childhood Antecedents of Learned Optimism: munotes.in

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33 Research Methodology For Psychology Seligman and colleagues (Abramson et ai., 2000; Gillham, 2000;
Seligman, 1991, 1995, 1998b) carefully described the de velopmental roots
of the optimistic explanatory style. To begin, there appears to be some
genetic component of explanatory style, with learned optimism scores
more highly correlated for monozygotic than dizygotic twins (correlations
= .48 vs .. 0; Schulman , Keith, & Seligman, 1993).
Additionally, learned optimism appears to have roots in the environment
(or learning). For example, parents who provide safe, coherent
environments are likely to promote the learned optimism style in their
offspring (Franz, McCl elland, Weinberger, & Peterson, 1994). Likewise,
the parents of optimists are portrayed as modeling optimism for their
children by making explanations for negative events that enable the
offspring to continue to feel good about themselves (i.e., external,
variable, and specific attributions), along with explanations for positive
events that help the offspring feel extra -good about themselves (i.e.,
internal, stable, and global attributions).
Moreover, children who grow up with learned optimism are character ized
as having had parents who understood their failures and generally
attributed those failures to external rather than internal factors (i.e., they
taught their children adaptive excusing; see Snyder, Higgins, & Stucky,
1983/2005). On the other hand, pes simistic people had parents who also
were pessimistic. Furthermore, experiencing childhood traumas (e.g.,
parental death, abuse, incest, etc.) can yield pessimism (Bunce, Larsen, &
Peterson, 1995; Cerezo & Frias, 1994), and parental divorce also may
underm ine learned optimism (Seligman, 1991). (Not all studies have
found the aforementioned negative parental contributions to the
explanatory styles of their offspring, and thus these conclusions must be
viewed with caution. For a balanced overview of parental contributions,
see Peterson & Steen, 2002.)
Television watching is yet another potential source of pessimism.
American children ages 2 through 17 watch an average of almost 25 hours
of television per week (3.5 hours per day; Gentile & Walsh, 2002). As but
one recent example of pessimism -related behaviors that stem from
children’s television watching, Zimmerman, Glew, Christakis, and Katon
(2005) found that greater amounts of television watched at age 4 years
were related significantly to higher subsequent l ikelihoods of those
children becoming bullies. Likewise, a steady diet of television violence
can predispose and reinforce a helpless explanatory style that is associated
with low learned optimism in children (Nolen -Hoeksema, 1987).

What Learned Optimism Predicts The various indices of learned optimism
have spawned a large amount of research (see Carr, 2004), with the
learned optimistic rather than pessimistic explanatory style associated with
the following: munotes.in

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34 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research 1. Better academic performances (Peterson & Bar rett, 1987; Seligman,
1998b)
2. Superior athletic performances (Seligman, Nolen -Hoeksema,
Thornton, & Thornton, 1990)
3. More productive work records (Seligman & Schulman, 1986)
4. Greater satisfaction in interpersonal relationships (Fincham, 2000)
5. More effective coping with life stressors (Nolen -Hoeksema, 2000)
6. Less vulnerability to depression (Abramson, Alloy et aI., 2000)
7. Superior physical health (Peterson, 2000).
2.5 HOPE Given the considerable attention that C. R. Snyder’s theory of hope
(Snyder, 1994; Snyder, Harris, et aI., 1991) has received in the last two
decades, we explore this approach to explaining hopeful thinking in some
detail. (Snyder is professor of psychology at the University of Kansas and
the senior author of this book.) Additionally, the book Hope and
Hopelessness: Critical Clinical Constructs by Farran, Herth, and Popovich
(1995) provides a good overview of various approaches for defining and
measuring hope.
A Definition:
Both the Snyder hope theory and the definition of hope emphasize
cognitions that are built on goal -directed thought. We define hope as
goaldirected thinking in which the person utilizes pathways thinking (the
perceived capacity to find routes to desired goals) and agency thinking
(the requisite motiva tions to use those routes). Only those goals with
considerable value to the individual are considered applicable to hope.
Also, the goals can vary temporally -from those that will be reached in the
next few minutes (short -term) to those that will take month s or even years
to reach (long -term). Likewise, the goals entailed in hoping may be
approach oriented (that is, aimed at reaching a desired goal) or
preventative (aimed at stopping an undesired event) (Snyder, Feldman,
Taylor, Schroeder, & Adams, 2000).
Lastly, goals can vary in relation to the difficulty of attainment, with some
quite easy and others extremely difficult. Even with purportedly
impossible goals, however, people may join together and succeed through
supreme planning and persistent efforts. O n this latter issue, coordinated
and successful group efforts illustrate why we should refrain from
characterizing extremely difficult goals as being based on “false hopes”
(Snyder, Rand, King, Feldman, & Taylor, 2002) Pathways thinking has
been shown to r elate to the production of alternate routes when original
ones are blocked (Snyder, Harris, et aI., 1991), as has positive self -talk
about finding routes to desired goals (e.g., ‘’I’ll find a way to solve this”; munotes.in

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35 Research Methodology For Psychology Snyder, LaPointe, Crowson, & Early, 1998). M oreover, those who see
themselves as having greater capacity for agency thinking also endorse
energetic personal self -talk statements, such as “I will keep going”
(Snyder, LaPointe, et aI., 1998), and they are especially likely to produce
and use such mo tivational talk when encountering impediments.
High hopers have positive emotional sets and a sense of zest that stems
from their histories of success in goal pursuits, whereas low hopers have
negative emotional sets and a sense of emotional flatness that st ems from
their histories of having failed in goal pursuits. Lastly, high - or low -hope
people bring these overriding emotional sets with them as they undertake
specific goal -related activities. The various components of hope theory
can be viewed in Figure 9 .2, with the iterative relationship of pathways
and agency thoughts on the far left. Moving left to the right from the
developmental agency -pathways thoughts, we can see the emotional sets
that are taken to specific goal pursuit activities. Next in Figure 9.2 are the
values associated with specific goal pursuits. As noted previously,
sufficient value must be attached to a goal pursuit before the individual
will continue the hoping process. At this point, the pathways and agency
thoughts are applied to the d esired goal. Here, the feedback loop entails
positive emotions that positively reinforce the goal pursuit process, or
negative emotions to curtail this process.
Along the route to the goal, the person may encounter a stressor that
potentially blocks the a ctual goal pursuit. Hope theory proposes that the
successful pursuit of desired goals, especially when circumventing
stressful impediments, results in positive emotions and continued goal
pursuit efforts (Le., positive reinforcement). On the other hand, if a
person’s goal pursuit is not successful (often because that person cannot
navigate around blockages), then negative emotions should result
(Ruehlman & Wolchik, 1988), and the goal pursuit process should be
undermined (i.e., punishment). Furthermore, suc h a stressor is interpreted
differently depending on the person’s overall level of hope. That is to say,
high hopers construe such barriers as challenges and will explore alternate
routes and apply their motivations to those routes. Typically having
experi enced successes in working around such blockages, the high hopers
are propelled onward by their positive emotions. The low hopers,
however, become stuck because they cannot find alternate routes; in turn,
their negative emotions and ruminations stymie thei r goal pursuits.
Childhood Antecedents of Hope:
More details on the developmental antecedents of the hope process can be
found in Snyder (1994, pp. 75 -114) and Snyder, McDermott, Cook, and
Rapoff (2002, pp. 1 -32). In brief, however, Snyder (1994) propos es that
hope has no hereditary contributions but rather is entirely a learned
cognitive set about goal -directed thinking. The teaching of pathways and
agency goal -directed thinking is an inherent part of parenting, and the
components of hopeful thought are in place by age two. Pathways thinking
reflects basic cause -and-effect learning that the child acquires from
caregivers and others. Such pathways thought is acquired before agency munotes.in

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36 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research thinking, with the latter being posited to begin around age one year.
Agenc y thought reflects the baby’s increasing insights as to the fact that
she is the causal force in many of the cause -and-effect sequences in her
surrounding environment.
What hope predicts:
For a detailed review of the predictions flowing from Hope Scale s cores,
see Snyder (2002a). What is noteworthy about the results related to these
predictions is that the statistically significant findings typically remain,
even after mathematical correction for the influences of a variety of other
self-report psychologi cal measures, such as optimism, self -efficacy, and
self-esteem. In general, Hope Scale scores have predicted outcomes in
academics, sports, physical health, adjustment, and psychotherapy. For
example, in the area of academics, higher Hope Scale scores take n at the
beginning of college have predicted better cumulative grade point
averages and whether students remain in school (Snyder, Shorey, et aI.,
2002).
In the area of sports, higher Hope Scale scores taken at the beginning of
college track season have p redicted the superior performances of male
athletes and have done so beyond the coach’s rating of natural athletic
abilities (Curry, Snyder, Cook, Ruby, & Rehm, 1977). In the area of
adjustment, higher Hope Scale scores have related to various indices of
elevated happiness, satisfaction, positive emotions, getting along with
others, etc. (Snyder, Harris, et aI., 1991). Additionally, hope has been
advanced as the common factor underlying the positive changes that
happen in psychological treatments (Snyder, I lardi, Cheavens, et aI.,
2000). In regard to interventions to enhance hope, see our discussion of
the various approaches in Chapter 15. For the reader with considerable
background in psychotherapy, a thorough overview of hope theory
interventions can be fo und in Snyder’s edited volume, the Handbook of
Hope (2000b).
For the reader with less experience in psychotherapy, “how -to”
descriptions for enhancing adults’ hopes can be found in McDermott and
Snyder’s Making Hope Happen (1999) and in Snyder’s The Psych ology of
Hope: You Can Get There From Here (1994/2004); “how to” descriptions
for raising children’s hopes are described in McDermott and Snyder’s The
Great Big Book of Hope (2000) and in Snyder, McDermott, et al.’s Hope
for the Journey: Helping Children T hrough the Good Times and the Bad
(2002). The latest frontier -collective hope As with the concept of self -
efficacy, hope researchers also have expanded their construct to explore
what is called collective hope (see Snyder & Feldman, 2000). Simply put,
collective hope reflects the level of goal -directed thinking of a large group
of people. Often, such collective hope is operative when several people
join together to tackle a goal that would be impossible for anyone person.
Snyder and Feldman (2000) have app lied the notion of collective hope
more generally to the topics of disarmament, preservation of
environmental resources, health insurance, and government. munotes.in

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37 Research Methodology For Psychology 2.6 REFERENCES Diener, E., Lucas, R. E., & Oishi, S. (2002). Subjective well -being: The
Science of h appiness and life satisfaction. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez
(Eds.), Handbook of Positive Psychology . New York: Oxford University
Press. Pp. 63 –73.
Fredrickson, B. L. (2002). Positive emotions. In C. R. Snyder & S. J.
Lopez (Eds.), Handbook of positive p sychology. New York: Oxford
University Press. pp. 120 –134.

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38
3
POSITIVE INDIVIDUAL TRAITS
Unit Structure
3.1 Self efficacy
3.1.1 Self -Efficacy and Psychological Adjustment
3.1.2 Self -Efficacy and Physical Health
3.1.3 Self -Efficacy and Self -Regulation
3.2 Creativity
3.3 Wisdom
3.4 Empathy and altruism
3.5 Reference
3.1 SELF EFFICACY Some of the most powerful truths also are the simplest —so simple that a
child can understand them. The concept of self -efficacy deals with one of
these truths —one so simple it can be captured in a children’s book of 37
pages (with illustrations), yet so powerful that fully describing its
implications has filled thousands of pages in scientific journals and books
over the past two decades.
This truth is that believing that you can accomplish what you want to
accomplish is one of th e most important ingredients — perhaps the most
important ingredient — in the recipe for success. Any child who has read
The Little Engine That Could knows this is so. For over 20 years,
hundreds of researchers have been trying to tell us why this is so.
The basic premise of self -efficacy theory is that “people’s beliefs in their
capabilities to produce desired effects by their own actions” (Bandura,
1997, p. vii) are the most important determinants of the behaviors people
choose to engage in and how much th ey persevere in their efforts in the
face of obstacles and challenges. Self -efficacy theory also maintains that
these efficacy beliefs play a crucial role in psychological adjustment,
psychological problems, and physical health, as well as professionally
guided and self -guided behavioral change strategies. Since the publication
of Albert Bandura’s 1977 Psychological Review article titled “Self -
Efficacy: Toward a Unifying Theory of Behavior Change,” the term self -
efficacy has become ubiquitous in psychology and related fields.
Hundreds of articles on every imaginable aspect of self -efficacy have
appeared in journals devoted to psychology, sociology, kinesiology, public
health, medicine, nursing, and other fields. In this chapter, I attempt to
summarize what we have learned from over two decades of research on
self-efficacy. I will address three basic questions: What is self -efficacy?
Where does it come from? Why is it important? What Is Self -Efficacy? munotes.in

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39 Research Methodology For Psychology Where Does Self -Efficacy Come From? As noted previously, self-efficacy
is not a genetically endowed trait. Instead, self -efficacy beliefs develop
over time and through experience. The development of such beliefs
begins, we assume, in infancy and continues throughout life.
Understanding how self -efficacy develop s requires understanding a
broader theoretical background. Self -efficacy is best understood in the
context of social cognitive theory —an approach to understanding human
cognition, action, motivation, and emotion that assumes that we are active
shapers of r ather than simply passive reactors to our environments
(Bandura, 1986, 1997; Barone, Maddux, & Snyder, 1997).
Social cognitive theory’s four basic premises, shortened and
simplified, are as follows:
1. We have powerful cognitive or symbolizing capabilit ies that allow
for the creation of internal models of experience, the development of
innovative courses of action, the hypothetical testing of such courses
of action through the prediction of outcomes, and the communication
of complex ideas and experiences to others. We also can engage in
self-observation and can analyze and evaluate our own behavior,
thoughts, and emotions. These self -reflective activities set the stage
for self -regulation.
2. Environmental events, inner personal factors (cognition, emot ion,
and biological events), and behaviors are reciprocal influences. We
respond cognitively, effectively, and behaviorally to environmental
events. Also, through cognition we exercise control over our own
behavior, which then influences not only the envir onment but also our
cognitive, affective, and biological states.
3. Self and personality are socially embedded. These are perceptions
(accurate or not) of our own and others’ patterns of social cognition,
emotion, and action as they occur in patterns of situations. Because
they are socially embedded, personality and self are not simply what
we bring to our interactions with others; they are created in these
interactions, and they change through these interactions.
4. We are capable of self -regulation. W e choose goals and regulate our
behavior in the pursuit of these goals. At the heart of self -regulation is
our ability to anticipate or develop expectancies —to use past
knowledge and experience to form beliefs about future events and
states and beliefs abo ut our abilities and behavior.
Efficacy beliefs and a sense of agency continue to develop throughout the
life span as we continually integrate information from five primary
sources.
Performance Experiences Our own attempts to control our environments
are the most powerful source of self -efficacy information (Bandura, 1977,
1997). Successful attempts at control that I attribute to my own efforts will munotes.in

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40 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research strengthen self -efficacy for that behavior or domain. Perceptions of failure
at control attempts usually d iminish self -efficacy.
Vicarious Experiences Self-efficacy beliefs are influenced also by our
observations of the behavior of others and the consequences of those
behaviors. We use this information to form expectancies about our own
behavior and its conse quences, depending primarily on the extent to which
we believe that we are similar to the person we are observing. Vicarious
experiences generally have weaker effects on self -efficacy expectancy
than do performance experiences (Bandura, 1997).
Imaginal Ex periences We can influence self -efficacy beliefs by
imagining ourselves or others behaving effectively or ineffectively in
hypothetical situations. Such images may be derived from actual or
vicarious experiences with situations similar to the one anticipat ed, or they
may be induced by verbal persuasion, as when a psychotherapist guides a
client through imaginal interventions such as systematic desensitization
and covert modeling (Williams, 1995). Simply imagining myself doing
something well, however, is not likely to have as strong an influence on
my self -efficacy as will an actual experience (Williams, 1995).
Verbal Persuasion Efficacy beliefs are influenced by what others say to
us about what they believe we can or cannot do. The potency of verbal
persuas ion as a source of self -efficacy expectancies will be influenced by
such factors as the expertness, trustworthiness, and attractiveness of the
source, as suggested by decades of research on verbal persuasion and
attitude change (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993 ). Verbal persuasion is a less
potent source of enduring change in selfefficacy expectancy than
performance experiences and vicarious experiences.
Physiological and Emotional States Physiological and emotional states
influence self -efficacy when we learn to associate poor performance or
perceived failure with aversive physiological arousal and success with
pleasant feeling states. Thus, when I become aware of unpleasant
physiological arousal, I am more likely to doubt my competence than if
my physiological state were pleasant or neutral. Likewise, comfortable
physiological sensations are likely to lead me to feel confident in my
ability in the situation at hand. Physiological indicants of self -efficacy
expectancy, however, extend beyond autonomic arousal. F or example, in
activities involving strength and stamina, such as exercise and athletic
performances, perceived efficacy is influenced by such experiences as
fatigue and pain (e.g., Bandura, 1986, 1997).
3.1.1 Self -Efficacy and Psychological Adjustment:
Most philosophers and psychological theorists agree that a sense of control
over our behavior, our environment, and our own thoughts and feelings is
essential for happiness and a sense of well -being. When the world seems
predictable and controllable, and w hen our behaviors, thoughts, and
emotions seem within our control, we are better able to meet life’s
challenges, build healthy relationships, and achieve personal satisfaction munotes.in

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41 Research Methodology For Psychology and peace of mind. Feelings of loss of control are common among people
who seek the help of psychotherapists and counselors. Self -efficacy beliefs
play a major role in a number of common psychological problems, as well
as in successful interventions for these problems. Low self -efficacy
expectancies are an important feature of depress ion (Bandura, 1997;
Maddux & Meier, 1995). Depressed people usually believe they are less
capable than other people of behaving effectively in many important areas
of life. Dysfunctional anxiety and avoidant behavior are often the direct
result of low sel fefficacy expectancies for managing threatening situations
(Bandura, 1997; Williams, 1995).
People who have strong confidence in their abilities to perform and
manage potentially difficult situations will approach those situations
calmly and will not be un duly disrupted by difficulties. On the other hand,
people who lack confidence in their abilities will approach such situations
with apprehension, thereby reducing the probability that they will perform
effectively. Those with low self -efficacy also will re spond to difficulties
with increased anxiety, which usually disrupts performance, thereby
further lowering self -efficacy, and so on. Finally, self -efficacy plays a
powerful role in attempts to overcome substance abuse problems and
eating disorders (Bandura , 1997; DiClemente, Fairhurst, & Piotrowski,
1995). For each of these problems, enhancing self -efficacy for overcoming
the problem and for implementing self -control strategies in specific
challenging situations is essential to the success of therapeutic
interventions
3.1.2 Self -Efficacy and Physical Health:
Health and medical care in our society gradually have been shifting from
an exclusive emphasis on treating disease to an emphasis on preventing
disease and promoting good health. Most strategies for pr eventing health
problems, enhancing health, and hastening recovery from illness and
injury involve changing behavior. Research on self -efficacy has greatly
enhanced our understanding of how and why people adopt healthy and
unhealthy behaviors and of how to change behaviors that affect health
(Bandura, 1997; Maddux, Brawley, & Boykin, 1995; O’Leary & Brown,
1995). Beliefs about self -efficacy influence health in two ways.
First, self -efficacy influences the adoption of healthy behaviors, the
cessation of unh ealthy behaviors, and the maintenance of behavioral
changes in the face of challenge and difficulty. All the major theories of
health behavior, such as protection motivation theory (Maddux & Rogers,
1983; Rogers & Prentice -Dunn, 1997), the health belief mo del (Strecher,
Champion, & Rosenstock, 1997), and the theory or reasoned
action/planned behavior (Ajzen, 1988; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Maddux
& DuCharme, 1997), include self -efficacy as a key component (see also
Maddux, 1993; Weinstein, 1993). In addition, researchers have shown that
enhancing self -efficacy beliefs is crucial to successful change and
maintenance of virtually every behavior crucial to health, including
exercise, diet, stress management, safe sex, smoking cessation,
overcoming alcohol abuse, compliance with treatment and prevention munotes.in

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42 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research regimens, and disease detection behaviors such as breast selfexaminations
(Bandura, 1997; Maddux et al., 1995).
Second, self -efficacy beliefs influence a number of biological processes
that, in turn, influence heal th and disease (Bandura, 1997). Selfefficacy
beliefs affect the body’s physiological responses to stress, including the
immune system (Bandura, 1997; O’Leary & Brown, 1995). Lack of
perceived control over environmental demands can increase susceptibility
to infections and hasten the progression of disease (Bandura, 1997). Self -
efficacy beliefs also influence the activation of catecholamines, a family
of neurotransmitters important to the management of stress and perceived
threat, along with the endogenous p ainkillers referred to as endorphins
(Bandura, 1997; O’Leary & Brown, 1995).
3.1.3 Self -Efficacy and Self -Regulation :
Social cognitive theory and self -efficacy theory assume that we have the
capacity for selfregulation and self -initiated change, and studi es of people
who have overcome difficult behavioral problems without professional
help provide compelling evidence for this capacity.
Research on self -efficacy has added greatly to our understanding of how
we guide our own behavior in the pursuit of happi ness. Selfregulation
(simplified) depends on three interacting components (Bandura, 1986,
1997; Barone et al., 1997): goals or standards of performance, self -
evaluative reactions to performance, and self -efficacy beliefs. Goals are
essential to self -regula tion because we attempt to regulate our actions,
thoughts, and emotions to achieve desired outcomes.
The ability to envision desired future events and states allows us to create
incentives that motivate and guide our actions. Through our goals, we
adopt p ersonal standards and evaluate our behavior against these
standards. Thus, goals provide us with standards against which to monitor
our progress and evaluate both our progress and our abilities
3.2 CREATIVITY The Origins of Creativity as a Cultural Phenome non:
Given the manifest importance of creativity, it is rather surprising to learn
that it is actually a somewhat recent concept. It is not listed among the
classic human virtues, for example. The philosophers of ancient Greece
listed prudence, temperance , fortitude, and justice, whereas the Christian
theologians added faith, hope, and love —but creativity is overlooked
entirely.
Part of the reason for this neglect is that creativity originally was
conceived as a defining characteristic of an omnipotent di vine creator
rather than an attribute of mere fragile mortals. In the biblical book of
Genesis, for instance, God is portrayed as the Creator of the cosmos, the
earth, and all life. Indeed, almost every culture possesses creation myths in
which their gods have this very function and capacity. Even when munotes.in

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43 Research Methodology For Psychology individual humans were seen as the locus of creative activity, the causal
agents still sprung from a spiritual world.
This linkage is apparent in the Greek doctrine of the Muses. There was a
Muse for all maj or creative activities of classical times, including heroic or
epic poetry, lyric and love poetry, sacred poetry, tragedy, comedy, music,
dance, and even astronomy and history. The corresponding Muse was
thought to provide a guiding spirit or source of ins piration for the mortal
creator. This usage underlies several commonplace expressions, such as to
say that one has lost one’s muse when one has run out of creative ideas.
The Romans are responsible for a concept that is closely related to
creativity —that o f genius.
According to Roman mythology, each individual was born with a guardian
spirit who watched out for the person’s fate and distinctive individuality.
With time, the term was taken to indicate the person’s special talents or
aptitudes. Although in t he beginning everybody could be said to “have a
genius,” at least in the sense of possessing a unique capacity, the term
eventually began to be confined to those whose gifts set them well apart
from the average. The expression “creative genius” thus unites two
concepts with Greek and Roman roots pertaining to how the spiritual
world permeates human affairs.
Outstanding creativity was the gift of the gods or spirits, not a human act.
Even during the Italian Renaissance, when European civilization was
becomi ng secularized by the advent of humanism, rudiments of this
ascription remain. In Vasari’s classic (a. 1550/1968, p. 347) Lives of the
Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, for example, we can read how “the
great Ruler of Heaven looked down” and decided “to send to earth a
genius universal in each art.” This person would be endowed with such
special qualities that his works would seem “rather divine than earthly.”
Vasari was speaking of Michelangelo. With the increased secularization of
European thought, how ever, the causal locus of creativity gradually
moved away from the spiritual to the human world. Once this cultural shift
took place, the phenomenon became the subject of psychological inquiry.
The Origins of Creativity as a Research Topic :
In the early h istory of the field, psychologists occasionally would discuss
creative thought and behavior. William James (1880), for example,
described the creative process in terms of Darwinian theory (also see
Campbell, 1960). In the 20th century, the Gestalt psycholo gists—most
notably Wolfgang Ko¨ hler (1925) and Max Wertheimer (1945/1982) —
displayed considerable interest in creative problem solving. Likewise,
creativity sometimes would attract the attention of psychologists of
differing theoretical persuasions, includ ing the behaviorist B. F. Skinner
(1972), the cognitive psychologist Herbert A. Simon (1986), the
personality psychologist David C. McClelland (1962), and the humanistic
psychologists Carl Rogers (1954), Abraham Maslow (1959), and Rollo
May (1975). munotes.in

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44 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research Althou gh several psychologists touched upon this topic, the one who
deserves more credit than any other for emphasizing creativity as a critical
research topic is the psychometrician J. P. Guilford (1950). His address as
president of the American Psychological A ssociation, which was
published in a 1950 issue of American Psychologist, is often considered a
“call to arms” on behalf of this overlooked subject. More important,
Guilford made many direct contributions to the research literature, most
notably by devisin g widely used instruments for assessing individual
differences in creativity (Guilford, 1967). In the latter half of the 20th
century, the interest in creativity steadily grew and diversified such that
researchers were covering a fairly wide range of subto pics (Feist & Runco,
1993).
Following a minor lull in activity in the 1970s, creativity research has
attained new heights in the 1980s and 1990s (Simonton, 1999a). This
growth is demonstrated by (a) the advent of several creativity handbooks
(e.g., Glover , Ronning, & Reynolds, 1989; Runco, 1997; Sternberg, 1999);
(b) the appearance in 1988 of the Creativity Research Journal, which
complemented the Journal of Creative Behavior founded previously in
1967; and (c) the 1999 publication of the two -volume Encycl opedia of
Creativity (Runco & Pritzker, 1999). Indeed, creativity now can be
considered as a legitimate topic for scientific inquiry in mainstream
psychological research.
Measurement Approaches:
Before a concept can be measured, it first must be defined. Fortunately, at
least in the abstract, there is virtually universal agreement on what
creativity is. In particular, creativity usually is said to entail the generation
of ideas that fulfill the two following conditions: 1. Creativity must be
original. Thes e days, no one can be called “creative” who decides to
“reinvent the wheel,” nor can one earn that ascription for writing the lines
“To be, or not to be.” Creative ideas are novel, surprising, unexpected —
sometimes even shocking. Originality is a necessary but not sufficient
criterion for creativity, which brings us to the second condition. 2.
Creativity must be adaptive. Someone who decides to make a blimp out of
solid concrete can no doubt claim considerable originality, but whether
this strange idea “can fly” is quite a different matter. Similarly, someone
may propose a highly unusual advertising slogan like “The worst wurst in
the West,” but whether that phrase will convince potential consumers to
buy more of that brand of sausage is highly unlikely.
Given the general definition of creativity as “adaptive originality,” how
can it be best measured? This turns out to be difficult. Creativity
researchers have not agreed on the optimal instrument for assessing
individual differences on this trait (Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989). The
reason for this lack of consensus is that creativity can manifest itself in
three distinct ways. First, creativity may be viewed as some kind of mental
process that yields adaptive and original ideas (e.g., Sternberg &
Davidson, 1995; Ward, Smith, & Vaid, 1997). munotes.in

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45 Research Methodology For Psychology Second, it can be seen as a type of person who exhibits creativity (e.g.,
Gardner, 1993; Wallace & Gruber, 1989). Third, creativity can be
analyzed in terms of the concrete products that result from the workings of
the creative process or person (e.g., Martindale, 1990; Simonton, 1980,
1998b). Each of these three manifestations suggests rather distinct
measures, as will become apparent next.
The Creative Process:
If the emphasis is on the thought processes that yield creative ideas, then
the best assessment approach should be to tap individual differences in
access to these processes. This was the approach adopted by Guilford
(1967), who began by proposing a profound distinction between two kinds
of thinking. Convergent thought involves the convergence on a single
correct response, such as is characteristic of most aptitude tests, like those
that assess intelligence.
Divergent thought, in contrast, entails the capacity to generate many
alternative responses, including ideas of considerable variety and
originality. Guilford and others have devised a large number of tests
purported to measure the capacity for divergent thinking (e.g., Torrance,
1988; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Typical is the Alternate Uses test, in
which the subject must come up with many different ways of using a
common object, such as a paper clip or brick. Another test that views the
creative process in a manner similar to divergent thinking is the Remote
Associates Test, or RAT, of Mednick (1962).
This test was b ased on the premise that creativity involves the ability to
make rather remote associations between separate ideas. Highly creative
individuals were said to have a flat hierarchy of associations in
comparison to the steep hierarchy of associations of those with low
creativity. A flat associative hierarchy means that for any given stimulus,
the creative person has numerous associations available, all with roughly
equal probabilities of retrieval. Because such an individual can generate
many associative varia tions, the odds are increased that he or she will find
that one association that will make the necessary remote connection. The
RAT can therefore be said to operate according to an implicit variation -
selection model of the creative process. Many investigat ors have tried to
validate these divergent -thinking tests against other criteria of creative
performance (see, e.g., Crammond, 1994). Although the researchers in
these validation studies have had some modicum of success, it also has
become clear that gener alized tests do not always have as much predictive
validity as tests more specifically tailored to a particular domain of
creativity (Baer, 1993, 1994; for discussion, see Baer, 1998; Plucker,
1998). Creativity in music, for example, is not going to be ver y predictable
on the basis of how many uses one can imagine for a toothpick.
The Creative Person:
To the extent that the content of the creative process is domain specific, it
would seem necessary to construct as many creativity instruments as there
are creative domains. Fortunately, an alternative psychometric tactic exists munotes.in

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46 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research that is based on the assumption that the creative individual is distinctively
different in various personal characteristics. Especially pertinent is the
evidence that creative people display personality profiles that depart from
those of the average person (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Martindale,
1989; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995).
Creative personalities tend to possess those characteristics that would most
favor the production of both nu merous and diverse ideas. In particular,
creative individuals tend to be independent, nonconformist,
unconventional, even bohemian; they also tend to have wide interests,
greater openness to new experiences, and a more conspicuous behavioral
and cognitive flexibility and boldness (see Simonton, 1999a). The only
major complication in this general picture is that the personality profiles of
artistic creators tend to differ noticeably from those of scientific creators
(Feist, 1998). In a nutshell, the creative scientists tend to fall somewhere
between the creative artists and noncreative personalities in terms of their
typical traits. Not surprising given these results, several measures of
creativity are based on personality scales, such as the 16 Personality
Factor Questionnaire (e.g., Cattell & Butcher, 1968) or the Adjective
Check List (e.g., Gough, 1979).
Yet this is not the only person -based assessment strategy. Presumably, the
personality contrasts between creative and noncreative individuals may
partiall y reflect significant differences in their biographical characteristics,
including family background, educational experiences, and career
activities. As a consequence, some psychometricians have designed
instruments based on biographical inventories (e.g., Schaefer & Anastasi,
1968; Taylor & Ellison, 1967). For instance, creative persons often report
having much broader interests and a wider range of hobbies than is the
case for their less creative colleagues.
The Creative Product:
Because process - and pe rson-based creativity measures are relatively easy
to design and administer, the bulk of the literature on creativity has tended
to use them. Yet one might argue that the ultimate criterion of whether
someone can be considered creative is whether or not th at individual has
successfully generated a product that meets both requirements of creative
behavior — originality and adaptiveness. This productbased assessment is
more direct and objective, but it also has more than one operational
definition. One approac h is to simply ask individuals to identify what they
would consider samples of their creative activities, such as poems,
paintings, and projects (e.g., Richards, Kinney, Lunde, Benet, & Merzel,
1988a). Another approach is to have research participants gene rate
creative products under controlled laboratory conditions and then have
these products evaluated by independent judges (e.g., Amabile, 1982;
Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995; Sternberg & Lubart, 1995). These two
operational definition s have the advantage tha t they are best designed to
assess individual differences in more everyday forms of the phenomenon. munotes.in

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47 Research Methodology For Psychology Yet it is obvious that at higher levels of creative activity, the investigator
can go beyond a participant’s self -report or a judge’s subjective
evaluation . Inventors hold patents, scientists publish journal articles,
dramatists write plays, directors create movies, and so forth. Hence, cross -
sectional variation in creativity can be assessed in terms of individual
differences in the output of such profession ally or culturally
acknowledged works (e.g., Simonton, 1991b, 1997a). Investigators may
count total output (quantity), select output (quality), or output influence
(impact).
For example, researchers of scientific creativity may tabulate the total
number o f publications, just those publications that are actually cited in
the literature, or the total number of citations those publications have
received (e.g., Feist, 1993; Helmreich, Spence, Beane, Lucker, &
Matthews, 1980). Happily, researchers have demonstr ated quite
conclusively that these three alternative measures correlate very highly
among each other (e.g., Simonton, 1992b). If creative persons have
generated a substantial body of highly influential products, it is inevitable
that they should attain emi nence for their accomplishments (Simonton,
1991c). In fact, the single most powerful predictor of eminence in any
creative domain is the number of works an individual has contributed
(Simonton, 1977, 1991a, 1997a).
Accordingly, sometimes cross -sectional v ariation in creativity will be
assessed using some variety of eminence indicator (e.g., Cox, 1926; Feist,
1993; Simonton, 1976a). These may include expert ratings, the receipt of
major honors, or having entries in biographical dictionaries and
encyclopedia s (e.g., Simonton, 1976b, 1998a). Empirical Findings Judging
from the previous section, there seems to be an embarrassment of riches
when it comes to the assessment of creativity. This superfluity, however,
is only superficial. One of the most critical fin dings in the empirical
research is that these alternative measures tend to display fairly
respectable intercorrelations (Eysenck, 1995; Simonton, 1999b). In other
words, creative products tend to emerge from creative persons who use the
creative process in generating their output. The correlations are by no
means perfect, but they do suggest that each instrument is gauging the
same fundamental reality.
Consequently, the various measures often yield the same general
conclusions about the nature of human cre ativity. For example, a
considerable literature exists on the relation between age and creativity
(Simonton, 1988a). Despite some differences due to the creative domain
and other factors, pretty much the same developmental trends are observed
for product - and processbased measures (see, e.g., Dennis, 1966; Lehman,
1953; McCrae, Arenberg, & Costa, 1987). That is, whether we are
counting creative products or assessing the capacity for divergent thinking,
longitudinal changes in creativity appear to be best de scribed by a single -
peaked curvilinear function. The only major discrepancy is that creativity
according to the productivity definition can undergo a resurgence in the
latter years of life that has no counterpart according to the psychometric
definition (e .g., Simonton, 1989). Because extensive reviews are readily munotes.in

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48 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research available elsewhere (Simonton, 1999a), the best choice here is to discuss
just two sets of empirical findings that have special relevance for a
positive psychology of creativity.
These concern ea rly trauma and psychological disorder. Early Trauma
According to the empirical literature, child prodigies and intellectually
gifted children tend to have enjoyed rather happy childhoods (Feldman &
Goldsmith, 1986; Terman, 1925). That is, their parents pro vided them with
financially comfortable homes and ample intellectual and aesthetic
stimulation; their parents had stable marriages, and the children were both
physically healthy and educationally successful. Yet when researchers turn
to highly creative ind ividuals, a rather contrasting picture emerges (e.g.,
Goertzel & Goertzel, 1962; Goertzel, Goertzel, & Goertzel, 1978). The
family may have experienced severe economic ups and downs, and the
parents’ marriage may have fallen far short of the ideal; the chi ld may
have been sickly or have endured some physical or cognitive disability
(e.g., Roe, 1953). More remarkably, early development of the future
creator may have been plagued with one or more traumatic experiences,
such as the loss of one or both parents in childhood or adolescence
(Eisenstadt, 1978; Roe, 1953). Yet what makes these findings all the more
intriguing is that the same developmental events also are associated with
negative life outcomes, such as juvenile delinquency or suicidal
depression (Eis enstadt, 1978).
This peculiar paradox suggests that under the right conditions, exposure to
traumatic or difficult experiences early in life can make a positive
contribution to the development of creative potential (Simonton, 1994).
Perhaps those who have the capacity to “rise to the challenge” will benefit,
and creativity itself may be an adaptive response to such circumstances
(Eisenstadt, 1978). Events that might have yielded a societal misfit instead
produce an individual who can respond constructively with an adulthood
of creative achievement rather than disappointment or alienation.
Psychological Disorder One of the oldest debates in the study of creativity
is the “mad -genius controversy” (Prentky, 1980).
As far back as Aristotle, thinkers have specu lated that outstanding
creativity is associated with psychopathology. This view has persisted in
more modern times, as is apparent in psychoanalytic psychobiographies of
creative geniuses (i.e., “psychopathographies”). Not every psychologist
agrees with th is thesis, however. Humanistic psychologists, in particular,
tend to see creativity as a symptom of mental health, not illness (e.g.,
Maslow, 1959; May, 1975). Based on the empirical research on this issue,
it appears that there is some truth in both viewp oints (Eysenck, 1995). On
the one hand, the rates of apparent psychological disorder in samples of
highly creative individuals do seem to be somewhat higher than in the
general population (Eysenck, 1995; Richards, Kinney, Lunde, Benet, &
Merzel, 1988b). Th e incidence rates are especially elevated for those who
pursue artistic forms of creative expression (Jamison, 1993; Ludwig,
1995). munotes.in

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49 Research Methodology For Psychology Furthermore, there is a positive relation between the amount of
psychopathological symptoms and the level of creative achie vement
attained (Barron, 1969; Eysenck, 1995; Ludwig, 1995). Finally, and
perhaps most provocatively, family lines with disproportionate numbers of
individuals with psychological disorders also are more likely to have
highly creative individuals (Juda, 194 9; Karlson, 1970; Richards et al.,
1988b). As such, pathological and creative pedigrees tend to overlap to a
degree that far exceeds chance expectation. On the other hand, the
empirical research also suggests that creativity and psychopathology are
by no m eans equivalent (Rothenberg, 1990).
For one thing, creative individuals often have character traits, such as high
ego strength, which are not found in clinical populations (Barron, 1969;
Eysenck, 1995). However bizarre their thoughts or behaviors may be,
creators remain in self -command —even exploiting their eccentricities for
creative ends. In addition, their symptomatology is below pathological
levels (Barron, 1969; Eysenck, 1995). Though their profiles do not fall in
the normal range, they also do not re ach truly pathological levels — they
are at the borderline between the normal and the abnormal. Finally,
psychopathology may be the consequence rather than the cause of a
creative career (Simonton, 1994). That is, a life of creativity can have
exceptional s tresses related to the tremendous disappointments of failures
and the unexpected distractions of fame (Schaller, 1997).
It is telling that a standard measure of life stressors, the Social
Readjustment Rating Questionnaire, assigns 28 points for any
“outstanding personal achievement” (Holmes & Rahe, 1967). This is
about the same weight granted to “change in responsibilities at work,” a
“son or daughter leaving home,” or “in -law troubles.” These 28 points
probably understate the true magnitude of stress for t he highest levels of
creativity. After all, the weights assigned by this questionnaire were based
on more everyday forms of achievement rather than creations on the level
of the Sistine Chapel or War and Peace. When one places these
psychopathology finding s alongside those for traumatic experiences, a
significant lesson emerges:
Events and traits that might severely disable or retard personal
development can sometimes be converted into forces for positive growth.
Or, if that is too strong an inference, one can safely infer the following
optimistic alternative: Such events and conditions need not prevent the
development of exceptional creativity. Indeed, people can be
phenomenally robust, as they transform “liabilities” into assets.
Theoretical Issues:
Despite the abundance of empirical findings, creativity researchers
continue to wrestle with profound theoretical questions, two of which
involve nature versus nurture and small -c versus big -C creativity. I
explore these next. The Nature -Nurture Issue Is crea tivity born or made, or
some combination of the two? Galton (1869) introduced this question in munotes.in

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50 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research his book Hereditary Genius, and he later coined the terms nature and
nurture in his book English Men of Science:
Their Nature and Nurture (1874):
Subsequent res earchers have suggested that creativity reflects a complex
interaction of genetic and environmental factors (Eysenck, 1995;
Simonton, 1999b). For example, genes may contribute to creativity
according to a multiplicative (emergenic) rather than a simple add itive
model (Lykken, 1998; Simonton, 1999c). As a further complication, it
may very well be that various environmental influences interact with
genetic factors with equally complex functional relationships (Eysenck,
1995). To some extent, creative developm ent requires a specific
congruence between genetic inheritance and environmental stimulation.
This intricate genetic -environmental determination helps to explain why
creativity may display a highly skewed cross -sectional distribution in the
general populat ion (Simonton, 1999b).
When optimal creative development requires a precise configuration of
many different factors, it makes it more difficult for people to emerge who
have the total package. Small -c Versus Big -C Creativity Small -c creativity
enhances ev eryday life and work with superior problem -solving skills,
whereas big -C creativity makes lasting contributions to culture and
history. In the first case, we are speaking of the creative person, whereas
in the latter case we are talking about the creative genius. The enigma is
whether these two grades of creative behavior are qualitatively or
quantitatively distinct. If everyday creativity is qualitatively different from
genius -level creativity, then the personal attributes underlying the first
may be diffe rent from those responsible for the second (e.g., any tendency
toward psychopathology). If the two are only quantitatively different,
however, then the factors that predict levels of small -c creativity would
also predict levels of big -C creativity. The evi dence to date supports the
notion that these two grades represent regions on a continuous scale of
creative activity
3.3 WISDOM Wisdom has been discussed and studied in philosophy and religion for
thousands of years (for an overview, see Assmann, 1994; K ekes, 1995;
Rice, 1958). More recently, scholars from other disciplines such as
cultural anthropology, political science, education, and psychology also
have shown interest in wisdom. Indeed, one can argue that wisdom is
becoming a center of transdisciplin ary discourse (e.g., Agazzi, 1991;
Arlin, 1990; Assmann, 1994; Baltes, 1993; Lehrer, Lum, Slichta, & Smith,
1996; Maxwell, 1984; Nichols, 1996; Nozick, 1993; Oelmu¨ ller, 1989;
Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996b; Sternberg, 1990;
Welsch, 1995 ).
In defining and studying wisdom from a psychological point of view, we
attempt to pay careful attention to what philosophers offer regarding the
nature of the structure and function of wisdom. Without such attention, we munotes.in

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51 Research Methodology For Psychology would lose the special strength that the concept of wisdom holds for
specifying the content and form of the primary virtues and behaviors that
individuals aspire to as they attempt to regulate their lives toward an
“universal canon of a good life.”
To prevent a possible misunderstanding , we acknowledge the scientific
limits of our work on wisdom. Specifically, any empirical manifestation of
wisdom falls short of the theoretical aspiration. In this spirit, we do not
maintain that a psychological theory will ever capture wisdom in its full -
blown cultural complexity. Our hope, however, is that this intermarriage
of philosophy and psychology results in lines of psychological inquiry
where virtues, values, and the mind can meet in a new and productive
collaboration. We believe that this may be possible because, at a high level
of analysis, the concept of wisdom appears to be culturally universal.
General Criteria Derived from an Analysis of Cultural -Historical and
Philosophical Accounts of Wisdom
Wisdom addresses important and difficult quest ions and strategies about
the conduct and meaning of life. Wisdom includes knowledge about the
limits of knowledge and the uncertainties of the world. Wisdom represents
a truly superior level of knowledge, judgment, and advice. Wisdom
constitutes knowledge with extraordinary scope, depth, measure, and
balance. Wisdom involves a perfect synergy of mind and character, that is,
an orchestration of knowledge and virtues. Wisdom represents knowledge
used for the good or well -being of oneself and that of others. Wisdom,
though difficult to achieve and to specify, is easily recognized when
manifested.
Psychological Theories of Wisdom: From Implicit to Explicit
Theories:
Because of its enormous cultural and historical heritage, a psychological
definition and opera tionalization of wisdom is extremely difficult. This
could be why many wisdom researchers have restricted their research
efforts to laypersons’ implicit theories of wisdom and wise persons
(Clayton & Birren, 1980; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Kramer, 2000;
Sowarka, 1989; Staudinger, Sowarka, Maciel, & Baltes, 1997; Sternberg,
1985, 1990). Empirical research based on explicit theories of wisdom -
related behavior is relatively rare.
Implicit Theories:
With implicit theories, we mean the beliefs or mental repre sentations that
people have about wisdom and the characteristics of wise persons. In
studies on implicit beliefs about wisdom and wise persons, one finds quite
a high degree of overlap in the core aspects of wisdom, even though
authors have focused on slig htly different aspects and named their
components differently. All conceptions include cognitive as well as
social, motivational, and emotional components (e.g., Birren & Fisher,
1990; Kramer, 2000). munotes.in

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52 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research The cognitive components usually include strong intelle ctual abilities, rich
knowledge and experience in matters of the human condition, and an
ability to apply one’s theoretical knowledge practically. A second basic
component refers to reflective judgment that is based on knowledge about
the world and the sel f, an openness for new experiences, and the ability to
learn from mistakes. Socioemotional components generally include good
social skills, such as sensitivity and concern for others and the ability to
give good advice. A fourth motivational component refe rs to the good
intentions that usually are associated with wisdom. That is, wisdom aims
at solutions that optimize the benefit of others and oneself. Sternberg’s
(1998) effort at specifying a comprehensive theory of wisdom is in the
tradition of these impl icit lines of inquiry.
In his theory, consisting so far of a coordinated set of characterizations
rather than empirical work, Sternberg emphasizes the role of “balance.”
Specifically, wisdom is conceptualized as the application of tacit
knowledge toward t he achievement of a common good achieved through a
balance among multiple interests, including one’s own interests and those
of others. A factor -analytic study conducted by Staudinger, Sowarka, et al.
(1997) illustrates the implicit theories tradition of w isdom. One hundred
and two participants rated 131 attributes regarding the degree to which
each represents the notion of an ideally wise person. The attributes were
selected from past work on implicit theories and work generated by the
Berlin Wisdom Paradi gm (see subsequently).
Consistent with past research, these dimensions refer to (a) exceptional
knowledge concerning the acquisition of wisdom; (b) exceptional
knowledge concerning its application; (c) exceptional knowledge about
contextual and temporal v ariations of life; and (d) person -related
competencies.
Explicit Theories:
The second cluster of wisdom theories represents explicit psychological
theories (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 1993; Pasupathi &
Baltes, in press; Sternberg, 1990). They are meant to focus on cognitive
and behavioral expressions of wisdom and the processes involved in the
joining of cognition with behavior.
One main objective of such theories is to develop theoretical models of
wisdom that allow for empirical inquiry —by means of quantitative
operationalization of wisdom -related thought and behavior —as well as for
the derivation of hypotheses that can be tested empirically (e.g., about
predictors of behavioral expressions of wisdom).
To date, the theoretical and empir ical work on explicit psychological
conceptions of wisdom can be divided roughly into three groups:
(a) the conceptualization of wisdom as a personal characteristic or a
personality disposition (e.g., Erikson, 1959; McAdams & de St.
Aubin, 1998); munotes.in

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53 Research Methodology For Psychology (b) the conceptualization of wisdom in the neo - Piagetian tradition of
postformal and dialectical thinking (e.g., Alexander & Langer, 1990;
Kramer, 1986, 2000; Labouvie -Vief, 1990; Peng & Nisbett, 1999);
and
(c) the conceptualization of wisdom as an expert sy stem dealing with the
meaning and conduct of life, as advocated in the Berlin Wisdom
Paradigm (e.g., Baltes & Smith, 1990; Dittmann -Kohli & Baltes,
1990; Staudinger & Baltes, 1994).
The Berlin Wisdom Project:
Wisdom as Expertise in the Fundamental Pragma tics of Life In this
section, we shall describe the conception of wisdom upon which the Berlin
Wisdom Project is based. Thereafter, we will discuss some general
considerations concerning the development of wisdom across the life
span.
The Content Domain o f Wisdom:
Proceeding from the notion that wisdom involves some form of excellence
(see Table 24.1), the Berlin Wisdom Project conceptualizes wisdom as an
expertise in the meaning and conduct of life. Our conceptualization of
wisdom as expertise signals th at we expect most people not to be wise.
What we expect, however, is that the behavioral expressions we observe in
individuals can be ordered on a “wisdom scale.” In general, wisdom is
foremost a cultural product deposited in books of wisdom rather than in
individuals. The contents to which this expertise of wisdom refers are the
“fundamental pragmatics of life,” that is, knowledge about the essence of
the human condition and the ways and means of planning, managing, and
understanding a good life (cf. Balte s & Smith, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger,
1993, 2000). Examples of the fundamental pragmatics of life include
knowledge and skills about the conditions, variability, ontogenetic
changes, and historicity of human development; insight into obligations
and goals in life; k nowledge and skills about the social and situational
influences on human life; as well as knowledge and skills about the
finitude of life and the inherent limits of human knowledge.
As these examples reveal, the contents to which wisdom refers a re
markedly different from those of other domains that have been reported in
the traditional expertise literature (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Most research
on ex332 pertise has focused on domains where well -defined problems
can be used to systematically stud y experts’ and laypersons’ knowledge
systems (e.g., physics or chess). In the domain of the fundamental
pragmatics of life, contrariwise, problems are almost by definition
illdefined, and no clear -cut “optimal” solutions exist (see also Arlin,
1990). Never theless, we assume that wisdom has a clear conceptual core
and that its manifestations can be evaluated.
As our empirical studies show, most people, after some training, are able
to reach high levels of consensus in their evaluation of wisdom -related
products. Antecedents of Wisdom Our concept of wisdom as expertise and munotes.in

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54 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research the linkage of this concept to life span theory (Baltes, 1987, 1997) suggest
an ensemble of three broad domains of antecedents or determining
factors —each comprising internal and external f actors and processes —to
be influential in the development of wisdom at the level of individuals.
Before describing these three domains in detail, we need to discuss five
more general considerations concerning the ontogenesis of wisdom. First,
as is typical for the development of expertise, we assume that wisdom is
acquired through an extended and intense process of learning and practice.
This clearly requires a high degree of motivation to strive for excellence,
as well as a social -cultural and personal env ironment that is supportive of
the search for wisdom.
Second, wisdom is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon; therefore,
for wisdom to emerge, a variety of experiential factors and processes on
micro - and macro -levels are required to interact and collabo rate. Third,
given that wisdom involves the orchestration of cognitive, personal, social,
interpersonal, and spiritual factors, its antecedents are diverse in nature.
Fourth, because developmental tasks and adaptive challenges change
across life, and the h uman condition is inherently a life -course
phenomenon, we expect wisdom to reach its peak relatively late in adult
life. Fifth, we believe that, as with other fields of expertise, the guidance
of mentors, as well as the experience and mastery of critical l ife
experiences, are conducive to individual manifestations of wisdom.
We now turn to the three domains of ontogenetic conditions and processes
that influence the development of wisdom, namely, facilitative
experiential contexts, expertise -relevant factor s, and person -related factors
(for a graphical representation of our developmental model, see Baltes &
Staudinger, 2000, Figure 1, p. 121). In our developmental model,
facilitative experiential contexts for the development of wisdom include
chronological a ge, education, parenthood, professions that require
individuals to strengthen their skills in social -emotional intelligence,
familiarity with books such as autobiographical novels, or the historical
period, which varies along dimensions of salience and fac ilitation in
matters of the human condition.
A second domain that is central to the development of wisdom refers to
expertise -relevant factors such as experience in life matters, organized
tutelage, the availability of mentorship in dealing with life probl ems, and
motivational factors such as a general interest in aspects of human life or a
motivation to strive for excellence. Finally, we consider person -related
factors such as basic cognitive processes, aspects of intelligence,
creativity, flexible cogniti ve styles, and personality dispositions such as
openness to experience or ego strength.
These three domains of ontogenetic influences are interrelated, and we
believe that, in the sense of equifinality (Kruglanski, 1996), different
combinations of the dom ains may lead to similar outcomes. Thus, there is
no single “optimal” pathway, but rather several different ways to acquire
wisdom. Nevertheless, it is assumed that there is a productive
collaboration among the relevant factors. For example, external facto rs munotes.in

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55 Research Methodology For Psychology like the presence of mentors or the experience and mastery of critical life
experiences are certainly conducive to the development of wisdom. For
these factors to be influential, however, preconditions such as being highly
motivated to live in a “good” way and a requisite level of cognitive
efficacy probably are necessary. The notion that wisdom requires the
presence of several intra - and interindividual factors that need to interact
in certain ways underlines that wisdom refers to qualities that can be
acquired only by very few people.
The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm:
Our paradigm for assessing wisdom comprises the following three core
features: (a) Study participants are confronted with difficult life probllems
of fictitious people under standardized condi tions. Specifically, they are
asked to read short vignettes about problems of life management,
planning, and review. (b) Participants are then instructed to think aloud
about those life problems, and their responses are tape -recorded and
transcribed. (c) A selected panel of trained judges then rates the protocols
according to five criteria (see subsequent criteria) that were developed
based on the general theoretical framework outlined. As an illustration,
two responses that would be scored as either high o r low on wisdom are
presented in In the context of our empirical work, we have developed five
qualitative criteria that can be used for evaluating wisdom in any kind of
material.
The development of these five criteria was guided by several lines of
resea rch, including research on expertise, life -span psychology of
cognition and personality, the neo -Piagetian tradition of cognitive
development in adulthood, and our cultural -historical analyses of wisdom
The first two criteria derive logically from our view of wisdom as an
expert system. They are rich factual (declarative) knowledge about the
fundamental pragmatics of life and rich procedural knowledge about the
fundamental pragmatics of life. Factual knowledge related to wisdom
includes topics like human na ture, lifelong development, interpersonal
relations, social norms, and individual differences in development and
outcomes. Procedural knowledge comprises strategies and heuristics for
dealing with life problems, for example, heuristics for the structuring and
weighing of life goals, ways to handle conflicts, or alternative backup
strategies. We view these two knowledge criteria as basic criteria —they
are necessary but not sufficient for achieving wisdom. The three other
criteria we refer to as metacriteria. Life span contextualism refers to
knowledge about the many different themes and contexts of human life
(education, family, work, friends, etc.), their interrelations, and cultural
variations.
This criterion includes a life span perspective, for example, regarding
changes in the relevance of different domains and in motivational
priorities during ontogeny from birth into old age. Value relativism and
tolerance refers to the acknowledgment of individual and cultural
differences in values. Note, however, tha t wisdom does not mean
tolerance of any possible value or priority system. On the contrary, munotes.in

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56 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research wisdom includes an explicit interest in achieving a balance between
individual and collective interests and a focus on human virtues. Aside
from this fundamental co nstraint, however, wisdom encompasses a high
level of tolerance and sensitivity for different opinions and values.
Recognition and management of uncertainty refers to knowledge about the
limitations of human information processing and about the low
predict ability of occurrences and consequences in human life.
Wisdom -related knowledge involves knowledge about such uncertainties,
but also about ways to deal with such uncertainty. For the purpose of
evaluating the protocols according to the five criteria, a s elect panel of
raters has been extensively trained in the application of the criteria. A
protocol is classified as approaching “wise” only if it has received high
ratings on all five criteria. Raters are trained on the basis of a manual
(Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes, 1994). Reliability and stability of the rating
procedure have been shown to be very satisfactory.
Selected Findings From the Berlin Wisdom Project:
In the following, we will discuss results regarding the relationship
between age and wisdom -related performance, the influence of
professional experience on wisdom -related performance, the performance
of persons nominated as wise, the main variables that predict wisdom -
related performance, and the activation of wisdom -related knowledge in
the contex t of intervention or optimization research. Age and Wisdom -
Related Performance Guided by the search for positive aspects of human
aging, age -comparative studies of wisdomrelated performance have been
one of our central foci (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Pasu pathi, Staudinger,
& Baltes, 2000; Smith & Baltes, 1990; Staudinger, 1999. Note that these
data are cross -sectional rather than longitudinal and therefore are
contaminated with cohort -related sampling and historical change (cohort)
factors.
Our findings s uggest that wisdom -related performance, as measured by the
Berlin Wisdom Paradigm, increases sharply during adolescence and young
adulthood (i.e., between 15 and 25 years) but, on average, remains
relatively stable during middle adulthood and young old age (i.e., between
25 and 75 years). Peak performances, however, seem to be more likely in
the 50s and 60s (Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker, & Smith, 1995).
Tentatively, our data also suggest that wisdom -related performance may
decline in very old age, beginning in current cohorts, at the average age of
75. At first sight, it is surprising that wisdom seems to remain relatively
stable during adulthood and old age, at least up to age 75. This empirical
finding is inconsistent with the notion that wisdom may be a p ositive
aspect of the aging process. In interpreting the empirical evidence,
however, it is important to consider the dramatically different results from
agecomparative studies on the fluid mechanics of cognitive functioning.
3.4 EMPATHY AND ALTRUISM A Bas ic Question: Is Altruism Part of Human Nature?: munotes.in

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57 Research Methodology For Psychology Clearly, we humans devote much time and energy to helping others. We
send money to rescue famine victims halfway around the world —or to
save whales. We stay up all night to comfort a friend who has just suff ered
a broken relationship. We stop on a busy highway to help a stranded
motorist change a flat tire. Why do we humans help? Often, of course, the
answer is easy. We help because we have no choice, because it is
expected, or because it is in our own best i nterest. We may do a friend a
favor because we do not want to lose the friendship or because we expect
to see the favor reciprocated. But it is not for such easy answers that we
ask ourselves why we help; it is to press the limits of these answers.
We wan t to know whether our helping is always and exclusively
motivated by the prospect of some benefit for ourselves, however subtle.
We want to know whether anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the
bounds of self -interest and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of
another. We want to know whether altruism is within the human
repertoire. Proponents of universal egoism claim that everything we do, no
matter how noble and beneficial to others, is really directed toward the
ultimate goal of self -benefit. Proponents of altruism do not deny that the
motivation for much of what we do, including much that we do for others,
is egoistic. But they claim more. They claim that at least some of us, to
some degree, under some circumstances, are capable of a qualitat ively
different form of motivation, motivation with an ultimate goal of
benefiting someone else.
Those arguing for universal egoism have elegance and parsimony on their
side in this debate. It is simpler to explain all human behavior in terms of
self-bene fit than to postulate a motivational pluralism in which both self -
benefit and another’s benefit can serve as ultimate goals. Elegance and
parsimony are important criteria in developing scientific explanations, yet
they are not the most important criterion. The most important task is to
explain adequately and accurately the phenomena in question. We need to
know if altruistic motivation exists, even if this knowledge plays havoc
with our assumptions about human nature. If altruistic motivation is within
the human repertoire, then both who we are as a species and what we are
capable of doing are quite different than if it is not.
Altruism, if it exists, provides an important cornerstone for positive
psychology. Whether altruism exists is not a new question. T his question
has been central in Western thought for centuries, from Aristotle (384 –322
b.c.) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 –1274), through Thomas Hobbes
(1588 –1679), the Duke de la Rochefoucauld (1613 –1680), David Hume
(1711 –1776), Adam Smith (1723 –1790), a nd Jeremy Bentham (1748 –
1832), to Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 –1900) and Sigmund Freud (1856 –
1939). The majority view among Renaissance and post -Renaissance
philosophers, and more recently among biologists and psychologists, is
that we are, at heart, purely e goistic — we care for others only to the extent
that their welfare affects ours (see Mansbridge, 1990, and Wallach &
Wallach, 1983, for reviews). munotes.in

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58 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research The many forms of self -benefit that can be derived from helping make the
case for universal egoism seem very p ersuasive. Some forms of self -
benefit are obvious, as when we get material rewards and public praise or
when we escape public censure. But even when we help in the absence of
external rewards, we still may benefit. Seeing someone in distress may
cause us t o feel distress, and we may act to relieve that person’s distress as
an instrumental means to relieve our own. Alternatively, we may gain self -
benefit by feeling good about ourselves for being kind and caring, or by
escaping the guilt and shame we might fe el if we did not help. Even
heroes and martyrs can benefit from their acts of apparent selflessness.
Consider the soldier who saves his comrades by diving on a grenade or the
man who dies after relinquishing his place in a rescue craft. These persons
may have acted to escape anticipated guilt and shame for letting others
die. They may have acted to gain the admiration and praise of those left
behind — or benefits in an afterlife. Perhaps they simply misjudged the
situation, not thinking that their actions w ould cost them their lives. To
suggest that heroes’ noble acts could be motivated by self -benefit may
seem cynical, but the possibility must be faced if we are to responsibly
address the question of whether altruism exists.
Empathic Emotion: A Possible So urce of Altruistic Motivation:
In both earlier philosophical writings and more recent psychological
works, the most frequently mentioned possible source of altruistic
motivation is an other -oriented emotional reaction to seeing another
person in need. Thi s reaction has variously been called “empathy”
(Batson, 1987; Krebs, 1975; Stotland, 1969); “sympathy” (Eisenberg &
Strayer, 1987; Heider, 1958; Wispe´, 1986, 1991); “sympathetic distress”
(Hoffman, 1981); “tenderness” (McDougall, 1908); and “pity” or
“compassion” (Hume, 1740/1896; Smith, 1759/1853). We shall call this
otheroriented emotion empathy. Empathy has been named as a source —if
not the source —of altruism by philosophers ranging from Aquinas to
Rousseau to Hume to Adam Smith, and by psychologists ra nging from
William McDougall to contemporary researchers such as Hoffman (1981),
Krebs (1975), and Batson (1987).
Formally, we define empathy as an otheroriented emotional response
elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone else. If
the other is perceived to be in need, then empathic emotions include
sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, and the like. It is
important to distinguish this other -oriented emotional response from a
number of related psychological phenomena, eac h of which also has at one
time or another been called empathy. We have identified seven related
concepts from which empathic emotion should be distinguished. Seven
Related Concepts
(1) Knowing another person’s internal state, including thoughts and
feelings. Some clinicians and researchers have called knowing
another person’s internal state “empathy” (e.g., Brothers, 1989; de
Waal, 1996; Dymond, 1950; Kohler, 1929; Wispe´, 1986). Others munotes.in

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59 Research Methodology For Psychology have called this knowledge “being empathic” (Rogers, 1975),
“accurate empathy” (Truax & Carkuff, 1967), or “empathic accuracy”
(Ickes, 1993). Still others speak of “understanding” (Becker, 1931) or
“perceiving accurately” (Levenson & Ruef, 1992). It might appear
that such knowledge is a necessary condition for the other -oriented
emotional response claimed to evoke altruistic motivation, but it is
not. Empathic emotion requires that one think one knows the other’s
state because empathic emotion is based on a perception of the other’s
welfare. It does not, however, require tha t this perception be accurate,
or even that it match the other’s perception, which is often the
standard used to define empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1993). An attempt
to help motivated by empathic feeling is, of course, more likely to be
beneficial if the fee ling is based on an accurate perception of the
other’s needs. Thus, it is not surprising that clinicians, whose primary
concern is to help the client, tend to emphasize accurate perception of
the client’s feelings more than feeling for the client.
(2) Assuming the posture of an observed other. Assuming the physical
posture or attitude of an observed other is a definition of empathy in
many dictionaries. Among psychologists, however, assuming
another’s posture is more likely to be called “motor mimicry”
(Bavelas, Black, Lemeray, & Mullett, 1987; Hoffman, 1981; Murphy,
1947; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000); “physiological
sympathy” (Ribot, 1911); or “imitation” (Becker, 1931; Lipps, 1903;
Titchener, 1909). Feeling empathic emotion may be facilitated by
assuming another’s posture, but assuming the other’s posture is
neither necessary nor sufficient to produce empathy as we are using
the term.
(3) Coming to feel as another person feels. Feeling the same emotion that
another person feels also is a common d ictionary definition of
empathy, and it is a definition used by some psychologists (Berger,
1962; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Englis, Vaughan, & Lanzetta, 1982;
Freud, 1922; Stotland, 1969). Among philosophers, coming to feel as
the other feels is more like ly to be called “sympathy” (Hume,
1740/1896; Smith, 1759/1853). Scientists —including psychologists —
who have been influenced by philosophy also typically refer to this
state as “sympathy” (Allport, 1924; Cooley, 1902; Darwin, 1871;
McDougall, 1908; Mead, 19 34; Spencer, 1870; Wundt, 1897). Feeling
the same emotion as another also has been called “fellow feeling”
(Hume, 1740/1896; Smith, 1759/1853); “emotional identification”
(Freud, 1922), “emotional contagion” (Becker, 1931; de Waal, 1996;
Hatfield, Cacioppo , & Rapson, 1992; Heider, 1958); “affective
reverberation” (Davis, 1985), and “empathic distress” (Hoffman,
1981). Although feeling as the oth er feels may be an important
stepping -stone to the other -oriented feeling that has been claimed to
be a source of altruism, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
precondition (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). Feeling as the other
feels may actually inhibit feeling for the other if it leads one to
become focused on one’s own emotional state. For example, sensing
the nervousness of other passengers on an airplane in rough weather, munotes.in

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60 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research one may become nervous, too, and focused on one’s own
nervousness.
(4) Intuiting or projecting oneself into another’s situation. Projecting
oneself into another’s situation is the psyc hological state referred to
by Lipps (1903) as Einfu¨ lung and for which Titchener (1909)
originally coined the term “empathy.” This state also has been called
“projective empathy” (Becker, 1931). Originally, these terms were
intended to describe an artist ’s act of imagining what it would be like
to be some person or, more often, some inanimate object —such as a
gnarled, dead tree on a windswept hillside. This original definition of
empathy as aesthetic projection often appears in dictionaries, but it is
rarely what is meant by the term in contemporary psychology
(although Wispe´, 1968, has called this state “aesthetic” empathy).
(5) Imagining how another is feeling. Wispe´ (1968) called imagining
how another is feeling “psychological” empathy in order to
differentiate it from the aesthetic empathy just described. Stotland
(1969) spoke of this as a particular form of perspective taking —an
“imagine him” (or, more generally, an “imagine other”) perspective.
Experimental instructions to adopt this imagine -other perspective
often have been used to induce empathic emotion in participants in
laboratory research (see Batson, 1991, and Davis, 1994, for reviews).
(6) Imagining how one would think and feel in the other’s place. Adam
Smith (1759/1853) prosaically refe rred to this act of imagination as
“changing places in fancy.” Mead (1934) sometimes called it “role
taking” and sometimes “empathy”; Becker (1931) coined the term
“mimpathizing.” In the Piagetian tradition, imagining how one would
think in the other’s pl ace has been called either “perspective taking”
or “decentering” (Piaget, 1932/1965; Steins & Wicklund, 1996).
Stotland (1969) called this an “imagine -self” perspective,
distinguishing it from the imagine -other perspective described
previously. These imagi ne-self and imagineother forms of perspective
taking often have been confused or equated in spite of research
evidence suggesting that they should not. When attending to another
person in distress, an imagine -other perspective stimulates the
otheroriented emotional response that we are calling empathy,
whereas an imagine -self perspective may stimulate empathy but is
also likely to elicit more self -orient ed feelings of personal distress
(Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997).
(7) Being upset by another person’ s suffering. The state of personal
distress evoked by seeing another in distress to which we just referred
has been given a variety of names. It has been called “sympathetic
pain” (McDougall, 1908); “promotive tension” (Hornstein, 1982);
“unpleasant arousa l occasioned by observation” (Piliavin, Dovidio,
Gaertner, & Clark, 1981); and “empathy” (Krebs, 1975). Here, one
does not feel distressed for the other nor distressed as the other but
feels distressed by the state of the other. We have listed these seven
other empathy concepts for three reasons. First, we wish to point out munotes.in

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61 Research Methodology For Psychology the range of psychological states to which the term empathy has been
applied, hoping both to reduce confusion and to discourage imperialist
attempts to identify it with only one of these phenomena. Second, we
wish to distinguish each of the seven other empathy concepts from the
other -oriented emotional response that has been claimed to be a
source of altruistic motivation. Third, we wish to suggest how e ach of
the other seven concepts rel ates to this empathic emotional response.
Most of the other empathy concepts describe cognitive or perceptual
states that are potential precursors to and facilitators of empathic
emotion (Concepts 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6). Two describe alternative
emotional stat es: feeling as the other feels (Concept 3) and feeling
personal distress (upset) as a result of witnessing the other’s suffering
(Concept 7). Feeling as the other feels may serve as a stepping -stone
to empathic feelings and, hence, to altruistic motivation , but it also
may lead to self -focused attention and inhibit other -oriented feelings.
Feeling personal distress is not likely to be a stepping -stone to
altruism. Instead, it is likely to evoke an egoistic motive to relieve
one’s own distress (Batson, Fultz , & Schoenrade, 1987; Piliavin et al.,
1981). Although distinctions among the eight concepts in the empathy
cluster are sometimes subtle, there seems little doubt that each of
these states exists. Indeed, most are familiar experiences. Their
familiarity, h owever, should not lead us to ignore their psychological
significance. The processes whereby one person can sense another’s
cares and wishes are truly remarkable, as are the range of emotions
that these processes can arouse. Some great thinkers (e.g., Davi d
Hume) have suggested that these processes are the basis for all social
perception and interaction. They are certainly key —and
underappreciated —elements of our social nature.
Empathic Emotion as Situational, Not Dispositional:
Note that all eight of the empathy concepts we have considered are
situation specific. None refers to a general disposition or personality trait.
There may well be individual differences in the ability and inclination to
experience these various states (see Davis, 1994, for a sugges tive
discussion), but attempts to measure these differences by standard
retrospective self -report questionnaires seem suspect at best. Such
questionnaires are more likely to reveal the degree of desire to see oneself
and to be seen by others as empathic ra ther than to provide a valid
measure of one’s proclivity to be empathic.
Testing the Empathy -Altruism Hypothesis:
The claim that feeling empathic emotion for someone in need evokes
altruistic motivation to relieve that need has been called the
empathyalt ruism hypothesis (Batson, 1987, 1991). According to this
hypothesis, the greater the empathic emotion, the greater the altruistic
motivation. Considerable evidence supports the idea that feeling empathy
for a person in need leads to increased helping of th at person (Coke,
Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; Krebs,
1975; see Batson, 1991, and Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, for reviews). To munotes.in

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62 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research observe an empathy -helping relationship, however, tells us nothing about
the nature of the motivation that underlies this relationship. Increasing the
other person’s welfare could be an ultimate goal, an instrumental goal
sought as a means to the ultimate goal of gaining one or more selfbenefits,
or both. That is, the motivation could be altruistic, egois tic, or both.
Three general classes of self -benefits can result from helping a person for
whom one feels empathy. Helping enables one to
(a) Reduce one’s empathic arousal, which may be experienced as
aversive;
(b) Avoid possible social and self -punishm ents for failing to help; and
(c) Gain social and self -rewards for doing what is good and right.
The empathy -altruism hypothesis does not deny that these self -benefits of
empathy -induced helping exist. It claims, however, that with regard to the
motivat ion evoked by empathy, these self -benefits are unintended
consequences of reaching the ultimate goal of reducing the other’s need.
Advocates of egoistic alternatives to the empathy -altruism hypothesis
disagree; they claim that one or more of these self -benefits is the ultimate
goal of empathyinduced helping. In the past two decades, more than 25
experiments have tested these three egoistic alternatives to the empathy -
altruism hypothesis.
Aversive -Arousal Reduction :
The most frequently proposed egoistic ex planation of the empathy -helping
relationship is aversive -arousal reduction. According to this explanation,
feeling empathy for someone who is suffering is unpleasant, and
empathically aroused individuals help in order to eliminate their empathic
feelings. Benefiting the person for whom empathy is felt is simply a
means to this self -serving end. Researchers have tested the aversive -
arousal reduction explanation against the empathyaltruism hypothesis by
varying the ease of escape from further exposure to a p erson in need
without helping. Because empathic arousal is a result of witnessing the
person’s suffering, either terminating this suffering by helping or
terminating exposure to it by escaping should reduce one’s own aversive
arousal. Escape does not, howe ver, enable one to reach the altruistic goal
of relieving the other’s distress. Therefore, the aversive -arousal
explanation predicts elimination of the empathy -helping relationship when
escape is easy; the empathy -altruism hypothesis does not. Results of
experiments testing these competing predictions have consistently
supported the empathy -altruism hypothesis, not the aversive -arousal
reduction explanation. These results cast serious doubt on this popular
egoistic explanation (see Batson, 1991, for a revie w of these
experiments).
Empathy -Specific Punishment: munotes.in

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63 Research Methodology For Psychology A second egoistic explanation claims that people learn through
socialization that additional obligation to help, and so additional shame
and guilt for failure to help, is attendant on feeling empathy for someone
in need. As a result, when people feel empathy, they are faced with
impending social or self -censure beyond any general punishment
associated with not helping. They say to themselves, “What will others
think —or what will I think of myself —if I don’t help when I feel like
this?” and then they help out of an egoistic desire to avoid these empathy -
specific punishments. Once again, experiments designed to test this
explanation have consistently failed to support it; instead, results have
consistentl y supported the empathyaltruism hypothesis (again, see Batson,
1991).
Empathy -Specific Reward:
The third major egoistic explanation claims that people learn through
socialization that special rewards in the form of praise, honor, and pride
are attendant on helping a person for whom they feel empathy. As a result,
when people feel empathy, they think of these rewards and help out of an
egoistic desire to gain them. The general form of this explanation has been
tested in several experiments and received no support (Batson et al., 1988,
Studies 1 and 5; Batson & Weeks, 1996), but two variations have been
proposed for which at least some support has been claimed. Best known is
the negativestate relief explanation proposed by Cialdini et al. (1987), who
suggest ed that the empathy experienced when witnessing another person’s
suffering is a negative affective state —a state of temporary sadness or
sorrow —and the person feeling empathy helps in order to relieve this
negative state. At first glance, this negative -state relief explanation may
appear to be the same as the aversive -arousal reduction explanation.
In fact, it is not. Although both explanations begin with the proposition
that feeling empathy for some490 one in need involves a negative
affective state, from this common starting point they diverge. The
aversive -arousal reduction explanation claims that the goal of helping is to
eliminate the negative state; the negative -state relief explanation claims
that the goal of helping is to gain mood -enhancing self -rewards that one
has learned are associated with helping. Although the negative -state relief
explanation received some initial support (Cialdini et al., 1987; Schaller &
Cialdini, 1988), subsequent researchers have found that this support was
likely due to p rocedural artifacts.
Experiments avoiding these artifacts have consistently supported the
empathy -altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1989; Dovidio et al., 1990;
Schroeder, Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988). It now seems
clear, therefore, that th e motivation to help evoked by empathy is not
directed toward the egoistic goal of negative -state relief. A second
variation on an empathy -specific reward explanation was proposed by
Smith, Keating, and Stotland (1989). They proposed that, rather than
helping to gain the rewards of seeing oneself or being seen by others as a
helpful person, empathically aroused individuals help in order to feel joy
at the needy individual’s relief: “It is proposed that the prospect of munotes.in

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64 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research empathic joy, conveyed by feedback from the help recipient, is essential to
the special tendency of empathic witnesses to help. . . . The empathically
concerned witness . . . helps in order to be happy” (Smith et al., 1989, p.
641).
Some early self -report data were supportive, but more rigorou s
experimental evidence has failed to support this empathic -joy hypothesis.
Instead, experimental results consistently have supported the empathy -
altruism hypothesis (Batson et al., 1991; Smith et al., 1989). The
empathic -joy hypothesis, like other version s of the empathy -specific
reward explanation, seems unable to account for the empathy -helping
relationship.
A Tentative Conclusion Reviewing the empathy -altruism research, as well
as recent literature in sociology, economics, political science, and biolog y,
Piliavin and Charng (1990) observed: There appears to be a “paradigm
shift” away from the earlier position that behavior that appears to be
altruistic must, under closer scrutiny, be revealed as reflecting egoistic
motives. Rather, theory and data now b eing advanced are more compatible
with the view that true altruism —acting with the goal of benefiting
another —does exist and is a part of human nature. (p. 27) Pending new
evidence or a plausible new egoistic explanation of the existing evidence,
this obse rvation seems correct. It appears that the empathy -altruism
hypothesis should —tentatively — be accepted as true.
Other Possible Sources of Altruistic Motivation:
Might there be sources of altruistic motivation other than empathic
emotion? Several have bee n proposed, including an “altruistic personality”
(Oliner & Oliner, 1988), principled moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976), and
internalized prosocial values (Staub, 1974). There is some evidence that
each of these potential sources is associated with increase d motivation to
help, but as yet it is not clear that this motivation is altruistic. It may be, or
it may be an instrumental means to the egoistic ultimate goals of
maintaining one’s positive self -concept or avoiding guilt (Batson, 1991;
Batson, Bolen, Cro ss, & Neuringer -Benefiel, 1986; Carlo, Eisenberg,
Troyer, Switzer, & Speer, 1991; Eisenberg et al., 1989). More and better
research exploring these possibilities is needed. Two Other Possible
Prosocial Motives Thinking more broadly, beyond the egoismaltrui sm
debate that has been a focus of attention and contention for the past two
decades, might there be other forms of prosocial motivation, forms in
which the ultim ate goal is neither to benefit self nor to benefit another
individual? Two seem worthy of cons ideration, collectivism and
principlism.
Collectivism:
Collectivism is motivation to benefit a particular group as a whole. The
ultimate goal is not to increase one’s own welfare or the welfare of the
specific others who are benefited; the ultimate goal is to increase the
welfare of the group. Robyn Dawes and his colleagues put it succinctly: munotes.in

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65 Research Methodology For Psychology “Not me or thee but we” (Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1988). They
suggested that collectivist motivation is a product of group identity
(Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1987 ). As with altruism, what looks like
collectivism may actually be a subtle form of egoism. Perhaps attention to
group welfare is simply an expression of enlightened self -interest. After
all, if one recognizes that ignoring group needs and the public good i n
headlong pursuit of self -benefit will lead to less self -benefit in the long
run, then one may decide to benefit the group as a means to maximize
overall self -benefit. Certainly, appeals to enlightened self -interest are
commonly used by politicians and so cial activists to encourage response to
societal needs: They warn of the long -term consequences for oneself and
one’s children of pollution and squandering natural resources; they remind
that if the plight of the poor becomes too severe, the well -off may f ace
revolution. Such appeals seem to assume that collectivism is simply a
form of egoism.
The most direct evidence that collectivism is independent of egoism
comes from research by Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1990). They
examined the responses of ind ividuals who had been given a choice
between allocating money to themselves or to a group. Allocation to
oneself maximized individual but not group profit; allocation to the group
maximized collective but not individual profit. Dawes et al. found that if
individuals faced with this dilemma made their allocation after discussing
it with other members of the group, they gave more to the group than if
they had no prior discussion. Moreover, this effect was specific to the in -
group with whom the discussion occu rred; allocation to an out -group was
not enhanced. Based on this research, Dawes et al. (1990) claimed
evidence for collectivist motivation independent of egoism, arguing that
their procedure ruled out the two most plausible egoistic explanations —
enlighten ed self -interest and socially instilled conscience.
There is reason to doubt, however, that their procedure effectively ruled
out self -rewards and selfpunishments associated with conscience. We may
have a standard or norm that says “share with your buddie s” rather than
one that simply says “share.” So, although this research is important and
suggestive, more and better evidence is needed to justify the conclusion
that collectivist motivation is not reducible to egoism.
Principlism:
Most moral philosophers argue for the importance of a prosocial motive
other than egoism. Most since Kant (1724 –1804) shun altruism and
collectivism as well. Philosophers reject appeals to altruism, especially
empathy -induced altruism, because feelings of empathy, sympathy, and
compassion are judged to be too fickle and too circumscribed. Empathy is
not felt for everyone in need, at least not in the same degree. They reject
appeals to collectivism because group interest is bounded by the limits of
the group. Collectivism not only permits but may even encourage doing
harm to those outside the group. Given these problems with altruism and
collectivism, moral philosophers typically advocate prosocial motivation munotes.in

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66 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research with an ultimate goal of upholding a universal and impartial moral
princi ple, such as justice (Rawls, 1971).
This moral motivation has been called principlism (Batson, 1994). Is
acting with an ultimate goal of upholding a moral principle really
possible? When Kant (1785/1898, pp. 23 –24) briefly shifted from his
analysis of wha t ought to be to what is, he admitted that concern we show
for others that appears to be prompted by duty to principle may actually be
prompted by self -love. The goal of upholding a moral principle may only
be an instrumental means to reach the ultimate go al of self -benefit. If this
is true, then principle -based motivation is actually egoistic. The self -
benefits of upholding a moral principle are conspicuous. One can gain the
social and self -rewards of being seen and seeing oneself as a good person.
One als o can avoid the social and self -punishments of shame and guilt for
failing to do the right thing. As Freud (1930) suggested, society may
inculcate such principles in the young in order to bridle their antisocial
impulses by making it in their best personal interest to act morally (also
see C ampbell, 1975). Alternatively, through internalization (Staub, 1989)
or development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976; Gilligan, 1982),
principles may come to be valued in their own right and not simply as
instrumental means to self -serving ends.
The issue here is the same one faced with altruism and collectivism. Once
again, we need to know the nature of a prosocial motive. Is the desire to
uphold justice (or some other moral principle) an instrumental goal on the
way to the ultimate goal of self -benefit? If so, then this desire is a subtle
and sophisticated form of egoism. Alternatively, is upholding the principle
an ultimate goal, with the ensuing self -benefits unintended consequences?
If so, then principlism is a fou rth type of prosocial motivation,
independent of egoism, altruism, and collectivism. Results of recent
research suggest that people often act so as to appear moral while, if
possible, avoiding the cost of actually being moral; this sham morality has
been c alled moral hypocrisy (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf,
& Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman,
1999).
Results of this research also suggest that if moral motivation exists, it is
easily overpowered by self -interest. Ma ny of us are, it seems, quite adept
at moral rationalization. We are good at justifying to ourselves —if not to
others —why a situation that benefits us or those we care about does not
violate our moral principles: why, for example, storing our nuclear waste
in someone else’s backyard is fair; why terrorist attacks by our side are
regrettable but necessary evils, whereas terrorist attacks by the other side
are atrocities; why we must obey orders, even if it means killing innocent
people. The abstractness of m ost moral principles, and their multiplicity,
makes such rationalization easy.
But this may be only part of the story. Perhaps upholding a moral principle
can serve as an ultimate goal, defining a form of motivation independent
of egoism. If so, then perha ps these principles can provide a rational basis
for responding to the needs of others that transcends reliance on self -munotes.in

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67 Research Methodology For Psychology interest or on vested interest in and feeling for the welfare of certain other
individuals or groups. This is quite an “if,” but it seem s well worth
conducting research to find out.
Toward a General Model of Prosocial Motivation:
Staub (1989) and Schwartz (1992) have for many years emphasized the
importance of values as determinants of prosocial behavior. Batson (1994)
has proposed a gen eral model that links prosocial values and motives: The
value underlying egoism is enhanced personal welfare; the value
underlying altruism is the enhanced welfare of one or more individuals as
individuals; the value underlying collectivism is enhanced gro up welfare;
and the value underlying principlism is upholding a moral principle. Four
experiments have provided evidence for the predicted link between
empathic emotion — a source of altruistic motivation —and valuing
another individual’s welfare (Batson, Tu rk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995); the
other value -motive links await test. Prosocial values usually are assumed
to be mutually supportive and cooperative; concern for the welfare of
others and concern for the welfare of the society are assumed to be moral
(Hoffman , 1989; Staub, 1989).
If, however, the different values evoke different ultimate goals and
therefore different motives, they may at times conflict rather than
cooperate. For example, concern for the welfare of a specific other person
(altruism) may confli ct not only with self -interest but also with concern
for the welfare of the group as a whole (collectivism) or concern to uphold
a moral principle (principlism). Evidence of such conflicts has been found
(Batson, Ahmad, et al., 1999; Batson, Batson, et al. , 1995; Batson, Klein,
Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). To entertain the possibility of multiple
prosocial motives (egoism, altruism, collectivism, and principlism) based
on multiple prosocial values (self, other, group, principle) begs for a better
understandin g of cognitive representation of the self -other relationship.
Several representations have been proposed. Concern for another’s
welfare may be a product of:
(a) A sense of we -ness based on cognitive unit formation or identification
with the other’s situ ation (Hornstein, 1982; Lerner, 1982);
(b) The self expanding to incorporate the other (Aron & Aron, 1986);
(c) Empathic feeling for the other, who remains distinct from self (Batson
& Shaw, 1991; Jarymowicz, 1992); (d) the self being redefined at a
group level, where me and thee become interchangeable parts of a self
that is we (Dawes et al., 1988; Turner, 1987); or
(e) The self dissolving in devotion to something outside itself, whether
another person, a group, or a principle (James, 1910/1982). Mos t of
these proposals seem plausible, some even profound.
Yet not all can be true, at least not at the same time. Based on research to
date, it appears that empathic feelings are not a product of self -other munotes.in

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68 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research merging (Batson, Sager, et al., 1997; Cialdini, B rown, Lewis, Luce, &
Neuberg, 1997), but the effect on one’s self -concept of caring for people,
groups, and principles is not, as yet, well understood. Theoretical
Implications of the Empathy - Altruism Relationship Returning to the
empathy -altruism relatio nship, it is clear that this relationship has broad
theoretical implications. Universal egoism —the assumption that all human
behavior is ultimately directed toward self -benefit —has long dominated
not only psychology but also other social and behavioral sci ences
(Campbell, 1975; Mansbridge, 1990; Wallach & Wallach, 1983).
If individuals feeling empathy act, at least in part, with an ultimate goal of
increasing the welfare of another, then the assumption of universal egoism
must be replaced by a more complex view of motivation that allows for
altruism as well as egoism. Such a shift in our view of motivation requires,
in turn, a revision of our underlying assumptions about human nature and
human potential. It implies that we humans may be more social than we
have thought: Other people can be more to us than sources of information,
stimulation, and reward as we each seek our own welfare.
We have the potential to care about their welfare as well. The empathy -
altruism relationship forces us to face the question of why empathic
feelings exist. What evolutionary function do they serve? Admittedly
speculative, the most plausible answer relates empathic feelings to
parenting among higher mammals, in which offspring live for some time
in a very vulnerable state (de Wa al, 1996; Hoffman, 1981; Mc - Dougall,
1908; Zahn -Waxler & Radke -Yarrow, 1990).
Were parents not intensely interested in the welfare of their progeny, these
species would quickly die out. Empathic feelings for offspring —and the
resulting altruistic motivat ion— may promote one’s reproductive potential
not by increasing the number of offspring but by increasing the chance of
their survival. Of course, empathic feelings extend well beyond one’s own
children. People can feel empathy for a wide range of targets (including
nonhumans), as long as there is no preexisting antipathy (Batson, 1991;
Krebs, 1975; Shelton & Rogers, 1981). From an evolutionary perspective,
this extension is usually attributed to cognitive generalization whereby one
“adopts” others, making it possible to evoke the primitive and
fundamental impulse to care for progeny when these adopted others are in
need (Batson, 1987; Hoffman, 1981; MacLean, 1973).
Such cognitive generalization may be facilitated by human cognitive
capacity, including symb olic thought, and the lack of evolutionary
advantage for sharp discrimination of empathic feelings in early human
small hunter -gatherer bands. In these bands, those in need were often
one’s children or close kin, and one’s own welfare was tightly tied to t he
welfare even of those who were not close kin (Hoffman, 1981). William
McDougall (1908) long ago described these links in his depiction of the
“parental instinct.” As with all of McDougall’s theorized instincts, the
parental instinct involved cognitive, affective, and conative (motivational)
components: Cues of distress from one’s offspring, including cognitively munotes.in

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69 Research Methodology For Psychology adopted offspring (e.g., a pet), evoke what McDougall called “the tender
emotion” (our “empathy”), which in turn produces altruistic motivation.
Although few psychologists would wish to return to McDougall’s
emphasis on instincts, his attempt to integrate
(a) Valuing based on cognitive generalization of the perception of
offspring in distress,
(b) Empathic (sympathetic, compassionate, tender) emotional response,
and
(c) Goal -directed altruistic motivation seems at least as much a blueprint
for the future as a curio from the past.
3.5 REFERENCE Snyder, C. R.; & Lopez, S. J. (2002). Handbook of Positive Psychology.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Snyder, C. R.; Lopez, S. J.; & Pedrotti, J. T. (2011). Positive Psychology:
The Scientific and Practical Explorations of Human Strengths. New Delhi:
Sage South Asia Edition.

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4
POSITIVE INSTITUTIONS
Unit Structure
4.1 Positive schooling
4.1.1 The Components of Positive Schooling
4.1.2 Care, trust, and respect for diversity
4.2 Aging well and role of family
4.2.1 What is successful aging?
4.2.2 The MacArthur Foundation Study of Successful Aging
4.3 Psychology of forgiveness for healthy society
4.4 The Me/We balance: Building better communities
4.5 References
4.1 POSITIVE SCHOOLING We agree that some instructors are so bad that they should not go near
classrooms. Such tea chers are the ones “who, when given the honor and
the privilege to teach, bore rather than inspire, settle for the lowest
common denominator rather than aspire to the highest possible numerator,
take the job for granted rather than being continually amazed at the
blessing -sins against all the minds they have closed, misinformed and
alienated from education” (Zimbardo, 2005, p. 12). That these bad
teachers can do harm is more than sheer speculation; the related research
consistently shows that poor teachers have adverse effects on their
students (for an overview, see Jennifer King Rice’s 2003 book, Teacher
Quality). In fact, the low quality of teachers has been found to be the most
influential of all school -related factors in terms of undermining students’
learning and their attitudes about education in general (Rice, 2003).
Furthermore, the effects of poor teachers are both additive and cumulative
over time (Sanders & Rivers, 1996), with teacher quality accounting for
7.5% of the variance in students’ achieve ments (Hanushek, Kain, &
Rivkin, as reported in Goldhaber, 2002).
What factors determine teacher quality? Of the various ways of tapping
quality, a teacher’s relevant educational background and degrees are two
of the most influential sources when it comes to enhancing students’
learning (Monk & King, 1994; Rowan, Chiang, & Miller, 1997).
Likewise, Darling -Hammond and Youngs (2002) reported that indices of
Positive Schooling teacher achievements and adequate preparation were
robust predictors of students’ a chievements in the areas of mathematics
and reading. To concretize the impact of teacher quality, consider the
finding that the difference between having had a bad teacher and a good
teacher reflects an entire grade level in student achievement (Hanushek,
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71 Research Methodology For Psychology Overall, therefore, poor teachers leave behind trails of intellectual
boredom and disrespect. Of course, there are legitimate reasons that some
teachers “turn bad.” The most obvious is burnout, where the instructor
loses enthusiasm after repeatedly encountering blockages and lack of
support for his or her efforts (see Maslach, 1999). There is no excuse,
however, for a teacher who does nothing to address such burnout. It is
hard to have sympathy for the teachers who continue to just “send it in”
when it comes to enthusiasm and preparation for their students. Not only
have they failed to teach formative young minds when they are most open
to the excitement of learning, but they also may have turned off these
minds for life (see Zimbardo, 1999). Althoug h negative teachers are
relatively rare, even one is too many. It would be bad enough if these poor
teachers only impaired the learning of their students, but they also may
inflict psychological pain and damage. Students tragically may become the
unwilling partic ipants in self -fulfilling prophecies in which they fail in
both the academic and interpersonal spheres.
Thus, as impassioned as we are about seeing to it that positive psychology
fills the minds and classrooms of our teachers and their students, so , too,
are we adamant about wanting poor teachers identified very early in their
careers and either taught to change or shown the door out of the
classroom. Should your own education have included one or more poor
teachers, we have prepared an exercise for you. We encourage you to
follow the steps outlined in the Personal Mini -Experiments, which may
help you to “bury” the bad influences of your previous poor teachers.
“No Child Left Behind” and Beyond :
In a letter to John Adams (anthologized in Barber & B attistoni, 1993, p.
41), Thomas Jefferson shared his vision of changing the American
aristocracy of “privilege by inheritance” to a more natural type of
aristocracy based on talent. Since those early times, the American ideal
has been that public education should make one’s life outcomes less
dependent upon family status and more dependent on the use of public
education. Thus, schools were idealized as making huge differences in the
lives of our children.
4.1.1 The Components of Positive Schooling :
Before reviewing the components of positive schooling (which is an
approach to education that consists of a foundation of care, trust, and
respect for diversity, where teachers develop tailored goals for each
student to engender learning and then work with him o r her to develop the
plans and motivation to reach their goals), we acknowledge briefly some
of the major educators who have paved the way for this approach. Noted
philosophers such as Benjamin Franklin, John Stuart Mill, Herbert
Spencer, and John Dewey fo cused on the assets of students (Lopez,
Janowski, & Wells, 2005). Alfred Binet (Binet & Simon, 1916) often is
considered the father of the concept of mental age, but he also emphasized
the Positive Schooling enhancement of student skills rather than paying
attention only to the remediation of weaknesses. Likewise, Elizabeth munotes.in

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72 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research Hurlock (1925) accentuated praise as more influential than criticism as a
determinant of students’ efforts. Similarly, Lewis Terman (Terman &
Oden, 1947) spent his whole career ex ploring the thinking of truly brilliant
learners, and Arthur Chickering (1969) sought to understand the evolution
of students’ talents. (See Chapter 14 for a discussion of Chickering’s
views of college student development.)
More recently, Donald Clifton identifi ed, and then expanded on, the
particular talents of students, rather than focusing on their weaknesses (see
Buckingham & Clifton, 2001; Clifton & Anderson, 2002; Clifton &
Nelson, 1992; Rath & Clifton, 2004). We next explore the major
components of positiv e schooling (see Buskist et al., 2005; Lopez et al.,
2005; Ritchel, 2005). For the reader interested in an actual one -week
curriculum to instill positive psychology ideas in a high -school course, we
recommend Amy Fineburg’s (2002) unit; moreover, details o f various
college curricula for positive teaching can be attained at
http://www.positivepsychology.org/teachingpp.htm. This figure shows the
positive psychology schoolhouse as being built of six parts, from the
ground up. We begin with the foundation, wher e we describe the
importance of care, trust, and diversity. Then, the first and second floors of
our positive schoolhouse represent teaching goals, planning, and the
motivation of students. The third floor holds hope, and the roof represents
the societal c ontributions and paybacks produced by our positive
psychology school graduates.
4.1.2 Care, trust, and respect for diversity :
We begin with a foundation that involves caring, trust, and respect for
diversity. It is absolutely crucial to have a supportive atmosphere of care
and trust because students flourish in such an environment. In attending
award ceremonies for outstanding teachers, we have noticed that both the
teachers and their students typically comment on the importance of a sense
of caring. Stud ents need as role models teachers who consistently are
responsive and available. Such teacher care and positive emotions provide
the secure base that allows young people to explore and find ways to
achieve their own important academic and life goals (Shore y, Snyder,
Yang, & Lewin, 2003).
Goals (Content) :
The component of goals is represented by the second floor of the strengths
schoolhouse. Exploring the responses of students from kindergarten to
college, Stanford University Professor Carol Dweck has put together an
impressive program of research showing that goals provide a means of
targeting students’ learning efforts. Moreover, such goals are especially
helpful if agreed upon by the teacher and students (Dweck, 1999; Locke,
& Latham, 2002). Perhaps the most conducive targets are the stretch goals,
in which the student seeks a slightly more difficult learning goal than
attained previously. Reasonably challenging goals engender productive
learning, especially if the goals can be tailored to particular stud ents (or
groups of students). It is important for students to feel some sense of input munotes.in

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73 Research Methodology For Psychology in regard to their teachers’ conduct of classes. Of course, the instructors
set the classroom goals, but in doing so they are wise to consider the
reactions of their
Positive Environments :
The success of class goals involves making the materials relevant to
students’ real -life experiences whenever possible (Snyder & Shorey,
2002). In turn, tailoring to students’ experiences makes it more likely that
students will become involved in and learn the material (see Dweck,
1999). We advise against emphasizing grades too strictly once learning
goals are set. Adherence to grading curves, for example, can turn students
into grade predators who are more fascinated with their perfor mances and
with doing better than their peers than they are with learning. Indeed, this
set has been linked to lower levels of hope (Shorey et al., 2004) and more
test-taking anxieties (Dweck, 1999). It also helps to make the goals
understandable and concr ete, as well as to take a larger learning goal and
divide it into smaller subgoals that can be tackled in stages. Likewise, as
we noted with respect to diversity issues in the previous section, goal
setting is facilitated when teachers allow part of studen ts’ grades to be
determined by group activities in which cooperation with other students is
essential. Again, Aronson’s “jigsaw classroom” (www.jigsaw.org)
paradigm is very useful in setting such goals.
Plans :
The first floor of the strengths schoolhouse is divided into plans and
motivation, both of which interact with the educational goals on the
second floor (and with content). Like building science on accumulating
ideas, teaching necessitates a careful planning process on the part of
instructors. Yet a nother planning approach is championed by the noted
social psychologist Robert Cialdini of Arizona State University (see
Cialdini, 2005). Once Professor Cialdini has established a teaching goal
regarding given psychological content, he then poses mystery s tories for
students. By solving the mystery, the student has learned the particular
content. (The inherent need for closure [see Kruglanksi & Webster, 1996]
regarding the mysteries also motivates the students; motivation is the
companion to planning, which we discuss in the next section. Likewise,
because the mystery stories have beginnings, middles, and ends, there is
the inherent desire on the part of students to get to the conclusion [see
Green, Strange, & Bro ck, 2002, on the drive to traverse a narrativ e].)
Another consideration in raising students’ motivations is to make the
material relevant to them (Buskist et al., 2005). At the most basic level,
when the course information is relevant, students are more likely to attend
class, to pay attention, and to make comments during the lectures
(Lowman, 1995; Lutsky, 1999). To increase the relevance of material,
instructors can develop classroom demonstrations and at -home exploration
(such as the Personal Mini -Experiments and Life Enhancement Strategies
Positi ve School i ng in this book) of various phenomena applicable to
situations that the students encounter outside the classroom. munotes.in

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74 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research Some instructors conduct surveys at the beginning of a semester, in which
they ask students to describe positive and negative eve nts that have
happened in their lives. Then, the instructor can use the more frequently
cited events to construct classroom demonstrations (Snyder, 2004). Or,
once the instructor has described a phenomenon, students can be asked to
give examples from their own experience. Before leaving the topic of
relevance, we caution aging instructors against trying to co -opt the
lifestyle manifestations of much younger students. This is a sure -fire way
to turn off student motivation. In the words of Snyder (2004),
Have you ever seen a 50 - or 60 -something professor who is trying
everything possible to be as “hip” as his or her 21 -year-old students? I do
not know what is most pitiful about this specter. Is it the aging professor’s
youthful clothes that look so wrong? Is it the out -of-place punked hairstyle
fashioned on the head with far too few hairs? Or it is the graying
professor’s awkward attempts to borrow college students’ language? It is
folly, in my view, for an older instructor to try to remain “hip” and be part
of the young crowd. Indeed, I think that such professors come across as
ludicrous and pandering. Give it up, I say, for it is only when we are
young -for it is who we really are then -that such hipness is appropriate.
Additionally, the truth is that our stude nts do not want a hip -hop “pal” as
their instructor. (pp. 17 -18)
Motivation (Plus Enlivening the Course Contents for Students) :
Teachers must be enthused about their materials so as to carry out the
plans that they have made for their classes (see the in teractive arrow
between plans and motivation on the first floor of Figure 16.1). Instructors
are models of enthusiasm for their students. Therefore, when instructors
make lesson goals and plans interesting to themselves, their students easily
can pick up o n this energy. Motivated teachers are sensitive to the needs
and reactions of their students. Strengths -based instructors also take
students’ questions very seriously and make every effort to give their best
answers. If the teacher does not know the answer to a student question, it
is enlivening to the class to inform them that, although the instructor
doesn’t know the answer at that time, he or she will make every effort to
find it. Then, the teacher follows through to locate the answer to the
question and presents it at the next class period; students typically are very
appreciative of such responsiveness.
Positive Environments :
Teachers also raise the motivational level when they take risks and try new
approaches in class (Halperin & Desrochers, 2005). When such risktaking
results in a classroom exercise that does not work, the instructor can have
a good laugh at him - or herself. Humor raises the energy for the next
classroom exercise, along with the effort level of the teacher. A strengths -
based teachin g motto is, “If you don’t laugh at yourself, you have missed
the biggest joke of all” (Snyder, 2005a). Anything an instructor can do to
increase students’ accountability also can raise their motivation (Halperin
& Desrochers, 2005). Relatedly, students who expect to be called upon by munotes.in

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75 Research Methodology For Psychology their instructors typically are prepared for each class -they read the material
and follow the lecture (McDougall & Granby, 1996).
Recall that the previously discussed jigsaw classroom approach fosters the
learning and planning of group goals and that in doing so it also imparts
motivation to students as they work together. Indeed, a sense of energy
can come from being part of a team effort. Lastly, praise is very
motivating. It is best to deliver this privately, however, becaus e an
individual student may feel uncomfortable when singled out in front of
peers. Public praise also may raise the propensities of students to compete
with each other. An office visit or a meeting with the student outside the
classroom is a good time to n ote the student’s good work or progress (or
even to offer praise for asking good questions). Furthermore, e -mail is a
ready -made vehicle for privately delivering positive feedback that may be
motivating. The opportunities for appropriately interacting with and
motivating students are many, and positive psychology teachers often try
to convey such energizing feedback.
4.2 AGING WELL AND ROLE OF FAMILY With the baby boomers joining the older adult group of Americans, stories
of successful aging are becoming more prominent in today’s media. The
stories of older adults provide valuable lessons to all of us. This was
definitely the case in the life of Morrie Schwartz (the focus of Mitch
Alborn’s 2002 book, Tuesdays with Morrie), who lived life to its fullest
and found great meaning during his physical decline and death. The study
of the positive aspects of aging (referred to as positive aging, healthy
aging, successful aging, and aging well) is only several decades old. It will
become a primary focus of psycholo gical science, however, given the
trends in American demography that will demand the attentions of
scientists and the general public. Our goal for this section is to describe
successful aging based on the MacArthur Study of Successful Aging and
the prospec tive study by Vaillant (2002).
4.2.1 What is successful aging? :
The term successful aging was popularized by Robert Havighurst (1961)
when he wrote about “adding life to years” (p. 8) in the first issue of The
Gerontologist. Havighurst also primed schola rly interest in healthy aspects
of getting older. Rowe and Kahn (1998), summarizing the findings from
the MacArthur Study of Successful Aging, proposed three components of
successful aging:
(1) Avoiding disease,
(2) Engagement with life, and
(3) Main taining high cognitive and physical functioning.
These three components are aspects of «maintaining a lifestyle that
involves normal, valued, and beneficial activities” (Williamson, 2002, p.
681). Vaillant (2002) simplifies the definition further by chara cterizing munotes.in

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76 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research successful aging as joy, love, and learning. These descriptions, though not
detailed, provide an adequate image of successful aging.
4.2.2 The MacArthur Foundation Study of Successful Aging :
They investigated physical, social, and psychological factors related to
abilities, health, and well -being. A sample of 1189 healthy adult
volunteers between the ages of 70 and 79 was selected from a pool of
4030 potential participants, using physical and cognitive criteria. These
high functioning adults par ticipated in a 90 -minute personal interview and
then were followed for an average of 7 years, during which time they
completed periodic interviews.
As mentioned previously, the MacArthur study revealed that the three
components of successful aging were av oiding disease, engaging with life,
and maintaining physical and cognitive functioning (Rowe & Kahn,
1998). Here, we focus on life engagement because it is the component of
successful aging that positive psychologists are most likely to address in
their re search and practice. Indeed, the two components of life
engagement, social support and productivity (Rowe & Kahn), parallel the
life pursuits of love, work, and play that we address in many of the
chapters in this book. Social support is most potent when i t is mutual; the
support given is balanced by support received.
Two kinds of support are important for successful aging: socioemotional
support (liking and loving) and instrumental support (assistance when
someone is in need). Further examination of the M acArthur data revealed
that support increased over time (Gurung, Taylor, & Seeman, 2003).
Moreover, the respondents with more social ties showed less decline in
functioning over time (Unger, McAvay, Bruce, Berkman, & Seeman,
1999). The positive effects of social ties were shown to vary according to
the individual’s gender and baseline physical capabilities (Unger et al.).
Gender also influenced how married participants (a 439 -person subset of
the total sample) received social support: «Men Living Well at Ev ery
Stage of Life received emotional support primarily from their spouses,
whereas women drew more heavily on their friends and relatives and
children for emotional support” (Gurung et al., p. 487).
Regarding productive activity in later adulthood, Glass et al. (1995)
examined patterns of change in the activities of the highly functioning
sample of 70 -to-79-year-olds and in a group of 162 moderateto - low-
functioning 70 -to-79-year-olds over a 3 -year period. The highest
functioning cohort was found to be sig nificantly more productive than the
comparison group. Changes in productivity over time were associated with
more hospital admissions and strokes, whereas age, marriage, and
increased mastery of certain skills were related to greater protection
against dec lines. These findings are consistent with the work of
Williamson (2002), who suggests that sustained physical activity (an
aspect of productive activity) helps to maintain healthy functioning.
Accordingly, interruptions of physical activity regimens often precipitate
declines in overall well -being. munotes.in

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77 Research Methodology For Psychology The Adult Development Study :
Vaillant (2002) acknowledges that subjective evaluation of functioning is
not the most rigorous approach to identifying those who age successfully.
He has relied on a system of inde pendent evaluations of the functioning
(e.g., physical, psychological, occupational) of the participants in the
Study of Adult Development. The original 256 Caucasian, socially
advantaged participants were identified in the late 1930s by the deans at
Harva rd (who viewed the students as sound in all regards). For the past 80
years, these participants have been studied via physical examinations,
personal interviews, and surveys. More than 80% of the study participants
lived past their 80th birthdays, whereas only 30% of their contemporaries
lived to that age. His extensive study of these older adults (and members
of two other prospective studies) identified the following lifestyle
predictors of healthy aging: not smoking, or stopping smoking while
young; copin g adaptively, with mature defenses; not abusing alcohol;
maintaining a hea lthy weight, a stable marriage, and some exercise; and
being educated. These variables distinguished people on the ends of the
health spectrum: The happy -well (62 individuals who exp erienced good
health objectively and subjectively, biologically and psychologically) and
the sad -sick (40 individuals who were classified as unhappy in at least one
of three dimensions: mental health, social support, or life satisfaction.)
The most robust predictor of membership in the happywell group versus
the sad -sick group was the extent to which people used mature
psychological coping styles (e.g., altruism, humor) in everyday life.
A More Developmental Focus In Positive Psychology :
We face daily has sles and adversities. This is true during childhood,
adolescence, adulthood, and older adulthood. Hopefully, as we age, we
become more resourceful and adaptable. This appears to be the case
Living Well at Every Stage of Life because there are numerous pos itive
developmental factors that help children and adults to bounce back. The
findings discussed in this chapter also suggest that positive psychology is
well on its way to identifying and sharing meaningful information about
how to live a better life.
4.3 PSYCHOLOGY OF FORGIVENESS FOR HEALTHY SOCIETY In this section, we explore how forgiveness can be taught. Accordingly,
we show how three sources -another person, oneself, and even a situation
or circumstance -can be used as targets in forgiveness instruct ion.
Forgiving Another Person In this most typical category of forgiveness,
forgiving another individual, one can imagine lyrics of a blues song in
which one partner in a Empathy and Egotism relationship has been
“done wrong” (e.g., the other partner had a n affair). In our therapy
experiences with couples dealing with forgiveness in the wake of martial
infidelities, we have found that the model of Gordon, Baucom, and Snyder
is a useful one (2004, 2005; Gordon & Baucom, 1998). In this model, in munotes.in

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78 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research which forgive ness is the goal, the first step is to promote a nondistorted,
realistic appraisal of the relationship of the two people.
The second step is the attempt to facilitate a release from the bond of
ruminative, negative affect held toward the violating (transg ressing)
partner. Finally, the third step is to help the victimized partner lessen his
or her desire to punish the transgressing partner. Over time, forgiveness
makes it possible for the hurt and the outpouring of negative feelings to
diminish -especially f or the victimized partner. Likewise, the treatment
enhances the empathy for the transgressing partner, and the therapist tries
to make both people feel better about themselves. Forgiveness parallels
the stages of recovery from psychological trauma. Over ti me, the couple
progresses from the initial impact stage to a search for meaning or
understanding of what happened to them. Finally, the couple moves to a
recovery stage, in which they “get on with their lives” (Gordon et aI.,
2005).
In the impact stage, t here is typically a rampage of negative emotions -hurt,
fear, and anger. At this time, the partners may swing from numbness to
very bad feelings. Then, in the meaning stage, the partners search
desperately to comprehend why the affair happened. Surely, the couple
reasons, there must be some meaning in this relationship - shaking event.
Last, the couple slowly begins to recapture a sense of control over their
lives; a major goal in this stage is to keep the affair from ruling every
waking thought of these two people.
To forgive does not necessarily mean that the couple decides to stay
together -but at least the forgiving process enables them to make more
informed decisions about what to do next. Another productive approach
for helping couples to deal with infid elity is the forgiveness model of
Everett Worthington of Virginia Commonwealth University (see Ripley &
Worthington, 2002; Worthington, 1998; Worthington & Drinkard, 2000).
This model is based on helping the partners through the five steps of the
acronym R EACH: Recall the hurt and the nature of the injury caused;
promote Empathy in both partners; Altruistically give the gift of
forgiveness between partners; Commit verbally to forgive the partner, and
Hold onto the forgiveness for each other.
Forgiving Ones elf:
A clinician will be alerted to the potential need for forgiveness of the self
when a client is feeling either shame or guilt. In this regard, shame reflects
an overall sense that “I am a bad person.” As such, shame cuts across
particular circumstance s, and it reflects an all -encompassing view of the
self as powerless and worthless. In contrast, guilt taps a situation -specific
negative self -view, for example, “I did a bad thing” (Tangney, Boone, &
Dearing, 2005). A person who feels guilt has a sense of remorse and
typically regrets something that he or she has done. To correct for such
guilt, some sort of reparative action is warranted, such as confessing or
apologizing. munotes.in

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79 Research Methodology For Psychology The process of helping a person to deal with shame is a more difficult one
for the helper than is the treatment for guilt. This follows because shame
cuts through more situations than the single -situational focus of guilt. Self -
forgiveness has been defined as “a process of releasing resentment toward
oneself for a perceived transgressio n or wrongdoing” (DeShea &
Wahkinney, 2003, p. 4). Given that we all must live with ourselves, it can
be seen that the consequences of not forgiving oneself can be much more
severe than the consequences of not forgiving another person (Hall &
Fincham, 2005 ). Interventions to lessen counterproductive criticism of the
self are aimed at helping the individual take responsibility for the bad act
or actions and then let go so that she or he can move forward with the
tasks in life. In fact, any client who is abso rbed in very negative or very
positive self -thoughts feels “caught:’
Accordingly, helpers attempt to help their clients understand how their
self-absorbed thoughts and feelings interfere with positive living.
Holmgren (2002) has captured this sentiment: T o dwell on one’s own past
record of moral performance, either with a sense of self -hatred and self -
contempt or with a sense of superiority, is an activity that is overly self -
involved and devoid of any real moral value. The client will exercise his
moral a gency much more responsibly if he removes his focus from the fact
that he did wrong and concentrates instead on the contribution he can
make to others and on the growth he can experience in the moral and
nonmoral realms. (p. 133)
Forgiveness of a Situatio n:
Recall the Enright position (described previously) that forgiveness should
be applied only to people, not to inanimate objects such as tornadoes. We
disagree with this premise; our views are consistent with the Thompson
model of forgiveness, in which t he target can be another person, oneself,
or a situation. A psychotherapy case of CRS’s some 20 years ago shows
how forgiveness can be applied to a situation. We live in Lawrence,
Kansas, where tornadoes occasionally descend on our community. In this
particular instance, a tornado had damaged houses and their inhabitants.
After this tornado, I saw a man in therapy who held severe angry and
bitter thoughts toward the tornado for destroying his house and making
him feel psychologically victimized. In the cour se of treatment, the goal
was to help this man to stop ruminating about the tornado, as well as to
stop blaming it for having ruined his life (Snyder, 2003). Therefore, the
man was taught to let go of his resentment toward the tornado. This was
part of a l arger Empathy and Egotism treatment goal aimed at teaching
this person to release the bitterness he felt about a series of “bad breaks”
that he had received in life. Moreover, he came to understand that the
tornado had struck other houses and families, but those people had picked
up the pieces and moved on with their lives. For this client, ruminations
about the tornado kept him stuck in the past, and he realized that letting go
was part of moving forward so as to have hope in his life (see Lopez,
Snyder, e t al., 2004; Snyder, 1989). munotes.in

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80 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research For professionals who have done considerable psychotherapy, this case
will not seem unusual, in that clients often point to their life circumstances
as the causes of their problems (i.e., they blame the happenings in their
lives). For such clients, therefore, a crucial part of their treatments entails
instruction in stopping thoughts about earlier negative life events so that
they instead can look ahead toward their futures (Michael & Snyder, in
press).
Development of the Dispo sition to Forgive :
Darby and Schlenker (1982) were the first researchers to notice age -
related trends in forgiveness. Consistent with Darby and Schlenker’s
(1982) original findings, other researchers have found that people appear
generally to become more forgiving as they age (Enright et al., 1989;
Girard & Mullet, 1997; Mullet & Girard, 2000; Mullet et al., 1998; Park &
Enright, 1997; Subkoviak et al., 1995). For example, Enright et al. (1989)
found that chronological age and reasoning about forgiveness w ere
correlated strongly in a sample of American children, adolescents, and
adults. Girard and Mullet (1997) also reported age differences in
willingness to forgive among a sample of 236 French adolescents, adults,
and older adults (age range, 15 –96). They found that older adults reported
significantly higher likelihoods of forgiving in a variety of transgression
scenarios than did the adolescents and adults. Furthermore, the adults were
more forgiving than were the adolescents. Mullet et al. (1998) also fou nd
that older adult s scored considerably higher than did young adults on
measures of the disposition to forgive (but cf. Mauger et al., 1992). It is
reasonable to ask whether these agerelated trends in forgiveness are linked
to agerelated trends in general cognitive or moral development. Enright
and colleagues (e.g., Enright et al., 1989; Enright & Human Development
Study Group, 1994) hypothesized that reasoning about forgiveness
develops along the same trajectory as does Kohlbergian moral reasoning
(Kohlbe rg, 1976). Correspondingly, they proposed that people at the
earliest stages of moral reasoning about forgiveness —the stages of
revengeful forgiveness and restitutional forgiveness — reason that
forgiveness is only appropriate after the victim has obtained revenge and/
or the transgressor has made restitution. People at the intermediate
stages —expectational forgiveness and lawful expectational forgiveness —
reason that forgiveness is appropriate because social, moral, or religious
pressures compel them to for give. People at the high stages —forgiveness
as social harmony and forgiveness as love —reason that forgiveness is
appropriate because it promotes a harmonious society and is an expression
of unconditional love. In support of this hypothesis, Enright et al. (1989)
found in two studies that Kohlbergian moral reasoning, as assessed with
standard interview measures, was positively correlated with people’s stage
of reasoning about forgiveness.
Personality and Forgiveness :
Forgiving people differ from less -forgi ving people on many personality
attributes. For example, forgiving people report less negative affect such
as anxiety, depression, and hostility (Mauger, Saxon, Hamill, & Pannell, munotes.in

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81 Research Methodology For Psychology 1996). Forgiving people are also less ruminative (Metts & Cupach, 1998),
less narcissistic (Davidson, 1993), less exploitative, and more empathic
(Tangney et al., 1999) than their less -forgiving counterparts. Forgivers
also tend to endorse socially desirable attitudes and behavior (Mauger et
al., 1992). Moreover, self -ratings of t he disposition to forgive correlate
negatively with scores on hostility and anger (Tangney et al., 1999), as
well as with clinicians’ ratings of hostility, passive -aggressive behavior,
and neuroticism (Mauger et al., 1996). What can we deduce from this
array of correlates? To some extent, they probably convey redundant
information because many personality traits can be reduced to a handful of
higher order personality dimensions. Within the Big Five personality
taxonom y (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999), for e xample, the disposition to
forgive appears to be related most strongly to agreeableness and
neuroticism (McCullough & Hoyt, 1999). Adjectives such as vengeful and
forgiving tend to be excellent markers for the Agreeableness dimension of
the Big Five taxono my, and other research confirms the link between
agreeableness and forgiveness (Ashton et al., 1998; Mauger et al., 1996).
Researchers have found also that forgiveness is related inversely to
measures of neuroticism (Ashton et al., 1998; McCullough & Hoyt, 1999).
Thus, the forgiving person appears to be someone who is relatively high in
agreeableness and relatively low in neuroticism/ negative emotionality.
Social Factors Influencing Forgiveness :
Forgiveness is influenced also by the characteristics of tr ansgressions and
the contexts in which they occur. Generally, people have more difficulty
forgiving offenses that seem more intentional and severe and that have
more negative consequences (Boon & Sulsky, 1997; Girard & Mullet,
1997). The extent to which an offender apologizes and seeks forgiveness
for a transgression also influences victims’ likelihood of forgiving (Darby
& Schlenker, 1982; Girard & Mullet, 1997; McCullough, Worthington, &
Rachal, 1997; McCullough et al., 1998; Weiner, Graham, Peter, &
Zmui dinas, 1991). Why do apologies facilitate forgiveness? By and large,
the effects of apologies appear to be indirect. They appear to cause
reductions in victims’ negative affect toward their transgressors (Ohbuchi,
Kameda, & Agarie, 1989) and increases in e mpathy for their transgressors
(McCullough et al., 1997; McCullough et al., 1998). Victims also form
more generous impressions of apologetic transgressors (Ohbuchi et al.,
1989).
Perhaps apologies and expressions of remorse allow the victim to
distinguish the personhood of the transgressor from his or her negative
behaviors, thereby restoring a more favorable impression and reducing
negative interpersonal motivations. In this way, apologies may represent
an effective form of reality negotiation (Snyder, Hi ggins, & Stucky, 1983).
Indeed, Snyder’s theory of reality negotiation explains why many of
transgressors’ posttransgression actions (including cancellation of the
consequences of the offense; Girard & Mullet, 1997) influence the extent
to which victims fo rgive. Other general theories of social conduct (e.g.,
Weiner, 1995) lead to similar predictions. Interpersonal Correlates of
Forgiveness Forgiveness may be influenced also by characteristics of the munotes.in

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82 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research interpersonal relationship in which an offense takes plac e. In several
studies (Nelson, 1993; Rackley, 1993; Roloff & Janiszewski, 1989;
Woodman, 1991), researchers have found that people are more willing to
forgive in relationships in which they feel satisfied, close, and committed.
McCullough et al. (1998) sur veyed both partners in over 100 romantic
relationships to examine more closely the association of relational
variables to acts of forgiveness. Both partners rated their satisfaction with
and commitment to their romantic partner. Partners also used the
Tran sgression -Related Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM) Inventory to
indicate the extent to which they had forgiven their partner for two
transgressions —the worst transgression their partner ever committed
against them, and the most recent serious transgression their partner
committed against them. Partners’ forgiveness scores were correlated both
with their own relational satisfaction and commitment and with their
partners’ relational satisfaction and commitment. McCullough et al.
(1998) also found evidence con sistent with the idea not only that
relationship closeness facilitates forgiveness but also that forgiveness
facilitates the reestablishment of closeness following transgressions. The
proposition that forgiveness is related to relationship factors such as
satisfaction, commitment, and closeness raises the question of whether the
dynamics of forgiveness could vary for different types of relationships.
We would not expect people to forgive perfect strangers in the same way
they forgive their most intimate rel ationship partners, for example.
However, currently we know little about the unique dynamics of
forgiveness within specific types of relationships (Fincham, 2000).
Forgiveness, Health, and Well -Being :
Empirical research on the links between forgiveness a nd mental health had
a humble beginning in the 1960s. In the first known study of forgiveness
and well -being, Emerson (1964) used a Q -sort method and found what he
perceived as a link between emotional adjustment and forgiveness.
Following Emerson’s work, however, researchers did not consider the
links between forgiveness, health, and well -being again until the 1990s.
4.4 THE ME/WE BALANCE: BUILDING BETTER COMMUNITIES WHERE WE ARE GOING: FROM ME
TO WE TO US In this chapter, we use two important human moti ves as a framework. The
first motive is the individualistic focus, in which one pursues a sense of
specialness relative to others. A second motive is the collectivistic focus,
in which one tries to maximize the link to others (Bellah, Madsen,
Sullivan, Swi dler, & Tipton, 1985, 1988; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). We
first explore the individualistic focus on the one -the ME -followed by the
collectivistic focus on the many -the WE. Last, we propose a blend of the
one and the many -the WE/ME, or, more simply, US. This approach
represents an intermingling in which both the individual and the group are
considered essential for satisfying and productive lives. As we see it, the munotes.in

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83 Research Methodology For Psychology US perspective reflects a viable positive psychology resolution for the
future of humankind.
Individualism: The Psychology of ME :
In this section, we touch on the American history of rugged individualism
(also discussed in Chapter 2), along with the core and secondary emphases
that define a person as individualistic. We then discuss one aspect of
individualism, the need for uniqueness, and show how this need can be
measured and manifested in a variety of activities. Emphases In
Individualism When concern for the individual is greater than concern for
the group, then the culture is said to be indivi dualistic; however, when
each person is very concerned about the group, then the society is
collectivistic. As shown in Figure 18.1, when the average person in a
society is disposed toward individual independence, that society is deemed
individualistic (se e the bell -shaped curve drawn with the dotted line).
Core Emphases We have used the terms core emphases and secondary
emphases to capture the more and less central aspects of individualistic
and collectivistic societies. Underlying each culture is a set of expectations
and memories about what is thought to be appropriate for the members of
that society. In individualistic societies such as America, social patterns
resemble a loosely interwoven fabric, and it is the norm for each person to
see him - or hersel f as independent of the surrounding group of people
(Triandis, 1995). On this point, research involving many studies supports
the conclusion that American individualism reflects a sense of
independence rather than dependence (see Oyserman, Coon, &
Kemmelme ier, 2002). A second core emphasis within individualism is that
the person wants to stand out relative to the population as a whole.
Within individualistic societies, therefore, people follow their own
motives and preferences instead of adjusting their de sires to accommodate
those of the group (this sometimes is called conforming). The
individualistic person thus sets personal goals that may not match those of
the groups to which he or she belongs (Schwartz, 1994; Triandis, 1988,
1990). Because of the indi vidualistic propensity to manifest one’s
specialness, coupled with societal support for actions that show such
individuality, it follows that the citizens of individualistic societies such as
the United States will have a high need for uniqueness. Research related to
this point supports the robustness of uniqueness -seeking thoughts and
actions among Americans (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin, 1977, 1980). We
explore this fascinating motive in greater detail later in this section. A
third core emphasis of individuali sm is that the self or person is the unit of
analysis in understanding how people think and act in a society. That is,
explanations of events are likely to involve the person rather than the
group. Therefore, the various definitions of individualism draw u pon
worldviews in which personal factors are emphasized over social forces
(Bellah et aI., 1985; Kagitcibasi, 1994; Triandis, 1995).
Secondary Emphases : munotes.in

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84 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research Several secondary emphases flow from the individualistic focus upon the
self rather than the group. T hese are listed in Table 18.1. Goals set by
citizens of an individualistic society typically are for the self; moreover,
success and related satisfactions also operate at the level of the self.
Simply put, the payoffs are at the personal level rather than the group
level. The individualistic person pursues what is enjoyable to him or her,
in contrast to collectivistic people, who derive their pleasures from things
that promote the welfare of the group. Of course, the individualist at times
may follow group norms, but this usually happens when she or he has
deduced that it is personally advantageous to do so.
As may be obvious by now, individualists are focused upon pleasure and
their own self -esteem in interpersonal relationships and beyond.
Individualists also weigh the disadvantages and advantages of
relationships before deciding whether to pursue them (Kim, Sharkey, &
Singelis, 1994). Thus, individualistic persons engage in benefit analyses to
determine what may profit them, whereas collectivists are more likely to
give their unconditional support to their group and think first and foremost
in terms of their duties to the group. Unlike individualists, collectivists are
not likely to behave spontaneously, because of their concerns about their
peer group. In dividualists tend to be rather short -term in their thinking,
whereas collectivists are more long -term in their thought patterns.
The Need For Uniqueness :
Although it is true that the norms in individualistic societies emphasize the
person (see the dotte d line with an arrow at the bottom), you will notice
that some people belong toward the group end of the continuum and others
toward the individual end. In this latter regard, we now explore the desire
to manifest specialness relative to other people. The pursuit of
individualistic goals to produce a sense of specialness has been termed the
need for uniqueness (see Lynn & Snyder, 2002; Snyder & Fromkin, 1977,
1980). This need is posited to have some universal appeal, as people seek
to maintain some degree o f difference from others (as well as to maintain
a bond to other people). In the 1970s, researchers Howard Fromkin and C.
R. Snyder (see Snyder & Fromkin, 1977, 1980) embarked on a program of
research based on the premise that most people have some desire to be
special relative to others. They called this human motive the need for
uniqueness. Beyond establishing that some specialness was desirable for
most of the people in their American samples, these researchers also
reasoned that some people have a very high need for uniqueness, whereas
others have a very low need for uniqueness. In short, there are individual
differences in need for uniqueness.
A historical comment on collectivism: We came together out of
necessity Thousands of years ago, our hunter -gatherer ancestors realized
that there were survival advantages to be derived from banding together
into groups with shared goals and interests (Cheney, Seyforth, & Smuts,
1986; Panter -Brick, Rowley -Conwy, & Layton, 2001). These groups
contributed to a sense of belonging, fostered personal identities and roles
for their members (McMillan & Chavis, 1986), and offered shared munotes.in

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85 Research Methodology For Psychology emotional bonds (Bess, Fisher, Sonn, & Bishop, 2002). Moreover, the
resources of the people in groups helped them fend off threats from oth er
humans and animals. Simply stated, groups offered power to their
members (Heller, 1989).
The people in such groups protected and cared for each other, and they
formed social units that were effective contexts for the propagation and
raising of offsprin g. Gathered into groups, humans reaped the benefits of
community (Sarason, 1974). By today’s standards, our hunter -gatherer
relatives were more primitive in their needs and aspirations. But were they
really that much different from people today in the sati sfactions and
benefits they derived from their group memberships? We think not,
because human beings always have had the shared characteristics of what
social psychologist Elliot Aronson (2003) has called “social animals.” In
this regard, one of our strong est human motives is to belong -to feel as if
we are connected in meaningful ways with other people (Baumeister &
Leary, 1995).
Social psychologists Roy Baumeister and Mark Leary (1995) and
Donelson Forsyth (1999; Forsyth & Corazzini, 2000) have argued tha t
people prosper when they join together into social units to pursue shared
goals.
Emphases In Collectivism :
Now, let’s return to Figure 18.1 on page 446. As shown there, when the
average person in a society is disposed toward group interdependence,
then that society is labeled “collectivist” (see the bell -shaped curve drawn
with the solid line). At this point, you may be curious as to which country
most markedly adheres to collectivistic values. In response to this
question, research suggests that China is the most collectivistic of the
various nations around the globe (see Oyserman et al., 2002).
Core Emphases :
the three core emphases of collectivism are dependence; conformity, or
the desire to fit in; and perception of the group as the fundamental uni t of
analysis. First, the dependency within collectivism reflects a genuine
tendency to draw one’s very meaning and existence from being part of an
important group of people. In collectivism, the person goes along with the
expectations of the group, is hig hly concerned about the welfare of the
group, and is very dependent upon the other members of the group to
which he or she belongs
Secondary Emphases :
The collectivist is defined in terms of the characteristics of the groups to
which she or he belongs. T hus, collectivist -oriented people pay close
attention to the rules and goals of the group and often may subjugate their
personal needs to those of the group. Moreover, success and satisfaction
stem from the group’s reaching its desired goals and from feeli ng that one
has fulfilled the socially prescribed duties as a member of that effective, munotes.in

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86 Philosophy And Ethics Of Psychological Research goal-directed, group effort (Kim, 1994). Collectivist people obviously
become very involved in the ongoing activities and goals of their group,
and they think carefully about the obligations and duties of the groups to
which they belong (Davidson, Jaccard, Triandis, Morales, & Diaz -
Guerrero, 1976; Miller, 1994). Furthermore, the interchanges between
people within the collectivist perspective are characterized by mutual
generosity and equity (Sayle, 1998). For such people, interpersonal
relationships may be pursued even when there are no obvious benefits to
be attained ( see Triandis, 1995). In fact, given the great emphasis that
collectivists place on relationships, they m ay pursue such relationships
even when such interactions are counterproductive
Both The Individualistic And The Collectivistic Perspectives Are
Viable :
Social scientists often have conceptualized individualism and collectivism
as opposites (Hui, 1988; Oy serman et aI., 2002), and this polarity typically
has been applied when contrasting the individualism of European
Americans with the collectivism of East Asians (Chan, 1994; Kitayama,
Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). This polarity approach
strike s us as being neither good science nor necessarily a productive
strategy for fostering healthy interactions among people from varying
ethnicities within and across societies. In the watershed review on this
topic, Oyserman and colleagues (2002) found that Americans indeed were
high in individualism, but they were not necessarily lower than others in
collectivism. Thus, there was support for only half the stereotype.
Viewing individualism and collectivism as opposites also has the potential
to provoke dispu tes, in which the members of each camp attempt to
demonstrate the superiority of their approach. Such acrimony between
these two perspectives seems especially problematic given that the
distinctions between individualism and collectivism have not been foun d
to be clear cut. For example, Vandello and Cohen (1999) found that, even
within individualistic societies such as the United States, the form of the
individualism differs in the Northeast, the Midwest, the Deep South, and
the West. Moreover, cultures are extremely diverse; each has dynamic and
changing social systems that are far from the monolithic simplicities
suggested by the labels “individualist” and “collectivist” (Bandura, 2000).
Likewise, there may be generational differences in the degree to whic h
individualism and collectivism are manifested (e.g., Matsumoto, Kudoh,
& Takeuchi, 1996). And when different reference groups become more
salient, propensities to ward individualism and collectivism vary (Freeman
& Bordia, 2001). Furthermore, a seemingly individualistic propensity in
actuality may contribute to collectivism; for example, consider the fact
that a robust personal sense of efficacy may contribute to the collective
efficacy of a society (Fernandez -Ballesteros, Diez -Nicolas, Caprara,
Barbaranel li, & Bandura, 2002).

munotes.in

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87 Research Methodology For Psychology 4.5 REFERENCES
Snyder, C. R.; & Lopez, S. J. (2002). Handbook of Positive Psychology.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Snyder, C. R.; Lopez, S. J.; & Pedrotti, J. T. (2011). Positive Psychology:
The Scientific and Practical Exp lorations of Human Strengths. New Delhi:
Sage South Asia Edition

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